

TEXT-BOOK
OF
MODERN INDIAN HISTORY

Vol. II, Part I

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SARKAR & DATTA

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TEXT-BOOK
OF
MODERN INDIAN HISTORY

(From 1526 to the Present Day)

Vol. II—Part I

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PREFACE

FROM the standpoint of the educator present-day college text-books of Indian History are not very helpful, even when they are written by scholars of repute. Amongst their defects that can be remedied without much difficulty are : (i) inadequate 'documentation' or reference to original sources or other authorities for statements made, (ii) persistence in the same old plan of 'formal' chronological presentation of matter, e.g., reign by reign, (iii) neglect of critical historical judgment, and repetition of discarded theories and notions or of the 'heresies' of history. Reform of school text-books many in India have heard of and begun, but college text-books are still in their 'Achalāyatanam.'

I have attempted in my humble way to draw up a college text-book of Indian History comparatively free from the three defects mentioned above ; and in this task my previous acquaintance with the business of training History teachers for high schools as well as the present one with that of training Research scholars in History, have been of some use ; for the principles and methods of college teaching and learning, though distinct from those for high schools, are yet the natural sequel and development of them.

Apart from drawing attention to the sources of each important statement in the book, arranging the facts topically wherever suitable, and introducing fresh perspectives, suggestive criticisms and judgment of evidence, the usefulness of the book has been sought to be improved by a bibliography both for junior and advanced students, by illustrative maps selected on a somewhat fresh plan, and by comparative time-charts. The book will appear in two volumes and in several parts.

In comparison with the University courses of study in other histories than in Indian History it is decidedly weaker in India,—a curious weakness in our system of education. The standard

of attainments in the national history at the different examinations should be very much higher than in any other branch of the subject. No modern advanced European or American country fails to emphasise this point, whereas in India the Indians know not themselves. We have kept this defective notion of standards in view in preparing this text-book for undergraduates: we leave it to the several universities of our country to judge for what class of undergraduates, junior or senior; in our view the book indicates the junior undergraduate standard.

In the work of preparation of this book my former Research student and present colleague, Mr. K. K. Dutta, M.A., P.R.S., has been in every sense a full collaborator, and more than that as far as the spade-work is concerned. Another Research student of mine, Mr. J. N. Sarkar, M.A., who has also just become a colleague, and a post-graduate scholar of my department, Mr. J. C. Sinha, B.A. (Hons.),* both the top men in History in their year, have helped us by looking through the typescript and the proofs, and by occasional suggestions.

While the Third Part of Volume I and the First Part of Volume II were being written and sent to the Press I had the very great advantage of the advice and suggestions of Sir Jadunath Sarkar on many points, for which I shall always remain grateful.

HISTORY DEPARTMENT,
PATNA COLLEGE, P.U.
September, 1933.

S. C. SARKAR

* Sinha has now passed away prematurely to the regret of us all.—S.C.S.

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Text-Book of Modern Indian History

Vol. II: Part I

CHAPTER I

FALL OF THE LEADING NATIVE POWERS—RISE OF THE NEW INDO-BRITISH POWER TO SUPREMACY (1786—1822)—THE LAST TEST OF THE MUTINY

INTRODUCTORY

THE end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth saw the fall of the leading Indian powers and the rise of the new Indo-British power to supremacy. Warren Hastings' governor-generalship formed a critical epoch in the history of the Company, and Hastings had to struggle hard for several years against the dangers created by the Marathas and Hyder Ali and Tipu. He simply patched up treaties with them; but their ambitions waited for new outlets. Both the Marathas and Tipu realised¹ that the English were "trying their utmost to encompass India" though they could not combine together.

The Marathas, in spite of their being split up into hostile groups, and their mutual jealousies, held a dominant position in Central India. Madhaji Sindhia exercised a powerful influence over Hindusthan, Malwa and the Deccan; and Nana Phadnavis, the Brahman Minister at Poona, was trying to maintain the Peshwa's hegemony over the whole Maratha confederacy. Tipu, the most relentless of the Company's foes, was busy with plans for extending his conquests and for breaking the power of the Company. The Nizam of Hyderabad was playing a vacillating game and was making shifting alliances

¹ Compare the letter from Madhaji Sindhia to Nana Phadnavis quoted in Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. III, pp. 24-25. Some historians prefer the spelling 'Mahadji' to 'Madhaji.'

with this power and that. The Carnatic was in a state of disorder and the relations of the Company with its Nawab were complicated. Oudh, under Nawab Asaf-ud-daula, was the scene of misrule and corruptions, more flagrant than those prevailing in the Carnatic. Shah Alam, "sitting crowned among the ruins of its ancient splendour, still reigned over Delhi. And although the imperial authority had lost all substance, the shadow of that great name still so far overspread the surrounding districts as to prevent their absorption under a new dominion."² The Rajput chiefs had lost their old valour, patriotism and strength of character, and their land was subject to foreign aggressions. Sindh was theoretically under Persia and Afghanistan since 1739 and 1757, but the tribute from this province very seldom reached the new masters. In 1783 Mir Fath Ali of the Talpura family made himself the Rais of Sindh, by overthrowing the last of the Kaloras.³ Since the death of Ahmad Shah in 1773 at Kandahar, where he had been recalled for suppressing a revolt, the Afghan hold on the Punjab began to relax and the vacuum created by their gradual withdrawal was being filled up by the revival and organisation of the Sikhs.⁴ In Nepal, the Gurkhas of the North, who had estab-

² Sir Alfred Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, p. 208. By 'absorption' is meant here 'formal annexation' by a new power like the British. The Jamuna valley and the Doab were under the sphere of influence of the Sindhia, and the Emperor was in the hands of the Marathas; *vide infra*.

³ For details *re* contending ruling families in Sindh, *vide Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 484.

⁴ A similar vacuum had been created after Nadir's withdrawal, which could not then be filled by the local Sikhs, for the united Marathas were surging in full tide into the gap. Though they had renewed their activities as early as 1738, the Sikhs were then rather exhausted by their late struggle with the empire, and the Marathas were non-Moslems who had destroyed the prestige of their enemies, the Mughals, in the North; so the Sikhs acquiesced in the Maratha advance into the Punjab. But now the situation was different; the Sikhs were recovering from the effects of the Mughal wars, and the Marathas were broken up, so that the Sindhia by himself could come up only to the Upper Jamuna. Thus the time was ripe for the Sikhs to step into the place of the Afghans.

lished themselves in that valley about ten years after Plassey, were gradually rising into power. In Burma, the dynasty of Alompra, which had been established there about 1750 A.D. and was expanding in various directions, had conquered Arakan in 1784, and was threatening Assam.

Such was the political condition of India when Warren Hastings left it, and it is very clear that the British power in India had then to reckon with the hostility of its old foes like the Marathas and Tipu, and also to guard against the activities of the rising powers in the Punjab, Nepal and Burma. Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Macpherson, who held the Company's government in India for a year and half before Earl Cornwallis' arrival, possessed neither ability and authority nor straightforwardness enough to deal satisfactorily with the problems, both domestic and foreign, with which the Company was then confronted. Again, clause 34 in Pitt's India Act stated that: "And whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this nation; be it therefore further enacted, that it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General-and-Council without the express command of the Court of Directors, or of the Secret Committee, in any case (except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities against the British nation in India, or against some of the princes or states whose territories the Company shall be engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee) either to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war, against any of the country princes or states in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country, princes or states."⁵ The situation in Europe and America was then one of peace for England till the outbreak of the great revolutionary wars, the influence of which was not felt in India until 1793; and this interval of ten years, which could very well

⁵ Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, p. 174.

have been utilised for strengthening the British position and extending the British dominion in India remained one of comparative inactivity ; Pitt's India Act had, no doubt, enforced the policy of non-interference on the Company in India, but its insecure position made the enforcement doubtful from the beginning, and the Parliamentary injunction had to be respected more often by violation than by observance.

SECTION I

THE MARATHAS AND THE ENGLISH

The death of Peshwa Madhav Rao was followed by dissensions among the Marathas, but even then they remained the strongest native power in India. They controlled a wide belt of territories extending from Gujrat in the west to Orissa in the east, and the limits of the Punjab in the north, and surrounding the Nizam's dominions on three sides in the south. But instead of being guided by such a common ideal of a national empire, as had been present in the time of Shivaji or Baji Rao I, the Maratha states during the last quarter of the eighteenth century were following the centrifugal tendency of independent growth. These were organised into a loose confederacy, each member owing only a nominal allegiance to it, and each being for all practical purposes an independent unit. Mr. Roberts has aptly described the constitutional position of the Maratha confederacy at this time as a "curious and baffling political puzzle."⁶ The Raja of Satara, the nominal head of the confederacy, was already living virtually as a prisoner in his palace, while all real powers in Western India had passed into the hands of the Peshwa. But the later members of this ministerial dynasty were also nothing more than puppets in the hands of their able minister Nana Phadnavis. Among the

⁶ *British India*, p. 239.

practically independent Maratha leaders, who were the hereditary generals of the Peshwa, was Raghuji Bhonsle II, the Raja of Berar (from 1788, after his father Mudaji's death), who possessed territories extending far eastwards from his capital Nagpur to Cuttack on the Bay of Bengal. The territories of the Gaekwad, another leader of the confederacy, roughly comprised Gujrat and the Kathiawad Peninsula, which were governed from 1771 to 1789 by Fateh Singh in the name of the titular ruler Sayaji, his imbecile elder brother. After the death of Fateh Singh, a dispute arose between his two other brothers Manaji Rao and Govind Rao for the regency. But after the death of Sayaji in 1792 and of Manaji in 1793, Govind Rao assumed the government of Baroda through the help of the British Resident against the demands of the Peshwa for the Gaekwad's territory south of the Tapti which would have meant a dismemberment of the Baroda State.⁷ Govind Rao, who ruled till his death in 1800, was harassed by the hostile intrigues of his illegitimate son Kanhoji and the enmity of Aba Selukar, the deputy governor of the Peshwa's (claimed) share of Gujrat. At last Aba Selukar was imprisoned, and in October 1800 the Peshwa "granted his share of the revenue of Guzerat in farm to the Baroda government for a period of five years, at five lakhs of rupees annually."⁸ Govind Rao was succeeded by his son Anand Rao, a man of weak intellect, whose rule was distracted by the rivalries of two parties, one under the aforesaid Kanhoji and the other under Raoji Appaji, a chief minister of Govind Rao. Their conflicts drew British intervention at the Baroda court and led to the establishment there of a British subsidiary force in 1801.⁹ The Holkar's territories embraced the south-western part of Malwa and these were governed after Malhar Rao Holkar's death by his

⁷ Grant Duff, *History of the Marathas*, Vol. III (Cambray Edn.), p. 95.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 211—14.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 214—18.

daughter-in law Ahalya Bai¹⁰ from 1766 to 1795 with the co-operation of Tukoji Holkar,¹¹ "a chief of the same tribe but in no way related to Mulhar Rao."¹² Ahalya Bai died in 1795 and was succeeded by Tukoji, who though a good soldier was not possessed of much political ability, and whose death in 1797 was followed by chaos and confusion till 1818. These circumstances (1766 onwards) prevented the Holkar State from taking as aggressive a part in contemporary political history as the Sindhia State. Madhaji Sindhia possessed eastern Malwa, the lands west of the Jumna, and the Upper Ganges—Jumna Doab.¹³ Besides these, there were some minor members of the Maratha confederacy among the piratical chiefs of Western India, who caused frequent trouble to the Company¹⁴ till they were finally suppressed in the year 1812.

Besides their loose allegiance to the confederacy, the different members of it were divided by "mutual distrust and selfish intrigue." But even in this period of decadence, there were among the Marathas a few outstanding personalities like Madhaji Sindhia, Nana Phadnavis, and the famous lady Ahalya Bai. Ahalya Bai was endowed with a generous heart, a lofty character and high political abilities. Sir John Malcolm, whose knowledge of the Maratha states at this period was based on personal investigations, has given a fine appreciation of her administration in the following words: "The success of Ahalya Bai in the internal administration of her domains was

¹⁰ Wife of Malhar Rao Holkar's son Khande Rao, who some years before the battle of Panipat (1761) was killed at the siege of Kumbher, lying between Deig and Bharatpur. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹¹ For details about the Holkar family, *vide* Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India* (1824), Vol I, Chap. VI. The 'tribe' was that of 'Dhangars' or peasants and goatherds; 'Ho(a)lkar' means coming from the village of Hal in the Deccan, 20 kos from Poona.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 163. At present he is taken to have been rather remotely related.

¹³ For details about the Sindhia family, *vide* *ibid.*, pp. 116—41, and Franklin's *Shah Alum*, pp. 116—30.

¹⁴ *Bombay Gazetteer*, p. 157 and pp. 442—49; Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 95—103.

altogether wonderful¹⁵ The undisturbed internal tranquillity of the country was even more remarkable than its exemption from foreign attack. This was equally produced by her manner of treating the peaceable, as well as the more turbulent and predatory classes ; she was indulging to the former, and although firm and severe, just and considerate towards the latter . . . Indore, which she had raised from a village¹⁶ to a wealthy city, was always regarded by her with particular consideration. Many extraordinary instances of her maternal regard for its inhabitants are narrated The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her ; she rejoiced, we are told, when she saw bankers, merchants, farmers, and cultivators, rise to affluence ; and so far from deeming their increased wealth a ground of exaction, she considered it a legitimate claim to increased favour and protection . . . she has become, by general suffrage, the model of good government in Malwa . . . Her munificence was not limited to her own territories ; at all the principal places of Hindu pilgrimage, including as far east and west as Jaggernath in Cuttack, and Dwaraca in Guzerat, as far north as Kedarnath, among the snowy mountains of Himalaya, and south as Ramiseram, near Cape Comorin, she built holy edifices, maintained establishments and sent annual sums to be distributed in charity. Her principal structures are at Gyah where a figure of herself adorning the image of Mahadeva is preserved in one of the temples¹⁷ The beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the

¹⁵ Sardar Rao Bahadur M. V. Kibe, M.A., Deputy Prime Minister, Indore State, has brought out six documents (proceedings, Indian Historical Records Commission, December, 1930), originally kept at Maheshwar, the old capital of the Holkars, which "show what a leading part the pious lady Ahilyabai took in the stirring events of the time."

¹⁶ The original settlement was not founded before 1715.

¹⁷ Reference may be made to the list of the charities of Devi Shri Ahalya Bai brought out from the state records of 'His Highness Maharaja Holkar's Government' by Mr. V. V. Thakur, Special Officer, History Department, Indore State, and published in the proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission, December, 1930.

fish of the river shared in her compassion . . . She died at the age of sixty, worn out with care and fatigue. She could read and understand the Purans, or sacred books, which were her favourite study. She is represented as having been singularly quick and clear in the transaction of public business . . . The facts that have been stated of Ahalya Baae rest on grounds that admit of no scepticism. It is, however, an extraordinary picture : a female without vanity, a bigot without intolerance . . . her name is sainted, and she is styled an *Avatar* or incarnation of the Divinity. In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limited sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed.”¹⁸

Madhaji Sindhia was the most powerful Maratha chief at that time. His predecessor, Ranoji Sindhia, was originally a *patel* or village headman of Kumerkerrah in the district of Wye, but afterwards got an employment under Balaji Biswanath and distinguished himself as a ‘very enterprising active soldier,’ under Baji Rao I. The great dominion and sphere of influence thus built up by Ranoji suffered serious losses early in Madhaji’s career as a result of the third battle of Panipat, in common with those of other Maratha Houses ; but Madhaji very soon succeeded in rebuilding his power and extending his influence over Central India and Hindusthan. We have already described his activities up to 1782. The treaty of Salbai recognised him “as far as related to the British Government an independent prince,” though “he continued to observe, on all other points which referred to his connexion with the Poona Government, the most scrupulous attention to forms.”¹⁹ This treaty and the dissensions at the Poona Court left him also free to extend his power and consolidate his authority in Northern India. He maintained in his service many Rajputs and Muhammadans besides Marathas ; and he

¹⁸ Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, pp. 179—95.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

discarded the old Maratha system of warfare and organised his armaments and trained his infantry on the western scientific methods by employing Benoit de Boigne (subsequently 'Count'), a Savoyard military expert, and other soldiers of fortune.²⁰ Thus with an army of sixteen battalions of regular infantry, five hundred pieces of cannon and one hundred thousand horse,²¹ Madhaji Sindhia obtained possession of the fortress of Gwalior and finally reduced the territory of Gohad on 24th November, 1784, its *raja*, Chatter Sing, surrendering himself to the Marathas²² "on a verbal promise of maintenance and protection."²³ He then proceeded to Delhi once again, thirteen years after his triumphant entry into it and control of the person of the Mughal Emperor. Thither he had been invited in the name of the Emperor Shah Alam to suppress the rebellion of Muhammad Beg, Governor of Agra.²⁴ The Mughal capital was again in the midst of chaos, and to remove this the emperor allowed his old ally Madhaji to assume full control of affairs at Delhi. Though the Emperor Shah Alam was then a mere figurehead, yet the fiction of imperial sovereignty served Madhaji's purpose well.²⁵ He secured from the emperor patents appointing his formal master, the Peshwa, to the office of the *Wakil-i-mutluq* or the vicegerent of the empire, and himself as the Peshwa's deputy, "so that he thus held by authority the executive power in Hindoostan, and a rank, which if he ever should be able and desirous of asserting it, would supersede that of all other ministers in the court of the Peshwa"

²⁰ Compton, *European Military Adventurers in Hindustan*, pp. 15 sqq. and 233 sqq. Grant Duff, Vol. II, pp. 476—80, footnote.

²¹ Malcolm, Vol. I, p. 123.

²² Francklin's *Shah Alum*, pp. 122-23.

²³ Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 476.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Francklin's *Shah Alum*, p. 124.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 129, footnote.

in the Deccan.²⁶ He further received from the emperor the command of the imperial army, and the administration of the provinces of Delhi and Agra. The emperor became in fact a puppet in his hands. In the words of Sir John Malcolm, the Sindhia remained as "the nominal slave but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alum, emperor of Delhi."²⁷ Thus by a peculiar turn of political affairs, the emperor of Delhi was compelled to throw himself into the arms of a leader of the Marathas, once the inveterate foes of the Mughal Empire, and Sahu in bondage was repaid by Shah Alam II in ignoble dependence and captivity. The nominal Mughal Empire now became a sphere of influence of the Marathas, who failed, however, to re-create an empire of their own for reasons which will be stated later on.

By the end of 1785 Muhammad Beg was forced to surrender himself to the Sindhia, who also speedily recovered the Doab, Agra and Aligarh, which had defied the authority of the titular emperor.²⁸ He went so far as to demand (February, 1785) in the name of the Mughal Emperor the tribute from the old Bengal Subah now converted into a British province by the Regulating Act, twelve years ago,²⁹ but Mr. Macpherson disavowed such a claim and tried to put some counterpoise to Madhaji's political progress by carrying on negotiations through the Bombay Government with Mudaji Bhonsle, Raja of Berar, and

²⁶ Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 481. Madhaji's Vice-Regency and the Peshwa's Regency of the empire had therefore as much legal and constitutional authority behind it as had the Diwani of Bengal Subah obtained by the East India Company from the same nominal emperor a few years ago. The utilization of the fiction of the imperial authority had begun much earlier in the eighteenth century and the Sindhia and the East India Company were not the only powers to try to profit by such use.

²⁷ *Memoir*, Vol. I, p. 122.

²⁸ Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 481; Francklin's *Shah Alum*, pp. 132—35; Mill's *British India*, Vol. V, p. 22.

²⁹ Cf. the demand of *chauth* from Bengal Subah by Raghuji Bhonsle on behalf of the Delhi Emperor (Muhammad Shah) in 1740.

by suggesting to Nana Phadnavis the substitution for Madhaji Sindhia of a British Resident for representing English interests at the Peshwa's Court.³⁰ Madhaji, however, now suffered some reverses. He was defeated in 1786 by a coalition of the Rajput chiefs, who had been alienated because of his heavy demand for tribute and who were joined by some of those disaffected Muhammadan *jagirdars* whose fiefs had been sequestered when he had organised a standing army at Delhi on the European model.³¹ This defeat of Madhaji encouraged a young Rohilla chief named Ghulam Kadir, son of Zabita Khan, to resist him. He drove out the Maratha garrison from Delhi, seized Aligarh, and baffled an attack by the Sindhia and an allied Jat army under a French adventurer Lestineau³² near Fatehpur Sikri. Delhi fell into his hands in June, 1788; the Emperor was blinded and the imperial palace and family were treated with gross barbarity and cruelty.³³ But with the help of reinforcements³⁴ from Poona under Ali Bahadur³⁵ and Tukoji Holkar, and with his own troops under de Boigne and Appa Khande Rao, the Sindhia recovered Delhi in 1789; Ghulam Kadir "suffered a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive," and Shah Alam was again restored to his throne.³⁶

³⁰ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 482-83. Madhaji represented these interests by the treaty of Salbai, 1782.

³¹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 21-23.

³² Compton, *Op. cit.*, p. 368.

³³ Francklin's *Shah Alum*, pp. 168-76; Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 28-30.

³⁴ "These troops were granted by Nana Furnuwees on condition that all territory acquired north of the Chambal should be equally shared by the Peshwa, Sindhia, and Holkar." (*Ibid.*, p. 39.) By this move the wise Nana wanted on the one hand to restrict the independent overgrowth of the Sindhia and on the other to restore Maratha unity, while retaining for the Marathas the influence gained in the North by Madhaji.

³⁵ One of the Moslem officers in Maratha employ.

³⁶ Francklin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 141-86; Scott, *History of the Deccan*, Vol. II, pp. 280-307.

The Sindhia also defeated Ismail Beg in 1790 at Patan (Rajputana) and his Rajput allies at Mairta in Jodhpur territory in September, 1791.³⁷ Shortly after this Shah Alam had to issue new patents making the Peshwa's office of *Wakil-i-mutluq* and Madhaji Sindhia's post as his deputy *hereditary*. Thus with Northern India under his influence, and his power reaching its 'meridian splendour,'³⁸ Madhaji Sindhia proceeded to Poona in June, 1892, with the avowed object of delivering the imperial orders and insignia of the office of *Wakil-i-mutluq* to the Peshwa³⁹ and of paying respects to the Peshwa, but in fact to establish his influence there against the absolute control of Nana Phadnavis. In spite of Nana's opposition, he held an investiture ceremony of the young Peshwa Madhu Rao and gained his confidence very tactfully, and tried to obtain from the Poona Government a recognition of his authority in Hindusthan. At Poona Madhaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis, in spite of their jealousies, "maintained every form of civility and respect," but the defeat of Nana's agents in Northern India brought them into open rupture. Some time before Madhaji Sindhia's arrival at Poona, Ismail Beg had surrendered himself to M. Perron, an officer second-in-command to de Boigne, at Kanund, and in September 1792, Tukoji Holkar's armies under the command of a French adventurer named Dudrenec were severely defeated by Madhaji Sindhia's troops under de Boigne at Lakheri near Ajmere.⁴⁰ But before his real object was fulfilled, Madhaji Sindhia died of fever at Poona at the age of sixty-seven on 12th February, 1794, and his possessions and military resources fell into the hands of his thirteen-year-old nephew and adopted son Daulat Rao Sindhia, while the control of Maratha policy and affairs passed into the hands of his rival Nana Phadnavis.

³⁷ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 74; Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 128.

³⁸ Francklin, *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

³⁹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 76.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 82—84; Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

The death of Madhaji Sindhia has been justly described by Duff "as an event of great political significance, both as it affected the Maratha Empire and the other states of India."⁴¹ It meant the decay of Maratha influence in Northern India and left the field open for the expansion of British dominion, because judging "from the incessant perseverance with which he laboured to bring to maturity schemes once formed for his own aggrandisement, had his life been extended, he would in all probability have become a formidable antagonist to the interests of Great Britain, whose rulers were not unacquainted with his active spirit or insatiable ambition."⁴² We have no definite instance to prove his hostile designs towards the English, but his growth led the English to suspect him; and "we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy."⁴³ This attitude was natural for the English Company as they too had for some years begun to utilise the distracted political situation of Northern India for the extension of their advantages, powers, and influence,—their Diwani and Oudh treaties being paralleled by the Maratha *Wakilship* and protectorate over the Empire; so active collision would have come sooner or later if Madhaji had time to progress further. Though Madhaji was helped by circumstances, yet it must be admitted that he was endowed with considerable political sagacity and military genius.⁴⁴ He was "patient and courageous, splendid under reverses, shifting and calculating, often irascible in temper, ever inclined to pick up the weaknesses of others and making the best use of them, as we know from his dealings with Nana, Raghoba, Sakharam Bapoo, or Tukoji and Ahalya Bai Holkar. He showed a friendly spirit to all, but would not be overscrupulous in keeping his word or doing a

⁴¹*Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 87.

⁴² Francklin, *Op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁴³ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 89.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

wrong act if it suited his purpose.”⁴⁵ Both Grant Duff⁴⁶ and Sir John Malcolm have said that the countries under him were well managed; but Mr. Sardesai, with his up-to-date and critical researches in Maratha History, has pointed out that Madhaji “too was not free from blame for mismanagement and irregularities which seem to be ingrained in the nature of the Marathas” and he has quoted a report of one Sadashiv Dinkar, an agent of Nana Phadnavis regarding Madhaji’s confused affairs at Mathura about the year 1788.⁴⁷ Opinions are divided as to whether Madhaji was trying to serve his own ends at the expense of the Maratha state; but this may be surmised that he was pursuing the policy laid down by Baji Rao I and successfully followed by the Peshwa Madhav Rao till 1772 which could not be given effect to owing to his sudden death and the growing internal discord among the Marathas.

While Madhaji Sindhia had been re-creating Maratha influence in the North, Nana Phadnavis was busy with Maratha politics chiefly in Peninsular India. He tried to recover those territories south of the Narmada which had once belonged to the Marathas, and open hostilities between him and Tipu broke out in 1785 with the latter’s unprovoked attack on Nargund which was held by a Brahmin *desai*. Nana Phadnavis under the impression that Tipu’s troops had latterly been well disciplined and that a treaty had been concluded between him and the French,⁴⁸ and also being doubtful of the help of the Nizam with whom he had concluded a general treaty of alliance in July 1784, sought the assistance of the English, but without any favourable response.⁴⁹ The Maratha army under the command of Hari Pant Phadke left Poona on 1st December, 1785,

⁴⁵ Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, p. 140.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 91.

⁴⁷ *Main Currents*, pp. 156—60.

⁴⁸ The French governor at Pondicherry “denied the existence of such a treaty and proposed a closer connection with the Peishwa.” Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 7.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5—8.

and was assisted by Tukoji Holkar and Mudaji Bhonsle, Raja of Berar, besides the rather half-hearted support of the Nizam. After some feeble operations Tipu made proposals for peace. Tipu's motives for peace at that time have been imputed to his apprehension of English alliance with the Marathas, which was strengthened by the appointment of Sir Charles Malet as Resident at Poona and some military preparations effected by the English for improving the condition of their army.⁵⁰ By this treaty, which was concluded in April, 1787, Tipu agreed to pay forty-five lacs of rupees, (thirty of which were immediately paid and the remainder promised at the end of a year) and to make over the districts of Badami, Kittur and Nargund to the Marathas, and received back the districts reduced by them.⁵¹

But this agreement between Mysore and the Marathas was ignored in June, 1790, when Nana Phadnavis and the Nizam entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with Cornwallis against Tipu.⁵² The triple alliance was formally concluded at the end of the war in August, 1792.⁵³ Mr. Ramsay Muir has remarked that for some time this became, in spite of clause 34 of Pitt's India Act, "a definite factor in Indian politics."⁵⁴ The Nizam "saw in it a disposition to assist him, and he hoped to realize his meditated scheme of raising a barrier between himself and the Marathas so that he might not only resist their future encroachments but evade their present demands."⁵⁵

But the Marathas were old foes of the Nizam and had been led to join in an alliance with him simply with the object of checking Tipu's aggression. So when the Marathas thought that the danger from Tipu was somewhat minimised, all their

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 43. Forrest, *Selections from the State Papers, etc.*, about Cornwallis, Vol. I, p. 47.

⁵³ Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, p. 183.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179. The alliance itself was 'repugnant' to the spirit of the said clause.

⁵⁵ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 108. *Vide infra*, on the subject of the Nizam's policies during this period.

leaders including the Peshwa, Daulat Rao Sindhia, Tukoji Holkar and the Raja of Berar, combined together, in spite of their mutual jealousies, against the Nizam. In 1794 the Peshwa renewed his claims upon the Nizam for arrears of *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*. The Nizam also strengthened his military force under the Frenchman Raymond, and when negotiations failed, the two parties were drawn to "decide their differences by the sword."⁵⁶ The Nizam appealed to the English for help, but without any success. The united army of the Marathas inflicted a defeat on the Nizam at the battle of Khardla (fifty-six miles south-east of Ahmadnagar) in March 1795, and the Nizam was compelled to submit to a humiliating treaty, suffering heavy pecuniary losses and ceding to the Marathas territories extending along the frontier from the district of Parenda on the south to the Tapti river on the north, comprising the fort of Daulatabad and such part of those districts, formerly conquered by Sadasiv Rao Bhao in 1760, as had been restored to the Nizam. He promised to pay three crores of rupees for arrears of revenue and expenses of the war, and by a separate arrangement he ceded some territories to Raghuji Bhonsle II and promised to pay the arrears due to him.⁵⁷ Moreover, much against his own desire, he had to deliver his minister Mushir-ul-mulk to the Marathas as a guarantee for the fulfilment of his own engagements. English intervention might have changed the fate of the Nizam, and Shore has been very vehemently criticised for his observance of neutrality. His critics have pointed out that the Nizam hoped for British support and was entitled to it on the basis of the treaty of February, 1768, whereby the Company became practically the guardian of his defence.⁵⁸ But it can very well be urged that Shore's hands

⁵⁶ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 110. The Nizam kept "two battalions of female sepoy, each 1,000 strong" who "took part in the battle (of Khardla) and behaved no worse than the rest of his army." (*Bengal: Past and Present*, January—March, 1933.)

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

⁵⁸ *Cambridge History*, p. 370; Roberts, p. 241.

were tied by the last India Act and his interference would have meant adding another violation of it to the previous one of the Triple Alliance of 1792. There is also another side of the question. The English were then at peace with the Marathas, and they were not bound by any of the previous treaties or alliances with the Nizam to help him against a friendly power.

This victory gave to the Peshwa's government for the moment some prestige and considerably increased Nana Phadnavis' influence at Poona.⁵⁹ But "this was the last time the chiefs of the Maratha nation assembled under the authority" of their Peshwa.⁶⁰ Their temporary unity vanished shortly, and internal dissensions marked by intrigue, art and treachery appeared to mar the effects of their combined victory at Khardla. The young Peshwa Madhu Rao Narayan grew tired of the control of Nana Phadnavis, and being seized with anger, disappointment and grief after the latter's refusal to tolerate his friendship with his cousin Baji Rao, Raghoba's son, he committed suicide on 25th October, 1795. An attempt was then made by the Nana to keep this Baji Rao, his inveterate foe, out of the Peshwaship. But the opposition of Nana Phadnavis against Baji Rao II⁶¹ vanished when the latter was about to throw himself into the hands of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and he soon recognised him as the Peshwa with himself as the head of his administration. This was opposed by Daulat Rao Sindhia and another faction, who set up, Chimanji Appa, the brother of Baji Rao, as the Peshwa, towards the end of May 1796. But Nana Phadnavis made a counter-plot which enabled him to restore Baji Rao II as the Peshwa and himself as his chief minister on 4th December, 1796.⁶² It, however, became impossible for him to recover his former influence.

⁵⁹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 120-21.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126—28.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

The Nizam profited by these dissensions, and got back the territories he had handed over to the Marathas after the battle of Khardla. Thus at a critical moment the Marathas spoiled their own game by indulging in mutual rivalries. The Peshwa Bajji Rao II was a weak, treacherous and intriguing man. Confusion was made worse confounded by the death of Tukoji Holkar in August 1797, which was followed by a civil war among his successors and the rash intervention of Daulat Rao Sindhia in favour of the imbecile Kasi Rao, son of Tukoji Holkar.⁶³ The Sindhia's interference in the state of affairs at Poona "soon extended to acts of sovereignty." After his return to Poona, the ungrateful Peshwa Bajji Rao II sought to remove Nana Phadnavis, and also to free himself from the control of the Sindhia. He first turned his attention against the former, who was arrested and whose house, along with those of his adherents at Poona, was plundered by Sirji Rao Ghatgé, the father-in-law of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Nana was placed in close confinement in the fort of Ahmadnagar.⁶⁴ Sirji Rao was empowered to realise the sum, which the Peshwa had secretly promised to the Sindhia, from the rich citizens of Poona. All the townsmen were subjected to violence and extortion, and the Peshwa, who "certainly never contemplated the commission of such barbarous enormities," remonstrated with the Sindhia, but in vain. Bajji Rao's next attempt to free himself from the control of the Sindhia led to various plots and counter-plots; and the affairs of the Marathas were further confused by the outbreak of bitter hostilities between Daulat Rao Sindhia and the widows of Madhaji Sindhia,⁶⁵ and the growing weakness of the Maratha troops.⁶⁶ Even Sivaji's descendants joined in breaking up the nation: the Raja of Kolhapur, who had been always more or less hostile to the Peshwa,

⁶³ *Vide* the genealogical table showing the Holkar family.

⁶⁴ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 146—52.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 161—66.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

was plundering the southern Maratha country, and he was helped by Chitur Sing, brother of the Raja of Satara;⁶⁷ and Jaswant Rao Holkar (a natural son of Tukoji Holkar), who had by his time escaped from his confinement at Nagpur (whither he had proceeded during the family disputes after the death of Tukoji), and had collected an army consisting of Pindaris, Bhils, Afghans, Marathas and Rajputs, was busy in plundering the Sindhia's territory in Malwa.⁶⁸ An insincere alliance was patched up between the Peshwa and the Sindhia, and the latter effected the restoration of Nana Phadnavis as a sort of check on the Peshwa, who had just formed an alliance with the Nizam.⁶⁹ Bajji Rao II also now paid a secret visit to Nana Phadnavis, and, by pleading his own innocence about his arrest, persuaded him to resume his old duties.⁷⁰

But this old statesman died on 13th March, 1800, leaving behind him only a young widow. He had controlled Maratha affairs for thirty-eight years, and "with him" remarked Colonel Palmer, the British Resident, "departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Maratha government." Grant Duff has described him as a "great statesman";⁷¹ his influence over Maratha politics during his lifetime was certainly very great, and it has also to be admitted that he rendered great services to the Maratha nation at that critical time. But, as Mr. Sardesai has pointed out, there were certain shortcomings of his policy.⁷² According to him, Nana made a mistake in regarding himself to be an indispensable personality in the Maratha state, though he was not a great general and though there were occasions when he ought to have retired from politics. Secondly, unlike Madhaji, Nana failed to realise the

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁶⁸ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I.

⁶⁹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 166.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-72.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁷² *Main Currents*, etc., pp. 143-56.

necessity of going to the north for checking the British advance in that direction. In his attempts to raise the decadent Peshwa-ship to its former supreme position, and in shutting his eyes to the growing importance of Madhaji Sindhia and his new dominion and influence in the North, Nana was grasping at the shadow by leaving the substance. Madhaji Sindhia was undoubtedly a great statesman, and "Maratha politics at that time would have attained immense strength if Nana had gone to the north, and putting his own personality in the background, allowed a free hand to Madhaji." He did not also provide for any defensive military measures for the safety of the Maratha Raj. He made a mistake in setting aside the ministerial cabinet called the Council of the '*Bar-bhai's*' or '*Twelve Brothers*' and in concentrating all powers in his own hands. He is also charged by some writers with having increased his own private wealth at the expense of the state: his fortune amounted to several crores. Nevertheless, one has to admit that with the exception of Madhaji Sindhia, Nana Phadnavis was the only figure, among the Maratha leaders of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, who was not guided by utterly base and selfish interests.

Thus the whole Maratha nation was torn by bitter internal dissensions and the Maratha affairs were hopelessly confused, when the East India Company's policy of non-intervention, as laid down by the last India Act and followed more or less during Shore's administration, was reversed and was replaced by one of conquest, and expansion, after the arrival, on April 26, 1798, of Lord Mornington, subsequently Marquis Wellesley, as Governor-General (1798—1805). With highly imperialistic ideas, and a knowledge of Indian affairs as a Commissioner of the Board of Control, Wellesley came as a saviour of the Indian dominion of England (when it had been challenged by the French in Europe), in the face of the hostile opposition of Tipu, the Marathas and the *rajās* of Malabar (with the exception of the *raja* of Coorg),—while an invasion of Hindusthan by Zaman Shah, the King of Kabul, was constantly apprehended,

and while the finances of the Company had become unsatisfactory.⁷³ Moreover, the influence of European politics upon India made the situation more complicated. Besides their activities in Europe, the French government, from their station of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, had formed an anti-English alliance with Tipu, and Napoleon had taken possession of Egypt with a view to an Indian expedition. Thus from all sides the situation was menacing for British interests in India, which could hardly be saved by sticking to the policy of neutrality and non-interference. Wellesley's policy of expansion and his plan of subsidiary alliance were the inevitable products as much of his imperialistic convictions as of his desire to save British dominion in India from being endangered by a combination of several hostile elements, or by a revival of the French attempt at creating an Indian empire. He had two broad principles. One was the system of subsidiary alliances; the other, he enunciated somewhat later: "The Company with relation to its territory in India must be viewed in the capacity of a sovereign power." The former implied that the native powers "were to make no wars, and to carry on no negotiations with any other state whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The greater principalities were each to maintain a native force commanded by British officers for the preservation of the public peace; and they were each to cede certain territories in full sovereignty to meet the yearly charges of this force. The lesser principalities were to pay a tribute to the paramount power. In return the British Government was to protect them, one and all against foreign enemies of every sort or kind."⁷⁴

So far as the Marathas were concerned, Wellesley first tried to secure their alliance against Tipu. The Peshwa (Baji Rao II) promised the help, but later on he carried on secret negotiations with Tipu under the influence of Daulat Rao

⁷³ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, pp. 1—6.

⁷⁴ Wheeler, *History of India*, pp. 426-27.

Sindhia, and when Tipu was defeated he tried to excuse himself by attributing the failure of his engagement with the English to Nana Phadnavis.⁷⁵ The subsidiary alliance of the English with the Nizam made the Marathas extremely restless and jealous of them. But the internal divisions among themselves, especially after the death of Nana Phadnavis (to which we have already referred), prevented any concerted action on their part,—so that the obvious reply to English subsidiary alliances in the form of Maratha subsidiary alliances could not be given.

By this time all the able Maratha leaders had passed away. We have already seen how intriguing and selfish Maratha leaders like Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar were engaged in hostility with one another and were trying to gain the upper hand at Poona. The frequent intrigues of the weak-minded and treacherous Peshwa and of Daulat Rao Sindhia made matters worse. The Sindhia agreed to assist the Peshwa in his policy of "implacable revenge" upon the friends of the dead Nana Phadnavis, and the Peshwa also promised his help to the Sindhia against Jaswant Rao Holkar.⁷⁶ But their union was far from being sincere; the Peshwa was always on the look-out for an opportunity to extricate himself from the thralldom of the Sindhia, and the latter also remained always suspicious of him.⁷⁷ When the Sindhia was busy in fighting against Holkar's troops in Malwa, the Peshwa "evinced a malignant spirit of revenge towards all the great families whom he suspected of ever having been the political opponents of himself and his father"⁷⁸ and he brutally murdered Vithuji Holkar, brother of Jaswant Rao

⁷⁵ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 169—76; Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 370—72.

⁷⁶ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 190—92.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 198-99.

Holkar. This was too much for Jaswant Rao to bear. In spite of his defeat by the Sindhia's troops⁷⁹ at the battle of Indore on 14th October, 1801, he marched into the Deccan to avenge the murder of his brother, and inflicted a defeat on the combined forces of the Peshwa and the Sindhia at Poona on 25th October, 1802, and took possession of the city, while the Peshwa fled to Singharh. "For a short time after his victory, the Holkar assumed an appearance of great moderation; he placed guards for the protection of the city, treated all the dependents of the Peshwa with kindness and used many vain endeavours to induce him to return to his palace."⁸⁰ After fleeing from place to place, the Peshwa took refuge at Bassein; and Jaswant Rao placed Vinayak Rao, son of Amrit Rao, the adopted son of Raghoba,⁸¹ on the Peshwa's *masnad*.

Finding himself in a desperate and helpless position, the Peshwa now solicited British alliance and protection. On 31st December, 1802, he concluded the Treaty of Bassein with the English, which "was declaredly for the purpose of general defensive alliance, and the reciprocal protection of the territories of the Peishwa and the English East India Company and their allies respectively. For this purpose a subsidiary force, of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of Field-Artillery and European artillery-men were to be permanently stationed in the Peishwa's dominions... No European of any nation hostile to the English was to be entertained by the Peishwa. Districts yielding 26 lakhs of rupees were assigned for the payment of the subsidiary force; and all articles intended for the consumption of these troops were to be allowed to pass duty free. The Peishwa relinquished his claims on Surat, and submitted to British arbitration in

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 201; Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 218; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 27.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁸¹ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 230.

the adjustment of his differences with and claims on the Nizam and the Gaekwar . . . The Peishwa likewise bound himself to engage in no hostilities with other states, neither to commence nor pursue, in future, any negotiations with any power whatever without previous consultation with the British Government."⁸² Thus the Peshwa "sacrificed his independence as the price of protection." British troops under General Arthur Wellesley reinstated him in his capital on 13th May, 1803, and compelled the Holkar to retire to Malwa.

The treaty of Bassein is certainly an important landmark in the history of the British dominion in India, in the sense that the Company entered into definite relations with the formal head of the Maratha confederacy, and henceforth it "had either to control the greatest Indian power, or was committed to hostilities with it."⁸³ But it would be over-emphasising its importance if we say that "the Treaty of Bassein gave the Company the supremacy of the Deccan," and that "the Treaty by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the Empire of India."⁸⁴ The authorities in England were alarmed at this turn in Deccan politics, and Lord Castlereagh, President of the Board of Control, rightly hinted at its weak aspect by pointing out that it "tended to involve us (the English) in the endless and complicated distractions of the Maratha Empire." Wellesley hoped for peace⁸⁵ and also thought that the English, being placed in favourable

⁸² Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 225-26; *vide* also Aitchison, *Treaties and Sanads*, 4th edition, Vol. VI, p. 52.

⁸³ Roberts, *British India*, p. 255.

⁸⁴ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, Introduction, xlv.

⁸⁵ "No reason," said Wellesley, "exists to justify an apprehension, that in the event supposed, Sindhia would proceed to such an extremity, as to make opposition, either singly or united with Holkar. Nor is any such desperate course of proceeding to be apprehended from the Raja of Berar. Uncombined with the power of Sindhia, Holkar will not probably venture to resist the Peshwa."—Quoted in Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 408-09.

circumstances, would be able to fight their opponents even if war actually broke out.⁸⁶

But Wellesley's hopes for peace were soon belied. His brother Arthur Wellesley justly characterised the treaty of Bassein as "*a Treaty with a cipher.*" All the Maratha chiefs saw in the treaty of Bassein the entire annihilation of their national independence, and they tried to forget their mutual rivalries and to organise a confederacy against the British. The weak-minded Peshwa, now penitent for his act, encouraged them by secret messages.⁸⁷ Daulat Rao Sindhia and Raghuji Bhonsle II of Berar at once joined together. They tried also to persuade Jaswant Rao Holkar to make a common cause with them, and a "treaty was signed by which the promise of his co-operation was obtained by a cession of all the countries that had formerly belonged to the Holkar family and the release of Kunde Rao and Beemah Bae, Jaswant Rao's (nephew and) daughter,"⁸⁸ and a recognition of his rights in Hindusthan. But even in this moment of extreme peril they could not completely sink their jealousies and failed to put forth united strength, for while the Sindhia and the Raja of Berar mobilised their troops, the Holkar "retired to Malwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events" and appeared on the scene of war when it was too late, while the Gaekwad remained neutral.

Some negotiations were carried on between Arthur Wellesley, the British commanding officer in the Deccan, on the one hand and the Sindhia and the Bhonsle Raja of Berar on the other, while both of them were encamping south of the Narmada, in which the former proposed to the two Maratha

⁸⁶ The Duke of Wellington (then Sir Arthur Wellesley) has elucidated this point in his Memorandum on Wellesley's administration (*vide* Owen's *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. ciii—cv).

⁸⁷ Arthur Wellesley's letter to Colonel Close, dated 23rd June, 1803; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, pp. 245—47 (last para).

⁸⁸ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 232; Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 232. Both these children had been formerly made prisoners by Daulat Rao Sindhia.

leaders that if their intentions were not hostile they should withdraw their troops,—the Sindhia to Hindusthan and Raghuji Bhonsle to Berar.⁸⁹ But these being rejected, the British Resident left the camp of the Sindhia on 3rd August, 1803, and hostilities at once commenced. Thus ensued the second Anglo-Maratha conflict. The arrangements which Lord Wellesley had previously made, *viz.*, the treaty with the Nawab of Oudh, the treaty with the Gaekwad, the arrangements at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty with the Nizam in October, 1800, and, above all, the treaty of Bassein, “afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success,”⁹⁰—though the Maratha armies totalled 2,50,000, besides 40,000 troops trained by Frenchmen, while the British forces in the different parts of India amounted only to 50,000 men.⁹¹ Lord Wellesley decided to attack at once the territories of the confederates on all points. It was planned to carry on the war in two main theatres,—in the Deccan under Arthur Wellesley, and in Hindusthan under General Lake. But subsidiary operations were to be carried on simultaneously in Gujrat, Bundelkhand and Orissa.⁹² The

⁸⁹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 233-34; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 37.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁹¹ For details, *vide* Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 234—36.

⁹² Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 480—84. He has tried to explain the political objects of those operations. These were two in the north: (1) “the possession of the nominal authority of the Mogul (Emperor), that is to say, the possession of his person, and thenceafter the use of his name, to any purpose to which the use of that name might be found advantageous” [It should be noted that Madhaji Sindhia had exploited the Mogul name and authority with success about 18 years ago, and it was to oust the Sindhias from that position of advantage in Indian politics that Wellesley planned this campaign.—*Authors*]; (2) to form an efficient system of alliances with the minor kingdoms to the southward and westward of the Jumna. According to Mill, it was expected by the Governor-General that by the conquest of Cuttack “the territory of the English nation in the northern part of India would be united, on the eastern coast, with that in the south, and would extend in one unbroken line from the

European officers in the Sindhia's service did not prove very serviceable at this moment ; Perron, the successor of de Boigne, who had to return to Europe in 1796 owing to ill-health, did not possess military enterprise and prudence like him ; and he with many of his followers deserted the Sindhia. Instead of following the old harassing tactics of the Marathas, their leaders at that time proceeded to fight the English on Western methods, which they had not yet been able to make their own and for which they had to depend on foreigners. This was a suicidal step and was attended with disastrous consequences for them.

The Marathas met with quick reverses. In the Deccan, Arthur Wellesley captured Ahmadnagar on 12th August, 1803, and defeated on 23rd September the combined army of the Sindhia and the Bhonsle at Assaye, a village situated about forty-five miles north of Aurangabad. The Bhonsle Raja's troops were decisively defeated by the English at Argaon on 29th November, and the strong fortress of Gawilgarh was captured by them on 15th December, 1803. In Hindusthan, Lake achieved equally decisive success. Marching with his troops from Cawnpur, he captured Aligarh towards the end of August, while the French adventurer Perron retired at about the same time from the Sindhia's service.⁹³ Lake then defeated

mountains on the frontier of Tibet to Cape Comorin; the Mahrattas on that side of India would be deprived of all connection with the sea [and of the advantageous position of having a wedge of territory dividing the British possession.—*Authors*], and hence with the transmarine enemies of the Anglo-Indian Government; a communication not liable to the interruption of the monsoons would be formed between Calcutta and Madras; and an additional portion of the Bengal frontier would be delivered from the chance of Mahratta incursions." [The Maratha menace to Bengal was now 63 years old.—*Authors*]

⁹³ Mr. Roberts (*British India*, p. 237) states that Perron quitted the Sindhia's service being disheartened by the capture of Aligarh. But the facts as stated by Grant Duff are that, "Perron, who had for some time been conscious of a decline in Sindhia's favour, and had even made overtures to General Lake before the commencement of the war, proceeded, after the affair at Coel, to Muttra, where he received certain accounts of his

M. Louis Bourquin (the successor of Perron in the Sindhia's army) and a party of French officers at the battle of Delhi in the month of September, and brought Shah Alam, then an unfortunate and blind old man of eighty-three, under British protection. He next concluded a treaty with the Jat Raja of Bharatpur, and took possession of Agra on 18th October. The remaining forces of the Sindhia were finally vanquished at Laswaree, in Alwar state, in the month of November. This victory completed the overthrow of the brigades trained by de Boigne and Perron, and brought Agra and Delhi, together with the possessions of the Sindhia, south of the Chambal, into the hands of the English.⁹⁴ In Orissa, the province of Cuttack was conquered by the English, and success attended their arms in Gujrat and Bundelkhand also. Thus within five months the two great leaders of the Maratha confederacy had to own decisive defeats. The Raja of Berar had to conclude the treaty of Deogaon on 17th December, 1803, by which it was arranged that "Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sena Saheb Soobeh, should cede to the British Government and its allies, the province of Kuttack, including Ballasore, and the whole of his territory and shares of revenue to the westward of the river Wurdah (Warda), and south of the hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh. The forts of Nurnalia and Gawelgurh remained in Rughoojee Bhonslay's possession, together with districts lying south of these forts, valued at four lakhs of rupees. All claims on the Nizam, including of course *chouth*, *ghasdana*, etc., were renounced ; all differences between

being superseded in the government of Sindhia's districts and that his successor and personal enemy, Ambajee Inglia, was intriguing with the French officers under him to deprive him of his *jagheer*, and of course of his command. Under these circumstances, to secure his private fortune, and avoid a crisis in which he had nothing to gain, he addressed a letter to General Lake on the 5th September requesting permission to pass with his effects, his family, and the officers of his suite, through the Company's territories, to Lucknow; with which General Lake, under instructions from the Governor-General, yielded a ready compliance."—Vol. III, p. 250.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

the Nizam, the Peshwa, and the Sena Saheb Soobeh were to be arbitrated by the British Government ; and no European or American of a nation at war with the English, or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British Government.⁹⁵ He agreed to maintain a British Resident at Nagpur, and the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone was sent there in that capacity. The Sindhia also concluded the treaty of Surji-Arjangaon on 30th December, by which he "ceded to the British Government and its allies his territories between the Jumna and Ganges, and all situated to the northward of the Rajput principalities of Jeypoor (Jaipur), Joudpoor (Jodhpur), and Gohud but the territory lying between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, to the southward of the former place was reserved. The forts of Ahmednugur (Ahmadnagar) and Baroach (Broach), with their districts, his possessions between the Ajunta Ghaut (Ajanta) and the Godavery, and all claims on the emperor of the Moghuls, the British Government and its allies, the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Gaekwar, were renounced by Sindhia ; he also gave up all claims upon such *rajās* or *jagheerdars* as might have become allies of the British Government during the war, and declared them independent of his authority. Sindhia entered into the same agreement in regard to Europeans and Americans, and to residents at his Court as had been admitted by Rughoojee Bhonslay : Major Malcolm was appointed to act as resident in his camp."⁹⁶ By a separate treaty, concluded on 27th February, he entered into a defensive alliance with the English. The Company agreed to maintain a body of 6,000 infantry, the expenses of which were to be defrayed out of the revenues of the lands ceded by the 2nd,

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 264; Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 417—19. The Americans are often mentioned in documents relating to Anglo-Maratha agreements of these times; it is a point of enquiry as to how far in Indian political or economic matters the French, English or other Americans had a share.

⁹⁶ Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 265; Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 419—

3rd and 4th articles, and which were, however, to be stationed not within the Sindhia's territory but at a convenient centre near his frontier within the Company's dominions. Both he and the Raja of Berar recognised the treaty of Bassein. The Peshwa got from him the territory and fort of Ahmadnagar.

The importance of the advantages thus gained by the English was certainly great. The victory over the two great leaders of the Maratha confederacy was itself an achievement of great political significance, and it foredoomed its final dissolution. Moreover, the territorial possessions of the East India Company were expanded in all directions, and the titular Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II came under their protection. The English "destroyed the corps in the service of the enemy, which was commanded and officered by Frenchmen, and took from them not less than 823 pieces of Ordnance." Lastly, their influence upon the 'Subadar of the Deccan' and on the Peshwa increased. Wellesley wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors on 13th July, 1804:—"Thus the influence and ascendancy of the British Government in the councils of Hyderabad and Poonah have been increased and permanently established, not by limiting the authority, controlling the independence or by reducing the power of these states, but by the operation of arrangements which have confirmed and corroborated their respective rights, authorities and independence, extended their dominion, consolidated their power, and augmented their resources; secured them from the vexatious claims, and litigious and violent interference of other powers, and established the sources of permanent tranquillity and prosperity within the limits of their respective dominions. Our influence and ascendancy in the councils of those allies are now founded on the solid basis of their entire confidence in the equity and moderation of our views, and in their just reliance on our protecting power."⁹⁷ Wellesley

⁹⁷ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 439.

has here rather overstated his case, and the Nizam and the Peshwa did not in fact emerge as greater powers from this war. He vainly hoped that the treaties afforded the "only possible security for the permanent tranquillity and prosperity of these (*i.e.*, the E. I. C.'s) valuable and important possessions." His arguments could not convince the ministry in England. Lord Castlereagh, in a letter written from London on 21st May, 1804, and received by the Governor-General in India on 14th October, expressed doubts as to whether the recent territorial gains did not "contravene too strongly the system of policy upon which the legislature has professed to act, by pushing our dominion beyond what the necessity of the case may fairly appear to warrant," and whether it did not "swell so largely and so suddenly not only our own immediate possessions but our dependencies necessarily included within the dominion of our army, as to run some risk of rendering the frame of our government complicated and unwieldy in such a degree as to hazard its becoming enfeebled and embarrassed in ordinary hands," when Wellesley would no longer control the affairs in India.⁹⁸

In fact, tranquillity was threatened very soon. As it has been justly noted by his brother Arthur Wellesley, the "Governor-General's too exacting interpretation of the Treaties of Peace,"⁹⁹ disgusted the Sindhia and the Bhonsle. But this time it was the Holkar who came forward to oppose the English when it was too late. The Sindhia also manifested a disposition to resume hostilities. War was declared against Holkar by the Company in April, 1804, after he had

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 447.

⁹⁹ "From all this statement you will observe that the system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so happily approved and extolled, is now given up. Our enemies are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and want of faith; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no means secured." Arthur Wellesley's letter to the Hon. Henry Wellesley, dated 13th May, 1804; Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, pp. 395-97.

plundered the territory of the *raja* of Jaipur. The British Generals committed mistakes at the beginning. Colonel Monson, who according to Wellesley "advanced (too far into the plains of Rajputana) and retreated in the same manner," was defeated by the Holkar who now pursued the old tactics of the Marathas in the Mukund-dara pass (thirty miles south of Kotah), and was obliged to retreat to Agra towards the end of August 'losing five battalions and six companies.' Emboldened by this victory, the Holkar proceeded towards Hindusthan at the head of 60,000 cavalry, 15,000 or 16,000 infantry and artillery-men with 192 or 190 guns, and besieged Delhi from 8th to 14th October ; but his attack was successfully repulsed by Lt.-Colonel Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, assisted by Lt.-Colonel Burn, the commandant. A part of the Holkar's armies was routed at Dig on 13th November, and another commanded by the Holkar himself was defeated by General Lake at Farrukhabad on 17th November. The English, however, suffered a reverse owing to Lake's failure (early in 1805) to capture the Jat fortress of Bharatpur, the reduction of which was thought necessary by the Company after the Holkar had received severe blows elsewhere, as its *raja* was an ally of the Holkar. But the Holkar's interests were not served by this English defeat, because the Raja of Bharatpur unexpectedly concluded a treaty with the English on 10th April, by which he "paid twenty lakhs of rupees, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British Government, and his claims to advantages secured by the former treaty with General Lake."¹⁰⁰ The Holkar was, however, saved from complete annihilation by the sudden recall of Lord Wellesley by the Directors in England. The retreat of Monson and Lake's failure before Bharatpur had given a "serious blow to British prestige," and caused grave apprehensions in the minds of the Directors in England, who were also alarmed by the rapid increase of the Company's debt from 17 millions in 1797 to 31 millions in

¹⁰⁰ Grant Duff, Vol. III. p. 298.

1806 under the pressure of Wellesley's forward policy. We have already seen how the ministry did not very well approve his military operations, and there was a widespread belief that his conquests "were becoming too large for profitable management." Moreover, he dealt with the authorities in England in a masterful way which offended them. So on the failure of British arms before Bharatpur, Lord Wellesley's "supporters waxed faint; and the vehement tide of public opinion in England condemned the rash, ambitious, and war-loving statesman." Pitt remarked that Lord Wellesley "had acted most imprudently and illegally, and that he could not be suffered to remain in the Government."¹⁰¹ Lord Cornwallis, then in his sixty-seventh year, was appointed to supersede Lord Wellesley, and he arrived in Calcutta on 30th July, 1805.

Opinions are divided about the merits of Lord Wellesley's Maratha policy and his system of subsidiary alliances in general. Mill,¹⁰² a hostile critic, has made strong strictures against his policy.¹⁰³ Wilson¹⁰⁴ and Sir Thomas Munro urged a serious objection to his system on the argument that the native prince being guaranteed in the possession of his territories, but deprived of the rights of sovereignty, "sinks in his own esteem, and loses that stimulus to good government, which is supplied by the fear of rebellion and deposition."¹⁰⁵ But his policy has been strongly defended by Thornton,¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Ross, *Cornwallis' Correspondence*, Vol. III, p. 522.

¹⁰² *History of British India*, Vol. VI, pp. 550—60.

¹⁰³ "Allowing then, that the subsidiary alliances were a scheme calculated to prevent the danger of war; as far as regards the British government, there was little or nothing of that sort to prevent; the subsidiary alliances were a great and complicated apparatus, for which, when got up, there was nothing to do; a huge cause prepared when there was no effect to produce." *Ibid.*, p. 555.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, footnote.

¹⁰⁵ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, Introduction, xxvii.

¹⁰⁶ *History of the British Empire in India*, pp. 558—70. He has gone so far as to assert that the policy of Marquis Wellesley was "essentially pacific," p. 568.

Owen,¹⁰⁷ Lyall¹⁰⁸ and others. Mr. Owen has remarked that "the line which Wellesley pursued in his Maratha negotiations was a bolder and more original one than had ever been adopted, or probably conceived, by any European statesman in India, Dupleix perhaps excepted . . ."¹⁰⁹ He was hastily judged and condemned by the event of a partial and temporary collapse. He was weakened and discouraged at last by the consciousness of hesitating and half-hearted support from the Ministers, virulent and vulgar opposition in the Court of Directors, and ill-informed public clamour; and, acting on his brother Arthur's advice, he threw up the game when on the point of winning it, lest the cards should be rudely snatched out of his hands. His work was mutilated; but it could not be effaced. And when the stress of the Napoleonic war was over, and local anarchy had produced a counterpart of the state of affairs around the shores of the Levant in Pompey's days, Lord Hastings resumed and completed his great predecessor's interrupted task."¹¹⁰

In the midst of these conflicting opinions, *three* points should be clearly noted. In the *first* place, it cannot be doubted that Lord Wellesley's ambitious measures immensely added to the growth of the British influence and dominion in India, though his conquests involved heavy expenses and rapid increase of the public debt. The Marathas were not of course completely subdued, yet their power was considerably broken, and at the same time many states had come under British influence and protection. He also succeeded in baffling Napoleon's "fixed idea of conquering England in India, together with the French faction already so powerful in Sindhia's dominions and their control over Shah Alam, whom Bounaparte

¹⁰⁷ *Op. cit.*, xix—xxx.

¹⁰⁸ *Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, pp. 256—64.

¹⁰⁹ On this point of early origins of the Subsidiary Alliance idea, *vide* Vol. I, Part 2, pp. 49, 132.

¹¹⁰ *Wellesley Despatches*, Introduction, xix.

would delight *more suo* to use as a political tool,"¹¹¹—and the control established by Wellesley over Shah Alam was politically significant. Moreover, the Company's territorial possessions in India were greatly augmented and its possessions in Madras were linked up with those in Bengal as a result of his acquisitions (which will be noted in order). In the *second* place, one has to admit that there was a strong necessity for a vigorous policy on the part of the Company in view of the alarming situation in which it had been placed when Wellesley came to India,—a time "when the British Government was halting dubiously between two political ways (the one a policy of non-interference and the other a forward policy), before a horizon cloudy and unsettled."¹¹² Collisions with Tipu or the Marathas might have been delayed but could not have been avoided. Even Mill acknowledged in his examination before the Committee of the House of Commons in 1832: "all our wars cannot perhaps be with propriety considered wars of necessity, but most of those by which the territories we possess have been obtained, and out of which our subsidiary alliances have grown, have been, I think, of necessity not of choice. For example, the wars with Tippoo and the Mahrattas."¹¹³ But in the *third* place, there is no reason to believe that Wellesley's hopes for at once preserving tranquillity in the country and improving the condition of the Indian people by bringing their rulers under British protection and influence, had any chance of being immediately fulfilled, nor were they actually fulfilled as is shown by subsequent events. One may very well conclude that though the British Empire in India was not an accomplished fact as a result of Wellesley's policy,

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, xxii. We have already noted how both the Marathas and the English were trying to utilise the fiction of Shah Alam's sovereignty; the French also were no exception to this. It may be noted that Napoleon was at that time at the height of his power in Europe.

¹¹² Lyall, *Op cit.*, p. 262.

¹¹³ *Wilson's note in Mill*, Vol. VI, p. 560.

yet during his administration in India an immense stride was taken towards the establishment of British supremacy. His goal of a grand Indian Empire for England, which, according to him, was the only logical outcome of the Company's position in India at that time, supplies the "key to his whole policy as a statesman;" he did much to realise it, and his successors carried his task to completion. While Napoleon, the arch-enemy of England, was trying for a French Empire definitely in Europe and vaguely also in the East, Wellesley thought of a British Empire definitely in India, and while the former ultimately failed against a combination of European powers, the latter succeeded in giving a tangible shape to his ideal by defeating a combination of some major Indian powers and by bringing others under control.

Jaswant Rao Holkar's power, though shattered to a great extent,¹¹⁴ was not completely broken, and Daulat Rao Sindhia, discontented with the English, was trying to form an alliance with the former against the latter,—when Lord Cornwallis assumed charge of the Company's government in India for the second time on 30th July, 1805. The old Governor-General entirely disapproved of the policy of subsidiary alliances, and evinced an earnest desire to come to a settlement with the Maratha chiefs.¹¹⁵ But his death at Chazipur on 5th October left the charge of the British Government in India to the senior member of the Bengal Council, Sir George Barlow, who accepted the views of his predecessor of "abandoning all connexion with the petty states, and generally with the territories to the westward of the Jumna."¹¹⁶ A new treaty was accord-

¹¹⁴ Malcolm, *Memoir*, Vol. I, p. 238.

¹¹⁵ Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 644—57; Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 304—06.

¹¹⁶ "This resolution," he said, "is founded, not only upon my knowledge of the entire conformity to those general principles of the provisions of the Legislature, and to the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors; but also upon my conviction of their expediency, with a view to the permanent establishment of the British interests in India."—Mill, Vol. VI, p. 658.

ingly concluded with the Sindhia on 22nd November, 1805, by which some of the articles of the treaty of Surji-Arjangaon were changed.¹¹⁷ The fort of Gwalior and the Gohud territory were restored to the Sindhia "from mere considerations of friendship,"¹¹⁸ on the argument that the subsisting engagement between the Company and the Rana of Gohud was inconvenient and that the Rana was totally unfit for ruling. The river Chambal, between Kotah on the west and the eastern limit of the Gohud territory, was declared to be the boundary between the possessions of the Sindhia and the Company; the Sindhia was to lay no claim to anything north of the river Chambal and the Company to anything south of it. The Sindhia was promised by the English a personal pension of four lacs of rupees per year, and two *jagirs* were granted to the Sindhia's wife and daughter within the Company's territory in Hindusthan. Further, the Company engaged to enter into no treaties with the Rana of Udaipur, the Rajas of Jodhpur, Kotah, and other chiefs, tributary to the Sindhia in Malwa, Marwar and Mewar, and not to interfere in any way with the Sindhia's internal arrangements with these states. Thus the Rajput states were again left at the mercy of the Maratha chief, and did not receive any recognition from the Company whose cause they had supported. It was also provided that, in the event of peace with the Holkar, the Company "should not desire the restoration of such of the districts of Holkar between the Taptee (Tapti) and Chumbul (Chambal) as Sindhia had taken or interfere in any manner with their arrangements, wars and disputes."¹¹⁹

Meanwhile Lord Lake had pursued the Holkar up to Amritsar, whither the latter had proceeded in the hope of some help from the Sikhs, who were then rising under Ranjit

¹¹⁷ Colonel Malcolm was the agent on the part of the Company and Munshi Kavil Nyne that of the Sindhia.

¹¹⁸ Beveridge, *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 808.

¹¹⁹ Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 307-08.

Singh. But the Holkar was disappointed in his expectations and opened negotiations with Lord Lake for peace.¹²⁰ A treaty was concluded between them, on 25th December, 1805, at Rajpurgat on the banks of the Beas, on terms favourable to the Holkar. The Holkar indeed gave up all his rights to places north of the Chambal; he renounced his claims upon Poona, Bundelkhand and on the English and their allies, and also engaged not to admit any Europeans in his service, and to return to his own dominions in Malwa by a prescribed route. But on the other hand the English also engaged not to interfere with his territories south of the Chambal, but to give him back his possessions in the Deccan, "excepting Chandore and its dependencies, and the districts of Amber and Seogaon; but in case if Holkar's evincing amicable and peaceful intentions toward the British Government, Chandore, Amber and Seogaon were to be restored" to him within eighteen months from the date of the conclusion of the treaty.¹²¹ Fearing future complications and responsibilities, Sir George Barlow, in spite of Lord Lake's strong objections, annexed declaratory articles to the treaties with the Sindhia and the Holkar, whereby he withdrew British protection from the states north of the Chambal, from Kotah to the Jumna, and restored Tonk, Rampur, and all the territory north of the Bundi hills to the Holkar, "thus abandoning to his fate the Raja of Boonde, who, on his part, had maintained the alliance with honour and generosity."¹²² He also dissolved the British connection with the Raja of Jaipur, who had rendered useful services to the English against the Sindhia and the Holkar, to whose vengeance he was now left. Thus, in the words of the Jaipur Wakil, the Company at this time made "its faith subservient

¹²⁰ About a decade later there was another infructuous attempt at combination of Marathas and Sikhs against the Company, in the time of Lord Hastings.

¹²¹ Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 309.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 311.

to its convenience." The engagements with the Rajas of Bharatpur and Machery were not broken ; the treaty of Deogaon concluded with Raghuji Bhonsle II remained intact,—but by a separate arrangement, dated 24th August, 1806, Patna and Shambalpur were given back to him, and the Rana of Gohud received the districts of Dholpur and Raykerah for his maintenance.¹²³

The policy of neutrality pursued by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow has received an almost universal censure from important writers like Captain Grant, Colonel Malcolm,¹²⁴ Beveridge,¹²⁵ Wilson¹²⁶ and others. There is no doubt that their policy was weak as compared with the vigorous policy of their predecessor, and that, in some cases, it entailed a violation of engagements with the native states. It is also true that it meant a stop half-way in the growth of the British Empire in India. But one can at the same time enquire if the bad financial condition of the Company at that time¹²⁷ could have permitted the further prosecution of ambitious wars. There was no surplus fund and the government was running on a huge deficit ; besides the Company's export trade was at this time steadily declining. Lord Cornwallis held that the preceding years had demanded " reinforcements of men and remittances of money," which gave in return " little other profit except brilliant gazettes . . . We literally have not the means of carrying on the business of government."¹²⁸ Wars must be backed up by finances, and, in view of the empty treasury of the Company at that time, it becomes difficult to

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

¹²⁴ *Political History*, Vol. I, p. 373.

¹²⁵ *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, pp. 810 and 817.

¹²⁶ Mill, Vol. VI, pp. 668-69, footnote.

¹²⁷ In the year 1805-1806, the Company's revenues in India " amounted to 15,403,409 l., charges and interest to 17,672,017 l., leaving a surplus of charge equal to 2,268,608 l."—Mill, Vol. I, p. 679.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Roberts, p. 264.

agree with Wilson that "what was done in 1817 might have been accomplished, with quite as much reason, with more ease and still less cost, in 1805."¹²⁹ It must be acknowledged that, by following a system of strict economy, Sir George Barlow was able to improve the financial condition of the Company, and to leave a surplus.¹³⁰ Moreover, it should also be noted that in their policy they were following strictly the instructions of the authorities in England, and they had no motives of personal gains.

The growth of a power presupposes the existence of inherent strength in it, and so the Marathas, utterly devoid of any real strength in the beginning of the nineteenth century, could not profit in the least by the British policy of neutrality. They moved swiftly on towards decay. Especially the affairs within the Holkar's territories became hopelessly complex and gloomy. His Deccani cavalry mutinied, and hoisted the standard of Jaswant Rao's nephew, Khande Rao, who had been placed by his uncle in the hands of the mutineers as a pledge for the payment of their arrear pay, to defray which the Holkar had to exact a large sum from the Raja of Jaipur.¹³¹ The Holkar next committed two atrocious deeds by secretly putting to death his nephew Khande Rao and his brother Kasi Rao. But these produced a reaction very soon, and Jaswant Rao died insane on 20th October, 1811.¹³² During Jaswant Rao's insanity the management of affairs was usurped by his favourite mistress Tulsi Bai, a woman of "profligate habits and of most vindictive disposition, totally unfit for high station and for the exercise of the power with which she was now vested."¹³³ She was supported by Balaram Seth, Jaswant Rao's minister, and by Amir Khan, the leader of the Central

¹²⁹ Footnote in Mill, Vol. VI, p. 669.

¹³⁰ Beveridge, Vol. II, p. 817.

¹³¹ Malcolm, *Memoir*, Vol. I, pp. 242-43.

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 245-53.

¹³³ Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 321.

Indian Pathans. But the administration was hopelessly mis-managed by those unworthy men ; revenues were not properly collected, different bodies of troops forcibly exacting them from the provinces ; and one faction broke into open rebellion, which was quelled by subsidiary troops from Poona and Hyderabad. Grant Duff has remarked that " the government, if such it may be designated, of Holkar was alternately swayed by two factions, the Marathas and the Pathans, who were constantly intriguing against each other, and nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country : at the court, bribery, execution, and murders ; in the provinces, violence, rapine and bloodshed." ¹³⁴ These distractions of the Holkar state continued unabated, ¹³⁵ and it remained too weak to offer any strong opposition to the English. The affairs of Daulat Rao Sindhia also were not very satisfactory. His military expenses far exceeded his financial resources, and his generals had to exact money on their own account from the districts. This affected the morale of his army, ¹³⁶ and his control over his generals ¹³⁷ was not firm. Though naturally jealous of the rising British power, the Sindhia did not at this time manifest any hostile design towards it. ¹³⁸ Weakness and disorder also prevailed in the territory of Raghuji Bhonsle II, who was being harassed by the Pindaris and the Pathans. ¹³⁹ In 1809 the turbulent Pathan chief Amir Khan, at the head of 40,000 horsemen and 24,000 Pindaris,

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 325. The revived importance of Moslems in Central India, at this time, is to be noted ; *vide* Prinsep, *Op. cit.*

¹³⁵ For details, *vide* Malcolm's *Memoir*, Vol. I, Chapter VII.

¹³⁶ Malcolm, *Memoir*, Vol. I, p. 138.

¹³⁷ His chief generals at this time were : Jean Baptist Filoze, Bapu Sindhia, Jagu Bapu and Ambaji Pant.

¹³⁸ Prinsep, *Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of Marquess of Hastings*, Vol. I, p. 27.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29 ; Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 325.

attacked Berar, on the plea of his alliance with the Holkar and under the pretext of realising from Raghuji the valuable jewels which had been ungenerously taken from the Holkar when he had once to take shelter at Nagpur during his early career. The Raja of Berar had no defensive alliance or any treaty with the English on the strength of which he could claim their help, and even if he had, it could not be rendered to him consistently with the principle of non-interference then followed by them. But from strategic considerations, *i.e.*, for preventing disorders on the frontiers of the Nizam's dominions, Lord Minto sent a force under Colonel Barry Close, which repelled the invaders. He expressed his point of view in a minute dated 10th October, 1809: "The question was not whether it was just and expedient to aid the Raja in the defence and recovery of his dominions (although in point of policy the essential change in the political state of India which would be occasioned by the extinction of one of the substantive powers of the Deccan might warrant and require our interference), but whether an interfering and ambitious Mussalman chief, at the head of a numerous army, irresistible by any power but that of the Company, shall be permitted to establish his authority on the ruins of the Raja's dominions, over territories contiguous to those of our ally the Nizam."¹⁴⁰ Lord Minto's attempt to bind the Raja into a permanent subsidiary alliance did not lead to any result owing to the latter's unwillingness. In fact, the Raja of Berar remembered with discontent the loss of his territories to the English after the previous war, but he was too wise to risk an open quarrel with them in the situation in which he had been placed.¹⁴¹ The Gaekwad of Baroda did not manifest any designs of violating

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Beveridge's *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 826. Thus Lord Minto (1807—13) did not follow the policy of non-interference as Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow had done. There are also other instances of this which would be noted in order.

¹⁴¹ Prinsep, Vol. I, p. 30.

the treaty of general defensive alliance which he had concluded with the Company on 21st April, 1805, and by which he had undertaken to maintain a subsidiary force and to submit his foreign policy and the adjustment of his relations with the Peshwa to British control.¹⁴² Thus Prinsep has remarked that "such being the feeling and disposition of the several Mah-ratta powers, there seemed little in their condition or motions calculated to excite any present alarm (for the British power). As far as they were individually concerned, the object of the settlement of 1805-1806 seems to have been attained; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise; at the same time the balance that had been established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second coalition were yet unextinguished."¹⁴³

But it should be noted that the Maratha danger was not over for the English. Another attempt was made by the Maratha power to regain its supremacy before it finally collapsed. Though apparently the attitude of the Maratha chiefs was friendly, yet they were burning within themselves with feelings of discontent, which might burst forth in revenge at any favourable opportunity. In fact, their first Maratha ally, the Peshwa Bajji Rao II, was anything but satisfied with his position of dependence on them, and harboured designs to emancipate himself from their control, since the time when he had been restored to his throne through their help,¹⁴⁴ though he did not openly show any signs of hostility. Moreover, as Elphinstone has stated, the Maratha chiefs were "constantly professing their devotion to His Highness and pressing to acknowledge him for their sovereign."¹⁴⁵ But in view of the distracted condition of his country Bajji Rao II did not

¹⁴² Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 312-13.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 30.

¹⁴⁴ Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 333.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in Mehta's *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 67.

desire to throw off British alliance all of a sudden ;¹⁴⁶ on the other hand, he utilised it to consolidate his own position with the help of Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was appointed Resident at his court in 1810 and went there in the following year, and who had local experience during his employment as an assistant to Colonel Close at Poona before he joined Arthur Wellesley's staff in 1803.

Baji Rao II devoted himself systematically to reduce the Maratha *jagirdars*, especially those to the south of Poona, who did not consider themselves to be under the "smallest obligations of fidelity and allegiance to the Peshwa's legitimate authority,"¹⁴⁷ and to whose untimely desertion of him at the hour of need he ascribed "the necessity he had felt of applying to the British for succour."¹⁴⁸ But these southern *jagirdars* had once rendered good service to General Wellesley, and so Lord Minto's government, which also apprehended further confusion and war, were led to arbitrate in the disputes between them and the Peshwa. An adjustment was finally effected in 1812, by which the services of their troops to the Peshwa were enforced, they had to restore all the lands they had usurped, and they were guaranteed in their lawful possessions as long as they obeyed the terms of the agreement.¹⁴⁹ At the same time another settlement was made by Elphinstone, by which the Rajas of Kolhapur and Sawantwadi became practically independent of the Peshwa's sovereignty,¹⁵⁰ and they promised to suppress piracy ; the Raja of Kolhapur also made over to the English the fort of Malavan.¹⁵¹

By the year 1814 the Peshwa was thus on the whole in an apparently stronger position, and his policy soon underwent

¹⁴⁶ Grant Duff, Vol. III, p. 335.

¹⁴⁷ Prinsep, Vol. I, p. 274.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 275; Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 349.

¹⁵⁰ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 275.

¹⁵¹ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 349—52.

a change under the influence of his unscrupulous favourite *Trimbakji Danglia*, who exercised complete influence over the Peshwa, though Sadaseo Mankeshwar remained as his formal minister. Under Trimbakji's advice the Peshwa sent envoys to the courts of the Sindhia, Raghuji Bhonsle II and the Holkar, with the object of negotiating a "secret treaty of general confederacy and support, which was actually concluded."¹⁵² About 1814 he revived his claims on the Nizam, which the British government had by the treaty of Bassein promised to adjust and settle; but he did not press the matter further when the latter proceeded to determine his claims.¹⁵³ He became, however, rather serious with regard to his claims on the Gaekwad, when the decennial lease of his share of Ahmadabad, granted to the Gaekwad in June 1804, was due to expire in 1814. The negotiations regarding the adjustment of the Peshwa's claims on the Gaekwad brought Gangadhar Shastri, the able minister of Baroda, to Poona, but the latter was treacherously murdered at the instigation of Trimbakji.¹⁵⁴ He was, therefore, put under confinement by Mr. Elphinstone in September in the face of the Peshwa's hesitation and unwillingness to surrender him. But a year later Trimbakji effected his escape from his confinement in the fortress of Thana; Baji Rao II was suspected of conniving at his escape, though there was no proof of this fact.¹⁵⁵

By the year 1817 Baji Rao II became determined to strike against British ascendancy by organising a general confederacy of the Maratha chiefs, with whom, as well as with Amir Khan and the Pindaris, he engaged in active negotiations. At the same time he strengthened his own army.

The British Resident, Mr. Elphinstone, did not fail to see through the Peshwa's designs. He threatened the Peshwa

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 364.

¹⁵³ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 277.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 279—92. This is denied by all modern Maratha historians.

¹⁵⁵ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 378.

with open war on the 7th and 8th May, 1817, and on the 10th May received the instructions of the Governor-General Lord Hastings "for the purpose of circumscribing the Peshwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as would prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the Court of Poona for several years, and of obviating inconveniences found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein."¹⁵⁶ The Peshwa was induced to sign the treaty of Poona on 13th June, 1817, on rigorous terms. He promised to seize and deliver up Trimbakji Danglia to the English, and until this was accomplished he agreed to hand over his family as hostages. He renounced his claims as head of the Maratha Empire, and engaged not to have any negotiations with other powers, except through the British Resident. His claims on the Gaekwad were commuted to an annual payment of four lacs of rupees, and he promised to make no further demands on the Gaekwad. In lieu of furnishing the contingent of 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry as before, he ceded to the British for that purpose territories yielding 34 lacs. The English got the right of admitting into his territory any number of British troops that they might think necessary. He ceded to the British the fort of Ahmadnagar, together with all his rights north of the Narmada, and the settlement made in July 1812 with the southern *jagirdars* was confirmed by him. He transferred his rights over Bundelkhand, Malwa and Hindusthan to the Company. Lastly, he gave up Mailghat, a territory on the Nizam's frontier, which his troops had occupied in 1811.¹⁵⁷ A separate treaty was concluded by the English with the Gaekwad on 6th November, 1817, by which the latter agreed to discharge a part of his irregular troops, to add 1,000 regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry to his subsidiary

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹⁵⁷ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 450—54; Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 385—87.

force, and to cede some of his districts to the English for additional expenses.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the Nagpur state was in the midst of disorders and internal dissensions since the death of Raghuji Bhonsle II on 22nd March, 1816. His son Parsoji was infirm in mind and body, and the young Raja's cousin, Appa Saheb, being the next male member in the royal family, was the heir presumptive to the throne of Nagpur. Raghuji's widow Buka Bai tried, with the help of a party of old officers, to create a regency over his son excluding Appa Saheb from it. But the latter was, after some time, reconciled to Parsoji, who recognised him as his regent. The English took advantage of these internal quarrels in Nagpur to conclude a treaty of subsidiary alliance with Appa Saheb, through their Resident Mr. Jenkins, on 27th May, 1816.

Thus these two treaties—the treaty of Poona and the treaty of Nagpur—immensely increased the influence of the English and severely affected the Marathas. By the former the Peshwa's dominions were dismembered, his resources were curtailed and his position as the head of the Maratha confederacy disappeared; his material interests were affected seriously, and his moral influence received a deadly blow. By the latter, the Nagpur state lost its independence, and it was brought under the subsidiary system, which had been evaded by Raghuji Bhonsle II during his lifetime, and which had been “so long and so earnestly desired by the British Government.” It greatly improved “the defensive means” of the English. Malcolm has justly observed that “in the actual condition of India, no event could be more fortunate than the subsidiary Alliance with Nagpur.” It dealt a serious blow at the power of the Maratha confederacy.¹⁵⁹

It was in such a favourable situation that the Company had given up its policy of neutrality and its Governor-General,

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ Malcolm, *Political History of India*, Vol. I, p. 465.

the Earl of Moira, better known as the Marquis of Hastings (1813—1823), was working with a firm determination for establishing British paramountcy in India. Within a few months after his arrival in India, he had remarked in his *Private Journal*: "Our object ought to be to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so. We should hold the other states vassals in substance, if not in name, not precisely as they stood in the Moghul Government, but possessed of perfect internal sovereignty, and only bound to repay the guarantee and protection of their possessions by the British Government with the pledge of the two great feudal duties. First: They should support it with all their forces on any call. Second: They should submit their mutual differences to the head of the confederacy (our Government) without attacking each other's territories."¹⁶⁰ This ideal of Lord Hastings was calculated to expand Wellesley's work, and we shall see that he was able in the end to complete it.

Besides the arrangements already made with the Peshwa and the Nagpur state, Lord Hastings compelled Daulat Rao Sindhia to conclude a treaty containing twelve clauses on 5th November, 1817. By the more important of these the latter engaged to assist the English against the Pindaris, "never to readmit the Pindaris or any other predatory bodies, into his territories, or in any manner to give them the smallest countenance or support, or to permit his officers to do so;" the eighth article of the treaty of Surji-Arjangaon, by which the English were "restrained from entering into treaties with certain chiefs therein specified," was abrogated, and the British Government got full liberty to enter into engagements with the states of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Bundi, and other 'substantive states' on the left bank of the Chambal. Daulat Rao Sindhia, on his part, engaged "on no account or pretence, whatever, to interfere in any shape in the affairs of

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 31.

those states, without the concurrence of the British Government."¹⁶¹

The Peshwa had been meanwhile strengthening his army, and his discontent now burst out into open hostility. On the very day that the Sindhia had to sign the revised subsidiary treaty, the Peshwa (who disliked it very much) attacked and burnt the British Residency at Kirki; but his attack was soon repulsed by the British forces with greater losses for him. Appa Saheb of Nagpur and Malhar Rao (II) Holkar, son of Jaswant Rao, also rose in arms against the British (in spite of previous and recent treaties). The Nagpur forces were defeated, after fierce fighting, at the battle of Sitabaldi, on 27th November, 1817. The Holkar's troops were also completely routed and destroyed at Mahidpur, on 21st December. Negotiations for peace were opened by Malcolm with Tantia Jog, the Holkar's able minister, and a treaty of subsidiary alliance was concluded at Mandasor, on 6th January, 1818. By this treaty the Holkar renounced all rights to the territories of Amir Khan, to the *perganas* in the possessions of the Kotah state, to all territories within or north of the Bundi hills, and agreed "to cede to the British Government all claims of tribute and revenues of every description which he has or may have had upon the Rajput Princes," and also "all his territories and claims of every description whatever within or south of the Satpura range of hills." He further bound himself to maintain a British force within his territory for maintaining internal tranquillity, and he engaged to submit all foreign affairs to

¹⁶¹ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix 'A.' Baji Rao II wrote to Daulat Rao Sindhia: "Your father Madhajee Sindhia, agreeably to the orders of the Sircar, went to Delhi, was made a Vizier, and acquired a high reputation. He served us with his heart and soul. When you became his successor you entered into alliance with the English: thus you govern in Hindustan, and thus you shew your gratitude. In thus serving us, it is befitting you to put bangles on your arms, and sit down like a woman. After my power is destroyed, is it possible that yours should stand?"—Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 140, footnote. The letter seems strange as coming from Baji Rao II.

the arbitration of the British, and "to have no communication with any other states, except with the knowledge and consent of the British Resident." It was also provided that the Peshwa or his descendants should not exercise any sovereignty over the Holkar and his descendants.¹⁶²

Thus the Sindhia and the Holkar were reduced to a state of dependence on the British Government. A worse fate was in store for the Peshwa. After his defeat at Kirki, he fled southwards from Poona, and got possession of the titular Raja of Satara. But being afterwards chased from place to place by the British troops, he fought two pitched battles with them at Koregaon (on 1st January, 1818) and Ashti (on 20th February, 1818); he was defeated at the second place, and had to run away leaving his able general Gokhale dead on the field. The English rescued the young Raja of Satara, who was treated with much courtesy by Elphinstone, as he was convinced of the political advantage of the restoration of one of the descendants of Shivaji. The Peshwa at last surrendered himself in the camp of Sir John Malcolm on 3rd June, 1818. Lord Hastings was determined to abolish the Peshwaship for ever with the idea that the continuance, even in a decayed form, of that symbol of Maratha unity, would rally the Maratha chiefs again round it, which would certainly be incompatible with the newly-established British paramountcy. So the Peshwaship ended, and Baji Rao II was allowed to live at a place called Bithur, twelve miles north-west of Cawnpore, under the guard of a British agent, and on a pension of eight lacs a year guaranteed to him by Malcolm much against the desire of the Governor-General. Trimbakji was seized by Elphinstone and was condemned to life-long imprisonment in the fort of Chunar near Benares. Pratap Singh, a lineal descendant of Shivaji, was set up as ruler of a small principality created out of Baji Rao's dominions, as a sop to Maratha sentiment. The alternative suggestion of Sir Thomas Munro,

¹⁶² Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix 'B.'

that the Company itself should stand forth as the Peshwa, was not accepted.¹⁶³ Opinions have differed about the restoration of the Raja of Satara. Prinsep writes that "the reestablishment of the Satara Raja, in the very seat of the ancient power and splendour of his race, was well adopted to reconcile the older Mahratta families to the annihilation of the more recent title and authority of Peshwa. It had the further effect of rendering the cause of Bajee Rao rather a personal than a national one; more especially as the commissioner's manifesto contained the promise to all, who might submit within two months of its date, of enjoying in perpetuity, under British guarantee, whatever lands they might at the time be possessed of."¹⁶⁴ Mr. Thornton has, however, remarked that "all the reasons which counselled that there should be no Peishwa, pressed with equal cogency against the revival of the claims of the Rajah of Sattara. To sever the usurping arm, and at the same time to elevate the long drooping head of the Mahratta body was not a consistent course of policy, the object being to destroy. The master was now freed from the domination of his ambitious servant, and restored, in imagination at least, to the place which, according to the theory of the Mahratta League, was his right. . . . The extent of territory assigned to him was indeed small, and the political power very strictly limited; but there was enough to afford stimulus to the wild visions of Mahratta fancy. The throne of Sevajee was restored, and though it could boast little of either power or splendour, it was to the Mahratta what Mecca is to the Mussalman."¹⁶⁵ Mr. Thornton's apprehensions were groundless, as the new state of Satara was much too crippled to form again the centre of a hostile Maratha confederacy; the force of Maratha nationalism had already spent itself, and India now

¹⁶³ Munro was probably thinking of the days when the Company stood forth as the Diwan of Bengal and Bihar, half a century ago.

¹⁶⁴ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 294.

¹⁶⁵ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 563.

required, and was preparing for, a different kind of national revival. Among the modern writers, Mr. Roberts¹⁶⁶ holds that "the policy of the British Government in this transaction was not justified by results ; the rule of the restored dynasty proved an evil and incompetent one, and Satara was one of the states to which subsequently the Doctrine of Lapse was applied by Dalhousie ; but the Indian Government erred, if at all, on the side of generosity." It should be noted that this transaction is an instance of gaining the real power while suffering the shadow, the formal authority, to remain, for political motives, at which Prinsep has hinted.

One by one all Maratha opposition to British arms disappeared. After the Peshwa had surrendered himself, Ram Din, who was one of the principal commanders of the Holkar but had joined the Peshwa after the treaty of Mandasor, submitted to the British Government "upon a promise of pardon for his rebellion." The designs of Appa Saheb of Nagpur, who had effected a romantic escape from British custody,¹⁶⁷ and had been gathering forces in the Mahadeo hills between Nagpur and the Narmada, were frustrated. After the famous fort of Asirgarh had been conquered from its commander Jaswant Rao Lar by General Deveton in cooperation with a force from Malwa under Sir John Malcolm, Appa Saheb sought refuge among the Sikhs in the Punjab, but subsequently retired to Jodhpur, where he died in 1840. The portion of his dominions lying north of the Narmada was annexed to the British territory, and the remnant of his kingdom was given to a minor grandson of Raghuji Bhonsle II. By the second week of June, 1819, all the territories of the Peshwa, with the exception of the principality left to the Raja of Satara, came under British possession, and "British influence and authority spread over the land with magical celerity."¹⁶⁸ The civil administra-

¹⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

¹⁶⁷ *Vide* Grant Duff, Vol. III, pp. 477-78, for details.

¹⁶⁸ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 189.

tion of the Peshwa's dominions was organised by Elphinstone, who also founded a Hindu college at Poona.¹⁶⁹ He was assisted in his work by Grant Duff, the Resident at Satara. Malcolm was appointed commissioner of the territories acquired from the Raja of Nagpur, under the supervision of Jenkins.¹⁷⁰ Malcolm also restored order, during the years 1818—1820, in the provinces of Khandesh and the parts of Malwa taken from the Holkar.

Thus ended the attempts of the Marathas to found a national Empire in India, and to rival the political supremacy, first of the Mughals, and then of the British. We have already discussed¹⁷¹ some elements in the character of the Maratha polity which were not at all compatible with the consolidation and stability of an empire. It has to be added here that those characteristics became more intense among the later Marathas, though there appeared among them such eminent personalities as Madhava Rao I, Malhar Rao Holkar, Ahalya Bai, Madhaji Sindhia, and Nana Phadnavis. They got several chances after the third battle of Panipat, and even after the treaty of Salbai, which some of them tried to utilise, and that with success, as in the case of Madhaji Sindhia, who hit the right point when he brought the Delhi Emperor under his control and established his influence in the North. By the end of the eighteenth century all those able Maratha leaders passed away one by one, and they were succeeded by men like Baji Rao II, Daulat Rao Sindhia and Jaswant Rao Holkar, who could never unite at the right moment but tried to win their selfish games by base intrigues. Their aims were not purely national and their means were also ignoble. Diplomacy is indeed needed for imperialism, but if it falls in weak hands and stoops to the low level of personal rivalries, selfish intrigues and base treacheries, then a moral canker eats into the vitality of the state and a

169 *Ibid.*, pp. 289—98; Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 488—501.

170 Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

171 Vol. I, Part I, Chapter IV, Section V.

Nemesis overtakes its destiny. Such was the case with the Marathas in the early nineteenth century, when they had to face superior British politics.¹⁷² They also failed, even under Madhaji Sindhia and Nana Phadnavis, to establish a scientific military system of their own after European models when they had to fight against the English with their up-to-date military organization, steeled through many European Wars for a century. They had to depend upon mercenary foreign adventurers like de Boigne and Perron "for a most vital means of self-protection, and since the old Maratha system of guerilla warfare could not stand against organised artillery and infantry, it went out of use and there was nothing else to take its place."¹⁷³

SECTION II

FINAL DECLINE OF THE RAJPUTS

The spirit of revival which awakened all the Hindu powers at the beginning of the eighteenth century disappeared much earlier among the Rajputs than among the Marathas. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Rajputana, once the land of chivalry and heroism, practically lost all her old traditions and passed through a dark period of her history. With few noteworthy exceptions, her children seem to have exhausted the stock of their old virtues. Internal feuds, pseudo-chivalry, feudal strifes represented in deadly clan rivalries, were eating into her vitals, and, added to these, the encroachments of her external enemies were sucking her life-blood. The Maratha chiefs of the period like Madhaji and Daulat Rao Sindhia, or Tukoji and Jaswant Rao Holkar, frequently appeared person-

¹⁷² Sardesai, *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

ally on the scene, or despatched their hordes into the country. Sometimes they established their full control, or again they deprived her of her economic resources, and they always pressed their claims on tributes from the Rajput chiefs. No less troublesome and harassing were the depredations within her borders of the other plundering hordes of Central India, like the Pathans¹⁷⁴ and the Pindaris.¹⁷⁵ The Company concluded a treaty with the Jaipur state in the time of Lord Wellesley (ratified on 15th January, 1804), but it was cancelled later on in conformity with the peace policy of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow.¹⁷⁶ Lord Lake's agreement of 1803 with the Jodhpur state was not ratified by the Maharaja and was not therefore carried into effect. In short, being incessantly engaged with formidable powers like Tipu and the Marathas, the Company had no opportunity to pay much attention towards Rajputana before the time of Lord Hastings.

We can here only make a brief review of the conditions of some of the more important Rajput states at that time. The reign of Rana Pratap Singh II of Mewar (Udaipur) was disturbed by many Maratha invasions.¹⁷⁷ Malhar Rao Holkar invaded Mewar in 1764 and "his threats of occupying the capital were only checked by draining their exhausted resources of six hundred thousand pounds."¹⁷⁸ A civil war within the kingdom in 1768 drew Madhaji Sindhia there, and this caused the transference in 1771 of the districts of Jawad, Jiran, Nimach, Ratangar, Khoni, and Bijapur to the Maratha chief.¹⁷⁹ The tributes of Bampura, Rampura, Mulhargarh, and Pratapgarh, amounting to Rs. 75 lacs, were given to the

¹⁷⁴ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 321.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 329-30.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 311.

¹⁷⁷ Tod, Vol. I, p. 496 (Crooke's Edition).

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 497.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 497-505.

state of Holkar.¹⁸⁰ Rana Bhim Singh's reign (1778—1828) was full of factions and intrigues, and these being combined with the "yearly aggressions of the Mahrattas accelerated the ruin of the country."¹⁸¹ The Marathas received a temporary check from the combined forces of Jodhpur and Jaipur at the battle of Lalsot, May, 1787,¹⁸² but the latter were defeated in the end by the united efforts of Madhaji Sindhia and Ahalya Bai. The growth of the internal feuds, "which alone were sufficient to ruin the country," led the Rana of Mewar, acting under the advice of his friends, chiefly Zalim Singh of Kotah, to solicit the help of Madhaji Sindhia, and the latter readily acquiesced in his desire.¹⁸³ This suggestion of Zalim Singh was a wrong step; he was thus trying to maintain himself in power by conciliating the Maratha chief, and in the words of Tod, "instead of becoming the arbitrator of India, he left only the reputation of being the Nestor of Rajputana."¹⁸⁴ This led to Madhaji's control over Mewar through his agent Ambaji, who remained there for eight years, enjoying its revenues and hoarding £2,000,000.¹⁸⁵ Though for some time Ambaji gave tranquillity to Mewar, yet "inflated with the wealth of Mewar, (he) assumed almost royal dignity in Hindusthan, assigning the devoted land to be governed by his deputies, whose contests with other aspirants made this unhappy region the stage for constant struggles for supremacy; and while the secret policy of Zalim Singh stimulated the Saktawat to cling to Ambaji, the Chandawats gave their influence and interests to his rival Lakwa. The unhappy Rana and the peasantry paid for this rivalry; while Sindhia, whose power was now in its zenith, fastened one of his desultory armies on Mewar, in contraven-

¹⁸⁰ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 128 footnote.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 512.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 513.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 520.

tion of former treaties, without any definite views or even instructions to its commander."¹⁸⁶ The tragedy of Krishna Kumari, the daughter of the Mewar Rana, distracted Mewar to a great degree. Her hand was sought by Jagat Singh of Jaipur and Rana Man of Marwar, who fell into rivalry and gathered under their banners not only their native troops but all the predatory powers (the Marathas, the Pathans, the Rohillas) of India, and she "like Helen of old, involved in destruction her own and the rival houses."¹⁸⁷

In the period of Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow's peace policy, Jaswant Rao Holkar and Daulat Rao Sindhia, the Pathans and the Pindaris, frequently pillaged and plundered Mewar.¹⁸⁸ In 1811 Bapu Sindhia went to Mewar with the title of Subahdar, while Amir Khan's son-in-law, the notorious Jamshid, was also there. By a conference at Dhaula Magra (the white hill), attended by a deputation from the Rana, the rival claims of the spoilers in Mewar were adjusted, and for a few years they went on quietly sucking the life-blood of the kingdom.

With the death of Abhay Singh (1750 A.D.) and the accession of Raja Ram Singh on the throne of Marwar, commenced a dark period in the history of that principality.¹⁸⁹ Raja Ram Singh was displaced by his uncle Bakht Singh (1752-53), who was succeeded by his son Raja Bijay Singh (1753-93). But Ram Singh, in conjunction with the prince of Amber, concluded a treaty with the Marathas with the object of dethroning Bijay Singh.¹⁹⁰ Bijay Singh was defeated on the plains of Merta, and all his strongholds, including Ajmere, rapidly fell into the hands of the Marathas. Tod has remarked that "with this gem (Ajmere) rudely torn from her diadem,

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 528.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 536; Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 32.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

¹⁸⁹ Tod, Vol. II, p. 1054.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1061.

the independence of Marwar from that hour has been insecure. She has struggled on, indeed through a century of invasions, rebellions, and crimes, all originating, like the blank leaf on her annals, from the murder of Ajit.”¹⁹¹ Bijay Singh continued to rule over the shorn Marwar, and subsequently formed a Rajput league (1787) against the aggressions of the common enemy the Marathas, and defeated them at the battle of Tonga,¹⁹² compelling Madhaji Sindhia to give up his conquests for the time being. But the Maratha chief quickly repaired the loss and defeated the Rajputs at the battles of Patan and Merta (1791), recovered Ajmere (which had revolted after the victory at Tonga), and established his influence over Jodhpur and the neighbouring state of Udaipur.¹⁹³ With his kingdom reduced in extent, his chiefs in rebellion and his sons and grandsons hostile to one another, Bijay Singh died after a reign of about forty years. His grandson Bhim Singh (1793—1803) seized the throne of Marwar after disposing of all his rivals except Man Singh (a legitimate grand-child of Bijay Singh, later on adopted as a son by Bhim Singh’s concubine). Man Singh (1804—1843) ‘succeeded to the honours and the feuds of Bijay Singh’ after the death of Bhim Singh. Internal quarrels distracted his reign from its beginning. The rivalry about Krishna Kumari of Mewar, and the invitation of a faction from within Marwar, drew upon him an attack by Raja Jagat Singh of Jaipur. In the wake of this invasion the Maratha and Pathan hordes also appeared there. Man Singh, supported by Amir Khan (1806), defended Jodhpur, defeated the Jaipur army and dissolved the confederacy formed against him. But the way in which Man Singh met the schemes of his antagonist “entailed upon him and upon his country unexampled misery.”¹⁹⁴ Amir Khan became the arbiter of Marwar, exer-

¹⁹¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1064.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 1074.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 128.

¹⁹⁴ Tod, Vol. II, p. 1090.

cising his unjust authority over its territory and people. Man Singh subsequently died of insanity, leaving his kingdom in utter disorder.

In the state of Jaisalmer, the reign of Rawal Mulraj (1762—1820) was distracted by the conspiracies and cruelties of the ministers, Sarup Singh and his son Salim Singh.

In Amber (Jaipur) Sewai Jai Singh died in 1743 A.D. after a rather prosperous rule of 44 years. His successor Isri Singh (1743—50) was "totally deficient in that nervous energy of character, without which a Rajput prince can enforce no respect;" the rival claims of Madhu Singh, a younger son of Jai Singh, born of a princess of Mewar, produced internal troubles and drew the Holkar's intervention.¹⁹⁵ Madhu Singh (1750—78) possessed greater vigour, and resented the interference of the Marathas in the affairs of Amber, but his attention and resources were distracted by the rising power of the neighbouring Jats. From his death the power of Amber began to decline, during the reigns of his minor successor Prithi Singh II and Pratap Singh (1778—1803), largely under the evil influence of the queen-regent (the mother of Pratap Singh). Tod writes that "throughout the twenty-five years' rule of Partap, he and his country underwent many vicissitudes. He was a gallant prince, and not deficient in judgment; but neither gallantry nor prudence could successfully apply the resources of his petty state against its numerous feudatory foes and its internal dissensions."¹⁹⁶ In 1791 Tukoji Holkar invaded Jaipur, and exacted an annual tribute, which was later on transferred to Amir Khan, and continued to be a permanent drain on the resources of Jaipur.¹⁹⁷ Up to 1803, Jaipur was also desolated by the troops of Daulat Rao Sindhia

¹⁹⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 1357.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 1363-64.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

under de Boigne and Perron, and by other predatory hordes.¹⁹⁸ The reign of the next ruler Jagat Singh (1803—1818) represents in every respect a dark period in the annals of Jaipur.

The state of Kotah alone was under the able management of Raj-Rana Zalim Singh, who, by his tact and intelligence, made himself a prominent figure. He saved his state from Maratha and Pathan devastations, and remained friendly with all the great powers like the Sindhia, the Holkar and Amir Khan. Malcolm notes that he had a "singular union of art, pliancy, firmness and wisdom,"¹⁹⁹ and Tod has also described in details his ability as an administrator.²⁰⁰

Thus torn by 'hereditary jealousies' and 'family feuds,' and distracted by the aggressions of her foreign invaders, Rajputana was in a state of anarchy and disorder when Lord Hastings arrived in India. In pursuance of his general plan of establishing British Supremacy, he was convinced of the necessity of bringing the Rajput states under control. He rightly thought that an alliance with these states would give "immense strategic advantages for the Company's military and political position in Central India," and would also make available "the resources of the Rajput country, for defensive and offensive purposes, against internal and external enemies of the Company."²⁰¹ In 1814, the authorities in England sent

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, de Boigne left India several years before the close of this period.

¹⁹⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 496.

²⁰⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 1547—69.

²⁰¹ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 127. This policy of utilizing Rajputs was at the root of the early success of Mughal Imperialism; the Marathas failed to learn the lesson of Akbar's days, and in their hour of greatest need (in the sixties of the eighteenth century) they were recently ruining and embittering the Rajputs instead of winning them over for a *Hindupad padshahi*, with disastrous results for themselves; the English were better successors of Akbar in this respect, and it is well known today that the Rajput states (as also the Sikhs later on) have been in the nineteenth century a very great support of the British Empire in India.

orders to Bengal for bringing the Jaipur state under British protection, but the Governor-General "postponed attempting it until a more favourable season."²⁰²

Such a favourable turn came by the year 1817, when Mr. Metcalfe, the Resident at Delhi, was instructed by the Governor-General to open negotiations with the Rajput states. About the settlement with these states, "the general conditions were, simply, that any tribute demandable under a fixed agreement with a Mahratta or Patan (Pathan) chief, should be paid directly to the British treasury, leaving us (the English) to account for it to the party to whom it might be due,—and that our (English) protection should be afforded on the usual condition of abstaining from the contraction of any new relations with other powers, and submitting to our (English) arbitration of external disputes."²⁰³

The state of Karauli, an acknowledged dependency of the Peshwa, entered into a treaty of subordinate alliance with the Company by submitting its right of negotiating with foreign powers to the control of the Company and by promising "to furnish troops at the requisition of the British Government, according to its means."²⁰⁴ Among the independent Rajput states, Kotah, then under the able management of Zalim Singh, was the first to form an alliance with the English. By a treaty, concluded by Metcalfe with the agent of Kotah at Delhi on 26th December, 1817, the ruler of that state acknowledged British protection and supremacy and entered into a relation of "perpetual friendship, alliance and unity of interest."²⁰⁵ A supplementary article of the treaty, added on 20th February, 1818, guaranteed to Zalim Singh and his heirs

²⁰² Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 390.

²⁰³ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 354.

²⁰⁴ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

²⁰⁵ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix No. XVI; D. Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 353—57; Tod, Vol. III, pp. 1577—90.

(in recognition of his services to the British) the office of the chief minister of the state. But this caused some trouble later on, because article 10 of the treaty provided that "the Maha-Rao (i.e., the rightful sovereign of Kotah), his heirs, successors, shall remain absolute rulers of the country": the Maha-Rao could not have absolute authority if the office of his Chief Minister was permanently fixed in a particular family by an external authority. The next state, in order of time, to enter into engagements with the British was Jodhpur. The treaty concluded with that state on 6th January, 1818, contained the "usual provisions of defensive alliance, perpetual friendship, protection and subordinate cooperation."²⁰⁶ The Rana of Udaipur, who "had suffered most from the usurpations of rebellious subjects, as well as from the operations" of the Marathas and the Pathans, entered into a similar arrangement with the Company on 16th January, 1818. The Raja of Bundi followed next in order, and signed a similar treaty on 10th February, 1818; the two Rathor states of Kishangarh, near Ajmere, and Bikanir concluded treaties with the Company in the month of March, 1818. Jaipur was the last of the important states to enter into a treaty alliance with the Company, on 2nd April, 1818, after various negotiations since 1816. The minor states became also bound by similar engagements. Agreements with the three principalities of Pratapgargh, Banswara, and Dungarpur, branches of the Udaipur House and situated on the border of Gujrat, were concluded under the superintendence of Sir John Malcolm, on 5th October,²⁰⁷ 5th December²⁰⁸ and 11th December, 1818,²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 134; Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 134; Tod, Vol. II, pp. 1092-94.

²⁰⁷ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix No. XVI, 'H.'

²⁰⁸ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369. "A treaty with Banswara was concluded at Dehlee (Delhi) on the 16th September, 1818, to the same effect precisely; but of the 5th December, having been negotiated directly with the Raja by Captain Caulfield, may be considered as that fixing the relations of the state."

²⁰⁹ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Appendix No. XVI, 'I.'

respectively. The state of Jaisalmer entered into a treaty with the British on 12th December, 1818,²¹⁰ and the chief of Sirohi in 1823.

Thus the historic country of Rajputana acknowledged British supremacy, and in the course of a few years order as well as British control was established there by a band of able English officers like Tod, Metcalfe, Malcolm, and others.

This extension of political influence over the Rajput states marks an important step in the advance of British paramountcy in India. But Lord Hastings' Rajput policy has not escaped criticism. The Rajput states had never manifested any hostility towards the British, but were, as Hastings himself expressed, their "natural allies." However, the treaties which they were led to accept subjected them to subordinate positions like other hostile states and entailed a loss of their independence. All proposals, which came forward later on to improve their relations with the British, were never put into force. Mr. Prinsep has strongly argued that the mutual jealousies and dissensions of the Rajput states "prevented their living together in harmony without a general sense of the necessity of submitting to the behest of a controlling power."²¹¹ But it may very well be asked if the Rajput states could not be protected from misrule and external aggressions by being attached with the English in a tie of 'friendly cooperation' instead of 'subordinate alliance.' It should be also noted that the "good and tranquillity" of the country was not "the exclusive aim" of the Company's interference, as Prinsep holds,²¹² but they were guided by considerations of political "expediency and convenience" to themselves. Lord Hastings has also been more severely criticised for continuing the tributes from the Rajput states. There was some justification for this and Mr.

²¹⁰ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 369.

²¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 346.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 349.

Prinsep's arguments in defence²¹³ are, firstly, that the British Government by undertaking to protect the states from external foes could legitimately realise from them the cost thereof,—secondly, that these were retained as a mark of supremacy over them,—and thirdly, that “by the immediate operation of the treaties” and by the establishment of regular government there was an increase of their revenues “of which it would have been an act of wanton profusion to make a distribution purely gratuitous.” But for this retention of tributes there was another motive of Hastings arising out of contemporary political conditions. Prinsep has rightly hinted at this: “It will be recollected that under the original plan it was intended to make the arrangement palatable to the Maratha powers, by securing to them the benefit of any revenues their past successes had enabled them to exact from the Rajput states.”²¹⁴

SECTION III

MYSORE : ITS LATER HISTORY AND RELATIONS

Mysore under Tipu was one of the formidable powers of India at that time. It remained for many years “a constant source of alarm and danger to the Madras Government, and of perplexity and expense to Calcutta and Leadenhall Street. Indeed, Hyder and Tipoo were names of fear to the British nation itself.”²¹⁵ Tipu was an ever-active and ambitious prince : Thomas Munro wrote about him in 1799 that “a restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to have everything to originate from himself, was the predominant feature of his character.”²¹⁶

²¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 347—51.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

²¹⁵ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, XIII.

²¹⁶ Gleig, *Life of Munro*, Vol. I, p. 233, quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 333.

After the pacification of 1784 he proceeded, early in 1785, to reduce certain chiefs (mostly Marathas) whose territories were situated in the country between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra, and who, though subdued by Hyder Ali, had evaded paying tributes.²¹⁷ This led to his subjugation of the *desai* of Nargund and consequent conflicts with the Peshwa of the Marathas, who utilised the natural jealousy of the Nizam against Tipu and entered into alliance with the former. The details of this Maratha-Mysore conflict have been already related.²¹⁸ Early in 1787 Tipu concluded a peace with the Marathas who retained the districts of Nargund, Kithur and Badami.

Tipu displayed this pacific disposition, because he anticipated renewed hostilities with the English. The peace of 1784 "was but a hollow truce;" neither Tipu nor the Company believed that it was the closing act in the drama of Anglo-Mysore hostility. Both parties knew that another trial of strength was inevitable. Tipu "never ceased to meditate on the means of subverting the British power in India."²¹⁹ Gifted with the sagacity of an acute diplomat, Tipu tried to put on the Company in India the pressure of Anglo-French hostility in Europe, by allying himself with the French Government. With this object he sent in July 1787 envoys to France, where they reached on 9th June, 1788, and came back to Seringapatam in May, 1789, with no material help but only with assurance of friendship and "promises of future assistance."²²⁰ The French Government was itself in a deplorable condition at that time, and could not, in spite of its hostility towards the English, render any active help to Tipu. Tipu also sent in 1787 ambassadors to Constantinople, where they were

²¹⁷ Bowring, *Hyder Ali and Tipu*, p. 131.

²¹⁸ *Vide* the Section on the Marathas.

²¹⁹ *History of Hyder Shah and Tippoo Sultan*, by M. M. D. L. T. (Bangabasi Edition), p. 271.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

ostentatiously received by the Sultan but could bring no real help from him.

Cornwallis (1786—1793) also believed, from the time of his arrival as Governor-General of India, that a rupture with Tipu was imminent, and that an alliance with other Indian powers as a sort of counterpoise was absolutely necessary. He wrote in his letter to Malet, the Resident at Poona, in March 1788: "look upon a rupture with Tipu as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with France, and in that event a vigorous co-operation of the Marathas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our interests in this country."²²¹ He realised the impossibility of strictly following the policy of neutrality enforced by Pitt's India Act, as is clear from his own expression that it was "attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our (the Company's) being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies."²²²

The settlement of the Guntoor *Sarkar* with the Nizam, and the omission of Tipu's name in the letter written by Cornwallis to the Nizam on 7th July, 1789, with the object of laying "the foundation of permanent and powerful co-operation,"²²³ confirmed Tipu's apprehension of an immediate outbreak of hostilities. But it was his own aggressive attack on the Raja of Travancore, that ignited the flame for which all had so long been gathering the fuel. The circumstances leading to the attack on Travancore, a small principality lying in the extreme south-west of the Peninsula, on 29th December, 1789, with an army of about 34,000 men and 10 pieces of cannon, have been narrated in the letter from the Governor-General-in-Council at Calcutta to the Court of Directors, dated

²²¹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 334.

²²² Letter to Malet, dated 28th February, 1790; Forrest, *State Papers about Cornwallis*, Vol II. p. 10.

²²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 40.

13th February, 1790.²²⁴ The ostensible reason was the purchase of Jaikottai and Kranganur by the Raja of Travancore from the Dutch. Tipu claimed that the Raja had no right to purchase those two places without consulting him, as they "were subject to a quit-rent, and held as dependencies of his tributary, the Raja of Cochin."²²⁵ But both the Raja of Travancore and the Dutch declared that "these two forts had been conquered by the latter from the Portuguese, and after they came into the possession of the Dutch Company, had never acknowledged a dependence on any native power in India." This reply did not satisfy Tipu, and the attack on Travancore followed.

Travancore had been included in the Treaty of Mangalore as an ally of the Company; so Cornwallis "considered the Company as at war" with Tipu, and proceeded to take vigorous measures for its prosecution. The Marathas and the Nizam were not well disposed towards Tipu, and "upon the expectation of their being guided by the common influence of passions and by considerations of evident interest, which ought to dispose them to seize a favourable opportunity with eagerness to reduce the power of a Prince whose ambition knows no bounds, and from whom both of them have suffered numberless insults and injuries,"²²⁶ Cornwallis sent orders to the Residents at Poona and Hyderabad to negotiate an alliance with these two powers. Tipu did not receive any help from the French on this occasion, but still, in order to provide against such a contingency, Cornwallis tried to "keep a watchful eye upon all the motions of the French in those seas," and also "solicited a friendly attention to the same object of the Dutch Governor of Ceylon, who resents the behaviour of Tipoo to the settlement of Cochin, and has shown a disposition to take some concern about the Raja of Travan-

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 2.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

²²⁶ Cornwallis' letter to Malet, dated 28th February, 1790; *Ibid.*, p. 10.

core."²²⁷ Cornwallis wrote to the Secret Committee on 12th April, 1790: "The cordial reception which the Nizam and the Marathas gave to the propositions that I have made to them to avail themselves of this opportunity to revenge the many injuries that they have suffered at different times from Tipoo or his father, by joining with us in the war, have been highly gratifying to me, and you will see from my correspondence with Mr. Malet and Captain Kennaway, that we have good grounds to expect that we shall obtain an early and vigorous cooperation from both these Powers upon very advantageous terms"²²⁸ His expectations were fulfilled: a treaty of defensive and offensive alliance was formed with the Marathas and the Nizam on 1st June²²⁹ and 4th July, 1790,²³⁰ respectively, whereby they promised to help the English with contingents in the invasion of Tipu's territory, and were given hopes of sharing in the conquests.

Thus Tipu was isolated and a formidable combination was formed against him. The Maratha troops were sometimes dilatory, but Cornwallis himself acknowledged that their presence at the siege of Seringapatam enabled the English army for "so long a period to them Tipoo with his army into a very circumscribed space, and to deprive him of all revenue or supplies of any kind from the greatest part of his extensive territories."²³¹ It is also true that the Nizam's cavalry was not very active; yet, in the words of the Governor-General, "even their presence contributed to awe the enemy, and was otherwise of value as being a proof of the strong connexion of the Confederacy."²³² In fact, the Marathas and the Nizam sometimes gave "useful aid."²³³

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²²⁸ Forrest, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, 13.

²²⁹ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 58—62.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. V, pp. 43—47.

²³¹ Letter to Court, 21st April, 1791; Forrest, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 38.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 336.

The war against Tipu, which lasted for nearly two years, was conducted in three campaigns. The first under Major-General Medows²³⁴ proved indecisive. Accordingly in December 1790, Cornwallis himself assumed command of the operations. He expressed the reasons in a letter, dated 12th November, 1790, to the Right Hon'ble Henry Dundas of the Board of Control, thus: "... that we have lost time and our adversary has gained reputation, which are two most valuable things in war. It is vain now to look back; we must only consider how to remedy the evil, and to prevent the ill effects which our delay may occasion in the minds of our allies. It immediately occurred to me that nothing would be so likely to keep up their spirits, and to convince them of our determination to act with vigour, as my taking the command of the army."²³⁵ The Company also began to entertain henceforth the project of deposing Tipu in favour of the heir of the old Hindu ruling family of Mysore.²³⁶ Cornwallis proceeded by Vellore and Ambur towards Bangalore, which was captured on 21st March, 1791, and on 13th May the English army reached Arikera, about nine miles from Seringapatam. But Tipu exhibited brilliant generalship, and with the commencement of the rains Cornwallis had to retreat for want of equipments and provisions for his army. The contest was resumed in the summer of 1791. On 3rd November, 1791, Tipu captured Coimbatore, though it was bravely defended by Lieutenant Chalmers. But Cornwallis captured one by one the hill fortresses which obstructed his advance towards Seringapatam, arrived within sight of Tipu's capital on 5th February, 1792, and soon captured the outworks of the town, though Tipu showed much skill as a general and a diplomat in averting a disaster.

²³⁴ For Major-General Medow's career, *vide* Forrest, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 47—50.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²³⁶ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 336.

All his efforts being baffled, Tipu opened negotiations with the English for a peaceful settlement, and the treaty of Seringapatam was concluded in March 1792.²³⁷ Half of Tipu's dominions was surrendered, and out of it the Nizam received a large portion extending from the Krishna to beyond the Penar river with the forts of Ganjdikottai and Cuddapah; the share which fell to the Marathas extended their boundary to the Tungabhadra; and the English obtained Malabar and the sovereignty over the Raja of Coorg, on the south Dindigul and the surrounding districts, and on the east the Baramahal and the famous mountain passes—"all of them cessions of considerable importance in adding to strength and compactness of the Company's territories."²³⁸ Besides these Tipu had to pay an indemnity of more than £3,000,000 and to surrender two of his sons to the English as hostages.

Some critics have found fault with Cornwallis for his hastily concluding the treaty of Seringapatam and for not completing the destruction of Tipu which, according to them, he could then have easily brought about. He has been "accused of want of character and vigour in not capturing Seringapatam." Munro wrote: "everything is now done by moderation and conciliation. At this rate we shall be all Quakers in twenty years more."²³⁹ Thornton finds "reason to lament that Tippu Sultan should have been granted so favourable terms."²⁴⁰ But it is to be noted that Cornwallis was guided by some very reasonable considerations. The British troops were suffering from sickness; a rupture with France, when Tipu might get help from that country (now free from the first troubles of the Revolution), was apprehended, and the Court of Directors expressed a desire for peace. He did not like to take possession of the whole country of Mysore, which would have increased the difficulty of settlement with

²³⁷ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 147—53.

²³⁸ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 505.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 178.

²⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 505.

the allies, who would also have become more powerful than was convenient.²⁴¹ When the peace negotiations were about to break down and the capture of Seringapatam was imminent, he is said to have exclaimed: "Good God! what shall I do with the place!"²⁴²

About the results of the war with Tipu, Cornwallis wrote: "We have effectually crippled our enemy, without making our friends too formidable."²⁴³ But Tipu was not a man to put up with this humiliation calmly. In the words of Malcolm, Tipu's conduct was "first marked by an honourable and unusually punctual discharge of the large sum which remained due at the conclusion of the peace to the allies. Instead of sinking under his misfortunes, he exerted all his activity to repair the ravages of war. He began to add to the fortifications of his capital—to remount his cavalry—to recruit and discipline his infantry—to punish his refractory tributaries, and to encourage the cultivation of his country."²⁴⁴ He could not forget his resentment against the English, who had vanquished him. In 1796, the *raja* of Mysore, whom the English wanted to use against Tipu by a Hindu restoration, died leaving an infant son, whom Tipu did not grant even the titular status of Raja. Tipu now began preparations for resuming hostilities with the English and, in order to secure allies for himself, sent embassies to Arabia, Kabul, Constantinople²⁴⁵ and Mauritius. In Europe, France was then engaged in a deadly war against England, and Tipu thought it to be a propitious moment for himself to secure French alliance against the English in India. About 59 Frenchmen, fired by the enthusiasm for the recently established French Republic, assembled at Seringapatam and elected "citizen Ripaud," a Lieutenant in the French navy, as their President. They were assured of 'affection and

²⁴¹ Forrest, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 178.

²⁴³ Roberts, *British India*, p. 235.

²⁴⁴ Quoted in Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 41.

²⁴⁵ Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 145.

support' by Tipu, and with his permission planted a 'tree of Liberty,' " surmounted by the cup of Equality." Tipu also enlisted himself as a member of a Jacobin Club. In 1797 he sent envoys to the French Governor at Mauritius, where they arrived on 19th January, 1798. The French Governor, General Malartic, received those envoys in public and heard their proposals for an alliance for expelling the English out of India. He promised to send Tipu's representations to France, but in order to show some sympathy then and there with the cause of Tipu, he publicly proclaimed that Tipu was waiting for a French alliance "to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India," and invited volunteers to come forward for helping Tipu. As a result of this some Frenchmen²⁴⁶ arrived at Mangalore in April, 1798. Both the Court of Directors²⁴⁷ and the Madras Council²⁴⁸ apprehended a Franco-Mysore alliance and their rupture with the Company. Wellesley's policy of expansion could not but lead him to oppose the pretensions of Tipu, and the latter's intrigues with the French afforded him a sufficient excuse for war. He held in his minute dated 12th August, 1798, that "the act of Tipu's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither expansion, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India. To affect to misunder-

²⁴⁶ The numbers have been differently stated. Wellesley in his minute, recorded 12th August, 1798 (Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 11), notes that they did not exceed two hundred. According to Colonel Wilks, the number was exactly 99. Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 14, footnote.

²⁴⁷ Letter from the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to the Governor-General-in-Council of Bengal, dated 18th June, 1798. Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 1—3.

²⁴⁸ Letter from Mr. Josias Webbe, Secretary to the Government of Madras, 6th July, 1798. *Ibid.*, pp. 4—11.

stand an insult and injury of such a complexion would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear."²⁴⁹

Wellesley, therefore, began preparations for an attack on Tipu. He tried to revive and strengthen the alliance with the Nizam and the Marathas, formed in the time of Cornwallis. The former readily complied with Wellesley's demands by entering into 'subsidiary alliance' on 1st September, 1798, and his French-trained troops²⁵⁰ were disbanded by Malcolm and Kirkpatrick. The Marathas did not give any clear answer. But with the object of keeping the Triple Alliance intact, Wellesley promised to give the Peshwa an equal share in the conquests that might be made from Tipu.

From November, 1798 till February, 1799 several letters passed between Wellesley and Tipu leading to no settlement. The former sought explanations and demanded 'absolute submission,' but the latter gave evasive answers. All these hollow negotiations failed; and war remained as the only other alternative for solving the vexed Anglo-Mysore relations. One English army under General Harris, joined by the Nizam's troops nominally under Mir Alam but under the real command of Arthur Wellesley, marched from Vellore on 11th February, 1799, and invaded Mysore on 5th March. Another army under General Stuart marched from Cannanore, on 21st February, up the Western Ghats from the west. On 6th March, Stuart defeated Tipu at Sedaseer (45 miles west of Seringapatam), and on the 27th the Sultan was again defeated by Harris at Malvelly (30 miles east of Seringapatam). Tipu then retired within the walls of Seringapatam, where the English arrived early in April and began its siege on the 17th of that month. It was taken by assault on 4th May, 1799; the English lost 1,164 men and the Mysoreans about 8,000. Tipu died bravely in the defence of his metropolis; his sons surrendered to the

²⁴⁹ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 11—57.

²⁵⁰ The numbers of which had been increased owing to the Nizam's dissatisfaction with Shore's policy of non-intervention.

English. Thus fell the new Muslim power in Mysore founded about thirty-three years ago.

Opinions are sharply divided about Tipu's character and abilities. On the one hand, he has been described by some writers, both contemporary and modern, as a cruel tyrant and a die-hard Muslim fanatic ; but there are others who have expressed favourable views about his character and administration. Kirkpatrick describes him " as the cruel and relentless enemy ; the intolerant bigot and furious fanatic ; the oppressive and unjust ruler ; the harsh and rigid master ; the sanguinary tyrant ; the perfidious negotiator ; the frivolous and capricious innovator ; the mean and minute economist ; the peddling trader and even the retail shopkeeper."²⁵¹ Wilks holds much the same opinion.²⁵² Even Major Rennell, who was not always guided by prejudices, described him as " cruel to an extreme degree." Writers like Lt. Moore,²⁵³ and Major Dirom,²⁵⁴ who were connected with the military operations of the time, and Mill²⁵⁵ have, however, left favourable descriptions of him. An impartial student of history has to turn from vehemence of expression to critical examination of basic facts : he will note accordingly that Tipu was a very industrious ruler, and that his kingdom was actually well governed : his official records were voluminous and were methodically arranged ; and he gave detailed instructions to his officers on every conceivable subject, civil, military and commercial.²⁵⁶ Mill writes that " as a domestic ruler he sustains an advantageous comparison with the greatest princes of the East ; " and that his country was accordingly, at least during the first and better part of his

²⁵¹ Quoted in Dr. Sen's *Studies in Indian History*, p. 165.

²⁵² *Historical Sketches of the South India*, Vols. I and II.

²⁵³ Moore's *Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment*.

²⁵⁴ *A Narrative of the Campaign in India*.

²⁵⁵ *History of British India*.

²⁵⁶ Bowring, *Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan*, p. 210 ; Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 57.

reign, " the best cultivated and its population the most flourishing in India ; " ²⁵⁷ this statement, though somewhat exaggerated, is not entirely devoid of truth. Other contemporary writers have also given favourable verdicts about his administration. " When a person," remarked Lt. Moore, " travelling through a strange country, finds it well cultivated, populous, with industrious inhabitants, cities newly founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and everything flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally conclude it to be under a form of government congenial to the minds of the people. This is a picture of Tipu's country ; and this is our conclusion respecting its government." ²⁵⁸ " His country," wrote Dirom, " was found everywhere full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to the utmost extent of which the soil was capable ; while the discipline and fidelity of his troops in the field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies equally strong, of the excellent regulations which existed in his army. His government, though strict and arbitrary, was despotism of a politic and able sovereign." ²⁵⁹ Sir John Shore also noted that " the peasantry of his dominions are protected, and their labours encouraged and rewarded." ²⁶⁰ He tried to introduce vigorous innovations in different branches of administration,—in the army, trade, banking and money-lending, coinage, weights and measures, calendar and method of calculating time and in the sale of liquors. Like the Revolutionary Government in France, Tipu had a passion for changing the name of everything. But his reforms were unwise and useless. Mill has justly remarked, " One of the most remarkable characteristics,

²⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 148-49. For details about Tipu's administrative system reference may be made to the *Journal of the Department of Letters* (Calcutta University), Vols. XIX and XXI.

²⁵⁸ *Narrative*, p. 201.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

²⁶⁰ Malcolm, *Political History of India*, Vol. II, Appendix II, pp. lxi. Cf. Buchanan's *Journal : Canara*.

however, of the Sultan's mind, was the want of judgment. For an eastern prince, he was full of knowledge. His mind was active, acute, and ingenious. But, in the value which he set upon objects, whether as means or as ends, he was almost perpetually deceived."²⁶¹ Thus he lacked his father's political sagacity and was devoid of his shrewd common sense.

As a soldier, Tipu possessed great valour and occasionally exhibited strategic and tactical abilities. His private life was without any blot, and he was above the common vices of his class. His mind was deeply impressed with a sense of religion and confidence in God. He said to one of his French advisers: "I rely solely on Providence, expecting that I shall be alone and unsupported ; but God, and my courage, will accomplish everything."²⁶² He had a good education, and he was interested in foreign politics, as is clear from his embassies to different countries. Some writers have dwelt much on his cruelties. Mr. Bowring has described him as a " ruler, who urged on by religious bigotry, innate cruelty, and despotism, thought little of sacrificing thousands of lives to his ardent zeal and revengeful spirit."²⁶³ But it would be unfair to accuse him of systematic cruelty. Major Dirom has remarked that his " cruelties were in general inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies." Tipu has also been charged with religious intolerance, which, it is said, led him to wound the susceptibilities of his non-Muslim subjects, by forcibly converting many of the Hindus and by driving out the Christians. Wilks wrote that " a dark and intolerant bigotry excluded from Tipu's choice all but true believers ; and unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindoo in his dominions. In the Hindoo no degree of merit was a passport to favour ; in the Mussalman no crime could ensure displeasure." Dr. Sen has conclusively proved on the

²⁶¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 146.

²⁶² Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 152.

²⁶³ *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

study of Tipu's Shringeri Letters that "Tipu knew how to placate Hindu opinion, and religious intolerance was not the real cause of his ruin."²⁶⁴ Himself a devout Mussalman, Tipu forced conversion only on those "refractory Hindus upon whose unquestioning obedience the Sultan could not count."²⁶⁵ He made grants in favour of Hindu temples and employed many Hindu officers. At the same time it is clear that there must have been some element of Hindu discontent with Tipu's rule, otherwise the victorious allies at the time of partitioning, settling and pacifying the country, would not at once have thought of restoring the Hindu dynasty and recreating a Hindu principality.

After Tipu's fall came the partition and settlement of his dominions. The tracts of Harponeli and Soonda lying between the northern part of Kanara and the lands ceded to the Nizam, and certain other districts, were offered to the Peshwa on certain conditions, but he refused to accept these. Mr. Roberts has remarked that "diplomatically, the offer of territory to the Peshwa was an astute move. It made it difficult for him to express any resentment with the settlement."²⁶⁶ The Nizam got certain territories on the north-east near his own dominion, that is, the districts of Gooty and Guramkonda, and part of the district of Chitaldrug without its fort. The British got Kanara on the west; Wynaad in the south-west; the districts of Coimbatore and Daraporam; two districts on the east, together with the town and island of Seringapatam.²⁶⁷ The rest of the kingdom of Mysore was restored to a minor prince of the old Hindu dynasty on the express condition "that the whole of the military force maintained for the

²⁶⁴ *Studies in Indian History*, p. 169. These letters were discovered in 1916 by Rao Bahadur K. Narsimachar.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 166. Vide 'New Light on Tipu Sultan,' in *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, July, 1931.

²⁶⁶ *India Under Wellesley*, p. 65.

²⁶⁷ Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 161-62.

defence of the country should be English ; that for the expense of it he should annually pay seven lacs of pagodas ; that in case of war, or of preparation for war, the English might exact any larger sum, which they deemed proportional to the resources of the Raja ; and last of all, should they be dissatisfied with his government in any respect, they might interpose to any extent in the internal administration of the country, or even take the unlimited management of it to themselves ; " the members of Tipu's family were sent to Vellore ; and for all practical purposes, the young ruler of Mysore became dependent on the Company. Mr. Thornton has remarked : " The Earl of Mornington, therefore, acted wisely in not making Mysore ostensibly a British possession. He acted no less wisely in making it substantially so, . . . ²⁶⁸ Wellesley himself wrote : " under this arrangement, I trust that I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Raja's territory " ²⁶⁹ Mill has written that " this Raja was a species of screen, put up to hide, at once from Indian and European eyes, the extent of aggrandisement which the British territory had received, and it so far answered the purpose, that, though an obvious aggression, it undoubtedly claims the praise of an adroit, and well-timed political expedient. It enabled the Governor-General to dismiss Nizam Ali with a much smaller share of the prey, than would have satisfied him, had the English taken without disguise the whole of what in this manner they actually appropriated. " ²⁷⁰ In this way the Nizam was prevented from becoming too powerful an ally, just as the Marathas were prevented from an inconvenient accession of power by attaching conditions to an offer of sharing that could not be accepted.

Thus fell one of the leading Indian powers whose " thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British

²⁶⁸ *The History of the British Empire in India*, Vol. VI, p. 89.

²⁶⁹ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 144.

²⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 164-65.

power." This was itself a great relief for the English. Moreover, the territorial gains made by the partition of Mysore were highly valuable. The British territory thus extended 'from sea to sea across the base of the Peninsula,' and it encircled Mysore on all sides except on the North. When in 1800 the English also got the Nizam's possessions in Mysore, it "was entirely encircled by the Pax Britannica."²⁷¹ As a military, financial, and pacificatory settlement," remarks Dean Hutton, "the conquest of Mysore was the most brilliant success of the British power since the days of Clive."²⁷² Wellesley himself wrote to Lord Grenville eight days after the fall of Seringapatam: "The event is indeed brilliant, glorious and substantially advantageous beyond my most sanguine expectations."²⁷³ He wrote to the Court of Directors on 3rd August, 1799: "Highly as I estimate these immediate and direct advantages of revenue, and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests in its tendency to increase your political consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependents, and of defending your possessions against any enemy, either Asiatic or European."²⁷⁴ The conquest of Mysore was highly acclaimed in England. The Governor-General was made Marquis Wellesley in the peerage of Ireland, and General Harris was elevated to the baronage.

²⁷¹ Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 68.

²⁷² Quoted in *Ibid.*

²⁷³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70.

²⁷⁴ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*. Cf :—"... Tippo, the certain ally of the French in India was subdued, and in his place was established in Mysore a government calculated to afford and which has afforded, the most substantial assistance to Great Britain in all her difficulties."—Duke of Wellington's *Memorandum*; Owen's *Wellington Despatches*, p. 10.

SECTION IV

THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD

The Nizam was the legal representative in the Deccan of the Delhi Emperor, though he had made himself practically independent of his authority during the first part of the eighteenth century. But the Nizam's authority was gradually overshadowed by the Marathas and the state of Mysore, and he was frequently subjected to attacks and harassments by those powers.²⁷⁵ His weak position made him an ally of the Company, and, except during their first war with Hyder (1780), he remained formally true to this alliance. As provided by the treaty of 1768, the Company demanded the reversion of the district of Guntoor, after the death of the Nizam's brother in 1782. This place was of great importance to the Nizam as being his only outlet to the sea ; but to the Company also it was of strategic importance, as it separated the British possessions in the North from those in the South, being situated between Madras and the other 'Circars.' The Nizam evaded its surrender by various pretexts, and Cornwallis had to wait till the situation improved by the middle of the year 1788,²⁷⁶ when Captain Kennaway went to Hyderabad in September and obtained a peaceful surrender of the Guntoor Circar.

The Nizam now sent his confidential minister to Calcutta, with the ostensible object of settling some financial matters, but really to form a profitable defensive alliance with the Company as a sort of compensation for the loss of Guntoor. We have it on the authority of Colonel Wilks that, at the same time the Nizam had sent an embassy to Tipu proposing an offensive and defensive alliance, but the negotiations broke off when Tipu wanted to strengthen the bond of union by a matrimonial alliance to which the former did not agree owing

²⁷⁵ Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 318.

²⁷⁶ Forrest, *Cornwallis*, Vol. I, p. 34.

to his family pride.²⁷⁷ Soon afterwards the Nizam claimed the help of British troops for the recovery of some of his former districts from Tipu, on the strength of the treaty of Masulipatam of 1768. But Cornwallis found himself in a delicate position because of two subsequent treaties,—one of 1769, by which Hyder's right to those territories of which the treaty of 1768 professed to dispossess him were affirmed, and the other of 1785, by which Tipu's rights to those very territories were acknowledged by the English. There were also before him the injunctions of clause 34 of Pitt's India Act. Cornwallis at last decided to accept the Nizam's request, because he was anxious to secure the Nizam and the Marathas as allies in view of the impending war with Tipu. He took to the expedient of interpreting the Parliamentary Act in the sense that though by that Act he could not conclude new treaties, yet he could explain the treaty of 1768 "with a view to a more perfect execution of it." Accordingly he wrote to the Nizam on 7th July, 1789: "In proof of the sincerity of my intentions that the Treaty (of 1768) should be carried into full effect, I agree that, in the sixth Article of the Treaty, the words 'whenever the situation of affairs will allow such a body of troops to march into the Deccan,' shall be understood to mean, that the force engaged for by this Article, *viz.*, two battalions of sepoys and six pieces of cannon, manned by Europeans—shall be granted whenever your Highness shall apply for it, making only one exception, that it is not to be employed against any power in alliance with the Company—*viz.*, Pundit Pirdhun Peishwa, Ragojee Bhoosla, Madajee Sindia, and the other Maratha chiefs, the Nawab of Arcot and Nawab Vizier, the Rajah of Tanjore and Travancore. That the battalions at present not defined in number shall not consist of less than eight hundred men each. That the six field pieces shall be

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37; Mill, Vol. V, p. 320, footnote. Both families were founded by adventurers who rose through official position; the only difference was that the Nizam's house had long become an established one while the other was recent.

manned with the number of Europeans which is usual in time of war."²⁷⁸ Tipu's name was deliberately not mentioned, and Cornwallis declared the letter to be as binding "as a treaty in due form could be."²⁷⁹

Cornwallis' letter to and engagement with the Nizam has not escaped criticism. "The desire of not offending," says Sir John Malcolm, "against the letter of the Act of Parliament, would appear on this occasion to have led to a trespass on its spirit." In spite of his strong belief in the hostile designs of Tipu and in the wisdom of Cornwallis in general measures, he has further added that "the liberal construction of the restrictions of the Act of Parliament had, upon this occasion, the effect of making the Governor-General pursue a course, which was not only questionable in point of faith; but which must have been more offensive to Tippu Sultan and more calculated to produce a war with that Prince, than an avowed contract of defensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition."²⁸⁰ Mill has quoted all these statements and has charged Cornwallis with a breach of faith. Forrest has argued that Cornwallis was not guilty of breach of faith either with the Parliament, because he had every reason to believe that he would receive the approval of the former, or with Tipu, because the latter had in fact violated the treaty of Mangalore by his manifestation of hostile design.²⁸¹ But a student of history will not fail to understand that Cornwallis' action was a violation of the spirit of the Parliamentary Act, and that he was guided

²⁷⁸ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 38—43.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Sketch of the Political History of India*, pp. 68-69. It is to be noted that Tipu had already felt very much slighted by rejection of the proposed matrimonial alliance with the Nizam's family; to this was now added his exclusion from the list of important allies by Cornwallis; so he was doubly irritated into hostile action.

²⁸¹ Cornwallis, Vol. I, p. 43.

solely by considerations of safeguarding British interests in view of a likely rupture with Tipu.²⁸²

We have already seen how the Nizam joined the triple alliance with the English in 1790, and again how he was worsted by the Marathas at the battle of Khardla in 1795 when Shore refused British help in pursuance of the non-intervention policy. The Nizam resented this indifference of the British, and his relations with them were rather strained when Wellesley came out to India. The 'Paigah' nobles of the Nizam's Court formed a party "which was anti-British, pro-French and pro-Tipu."²⁸³ The Nizam had in these circumstances handed over the training of his troops to French officers, who were, in the words of Wellesley, "all Frenchmen of the most virulent principles of Jacobinism."²⁸⁴

But some favourable factors soon appeared to improve the relations between the English and the Nizam. He was helped by the British during the rebellion of his son Ali Jah in 1797.²⁸⁵ "This," remarks Malcolm, "may be truly said to have saved the British Government from the very serious evils to which it was at this crisis exposed."²⁸⁶ Further, the Nizam began gradually to suspect the increasing French influence in his court,²⁸⁷ and the British had a supporter in the Nizam's minister Mir Alam, who urged him to enter into friendship with the English. Thus the Nizam was persuaded to conclude a subsidiary treaty with the English on 1st September, 1798,²⁸⁸ by which the "subsidiary force was made permanent and

²⁸² Beveridge, *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 582.

²⁸³ Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 78; Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 34.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁸⁵ Beveridge, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 678.

²⁸⁶ *Political History*, Vol. I, pp. 151-52.

²⁸⁷ The French domination of Hyderabad under Bussy was yet remembered, being only about forty years ago.

²⁸⁸ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 49-54.

raised to six battalions costing Rs. 24,17,100 a year ; the Nizam's French corps was to be disbanded ; the British Government was to arbitrate between the Nizam and the Peishwa, or, in the event of the Peishwa not consenting to that arrangement, to protect the Nizam from any unjust and unreasonable demands of the Mahrattas." The Nizam rendered assistance to the English in their war against Tipu,²⁸⁹ and after the conquest of Mysore they thought it necessary to form a closer alliance with him, and to " advert to the means of strengthening the Government of the Nizam,"²⁹⁰ in order to prevent Hyderabad from becoming again, as after 1795, a sphere of Maratha influence. After consideration of various suggestions, it was decided " to extend the basis of the treaty of September 1, 1798 ; to make it generally defensive against all powers ; and in fact to take the Nizam under the protection of the British Government."²⁹¹ A treaty of ' perpetual and general defensive alliance ' was then concluded by the British with the Nizam on 12th October, 1800,²⁹² by which " two battalions of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were added to the subsidiary force, and for the payment of the force the Nizam ceded all the territories he had acquired by the Mysore Treaties of 1792 and 1799, yielding about 17,58,000 *Pagodas*, subject to some exchanges to secure a well-defined boundary. The treaty regulated the duties on which the subsidiary force was to be employed, secured the Nizam in the internal sovereignty of his dominions, prohibited his entering into political negotiations with other states, and made the British Government the arbiter in his disputes with other powers."

²⁸⁹ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, XXXVII.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

²⁹² Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 69-80. Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 171-77.

The submission of the Nizam was of importance to the British and the Nizam was also henceforward safe against his enemies ; but his kingdom could not thereby be forthwith saved from the forces of disorder. Internal peace did not come hand in hand with assurances of safety from external dangers. Depending on the subsidiary troops, the government of the Nizam ceased to maintain an efficient military establishment of its own, and thus the forces of disintegration²⁹³ worked without any check. The Duke of Wellington later on remarked : " conceive of a country, in every village of which there are from twenty to thirty horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no means of living except by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government . . . no inhabitant can, or will remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village. This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peishwa and the Nizam." ²⁹⁴ It is instructive to compare this picture with that of Mysore, as drawn by Moore and Dirom, under the Indian revivalist Tipu. In the Nizam's state (as in the Peshwa's) the real power was now passing into the hands of the East India Company, and the native government was decaying during the transition period of inefficiency and undefined responsibility. In other parts of India also the same thing had happened in the latter half of the eighteenth century ; as for example in Bengal,—where also the passing of sovereign power from native hands, the listlessness and futility of the last Nawabs, the disbanding of the older armies, etc., produced the same anarchy, unsafety and economic decline, which Wellington has described of Hyderabad.

In 1802 a commercial treaty was concluded between the Nizam and the English for the improvement and security of the Company's trade within his dominions.²⁹⁵ Nizam Ali died

²⁹³ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, XXXIX.

²⁹⁴ Quoted in Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 83.

²⁹⁵ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 83—86.

in 1803, and was succeeded by his son Sikandar Jah, who "went through the farce of obtaining the confirmation of the Emperor of Delhi," but confirmed all existing treaties with the English.²⁹⁶ As has been already noted, the Nizam received at the close of the second Anglo-Maratha conflict, by the partition treaty of Hyderabad, dated 28th April, 1804, the Deccan territories conquered from the Sindhia and the Bhonsle Raja.²⁹⁷

In 1808 died the Nizam's minister Mir Alam, a sincere friend of the English, and some strong discussions took place between the English and the Nizam, as the former wanted to have a minister who would be obedient to them while the Nizam favoured Munir-ul-mulk. At last it was settled, in June 1809, that formally Munir-ul-mulk should become the Prime Minister, but the administration would be carried on by Chandulal, deputy of the late Mir Alam. Chandulal became entirely dependent on the English, and the Nizam "retired from administration in disgust, leading a life of gloomy retirement and sullen discontent," as later recorded by Metcalfe.²⁹⁸ In 1810 Henry Russel was appointed Resident at Hyderabad, and improvements were effected in the forces of the Nizam. In the course of a few years, his government became more oppressive and demoralised from the effects of which the reforms introduced by Russel in the civil administration of the Nizam could not save the people. When Metcalfe took over charge from Russel on 1st December, 1820, he found the government 'thoroughly disorganised' and involved in great financial difficulties, and the country in the midst of disorders,—caused by the disbanded soldiers and dacoits, European superintendents of districts, and an unscrupulous Banking Company styled William Palmer and Co. (started in the Nizam's kingdom by William Palmer, son of General Palmer

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

²⁹⁸ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

by his Muslim wife),²⁹⁹ and also by the selfish ministers of the state, who opposed every project for reform. Metcalfe introduced some reforms in the land-revenue system of the Nizam's state, but his other measures were thwarted by Chandulal and by the inconsistent policy of Lord Hastings, who objected to interference in the Nizam's civil government, while at the same time he authorised and sanctioned measures for the payment, organisation and discipline of his army.³⁰⁰ There can be no better conditions in a country of which the ruler loses self-reliance and initiative for progressive actions by learning to depend on others, and where at the same time the protectors cannot, from some reason or other, directly intervene to root out the elements of disorder. In fact the Company was busy during this period with schemes for territorial expansion and political supremacy;³⁰¹ the work of reconstruction and reform, even in the British territories proper, began some years later in the time of Bentinck. Before his departure, Lord Hastings concluded a treaty with the Nizam on 12th December, 1822, "whereby the Nizam received a considerable accession of territory, was released from all arrears of tribute which he owed to the Peishwa, and some exchanges of territory were effected to secure a well-defined frontier."³⁰²

SECTION V

THE CARNATIC, TANJORE AND SURAT

Since the middle of the eighteenth century, the Carnatic presented a scene of woeful corruptions and the relations of the Company with its Nawab Muhammad Ali were rather

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

³⁰¹ Cf. the ideal of Lord Hastings: "We should have thus a complete control over the politics of the whole confederacy," for establishing a more "operative ascendancy."—Quoted in Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 242.

³⁰² Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 91—97.

complicated. The Nawab left Arcot, and built a palace in the village of Chepauk, a suburb of Madras, where he spent his days in idleness and luxury by borrowing money from the Company's servants at exorbitant interest (sometimes going as high as 36 per cent per annum), and granting them assignments on the revenues of the districts of the Carnatic.³⁰³ As Burke remarked, "he totally sequestered himself from his country . . . He has there continued a constant cabal with the Company's servants, from the highest to the lowest; creating out of the ruins of the country, brilliant fortunes for those who will, and entire destroying those who will not, be subservient to his purposes."³⁰⁴ The Nawab of Arcot's debt was a heavy drain upon the country and was at the same time responsible for all the administrative scandals, which the corrupt government of the Company in Madras failed to remove.

Arthur Wellesley justly remarked: "Here then was established a system which tended not only to the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Nawab, and to the destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic, but it was carried into execution by the Company's civil and military servants and by British subjects."³⁰⁵

The scandal became too great to escape the notice of the British Parliament when it proceeded to deal with Indian affairs. Dunda's Bill, Fox's Bill, and Pitt's Bill considered the matter, and the Parliamentary Act of 1784 laid down that the Court of Directors should enquire into the origin of the debts, and should keep a fund for paying off such claims as will be justly due. But the Board of Control itself interfered in the matter, divided the loans into three classes,—the Consolidated Loan of 1767 amounting to £880,000, the Cavalry

³⁰³ Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, pp. 85-86. The best example of the debt-holders was Paul Benfield, who amassed a fortune of more than half a million.

³⁰⁴ Quoted in *Ibid.*, from 'The Works of Edmund Burke,' Bohn's Standard Library, 6 Vols., London, 1894-97; Vol. III, p. 117.

³⁰⁵ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 15.

Loan amounting to £160,000 and the Consolidated Loan of 1777 amounting to £2,400,000 at twelve per cent,—and decided that each class should be separately treated, that “the account of the whole should be made up with interest, and that a portion of the revenues of the Carnatic should be annually set apart for the liquidation.”³⁰⁶

This was, remarks Mr. Thornton, “either a lamentable error of judgment or a culpable breach of duty. The claims of the alleged creditors of the Nawab of Arcot were surrounded by circumstances of the highest degree of suspicion. If ever there were claims which called for minute and searching enquiry, such were these. The course taken by the ministry upon this question tended to cast great discredit upon them, and to afford to the opposition favourable ground of attack.”³⁰⁷ The Company remonstrated against this decision of the Board and it was denounced in the Parliament. Burke delivered a vigorous speech attacking it in various ways; the speech remained unanswered; but clearly “a serious blow was dealt by the Board of Control at the cause of pure administration in the East.”³⁰⁸ By an arrangement dated 2nd December, 1781, the revenues of the Carnatic had been transferred to British control for five years, the Nawab getting one-sixth for his private expenses.³⁰⁹ But his creditors clamoured for more, in response to which the Board of Control “ordered the restitution of the revenues to the Nawab, and the assignment of twelve lakhs of *pagodas*³¹⁰ a year for the payment of his debts to the Company and to private creditors.”

Cornwallis concluded a treaty with the Nawab of Arcot

³⁰⁶ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 356.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

³⁰⁸ Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 97.

³⁰⁹ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 220-21.

³¹⁰ The Pagoda refers to a coin current in Southern India equal to three and a half rupees at the normal rate of exchange.

on 24th February, 1787,³¹¹ by which it was agreed that the Nawab should pay nine lacs "for the military defences in peace besides the twelve lakhs for his debts; that in time of war the contracting parties should each pay four-fifths of their revenues, the Nawab being first allowed to deduct the value of certain *jaghires*; and that in case of failure of payment by the Nawab certain districts should be assigned as security." But when war broke out between Tipu and the English, Cornwallis brought the Carnatic under the direct management of the Company in order "to secure the two states (the Carnatic and Madras) against the dangers to which he thought them exposed from the mismanagement of the Nawab's officers."³¹² A new treaty was concluded on 12th July, 1792, by which it was stipulated that the Company should maintain a force for the payment of which the Nawab agreed to pay nine lacs of *pagodas* annually; that the Carnatic should be garrisoned by the Company's troops; that in case of war the Company should possess full authority over the Carnatic (except the *jagirs* belonging to the Nawab's family) paying to the Nawab one-fifth of the revenues; "that the assignment for the debts of the Nawab should be reduced to 6,21,105 *pagodas*; that the British Government should collect the tribute of the *polygars* in the Nawab's name, and give him credit for it in his contribution; that on failure of payment the British Government should assume the management of certain specified districts; that if the Nawab required additional troops, they should be separately paid for; and that the Nawab should renounce political intercourse with other States and be included in all Treaties relating to the Carnatic."³¹³

Muhammad Ali died on 13th October, 1795, and was succeeded by his son Omdut-ul-Omra, who could not be persuaded by Lord Hobart, the then Governor of Madras, to change

³¹¹ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 227—34.

³¹² Malcolm, *History of India*, Vol. I, p. 94.

³¹³ Aitchison, Vol. V, pp. 236—46.

the terms of the treaty by ceding to the Company the territories that had been pledged as security for arrear dues, owing to the influence of his debt-holders, who "perplexed, plagued and intimidated him."³¹⁴ It was Wellesley who finally brought the Nawab's administration to an end. "The method he employed was unfortunate, and laid him open to the charge of sophistical dealing."³¹⁵

After the capture of Seringapatam the British Government discovered there certain documents³¹⁶ which, it is held, proved a treasonable correspondence between Muhammad Ali and his son and the ruler of Mysore. This gave Wellesley the opportunity to declare that the Nawab had broken the treaty obligations and that he had forfeited his throne by his "hostile counsels . . . modelled upon the artful example, actuated by the faithless spirit, and sanctioned by the testamentary voice of his father."³¹⁷ But the death of Omdut-ul-Omra on 15th July, 1801, frustrated the immediate execution of Wellesley's plan. The Nawab's son Ali Hussain began to govern the Carnatic with two regents from the very day of his father's death. Wellesley now demanded from him the surrender of the administration of his kingdom by retaining only the nominal sovereignty and a liberal pension. "This fact," remarks Mr. Roberts, "that this was done on the very day of Omdut-ul-Omra's death surely argues an inexcusable precipitancy and

³¹⁴ Quoted in Malcolm's *Political History*, Vol. I, p. 164, from Hobart's *Minute*.

³¹⁵ Roberts, *India Under Wellesley*, p. 102.

³¹⁶ "The documents on which so extraordinary a value was set by the Governor-General consisted almost entirely of certain things picked out from a mass of correspondence which purported to have passed between the "Presence" (the title which Tippoo bestowed upon himself) and two *vakeels*, Golam Ali Khan, and Ali Raza Khan, who accompanied, in 1792, the hostage sons of the Sultan to Madras. Besides these, only two letters were produced; one from a subsequent *Vakeel* of Tippe at Madras; another, supposed to be from Omdut-ul-Omrah, but under a fictitious name."—Mill, Vol. VI, p. 311.

³¹⁷ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 184.

an almost brutal lack of feeling."³¹⁸ But the new Nawab and his regents refused to comply with those terms, and reasonably demanded evidences for the charge of treason against his predecessors. The British commissioners put forward counter-arguments. Being unsuccessful in persuading Husain Ali, Wellesley made an arrangement with Azim-ud-dowla, nephew of the late Nawab and the immediate great-grandson of Anwaruddin through both parents, on 31st July, 1801, by which he made over the civil and military government of the Carnatic to the English and received a pension of one-fifth of his revenues. "Thus was this important arrangement concluded in a peaceable manner," remarked Arthur Wellesley, "by which a remedy was provided for all the evils which had attended the former connexion between the Company and the Nabobs of the Carnatic; additional security was given to the British Government, and an addition of £800,000 per annum, the value of 20 lacs of star *pagodas*, was made to their pecuniary resources."³¹⁹

The Company's Government at that time justified its behaviour towards the Carnatic Nawab by declaring that "justice and moderation warrant that the family of Omdut-ul-Omra shall be deprived of the means of completing its systematic course of hostility; wisdom and prudence demand that the reputed son of Omdut-ul-Omra shall not be permitted to retain the possession of resources dangerous to the tranquillity of the British Government in the Peninsula of India."³²⁰ Wellesley described it to have been "perhaps the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the *dewanny* of Bengal."³²¹ Wellesley's action received the sanction of the authorities in England. This has been support-

³¹⁸ *India Under Wellesley*, p. 103; Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 332—34.

³¹⁹ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 19.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³²¹ Quoted in Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 156.

ed by Thornton³²² and Owen ; the latter writes : “ However little the papers discovered at Seringapatam may satisfy Mill’s severe test, they clearly enough proved both a technical breach of Treaties, and a violation of their spirit and object.”³²³ Mill has, however, made severe but reasonable criticism of the whole affair, and Beveridge shares much the same opinion.³²⁴ One has to admit that the documents in question did not *prove* any charge of treason against the Nawabs of the Carnatic. Mill has justly summed up : “ Not only does this evidence afford no proof of a criminal correspondence with Tippoo on the part of the Nabob ; but the total inability of the English to produce further evidence, with all the records of the Mysore Government in their hands, and all the living agents of it within their absolute power, is a proof of the contrary.”³²⁵ Wilson admits that “ upon the face of the correspondence little appeared to convict the Nawabs of the Carnatic of actual treachery against the British Government.”³²⁶ Even Torren, an admirer of Wellesley, has remarked : “ No proof of political perfidy seems to have been gleaned from the mass of rubbish found at Seringapatam.” It is true that the corrupted state of affairs in the Carnatic made some sort of settlement highly necessary, but one can very well question if a more plain course could not have been adopted by the Governor-General. Roberts has very aptly remarked : “ It is a thousand pity that Wellesley did not in the first instance come boldly forward with the statement that the Company intended to take over the Government of the Carnatic on the simple but adequate grounds, first that the administration of the Nawab had long been a sham and an unreality ; secondly, that so corrupt and incompetent an administration could be endured no longer by

³²² *Ibid.*

³²³ *Wellesley Despatches*, XVII.

³²⁴ *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, pp. 718—21.

³²⁵ Vol. VI, p. 322.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 324, footnote.

the power through whose indulgent tolerance alone its very existence was possible."³²⁷ It is difficult to maintain that "Wellesley, in the annexation of the Carnatic, vindicated political justice as well as political wisdom."³²⁸ Even Wilson, a strong supporter of Wellesley's policy in this episode, has to admit: "The inconsistencies and unsoundness of many of our attempts to vindicate our political measures in India are undeniable. It would have been more honest and honourable to have confined ourselves to the avowal that the maintenance of British dominion in India was the main-spring of all our policy."³²⁹

At this time the rulers of Tanjore and Surat had also to give up their kingdoms to the Company in return for titles and pensions. After the death of Tulaji, the Raja of Tanjore, two candidates came forward for his throne,—one his half-brother Amar Singh and the other his adopted son Serfoji. The former was a man of violent and unbalanced character, but the latter, being trained by the famous missionary Schwartz, had many good traits in his character. With the opinion of the Pandits of Tanjore in his favour, Amar Singh got the throne. But his rule proved injurious, and so Cornwallis referred the case to the scholars of Benares and Calcutta, who decided in favour of Serfoji. The Court of Directors expressed their willingness to recognise him, and he concluded a treaty with Wellesley on 25th October, 1799, by which he gave up to the Company the whole civil and military administration, in return for a pension of £40,000 a year.

In Surat, the Company had undertaken its defence on behalf of the Emperor since 1759, while the civil administration remained in the hands of its Nawab. But the English soon saw that the revenues of Surat did not prove sufficient to meet the expenses of its defence. In 1790 the old Nawab of

³²⁷ *India Under Wellesley*, p. 108.

³²⁸ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 362.

³²⁹ Mill, Vol. VI, p. 329, footnote.

Surat died and his son ascended the *masnad*. Since the days of Cornwallis, the Bombay Council had been thinking of putting an end to this state of things, but Cornwallis did not like to interfere. The Company's authorities, however, became gradually impatient, and in 1797 the Nawab was asked to disband a great part of his own undisciplined troops and to assign funds for the maintenance of British battalions. After some negotiation, the Nawab agreed to make several concessions, but he died on 8th January, 1799, before the treaty was concluded. His only son, an infant, dying within a few weeks, his brother justly claimed the throne, but the Company imposed on him the conditions that a judicature should be established at Surat and that the Company should receive sufficient money for the garrison. The claimant to the throne agreed to pay a lac of rupees annually and justly expressed his inability to pay anything more. After several enquiries, Mr. Seton, the Resident, wrote to the Governor of Bombay on 18th August, 1799: "I have left nothing undone; pressed him to the utmost. I am convinced he has not the means, nor believe he really would pay more."³³⁰ But Wellesley, guided solely by the Company's interests, ordered on 10th March, 1800, that the Nawab should be immediately displaced and the government should be taken over by the English. It is clear that Wellesley's treatment of the Surat Nawab was high-handed. Mill has described his conduct to have been "the most unceremonious act of dethronement, which the English had yet performed, as the victim was the weakest and most obscure."³³¹ Beveridge has no hesitation in saying "that the whole proceeding was characterised by tyranny and injustice."³³²

³³⁰ Quoted in Mill, Vol. VI, p. 295.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³³² *Comprehensive History*, Vol. II, p. 717.

SECTION VI

THE FATE OF OUDH

As we have already said, Oudh was a scene of corruptions and administrative abuses more flagrant than those prevailing in the Carnatic. Sir John Macpherson's government, which was described by Cornwallis "as a system of the dirtiest jobbing" did nothing to remove these. But the buffer state of Oudh had a strategic importance for the Company, whose interests demanded that it should be made a strong barrier of defence on the north-western boundary of Bengal. Oudh did not escape the attention of Cornwallis. He had a conference with Hyder Beg, minister of the Nawab-Wazir Asaf-ud-daula, who urgently entreated him for the withdrawal of a great part of the Company's troops stationed within the Nawab-Wazir's dominions. Cornwallis agreed to reduce the tribute paid by the Nawab-Wazir from 74 to 50 lacs, if this should be punctually paid, but he refused to withdraw the Company's battalions.

But with the death of Hyder Beg in 1794 all chances of reform disappeared. After the death of Asaf-ud-daula in 1797, Sir John Shore intervened in the matter of a disputed succession between Mirza Ali, whom Asaf-ud-daula had treated as his son and successor and the dead Nawab's eldest brother Saadat Ali, "who in fear of intrigues, had been compelled to reside on a pension at Benares."³³³ The latter was raised to the throne by Shore on 21st January, 1798, and a treaty was concluded with him by which "it was finally settled that the annual subsidy should be raised to seventy-six lacs of rupees, and that the fort of Allahabad should be made over to the English. It was also arranged that the regular amount of the English forces stationed in Oude should be 10,000 men, including all descriptions; that, if any time the amount

³³³ Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 49.

should exceed 13,000 men, the expense of all the troops above that number should be defrayed by the Nabob ; if it should fall below 8,000 a proportional deduction should be made. The Nawab further agreed to pay twelve lacs of rupees to the English, as compensation money, for the expense of placing him, on the *musnud* ; and not, without their consent, to hold communication with any foreign state, to employ the Europeans in his service, or to permit any to settle in his dominions. Finally he agreed to allow a lac and a half of rupees as an annual pension to the deposed Wazir Ali, who was removed to Benares ; and to afford a suitable maintenance to the rest of the reputed children of his brother the deceased Nabob."³³⁴ The authorities in England congratulated Shore for this settlement with the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh, but it could not reform the corrupt government or remove the sufferings of the toiling peasantry of the realm. The administration remained a "by-word for inefficiency, corruption and oppression. Behind the all-too-powerful screen of British bayonets, guarding the frontiers and eliminating the need for any national and patriotic vigour, the energies—not too strong in any case—of the Muhammadan Government rapidly decayed. Commercially the country was the prey of European adventurers, whose activities were a continual annoyance to the authorities in Calcutta."³³⁵

Thus, being devoid of cohesion and torn by internal corruptions, Oudh fell a victim to Wellesley's imperialism. Soon after his arrival in India, Wellesley wrote to the Resident at Oudh on 23rd October, 1798: "There are, however, two or three leading considerations in the state of Oude to which I wish to direct your particular notice, intending at an early period to enter fully into the arrangements in which they must

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

³³⁵ Cf. the similar state of affairs in Hyderabad and Bengal under similar political circumstances in the same latter half of the eighteenth century.

terminate. Whenever the death of Almas shall happen, an opportunity will offer of securing the benefits of Lord Teignmouth's treaty by provisions, which seem necessary for the purpose of realizing the subsidy under all contingencies. The Company ought to succeed to the power of Almas. And the management, if not the sovereignty, of that part of the Doab, which he now rents, ought to be placed in our hands, a proportionate reduction being made from the subsidy ; the strength of our north-western frontier would also be increased. On the other hand, in the event of Almas' death we shall have to apprehend either the dangerous power of a successor equal to him in talents and activity, or the weakness of one inferior in both, or the division of the country among a variety of renters ; in the first case,—we should risk internal commotion ; in the two latter, the frontier of Oude would be considerably weakened against the attacks either of the Abdali or of any other invader. The only remedy for these evils will be the possession of the Doab fixed in the hands of our government. The state of the Vizir's troops in another most pressing evil In the place of the armed rabble which now alarms the Vizir, and invites his enemies, I propose to substitute an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time and to be paid by his Excellency. . . ."³³⁶ He expressed his desires also "to dislodge every European, excepting the Company's servants." But before these projects could be carried into effect, Wazir Ali, who was residing near Benares, murdered Cherry, the British Resident ; he was pursued and captured by a British force and was sent to Fort William, where he lived in confinement till 1817.

Wellesley could not, however, charge the Nawab of Oudh with treason or insubordination, as he had done in the case of the Carnatic. The Oudh rulers were faithful to the Com-

³³⁶ Quoted in Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 163-64; Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 176-77.

pany, and the instalments of the subsidy had been regularly paid. But the threat of Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan, gave Wellesley a convenient pretext for demanding from the Nawab of Oudh that his own army should be disbanded, retaining only as many troops as might be necessary for the collection of taxes and other administrative affairs of the kingdom, and that the Company's forces should be considerably augmented.³³⁷

The Nawab resisted, but pressed by the Company's Resident, Mr. Scott, he expressed his intention to abdicate on 12th November, 1798. Whatever might have been the motives of the Nawab-Wazir in this proposal for abdication, Wellesley informed the Court of Directors: "it is my intention to profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent; and I entertain a confident hope of being able either to establish, with the consent of the Vizier, the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oude and its dependencies, or at least to place our interests in that quarter on an improved and durable foundation."³³⁸ But Wellesley's attempt to provide against future embarrassments, by eliminating the Nawab-Wazir's sons from the succession to the *masnad* of Oudh, led him to withdraw his abdication. Wellesley professed himself "extremely disgusted at the duplicity and insincerity which mark the conduct of the Nawab-Vizir on the present occasion."³³⁹ "The duty imposed on me by my public station," he wrote to the Nawab-Wazir on 9th February, 1800, "compel me to communicate to you, in the most unqualified terms, the

³³⁷ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 189; Mill, Vol. VI, p. 190.

³³⁸ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 190.

³³⁹ Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 212. Mill remarks: "The truth is, that the vivacity of the Governor-General in the pursuit of his objects was far too great. Had the sincerity of the Vizir been ever so indisputable, it was one thing to abdicate in favour of his son; a very different thing to abdicate in favour of the East India Company; and from a proposition to this effect, presented nakedly and impetuously, as was that of the Governor-General, it ought to have been expected that he would revolt."

astonishment, regret and indignation" at this conduct, and he gave him a stern warning.³⁴⁰ The Nawab-Wazir put forward some reasonable objections by appealing to the former treaties; but these were arbitrarily rejected by Wellesley, and the Nawab was thus coerced to yield to his demands.³⁴¹ This was not all. Wellesley further forced the Nawab-Wazir to conclude a treaty on 10th November, 1801, by which the latter had to cede half of his dominions comprising Rohilkhand and the Lower Doab, that is, the land lying between the Ganges and the Jumna. Thus Oudh, for all practical purposes, came under British control. The Company secured immense advantages from the treaty. Owen writes: "The rectification of our military frontier, and the territorial isolation of the Nabob, were not only parts of a larger scheme, but in themselves measures of obvious importance, especially at such a crisis."³⁴² Wellesley himself summed up its advantages in his letter to the Court of Directors, dated 14th November, 1801;³⁴³ these were: the "entire extinction of his (the Nawab's) military power;" the maintenance of a great part of the Bengal army at the Nawab-Wazir's expense; a considerable augmentation was made "in the amount of the subsidy for the purpose of embracing the expenses of the army to be maintained on our north-western frontier, in the ceded districts and in those reserved to the Vizier, as well as the charges of administering justice and of managing the revenue through the channel of the Company's servant;" the payment of the subsidy "no longer rested on the faith of the native government of Oude," nor remained "subject to be affected

³⁴⁰ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 191—201.

³⁴¹ Mill's strictures on the whole transaction are not undeserved: "If the party injured submits without a word, his consent is alleged. If he complains, he is treated as impeaching the honour and justice of his superior; a crime of so prodigious a magnitude, as to set the superior above all obligation to such a worthless connexion," Vol. VI, p. 221.

³⁴² *Wellesley Despatches*, XVIII.

³⁴³ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 207—211.

by the corruption, imbecility and abuse of that vicious and incorrigible system of vexation and misrule." Besides acknowledging these advantages, Arthur Wellesley, as a soldier, judged also the strategic importance of these acquisitions, and said: "The Company were equally bound to defend, and had actually defended, this same frontier in 1798 and 1799 when the country was governed by the Nabob, so that all was gain and strength, without the smallest degree of disadvantage or weakness."³⁴⁴

Wellesley's dealings with the Nawab-Wazir were exceedingly high-handed. Leaving aside Mill's strictures, which are in most cases just, upon his policy, we find that even Wilson admits the objectionable nature of his negotiations. Marshman writes: "of all the transactions of Lord Wellesley's administration, the acquisition of territory from the Nawab by the process of coercion has been considered most open to censure, as an arbitrary, if not unjust proceeding."³⁴⁵ Sir Alfred Lyall, a favourable critic of Wellesley, remarks that, in the case of Oudh, Wellesley "subordinated the feelings and interests of his ally to paramount considerations of British policy, in a manner that showed very little patience, forbearance, or generosity."³⁴⁶ His action was criticised by the Court of Directors also. Imperial aggrandisement was the key to his whole policy. "Quite frankly," says Mr. Roberts, "Wellesley did not regard Indian powers as independent states to be treated with the niceties of international law."³⁴⁷ It should also be noted that Oudh did not immediately enjoy all the fruits of good and civilised government, as Wellesley professed

³⁴⁴ Owen, *Wellington Despatches*, p. 13.

³⁴⁵ *History of India*, Part II, p. 50.

³⁴⁶ *British Dominion in India*, p. 246.

³⁴⁷ *India Under Wellesley*, p. 135. Historically speaking, in these days "International Law" was as yet only an Inter-European Law, and had no application to relations between Christian and non-Christian, or European and Asiatic States.

to introduce there by supplanting the native administration. Even Owen has admitted that "the English intervention cannot be said to have much improved, in the long run, the condition of the country."³⁴⁸

SECTION VII

LAST DAYS OF EMPEROR SHAH ALAM II AND THE BRITISH CAPTURE OF DELHI

Shah Alam's career is a tragic one. We have already seen how he had to make over the Diwani of the Bengal Subah to the Company, and how in the time of Hastings his pension was stopped for his friendship with the Marathas. His last days were very bitter. Deprived of all power, he was living at Delhi as the titular head over the corpse of the once great Mughal Empire, amidst the ruins of its ancient grandeur. Though the independent provincial rulers, like the Nawabs of Oudh and the Nizams of Hyderabad, maintained till the last moment a show of obedience to his sovereignty, by obtaining formal confirmations in their offices and grants of title, by striking coins in his name, and by reading in his name the formal prayers in the mosques, yet it was pathetic that, for all practical purposes, "in strong contrast to the observance of these forms, none thought of obeying his orders, of remitting to him the surplus revenues of the provinces, of mustering troops for his support."³⁴⁹

Towards the end of 1782 died Najaf Khan, who had served the Emperor with ability from 1765, and who had "the character of an able statesman, a skilful commander, and a humane and benevolent man."³⁵⁰ His death was deservedly regretted by Shah Alam, who certainly owed to him "a situation more respectable than he had been in before, or was

³⁴⁸ *Wellesley Despatches*, XVIII.

³⁴⁹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 602.

³⁵⁰ Francklin, *Shah Alum*, p. 97.

hereafter, destined to experience."³⁵¹ After his death, the turbulent spirit of the other nobles broke forth with ungovernable fury into scenes of violence, anarchy and confusion,—in the midst of which the unhappy Emperor, “in the evening of life, had the mortification to perceive his authority totally annihilated, and himself became a wretched pageant in the hands of his rebellious subjects.”³⁵²

The Supreme Council in Calcutta did nothing to help the Emperor at this crisis, and when his eldest son and heir-apparent repaired to Oudh,—as Hastings was then at Lucknow in 1784,—to solicit the help of the Governor-General and the Nawab-Wazir, in delivering his father from the oppression of the nobles, he got simply an advice to approach Madhaji Sindhia for it. Thus the refusal of the English to help the unfortunate Emperor, threw him into the hands of the Maratha dictator, who, as we have already seen, soon made the Emperor a puppet in his hands. Shah Alam had sought a protector but got a master.

So tortuous was the course of politics in India at that time that the English, who only a few years back, had accused the Emperor for his friendship with the Marathas, now in a way pushed him into their hands. We need not enter into any criticism on Hastings' conduct, on which opinions have differed; but this much is certain that this was a case of betrayal, whoever might be responsible for it, the Council in Calcutta or Hastings.³⁵³

Madhaji Sindhia's control could not save the Emperor from further ignominies and troubles. The other engagements of the Sindhia gave opportunity to a young Rohilla chief, Ghulam Kadir, to take possession of Delhi in June, 1788. He blinded the Emperor, removed him from the throne and treated his family with barbarous cruelty. The Emperor, however,

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 98; Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 15.

³⁵³ For arguments, *vide* Mill, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 16—21.

“evinced, under such accumulated misfortunes, a firmness of mind and resignation highly honourable to his character . . . surviving the loss of his sight during his confinement, solaced himself in contemplative reveries, and in composing elegiac verses, descriptive of his deplorable state.”³⁵⁴ But Madhaji Sindhia soon recovered Delhi in 1789, and after taking revenge upon the Rohilla Chief, resealed the blind Emperor on the throne. It was natural that at this time the English were gradually becoming more and more anxious to establish their own sovereignty and could see no political reasons “to employ their resources in restoring a vanished empire.”³⁵⁵ Falling into the hands of Ghulam Kadir, Shah Alam had appealed to Cornwallis for help, but to no effect. “I have received several melancholy (letters) from the king,” Cornwallis wrote to Shore, “calling on me in the most pressing terms for assistance and support. This morning I wrote him a letter perfectly civil and respectful, but without all that jargon of allegiance and obedience, in which I stated most explicitly the impossibility of our interference.”³⁵⁶ Such declarations of the Company’s independence from any obligations to Shah Alam (who on his part naturally did not expect these) were made by Cornwallis in 1790, 1792 and 1793: a quarter century had passed since the grant of the Diwani.

Shore’s government saw no change in the Company’s position, but a gigantic transformation took place under Wellesley. The latter realised the importance of getting possession of the Emperor’s person against French intrigues: a French document had fallen into his hands stating that Shah Alam “ought to be the undisputed sovereign of the Mogul Empire . . . The English Company by its ignominious treatment of the Great Mogul, has forfeited its rights as *dewan* and treasurer of the Empire . . .; thus the Emperor of Delhi has a

³⁵⁴ Francklin, *Op. cit.*, p. 77 and also Appendix No 4.

³⁵⁵ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 603.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

real and indisputable right to transmit to whomsoever he may please to select, the sovereignty of his dominions, as well as the arrears due to him from the English."³⁵⁷ After Lake's victories before Delhi in 1803, the capital and person of the Emperor, "reckoned among the most precious spoils of victory," passed into English hands. The Company's government in Calcutta intimated to Shah Alam that it did not want to "interdict or oppose any of those outward forms of sovereignty to which his Majesty has been accustomed. His Excellency is desirous of leaving his Majesty in the unmolested exercise of all his usual privileges and prerogatives."³⁵⁸ But it is clear that Shah Alam's sovereignty passed in every sense to the Company, and he remained practically a captive in his own capital till his death in 1806. Lord Hastings finally extinguished the fiction of the Mughal Raj.

SECTION VIII

THE HIMALAYAN FRONTIER : THE GURKHAS

It was in the time of Lord Hastings that Nepal, lying amidst the southern slopes of the Himalayan ranges, came under British influence.

The dynasty of the Mallas, founded at the commencement of the thirteenth century, continued to rule in the Valley till the time of Yakshamalla (1428—1476), who was the greatest of the Malla kings of Nepal. He conquered Mithila (Tirhut up to the Ganges), and advanced into Magadh (Bihar), subjugated various Himalayan tribes including the Goraksha Palas (Gurkha chiefs) of the West, and also acquired possessions from the Tibetans. But he took the unwise step of dividing his kingdom between three sons and a daughter, which weakened Nepal and paved the way for its conquest by the Gurkhas of

³⁵⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 604.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 605.

the Western Himalayas. In course of several generations the four branches re-formed into two branches, of Katmandu and Bhatgaon, which went on fighting against each other. In the course of these internecine struggles Ranjit Malla of Bhatgaon (1722—54) invited the Gurkha chief Prithvi Narayana to help him, and this led to the Gurkha conquest of 1768.³⁵⁹ The local Rajas whom these sturdy mountaineers displaced, were, in the words of Prinsep, "mere ignorant, selfish tyrants, on bad terms with their subjects and neighbours, but most of all with their own relations . . . there was amongst them no principle of combination for mutual defence against a common enemy, not one of the petty principalities was sufficiently strong or united within itself to be capable of substantial resistance."³⁶⁰

Nawab Mir Casim of Bengal had sent an expedition to Nepal in 1762, but his army sustained a defeat under the walls of Makwanpur.³⁶¹ An expedition sent, a few years later, by Mr. Golding, the English Commercial Resident of Betiah, against the Gurkhas also failed.

After the Gurkha conqueror Prithvi Narayan's death in 1771 and his son's in 1775, his infant grandson Ran Bahadur came to throne, remaining for some time under the regency of the queen-mother, and subsequently of his uncle Bahadur Shah, till he himself came of age and began personally to conduct the affairs of the state in 1795. In 1792 the Gurkhas had concluded a commercial treaty with the English, and Colonel Kirkpatrick was sent on a mission to Katmandu, but the mission failed to achieve any favourable result. Ran Bahadur's excessive tyranny and madness led to a conspiracy

³⁵⁹ H. C. Ray: *Dynastic History of Northern India*, Vol. I, Chapter 4.

³⁶⁰ *Political and Military Transactions in India*, p. 55. Mr. Wheeler (*A Short History of India*, 1880, p. 463) has opined that "the Gorkha conquest may have been a later wave of the Great Brahmanical revival, which convulsed India in mediæval times, and drove Buddhism out of Hindusthan." This view seems to be correct, as Brahmanical revivals have very often taken the support of fresh foreign or semi-foreign ruling families.

³⁶¹ Prinsep. *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

against him organised by Damodar Pande, the head of the Pande family famous in Nepalese history, and he was expelled and took refuge at Benares in 1800. The Company's Government in Bengal made another commercial treaty with the ruling faction in Nepal, and sent Captain Knox there as Resident in 1802 ; but this mission also failed to gain the desired objects, whereupon Captain Knox was recalled in 1804, and Lord Wellesley declared the alliance with Nepal to have been dissolved.

Ran Bahadur again appeared in Nepal soon after Knox's recall and was received back as King, but was soon assassinated by his half-brother in 1805. Except an infant son of Ran Bahadur, the "royal family was nearly extinguished," and real power now passed into the hands of Bhim Sein Thapa (leader of the faction opposed to that of Damodar Pande).

When Lord Hastings took charge of his office in India, the dominion of the Gurkhas extended as far as the river Tista to the east and the Sutlej to the west ; "so that this nation was then in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindustan."³⁶² Since the occupation of the Gorakhpur district by the Company in 1801, the northern frontier of the British dominion came into contact with the Gurkha territories in the Tarai, and the Gurkhas made frequent inroads into the border districts.³⁶³ The remonstrances of Sir George Barlow had no effect, and in the time of Lord Minto the Gurkhas conquered two districts,—Butwal lying north of the modern Basti district, and Sheoraj further to the east. These districts were re-occupied by the English without any open conflict.

The undefined frontiers and the rival claims of the English and the Gurkhas on the border districts made conflict between

³⁶² Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 55.

³⁶³ "The magistrate of Tirhoot reported, that between 1787 and 1813 upwards of two hundred villages had been seized on one or other unjustifiable pretext." *Ibid.*, p. 78.

them inevitable. It came at last in the time of Lord Hastings (October 1814), the immediate occasion being supplied by a Gurkha attack on three police-stations in Butwal in May, 1814. Lord Hastings "resolved to act offensively against the enemy along the whole line of frontier from the Sutlej to the Koosee,"³⁶⁴ and himself planned the campaign. The main body of the Gurkha army was then engaged in an expedition on the Sutlej. Lord Hastings decided that Colonel Ochterlony from Ludhiana should operate in the hilly country near the Sutlej, that Major-General Gillespie from Meerut should help Colonel Ochterlony to fall upon Amar Singh Thapa, who was commanding the main Gurkha army, and that Major-Generals Marley and John Sullivan Wood should advance towards the Gurkha capital from Patna and Gorakhpur respectively.³⁶⁵ Beyond the Kusi eastward, Major Latter was charged with the defence of the Purnea frontier. The English authorities also made an unsuccessful attempt to shake the allegiance of the Nepalese officers like Amar Singh Thapa. In this connection, Mr. Thornton has remarked that the "endeavours made to corrupt fidelity of the servants of the Nepalese government are not unsanctioned by precedent; but it is certain that such practices cannot be reconciled with the great moral principles by which states, no less than individuals, ought to be governed."³⁶⁶

Lord Hastings had expected a quick success. But the geographical difficulties of the campaign, the bravery of the hardy Nepalese and their harassing mode of warfare contributed to the failure of the British operations of 1814. Marley and Wood retired after some feeble attempts; Gillespie, the hero of Vellor, died for his 'indiscreet daring' in trying to assault the mountain-fortress of Kalanga, and his successor Major-General Martindell met with a defeat before the stronghold of Jaitak. The defeat of arms meant also a loss of

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³⁶⁵ For details, vide *Ibid.*, pp. 83—85.

³⁶⁶ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 268.

British prestige. But undaunted by these reverses, the English renewed their attempts. Colonels Nichollos and Gardner occupied Almora in Kumaon in April 1815, and General Ochterlony, after some successful manœuvres, compelled the Gurkha leader Amar Singh to surrender the fort of Malaon on 15th May, 1815. Many of the Gurkha soldiers were now induced to take service with the British, and they were formed into three battalions at the suggestion of General Ochterlony. Like other inland mountaineer races (e.g., the Swiss in Europe, the Turks, etc., in Central Asia) the Gurkhas were by nature inclined to mercenary military service, fighting for any side to get a good living; hence it is not surprising to find them being recruited at this stage for the British army. Thus "the campaign, which in January promised nothing but disaster, finished in May by leaving in the possession of the British the whole tract of hills from the Gogra to the Sutlej."³⁶⁷

The fall of Malaon led the Gurkhas to open negotiations for peace. Lord Hastings at first made exorbitant demands—(1) "the perpetual cession of all the hill-country taken in the campaign, viz., from the Kalee westward; (2) a like cession of the entire Turaee (Tarai) from the foot of the outer hills along the whole line of the remaining territory of the Goorkhas; (3) the relinquishment by the Goorkhas of the footing they had gained in the territory of the Sikhim Raja, and the surrender to that chief of the stockaded forts of Nagree and Nagurkot; and *finally*, the reception of a Resident, with the usual escort and establishment, at Katmandoo, and the customary stipulation not to receive or give service to Europeans without the special sanction of government."³⁶⁸ After some time Lord Hastings reduced his demands, and a treaty was signed at Sagauli, on 28th November, 1815.

But owing to the ascendancy of the war party in Nepal, the Gurkha government refused to ratify the treaty and hosti-

³⁶⁷ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 175.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

lities were resumed. Their activities were however checked by Ochterlony, who advanced into the heart of Nepal, inflicted a defeat on the Gurkhas at Makwanpur on 28th February, 1816, and thus compelled them to ratify the treaty early in March.³⁶⁹ By this treaty the Nepalese government ceded to the British the districts of Garhwal and Kumaon with the great portion of the Tarai, agreed to receive a British Resident at Katmandu, and permanently withdrew from Sikkim. The Tarai boundary was defined by pillars of masonry. "The part of the Turae which skirted the Oudh dominions was however retained, and with Khyreegur, a *perguna* of Rohilkhund, lying on the Oudh side of the Gogra, was made over to the Nuwab Vizeer, in extinction of the second loan of a crore of rupees obtained from him during the war."³⁷⁰

The English secured some important advantages from this treaty. The north-west frontier of their possessions was extended up to the mountains; they got the sites for the principal hill stations and local or central summer capitals of India,—like Simla, Mussoorie, Almora, Ranikhet, Landour and Naini Tal,—and facilities were obtained for communications with the remoter regions of Central Asia. As Mr. Wilson has written: "countries before unknown have been added to geography; and nature has been explored by science in some of her most inaccessible retreats and most rare and majestic developments . . . Roads have been cut along the sides of precipices; bridges constructed over mountain torrents; stations have been formed which have grown into towns; and the stir and activity of human life have disturbed the silence of the lonely forests, and broken the slumber of the eternal snows."³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Appendix C.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³⁷¹ *The History of British India*, Vol. II, p. 59. The above estimate is of course from the European point of view; these Himalayan regions have been well-known to and well-inhabited by Indian peoples from time immemorial.

The kingdom of Nepal has never broken this peace and alliance with the British Government. By a treaty with the Raja of Sikkim, dated 10th February, 1817, a considerable tract of mountainous country ceded by the Nepalese, and lying to the eastward of the Mechi river and to the westward of the Tista river, was made over to him and this created an effective barrier on the eastern frontier of Nepal.

SECTION IX

PACIFICATION OF CENTRAL INDIA : PINDARIS, PATHANS, AND OTHER MINOR STATES

The Pindaris were a horde of cruel marauders, with their headquarters in Central India, who disturbed the peace of India by their predatory habits and plundering activities.³⁷² Pindaries were heard of as early as 1689 during the Mughal-Maratha wars in the South. In fact it was the total failure of the Mughal policing in the provinces and the repeated example of reckless plundering raids of the Marathas, that taught a large number of people, for whom other occupations were gone, to lead a life of organised robbery.³⁷³ Mr. Malcolm writes that "the Pindaris, who had risen, like masses of putrefaction in animal matter, out of the corruption of weak and expiring states, had, fortunately, none of those bonds of union which unite men in adversity. They had neither the tie of religion nor of national feeling."³⁷⁴ From obscure

³⁷² "Many different conjectures have been offered as to the etymology of the term Pindarry. The most popular one among the Natives is that they derived it from their dissolute habits leading them constantly to resort to the shops of the sellers of an intoxicating drink termed Pinda." Malcolm, *Memoir*, Vol. I, p. 433.

³⁷³ The growth of widespread organised robbery in Bengal in the latter half of the eighteenth century is a close parallel both in features as well as in originating circumstances.

³⁷⁴ *Memoirs of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 431; Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 417.

free-booters they were utilised as auxiliaries by the different Maratha states, their great patrons being the Holkars and the Sindhias. Malhar Rao Holkar gave one of their chiefs a golden flag ; and in 1794 some of their principal leaders received assignments of lands from the Sindhia in the valley of the Narmada which they extended soon by " conquests from the Grassias or original independent landlords in their neighbourhood." ³⁷⁵

Writers like Malcolm, Prinsep, Grant Duff, Tod and Thornton, have drawn almost similar pictures of their organisations and cruelties. They were all mounted on horses ; their favourite weapons were bamboo spears from twelve to eighteen feet long ; and some of them also used fire-arms. The extension of their depredations and ravages and their successes drew numerous vagabonds into their ranks and added to their numbers and strength. Their only object was plunder, and they always avoided pitched battles with regular armies. ³⁷⁶ " The celerity of their marches was not more remarkable than their secrecy. It was scarcely possible to gain information of their movements till they had completed." ³⁷⁷ They perpetrated horrible cruelties on the innocent people ³⁷⁸ and ran away with their property and effects. Malcolm writes that " the Pindaries, when they came to a rich country, had neither the means nor inclination, like the Tartars, to whom also they have been compared, to settle and repose. Like swarms of locusts, acting from instinct, they destroyed and left waste whatever province they visited." ³⁷⁹ In short they were terri-

³⁷⁵ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 326; Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 37.

³⁷⁶ " They avoid fighting," said Captain Sydenham in a Memorandum on the Pindaris drawn up in 1809, " for they come to plunder, not to fight."

³⁷⁷ Quoted in Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 404. *Ibid.*, p. 418.

³⁷⁸ Grant Duff, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 329.

³⁷⁹ *Memoirs*, etc., Vol. I, p. 428. Compare an almost similar description in Tod's *Rajasthan*, *Annals of Mewar*, Chapter XVII.

ble pests of the society, and were destroyers of public peace and political order. Their existence and activities were bound to collide with the interests of a power which wanted to consolidate its authority in India, and thus the attention of the English fell upon them after they had subdued the decaying Indian powers.

Under their prominent leaders Hiru, Buran (1794—1800), Chitu, Wasil Muhammad and Karim Khan,³⁸⁰ the Pindaris gradually extended their raids far and wide. In 1808-09 they entered Gujrat, and again in 1812 they devastated the British districts of Mirzapur and Shahabad. During 1815-16 they ravaged the Nizam's dominions, and early in the latter year they cruelly plundered the Northern Sarkars. This strengthened Lord Hastings' determination to extirpate the evil, and he received the authority of the Court of Directors, who also now became convinced about the necessity of suppressing them, in September of that year. But before resorting to direct offensive operations against them, Lord Hastings diplomatically improved the position of the British with regard to the other powers like the Marathas, the Rajputs³⁸¹ and the state of Bhopal, the Muhammadan ruler of which signed a treaty of faithful alliance.

Thus towards the close of 1817 operations for the final extermination of the Pindaris commenced. The Governor-General's plan was that "the Pindaris were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Malwa somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbada, and between Bhopal and the dominions of Sindhia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarat—and to keep the native states in check. An extended movement, therefore, was about to be made

³⁸⁰ For detailed accounts of these leaders, *vide* Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 36—48; Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 433—60.

³⁸¹ Vide, *ante*.

inwards, from the circumference of a great circle, whose centre was somewhere near Handia (in the Allahabad District), and whose diameter was nearly 700 miles in length ; the enormous distances which separated the different bases of operations, the absence of rapid means of inter-communication, and the necessity of simultaneous action, all contributed to render the task which had been undertaken an exceedingly difficult one."³⁸² He collected an army of 113,000 men and 300 guns ; the Northern force of four divisions was commanded by himself, and the Deccan force of five divisions was under Sir Thomas Hislop. With these vigorous preparations, the English were successful, by the end of 1817, in driving the Pindaris across the Chambal, and by the close of January 1818 their organised bands were destroyed. Karim Khan surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on 18th February, 1818, and he received the estate of Ganeshpur, then in the Gorakhpur District. Wasil Muhammad, who had taken refuge in the Sindhia's camp at Gwalior, was delivered by that prince to the English, and he committed suicide during his captivity at Ghazipur. Many of their followers surrendered themselves to Zalim Singh of Kotah. Chitu was hunted out from place to place till he was devoured by a tiger in the jungles near the fortress of Asirgarh. Thus Malcolm could write only after about five years, "the Pindaries are so effectually destroyed, that their name is almost forgotten."³⁸³ Duff also says about the same time : "The Pindharees thus dispersed, without leaders, and without a home or a rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of, though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peishwa : they mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindharees still retain their name, though some of them have become active improving farmers."³⁸⁴

³⁸² Quoted in V. A. Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 628.

³⁸³ *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 462.

³⁸⁴ Vol. III, pp. 467-68,

The Pathans were also a predatory horde, who rose into power under their leaders Amir Khan and Muhammad Shah Khan. Though actuated by the same spirit as the Pindaris, they commanded "forces of a different description from those of the Pindaree chiefs Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Patans were banded together for the purpose of preying on governments and powerful chiefs: to this end their force moved about with the materials of regular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army could only impress:³⁸⁵ while the object of the Pindaris was universal plunder." Rajputana was greatly subject to their depredations. In 1809 the Raja of Jodhpur took Muhammad Shah Khan's army into pay for repelling an attack of the Sindhia.³⁸⁶ They often found opportunities to interfere in the "passing intrigues among the Rajputs themselves, and to become partisans of the several factions, from each of which they took care to reap some personal advantage." Thus Amir Khan helped Jagat Singh of Jaipur in his contest against the Raja of Jodhpur for the hand of Krishna-Kumari.³⁸⁷ About the year 1799 Amir Khan had joined Jaswant Rao Holkar and became associated with the activities of the Holkar government. After Jaswant Rao's death and during the

³⁸⁵ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 48-49.—For details about the Pathans and Amir Khan's career, vide *Ibid.*, pp. 48—52; Malcolm, *Memoir*, Vol. I, pp. 325—48; Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 461—65, footnote.

³⁸⁶ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 50-51. The Pathans were not only bands of military adventurers during this transition period. Ever since the time when the European Companies began to take active part in Indian political affairs, an increasingly large number of European military adventurers formed mercenary companies of soldiers, ready to enter into the intrigues of native politics and so profit by them as to carve out estates, and ever shifting in their allegiances.

³⁸⁷ Malcolm, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 329.

regency of Tulsi Bai, he exercised real power in the Holkar state through his brother-in-law Ghafur Khan.³⁸⁸

After the death of Muhammad Shah Khan in 1814, his troops passed over to Amir Khan and swelled the number of his armies.³⁸⁹ After the settlement of the disputes between Jodhpur and Jaipur, Amir Khan's "Mahomedan bands ranged over every part of Rajpootna that presented the slightest hopes of plunder. These scenes of rapine were only interrupted by occasional mutinies of the troops, the quarrels of their commanders, and the protracted resistance of fortified places."³⁹⁰ His movements and activities could by no means be compatible with the consolidation of British power, and the English therefore decided "to waken a little the hopes of Amir Khan with a view to detach him from the rest of the predatory bands."³⁹¹ Negotiations were opened with him by the British Resident at Delhi, Sir Charles Metcalfe; the shrewd Pathan leader, after some hesitation, agreed to his proposals and concluded a treaty on 9th November, 1817, by which he agreed to disband his forces, his right to all the territories he held from the Holkar state was confirmed, and he was recognised as the Nawab of Tonk.³⁹² Thus a plundering and powerful Pathan leader, who might have been hostile to the British, was made a peaceful ally and a counterpoise against the Holkar. After the treaty of Mandasore, 6th January, 1818, the Holkar also recognised his independence.

British supremacy was established and became effective also in other states besides what we have here enumerated. The Nawab of Bhopal finding his position insecure in the midst of conflicting forces in Central India, entered into a treaty of "defensive and subordinate alliance" with the

³⁸⁸ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 283—87 and 300—24.

³⁸⁹ Prinsep, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 51.

³⁹⁰ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 343.

³⁹¹ Quoted in Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 107.

³⁹² Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 345.

British on 27th February, 1818. Its wise and energetic ruler Nazar Muhammad³⁹³ maintained friendly relations with the English, and their influence over that state increased so much that, after Nazar Muhammad's death by an accidental pistol shot on 11th November, 1819, the question of succession was decided by the British, who placed Munir Muhammad, the dead chief's nephew, on the throne of Bhopal. British supremacy was also acknowledged by the smaller states of Malwa ; the Raja of Dhar and the *joint* Rajas³⁹⁴ of Dewas (Tukaji and Anand Rao) entered into treaties of subordinate alliance with the British Government. In 1818 a new principality was created in Malwa by the British by confirming Ghafur Khan, Amir Khan's brother-in-law, in the possession of his *jagir* which he held of the Holkar state. Ghafur Khan's independence also (like that of Amir Khan) was recognised by the Holkar's government, and he was thus made the first Nawab of Jaora. "The dismemberment of Ameer Khan, and the establishment of Ghafoor Khan in a guaranteed *Jageer*, from the possessions of the Holkar family," remarks Prinsep, "have had the effect of introducing a counterpoise to the predominant influence of the Hindoos in this particular part of India, and the respectable footing on which the Bhopal Nawab has been placed will tend to give weight and consistency to the Moosulman interest so created."³⁹⁵ Besides these, Malcolm, who was engaged in the settlement of Malwa for four years after the close of the campaigns of 1817-18, "dezzed the position, powers and claims of a large number of minor chieftains and sirdars."³⁹⁶ Bundelkhand had also to accept British paramountcy. By three treaties (the first dated 5th October, 1812, the second dated 25th June, 1813, and the third dated 11th March, 1814) the

³⁹³ Malcolm, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 419—22.

³⁹⁴ Puranic tradition knows of *joint* kings in ancient times in the same Maratha country.

³⁹⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 399.

³⁹⁶ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, p. 220.

state of Rewa, ruled by the Baghela Rajputs, came under British protection. The Raja of Orcha entered into an alliance with the English by a treaty, dated 23rd December, 1812,³⁹⁷ on terms similar to those of the treaty with the state of Rewa; the chiefs of Datia and Samthar, and the 'Subadar' of Jhansi also came under British protection. All the sovereign rights of the Peshwa in Bundelkhand passed to the English after the former's defeat in 1818. The state of Kutch, ruled by the Jareja Rajputs and lying in disorder for several years, was brought in this period under the sway of the East India Company.³⁹⁸

Thus the Indian powers, who had struggled so long for political supremacy on the ruins of the Mughal Empire, fell before the pressure of British arms and diplomacy; all the principal Indian states now acknowledged the British sway; and by a series of political and military transactions effective supremacy of the British became fully established from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Brahmaputra to the Sutlej, across which the rising Sikh power stood in friendship and alliance. Lord Hastings completed the work which Clive had begun and Wellesley had pushed forward. British sovereignty over India became an accomplished fact when he left India in 1823. Prinsep hoped at that time: "The struggle which has thus ended in the universal establishment of British influence, is particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the *last* we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India."³⁹⁹ As subsequent events will show, this last struggle was yet to come.

Lord Hastings left India on 1st January, 1823; the famous minister George Canning, appointed Governor-General of India, could not come over, as he had to accept the office of Foreign Secretary owing to the suicide of Lord Castlereagh.

³⁹⁷ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 210—13.

³⁹⁸ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, pp. 204—10.

³⁹⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 421.

Lord Amherst was then appointed Governor-General, but during the interval before his arrival in India in August, 1823, John Adam, senior member of the Council, held the reins of government.

SECTION X

THE LAST TEST OF THE NEW BRITISH SUPREMACY: THE MUTINY

"I wish," remarked the late Lord Cromer, "the young generation of the English would read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the history of the Indian Mutiny; it abounds in lessons and warnings." The Mutiny of 1857—59 during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Canning (1856—62) was indeed the last and the most appalling ordeal to which the growing British Empire in India was subjected. Though it began as a military rising, its causes were deeply rooted in the changing conditions of the times. It drew its strength from several elements of discontent against British rule, all of which were focussed into one lens and produced the fierce flare of 1857. The causes of this outbreak may be conveniently studied under several heads,—political, social and religious, and military.

With regard to the first group of causes it may be said that Dalhousie's policy of annexations, the doctrine of escheat or lapse, and his idea of removing the descendants of the Mughal Emperor from their ancestral palace to the Kutb (near Delhi), created alarm and discontent in the minds of the Indian princes. The fate of the Mughal Emperor and the annexation of Oudh irritated Muslim sentiment, while Dalhousie's refusal of pension to Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the ex-Peshwa Baji Rao II, was resented by the Hindus. So far as the "Mughal Empire" was concerned, the British in their race for dominion in India had nearly all along to deal only with its shadow, the substance having disappeared early in the eighteenth century if not earlier; but the case was otherwise with the revived

Maratha power of the eighteenth century, for with it the British had, not very long ago, a serious and prolonged contest for political supremacy in India. The successors to the names of the ancient ruling families of both the communities harboured feelings of discontent against the alien British rule; the Marathas naturally "felt that they had been beaten in their bid for Empire" while the Muslims were moved by the dreams of their once great dominion in India and some among them, notably the Wahabis, by thoughts of the long past world-supremacy of Islam.

Secondly, the growing strength of the British Indian administration along with the expansion of the limits of the British Empire in India and the settlement of the acquired territories created social and economic grievances among the members of Indian aristocracy, old jagirdars, zamindars or talukdars. Measures like Bentinck's resumption of rent-free tenures reduced many of them to poverty by depriving them of their estates, at the same time that the new administration rapidly narrowed down the "field in which men of Indian race could display their political and administrative talents." During the five years preceding the Mutiny the Imam Commission at Bombay enquired into a large number of titles to lands and confiscated about 20,000 estates. In Oudh especially, grievances became very acute. "The annexation of Oudh," writes Malleeson, "converted a country, the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial into a hotbed of discontent and of intrigue."⁴⁰⁰ Sir James Outram, who had been smoothly effecting the settlement of Oudh by paying regard to the "fixed ideas and prejudices of the native mind, however little they might be consonant with the abstract political theories of the West,"⁴⁰¹ was compelled for reasons of health to leave Oudh in April 1856, and to the chief commissionership of Oudh, Lord Canning appointed Coverly Jackson a man of unsympathetic and over-

⁴⁰⁰ Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny of 1857*, Vol. I, p. 349.

⁴⁰¹ Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 304.

bearing disposition. Under him, "for more than a year no allowances were paid to the King's stipendiaries, among whom were some of his relations; the officiating chief commissioner took possession of a palace which had been expressly reserved for the royal family; the officials employed by the late court were excluded from pensions; the disbandment of the king's army had thrown professional soldiers upon the world with inadequate means of support; and in many cases the demands of the settlement officers were excessive."⁴⁰² Oudh was soon in a ferment, but the discontent was allayed to a great extent by the recall of Jackson and the reappointment of Sir Henry Lawrence. A great majority of the Oudh Talukdars therefore did not join the revolt until Havelock's retreat from Lucknow (after his first advance) encouraged them.

In the wake of British political supremacy, spread far and wide the new Western Civilization of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While the ruling and aristocratic classes were getting discontented because of annexations and the growth of a powerful British official class at their cost, the masses were perturbed by the rapid spread of an alien civilization, which, they apprehended, would destroy the sanctity of ancient customs and the purity of Indian religions, and the Muslim antipathy to Christians supported this attitude of the Hindus. The introduction of railways, the construction of a telegraph system connecting Calcutta with Peshawar and Bombay, and Bombay with Madras, the rapid expansion of European education, the abolition of superstitious practices like the *Sati* and infanticide, the legalisation of widow-remarriage, the recognition of the claims of persons forsaking their religion to inherit the family property, and the recently manifested aggressive spirit of the Christian missionaries—all were suspected by the more conservative elements of Indian society, from whose ranks the high-caste 'Bengal' sepoys were mainly drawn, as attempts to westernise India and convert her people to Christianity.

⁴⁰² *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, pp. 168-69.

All these created an atmosphere favourable for a revolt, but the effective combination of all elements of discontent against the British was not possible so long as the Sepoy Army, which had so far helped them immensely in building up their Empire, remained in their hands and loyal to them. Thus, as Innes has remarked, "in the control of the Sepoy Army lay the crux of the position."⁴⁰³ Colonel Sleeman had indeed made a prophetic statement in 1853: "The native states I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept away we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not always be sufficiently under control." But for several reasons, the Sepoy Army instead of being a pillar of strong support became now a source of danger to the British Raj. Campaigns in lands outside the limits of their country had sorely tried the loyalty of the sepoys; some of their regiments had already mutinied four times during the thirteen years preceding the great outburst of 1857, owing to the failure of the Company to satisfy their claims for extra allowances, the 34th N.I. in 1844, the 22nd N.I. in 1849, the 66th N.I. in 1850, and the 38th N.I. in 1852.⁴⁰⁴ Since the days of the disenchanting Afghan War,⁴⁰⁵ the morale of the army, especially of the Bengal Division, had deteriorated and discipline had become lax. The Company itself was largely responsible for this. Many able British officers were transferred from regimental duties to political employments, and both British and Indian officers were promoted by seniority alone though they had become useless (thus General Godwin commanded in the Second Burmese War at the age of seventy). The so-called "Bengal" Army was recruited for the most part from high-caste communities of Oudh and the North-West Provinces, and being very particular about their caste-prejudices and customs, were not easily amenable to the levelling army discipline of the West. "High caste, that is to

⁴⁰³ *Op. cit.*, p. 301.

⁴⁰⁴ Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 712.

⁴⁰⁵ Holmes, *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 55-56.

say, mutiny," remarked Sir Charles Napier, "is encouraged;" "some day or other," he prophesied of Delhi, "much mischief will be hatched within those walls, and no European troops at hand. I have no confidence in the allegiance of your high-caste mercenaries."⁴⁰⁶ At this time again England was engaged in several wars outside India, the Crimean War ending in March 1856 (which clouded the prestige of British efficiency as much as the Afghan War), the Persian War and the Chinese War. There had also grown up a glaring disproportion (one to six) between the numbers of the British soldiers in India and native troops in India. When Dalhousie left India, the latter amounted to about 233,000 while the former numbered only 45,322. "This was due in part to the great increase in the number of sepoy necessitated by the annexations, the additional troops being required in the new districts: in part to the reduction of the British garrison by the home authorities, who, instead of sending out additional regiments as urged by Dalhousie, withdrew troops to serve in the Crimea and never even replaced them."⁴⁰⁷ The troops were also not properly distributed. Strategical points like Delhi and Allahabad were left in sepoy hands; with the exception of one regiment at Dinapore, no British troops were stationed in any place between Allahabad and Calcutta.

An unsuitable measure intensified the prevalent discontent. Under the pressure of the activities in the new oversea acquisitions in Burma, Lord Canning issued the General Service Enlistment Act by which all recruits to the Bengal Army were henceforward to be ready for service everywhere, whether within or outside India. This affected the scruples of the Indian sepoy about crossing the sea: it was soon brought in their minds "under the category of the insidious measures aimed at caste: another of the items accumulating to form an avalanche."

Meanwhile, the gospel of revolt was being secretly preached among the army by Nana Sahib, by the Begum of Oudh and

⁴⁰⁶ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, p. 172.

⁴⁰⁷ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 302; Lee-Warner, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 285.

some of the Oudh chiefs, by Lakshmi Bai, the Rani of Jhansi, and by some zamindars like Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur near Arrah.⁴⁰⁸ Other leaders appeared as the movement expanded.

Lastly, the introduction of the Enfield rifle, the cartridges for which were greased with animal fats equally abhorrent to orthodox Hindus and Muslims, kindled the flame the faggots for which had already been piled. This was certainly a blunder, which, as Innes has said, "gave the enemies of British rule a gratuitous lever wherewith to engineer an upheaval."⁴⁰⁹ The story of the greased cartridge spread rapidly from one end of the country to another, and the alarm of the sepoys, who were required by a regulation of 1857 to bite the ends of these cartridges in using them, was not unfounded; the objectionable animal fats had actually been used in some of the ammunition factories. "On this inflammable material," remarks Aitchison, "the true story of the cartridges fell as a spark on a dry tinder."⁴¹⁰ All precautions, assurances and explanations of the officers of the Government proved fruitless, and the storm burst all over the country from the Sutlej to the Narmada.

The first symptoms of unrest appeared at Barrackpore and Berhampore early in 1857. On the 29th March the adjutant of the 34th N.I. at Barrackpore was murdered by a Brahman sepoy named Mangal Pande, none of the sepoys except a Muhammadan named Shaikh Paltu coming to the rescue. This mutiny was suppressed by the prompt intervention of General Hearvey. Next day the 19th Regiment was disbanded but a deferential treatment was meted out to the 34th regiment whose offences had been more grievous. Though Mangal Pande was executed

⁴⁰⁸ Some interesting and original records about the Mutiny in Bihar which have recently come into our hands will soon be utilised for a separate paper. There is a portrait of Kunwar Singh in the Khudabaksh Library, Patna.

⁴⁰⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 306.

⁴¹⁰ *Lord Lawrence*, p. 76.

after ten days, others who had delaboured their officers were not punished for five weeks. Cases of incendiarism soon occurred at Ambala ; at Meerut troopers of the third cavalry refused to use the cartridges supplied to them ; and on the 3rd May, at Lucknow, the 7th Oudh infantry broke into open mutiny. The Lucknow mutiny was soon quelled ; the Merrut mutineers were court-martialled and sentenced to long-term imprisonments, their punishment being proclaimed on Saturday the 9th May in a special parade. But on the next day the rising took a serious turn with a fierce outbreak at Meerut, where the cavalry and the two infantry regiments broke open the gaols, released their imprisoned comrades, murdered their officers and burnt down their houses. The British commanding officer at Merrut, General Hewitt, an infirm old man, could do nothing to check the rising. On the morning of the 11th May, the mutineers marched off to Delhi and soon brought the city and the palace under their control, not a single British Regiment being stationed there at that time. Many of the European residents were massacred and their houses burnt.⁴¹¹ Two young signallers in the telegraph office outside the city warned the Punjab authorities by a message. Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in charge of the magazine, defended it for three hours but when resistance was no longer possible, he blew it up—which destroyed many mutineers. But the rest remained as furious as before, and proclaimed the titular Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah the real Emperor of Delhi. Thus Delhi, which had been won by the British half a century ago as the prize of strenuous war and astute diplomacy, simply slipped out of their hands, and a severe blow was struck at their prestige if not at their power.

The recapture of Delhi seemed to be a pressing necessity. During a temporary respite of about three weeks after the

⁴¹¹ During these days of dangers and sufferings many fugitive British soldiers and civilians received kind treatment from the Hindus of the villages through which they passed. Holmes, *Indian Mutiny*, pp. 104 sqq.; *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 177.

Meerut outbreak, the Punjab was made secure by its Chief Commissioner Sir John Lawrence ; certain sepoy regiments at Lahore were disbanded and a mobile column, organised by John Nicholson, brought the whole province under control. Forces were being collected at Ambala and Meerut for the recovery of Delhi ; Henry Lawrence at Lucknow was defending against a siege and bodies of troops were advancing from Lower Bengal towards Allahabad. But by the 29th of May, the Revolt was widely spread throughout the upper Gangetic provinces and in parts of Central India as well. Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow were the storm centres ; south of the Narmada there was no outbreak of importance. The Bombay Presidency remained quiet under the able rule of Lord Elphinstone though there was naturally a great deal of excitement in sympathy with the Nana Saheb in the Maratha country, and a clear mutiny at Kolhapur. Rajputana also remained generally loyal under the care of George Lawrence. The efforts of some of the most notable Indians of the times, like the Sindhia and his prime minister Sir Dinkar Rao, Sir Salar Jang, the minister of Hyderabad, the Begum of Bhopal and Sir Jang Bahadur, the real ruler of Nepal, prevented the Mutiny from spreading wider than it did. Some other Indian princes like Gulab Singh of Kashmir and the Maharaja of Patiala, many zamindars and most of the Indian officials stood loyal to the British Government. General Innes considered that the Sindhia's loyalty in particular " saved India for the British."⁴¹² Sir Salar Jang, according to Holmes, was " a man whose name deserves to be ever mentioned by Englishmen with gratitude and admiration."⁴¹³

Mr. Innes has thus analysed the constituent elements of the Mutiny :—" In the earlier stage, those who took part in it were of these classes : the Hindustani sepoys of the Company's army ; the Hindustani sepoys of the Native ' contingents ' as at

⁴¹² *The Sepoy Revolt*, p. 301.

⁴¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 499.

Gwalior ; the Mussalmans of the Ganges provinces ; a few aggrieved Talukdars in Oudh with their clansmen ; among the Marathas, the Nana Sahib, the Jhansi Rani, and a few minor chiefs. Havelock's retirement to Cawnpore added to these the levies of the Oudh Talukdars generally ; but these never showed fight till the last part of the war, when Canning's proclamation made the Talukdars actively instead of formally hostile. Then the Rajput clansmen (*i.e.*, of Oudh) became formidable foes. The Mussalmans of Afghanistan and the frontier, the Sikh, Gurkha and Madras sepoys, almost without exception remained staunch. The princes held aloof. They made declarations of loyalty but would not be answerable for their troops."⁴¹⁴

By the beginning of June the Mutiny had affected numerous troops in different parts of India north of the Narmada as well as in Central India : at Nasirabad in Rajputana, at Nimach in the Gwalior State, at Bareilly in Rohilkhand, at Lucknow, Cawnpore and Benares in Oudh, in several parts of Bihar, and in Bundelkhand under the leadership of the Rani of Jhansi. The Bihar outbreak, which became most furious at and near Arrah under the leadership of Kunwar Singh of Jagdishpur, an aggrieved zamindar, was suppressed through the efforts of William Tayler, Commissioner of the Patna Division and Major Vincent Eyre of the Bengal Artillery.⁴¹⁵ At Benares the Mutiny broke out on the 4th June but it was put down by Colonel Neill, of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, who had arrived there on the previous day with a British detachment. "Neill put to death all the mutineers who were caught ; and in the surrounding country, which was placed by the Governor-General under martial law, rebels, suspects, and even disorderly boys were executed by infuriated officers and unofficial British Residents

⁴¹⁴ *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 323.

⁴¹⁵ For the outbreak of the Mutiny in Bihar, *vide Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, pp. 180-81 ; Malleson, *The Indian Mutiny*, Vol. I, Book VII, Chapter II ; Holmes, *Op. cit.*, pp. 195 *sqq.* ; Tayler, *Thirty-eight Years in India*, Vol. II, p. 237 *sqq.*

who volunteered to serve as hangmen."⁴¹⁶ At Allahabad, Captain Brasyer with a Sikh regiment saved the fort until he was relieved by Neill's advance from Benares.⁴¹⁷

At Cawnpore, Nana Sahib placed himself at the head of the insurgents, proclaimed himself the Peshwa and attacked the English, "collected together behind very inadequate entrenchments" hastily constructed near the north-eastern corner of the town by Sir Hugh Wheeler, who commanded the station. From the 8th June to the 26th "the little garrison—some four hundred English fighting men, more than seventy of whom were invalids, with the faithful sepoy's defended their women and children against a continuous fire, enduring hunger, thirst, exposure to midsummer sun, the torture of wounds for which they had no remedy, and finally despair."⁴¹⁸ The garrison at last surrendered on Nana Sahib offering assurances of a safe passage to Allahabad to every member of the garrison "who had not been connected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie." But as this apparently favoured party were leaving the place in boats, a terrible fire was opened upon them and a hideous carnage ensued. All the men were shot down with the exception of officers Mowbray Thomson and Delafosse, and two privates, who saved their lives after swimming for six miles, by taking shelter with a friendly *raja* of Oudh; the rest, about two hundred men and women, were confined in a small house called the Bibigarh, where they were butchered on the night of the 15th July by order of Nana Sahib and his trusted counsellor Tantia Topi, and their bodies were cast into a well.⁴¹⁹ An avenging force under Neill and Havelock arrived too late to

⁴¹⁶ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 182.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴¹⁹ "Perhaps, as it has been alleged, he (Nana Sahib) was persuaded by a woman in his zenana to permit the final massacre; at all events it is probable that revenge for the cruelties committed by Englishmen and Sikhs at Benares, at Allahabad, and on Renaud's march, was one motive for the tragedy of Cawnpore." *Ibid.*, p. 184.

prevent the perpetration of this ghastly deed. The rebellious Gwalior contingent occupied Cawnpore on November 27 and 28. But Sir Collin Campbell relieved it on 6th December.

At Lucknow, in spite of certain precautionary and defensive measures taken by Sir Henry Lawrence (who had succeeded the much disliked Mr. Jackson as Chief Commissioner), the Mutiny broke out on 30th May and he had to take shelter in the Residency with all the Europeans and Christians and about 700 loyal sepoys. The mutineers besieged the Residency, and the garrison suffered a severe blow when at the outset Lawrence was killed on the 4th July by the bursting of a shell. The command of the garrison then devolved upon Brigadier Inglis, who maintained the defence against several assaults and amidst various odds in expectation of reinforcements. On the 25th July Havelock with a force of 1,500 men marched towards Lucknow. After winning two victories, he had advanced half the way, when, considering that his army had been much weakened and thinned by cholera and the enemy's fire, and that he had no hope of getting speedy reinforcements owing to the recent mutiny at Dinapore, he decided to retrace his steps, and fell back upon Cawnpore. Once again, reinforced by only one Company of British infantry and half a battery, Havelock set out for Lucknow, and reached the point up to which he had come before, but was obliged to retreat again owing to similar reasons. At the same time Neill, who, under the impression that "severity at the first is mercy in the end" had been trying to avenge the massacre of Bibigarh (Cawnpore) with horrible cruelties, was hard-pressed by a large party of the mutineers, but was luckily relieved by Havelock. Sir James Outram had now arrived to supersede Havelock, but considering the gravity of the situation he decided to serve as a volunteer under Havelock till Lucknow was relieved.

Thus, along with Outram, and with his force raised to about 3,200 men, Havelock again crossed the Ganges on the 9th September, and after winning three successes against the enemy he forced his way into Lucknow on the 25th September

with valuable supplies. General Neill, who, in the words of Malleson, had the "energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man"⁴²⁰ died at this time. The entry of Outram and Havelock with reinforcements into Lucknow did not, however, result in the mutineers raising the siege. It only afforded the besieged garrison some relief; it concluded "the episode of the first siege of the Lakhno (Lucknow) Presidency"⁴²¹ and enabled it to settle down "to the second stage of the defence."⁴²² It remained reserved for Sir Collin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who had arrived from England to take the chief command, to effect the final relief on the 17th November. With a powerful force, joined by a Gurkha contingent under Jang Bahadur the able minister of Nepal, Sir Collin brought the city under British control on the 21st March, 1858, after three weeks of incessant fighting. But the reconquest of the province was delayed because of the opposition of the Oudh Talukdars, who were incensed by Canning's injudicious proclamation at the end of March 1856, declaring "the lands of all Talukdars forfeit to Government except those of six specifically mentioned and of others who could prove their loyalty." Campbell captured Bareilly in the month of May and it was not till the end of December that the Talukdars were overpowered and the rebel regiments were driven across the frontier into Nepal.

Delhi, the rallying centre of the mutineers, had already been recovered by the English. The story of the recapture⁴²³ is an extremely stirring one, and illustrates, along with other incidents of the Mutiny, the selfless devotion of the British officers to the cause of the British Empire in India and their untiring energy and perseverance. Anson started with a British force from Ambala for relieving Delhi and proceeded down to

⁴²⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 497.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

⁴²² Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 319.

⁴²³ A detailed narration of it lies beyond the scope of the present work.

Karnal, where he died of cholera on the 27th May, 1857. The command of his army then fell upon Sir Henry Barnard, who continued the march to Delhi and was joined on the 7th June by Brigadier Wilson from Meerut. The combined forces inflicted a defeat on a rebel army at Badli Sarai on the 8th June, and encamped on the famous Ridge overlooking the city of Delhi, where they had to spend many weary weeks in the face of fierce attacks from the mutineers. On the 9th July Barnard died and was succeeded by General Reed, who again from illness, had soon to give place to Sir Archdale Wilson. It seemed clear that without further reinforcements Delhi could not be relieved. This additional help came from the Punjab, where mutinous tendencies had been successfully checked by a band of able officers: Sir John Lawrence with the advice of his co-adjutors, Herbert Edwards (the Commissioner at Peshawar), John Nicholson (the Deputy-Commissioner), Sydney Cotton (the Brigadier) and Neville Chamberlain (the Commander of the Punjabi Irregulars), decided at the end of July to denude the Punjab of its troops for the greater need of recovering Delhi, and to send a reinforcing and relieving army to that vital point under Nicholson. On the 6th September all the relieving troops, together with the siege train, arrived in camp, after foiling an attempt of the mutineers to intercept their advance (towards the end of August).⁴²⁴ Nicholson, helped by Wilson, Baird Smith and Neville Chamberlain now delivered a vigorous attack against the Delhi mutineers; the Kashmir gate was blown on the 27th September and four columns advanced to storm the city. By the 21st of the next month the whole city, with the person of the "Mughal Emperor," fell into British hands, and the mutineers fled towards Oudh to join their fellows there; Wilson followed up the capture of Delhi by sending a force

⁴²⁴ "The effective rank and file, of all arms, amounted to eight thousand seven hundred and forty-eight men, of whom three thousand three hundred and seventeen were Europeans. In line with, and acting with them were two thousand two hundred native levies from Kashmir, and some hundreds from Jhind."—(Malleeson, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 10.)

towards Agra, which later on joined Sir Collin Campbell's relieving force at Cawnpore ; Nicholson had fallen in the fight. In recognition of the services of Sir John Lawrence towards the recovery of Delhi, the imperial city with the surrounding territory was transferred in February 1858, from the control of the Government of North-Western Provinces to that of the Punjab. Bahadur Shah II, the old titular Mughal Emperor, was captured at the tomb of Humayun by Lt. Hodson, a dashing cavalry officer, with the promise that his life would be spared ; he was condemned to exile and was deported overseas to Rangoon, where he died in 1862 at the age of eighty-seven. The old man's sons and a grandson surrendered to Hodson, who butchered them with his own hands, as he held them guilty of massacring English men and women, and also as he thought his royal prisoners would be rescued by the mob before they could be removed to a place of safe custody. Thus disappeared the last representatives of the Mughal Imperial dynasty. This act of Hodson has been the subject of a bitter controversy. Hope Grant considers it " was most uncalled for."⁴²⁵ Malletson has made a long critical comment : " A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed. It was a blunder as well as a crime. It is true that the gossip of the camp had accused the princes of the imperial house of having instigated the massacre of our countrymen and countrywomen in the month of May, but not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge. It is quite possible that a fair trial might have cleared them ; or had it convicted them, the British public would have enjoyed the satisfaction of knowing that they deserved the fate which would then have befallen them. The princes surrendered prisoners of war. It is idle to say that unless they had been shot they would have been rescued. No attempt was made by the crowd to wag a finger on their behalf . . . It is to be regretted on every ground that he (Hodson) gave way to the promptings of his nature

⁴²⁵ Holmes, *Op. cit.*, pp. 384—87.

In the history of the Mutiny there is no more painful episode than that connected with his name on this occasion."⁴²⁶

Central India and Bundelkhand were also greatly agitated by the Mutiny. In the Indore district, Colonel Durand, who had been supervising the affairs of the Holkar's state, in the absence of the agent Sir Robert Hamilton, overpowered the Holkar's mutinous troops between October and December. While Sir Collin Campbell had been engaged in relieving Lucknow, the mutinous Gwalior army, 20,000 strong, "dropped its rôle of being merely threatening, and became for the first time actively aggressive" under the able leadership of the Maratha Brahman Tantia Topi. They crossed the Jamuna at Kalpi, joined Nana Sahib's forces and defeated General Winham, who had been left in charge of Cawnpore. But Sir Collin Campbell drove them out on the 6th December; some across the Ganges and others across the Jamuna. Tantia Topi then joined the Rani of Jhansi and carried on a harassing warfare throughout Central India. But Sir Hugh Rose, leaving his base of operations at Mhow on the 6th January, 1858, advanced to Sagar, relieved it on the 3rd February and after capturing the fort of Garra-Kota, reached Jhansi on the 21st March. While besieging Jhansi Sir Hugh came to know that Tantia Topi was advancing with a relieving force to make him raise the siege. He thereupon marched forth against Tantia Topi whom he defeated at the battle of the Betwa, and then returning to Jhansi he captured it on the 3rd April; the Rani left the fort during the night of the 4th and rode off with a few followers to Kalpi, which however fell into British hands on the 22nd May. The Rani and Tantia then marched with the remnant of their forces to Gwalior, occupied the fortress, drove out the Sindhia, who had remained loyal to the English, to Agra and proclaimed the Nana as the Peshwa. Sir Hugh immediately took the field again and recovered Gwalior after defeating the rebels in two battles in one of which (17th June,

⁴²⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 80-81.

1858) the Rani (whom Sir Hugh esteemed as "the best and bravest military leader of the rebels") fell fighting heroically in male attire. Tantia, after being hunted from place to place, was betrayed early in April 1859 into the hands of the British by a feudatory of the Sindhia, and was executed on the 18th April at Sipri in the Gwalior state, on charges of rebellion and murder. Nana Sahib fled into the jungles of Nepal never to return again.

Thus, one by one all the rebel leaders passed away, and the Mutiny was suppressed at all its centres. On the 8th July, 1859, Canning proclaimed peace throughout India and during that year the country was gradually restored to something like its normal state.

There was a loud outcry among the British people both in England and India for "a ruthless and indiscriminate policy of vengeance." Even Nicholson spoke for legalising "the flaying alive, impalement, or burning of the murderers of the women and children at Delhi."⁴²⁷ But unmoved by popular clamour, Canning considered the question with cool judgment and held that "sheer undistinguishing vengeance on the entire population was not to be permitted."⁴²⁸ For this he was called 'Clemency Canning' in derision. But it must be admitted that his policy was statesmanlike. "The horrors of Mutiny, and the consequent irrepressible lust for blood that attended its suppression, left behind them," writes Mr. Innes, "an evil legacy of hostility, to be eradicated only by long years of resolutely just administration; a legacy which would have been infinitely more intolerable, perhaps ineradicable altogether, but for the unfaltering firmness with which Clemency Canning, amidst a storm of taunts and bitter attacks, pursued his policy of unswerving justice."⁴²⁹ Modern historical studies, however, indicate that the aforesaid legacy of mutual hostility was never

⁴²⁷ Kaye and Malleeson, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, p. 301.

⁴²⁸ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 327.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29.

completely eradicated, and has continued ever since to affect Indo-British political thought and attitudes ; it is now possible, for example, to trace a continuity in the history of Indian Extremism from the Mutiny to the present day, or to realise that the isolation of British social and political life from the Indian began to grow steadily from that time.

Opinions have been divided as to the nature of the Mutiny, —whether it was in meaning and origin, a mere military revolt, or was the outburst of an organised conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of the British Empire. Even persons directly connected with the movement expressed diametrically opposite views in this matter. According to Sir John Lawrence it was nothing more than a military rising, the proximate cause of which was supplied by the cartridge incident,⁴³⁰ while Sir James Outram declared that it was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy which utilised Hindu grievances to its own advantage. The cartridge incident, according to the latter opinion, “ precipitated the Mutiny before it had been thoroughly organised and before adequate arrangements had been made for making Mutiny a first step to a popular insurrection.” Mr. Innes has accepted the mean between these two extreme views and has remarked that “ the panic was engineered by political intriguers ; but the insurrection was not organised. None of the Native rulers had made up their minds to rise. There is every indication that the sepoys took their leap blindly in the dark, not knowing whither they were going. But there is also every indication that Nana Sahib on one side and a Mogul faction on the other had a great deal to do with working them up to take the leap, and that the Mogul faction at least had a tolerably definite idea of the use which was to be made of the leap when taken.”⁴³¹ He remarks in another place that “ there was no concerted attempt at a Hindu rising ; but . . . there was a definite Mussalman plot to foment a general mutiny as a

⁴³⁰ Aitchison, Lord Lawrence, p. 74.

⁴³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

means to a Mogul restoration.”⁴³² A more charitable view is that of Roberts “that the rising was mainly military in origin, but that it occurred at a time when, for various reasons, there was much social and political discontent, and that the mutineers were promptly joined by interested adventurers, who tried to give it a particular direction to suit their own schemes.”⁴³³ Holmes holds much the same view; he writes that “before the story of the greased cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was formed even after the first mutinies . . . civil disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion . . . These rebellions (in Jhansi and Oudh) arose in consequence of the Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the Nana, conspired before it began.”⁴³⁴ The mutineers had no recognised head, no clearly defined policy, and no concerted plan among the different groups. In fact it failed for its diversity of interests. Except the heroic figure of the Rani of Jhansi, they could not produce any leader of outstanding ability. Had the Mutiny been a national movement, in the true sense of the term,⁴³⁵ guided by intelligent leadership and moved by a cogent, concerted plan, then probably its suppression could not have been effected so quickly,—though it is true that the English met the rising with extraordinary courage and daring,—for which the Lawrences, Outram, Havelock, Nicholson, Neill and Edwardes, justly deserved the laurels of victory.

⁴³² *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

⁴³³ *British India*, p. 371.

⁴³⁴ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, pp. 204-05.

⁴³⁵ In fact, the progressive and educated sections of the Indian people (as in Bengal) kept aloof and stood by the established government, for they had learnt to esteem the British connexion for its civic and cultural value, and through it they saw a path to a greater nationalism than the Peshwa or the Padishah could lead to.

We have already incidentally dwelt on some of the causes of the failure of the Mutiny ; other causes, mainly military, can thus be summed up :

Firstly, the sepoys were weaker in equipment ; thus the newly invented breech-loaders of the English troops outranged the old muzzle-loaders in their hands. Secondly, the possession of a wide-spread telegraph system and the control of postal communications was of immense help to the British, in the way of conveying information or instruction from one part of the country to the other for proper military action ; the mutineers understood nothing about these, and made no attempt to possess and control them. Thirdly, as we have already pointed out, the English had the advantage of superior generalship, and of recent experience of a strenuous European War on their side, and they had a plethora of talented men as their leaders ; as opposed to these, the mutineers were utterly disunited among themselves, and there were very few able generals among them. Fourthly, the medieval ignorance of the mutineers was also partly responsible for their ineffectiveness. The English had utilised the advantages of modern scientific improvements while the mutineers remained in the dark about them and shrank away from innovations ; they even bombarded the railway engines at Allahabad as demons, from a safe distance. Ignorance is itself a curse, and becomes more so in a conflict with superior knowledge. Lastly, the mutineers, because of their reckless vandalism, gradually lost the sympathy of the civil population who were subjected to various sufferings at their hands. Anarchy was let loose over the country, most of the atrocities being committed in the name of the rising by professional *badmashes* and jail birds ; naturally, therefore, the bulk of the population were alienated from the mutineers and sympathised with the British who stood for law and order in an established government.

The Mutiny sounded the deathknell of the East India Company's rule in India. The British statesmen at home realised the unwisdom of leaving any longer the government of so

vast and populous a country as India in the hands of a private corporation. The Company protested loudly against this change, which could not, however, be averted. Accordingly an Act for the better government of India was passed on the 2nd August, 1858, which directed that "India shall be governed by and in the name of the sovereign through one of the principal Secretaries of State, assisted by a Council of fifteen members. At the same time the Governor-General received the new title of the Viceroy." The details of this Parliamentary Act will be discussed in another connection; it may be noted here in passing that the "transfer of the Indian Empire to the Crown involved far less change than might at first sight appear; for the Crown had been steadily increasing its control over the Company's affairs almost since the beginning of its (the E. I. C's) territorial sovereignty." Thus, all real power had been exercised under the Company by the President of the Board of Control who was also a minister of the Crown.

The assumption of the government of India by the British Crown was formally announced to the Princes and Peoples of India in a Proclamation issued on November 1, 1858, in the name of the Queen. The Queen's Proclamation is an important document in the history of Modern India and it has been called the Magna Carta of the Indian people. It declared:

"We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained and we look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity, and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects,

and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge.

"We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from our ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India.

"We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled but who desire to return to the path of duty.

"Already, in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness.

"We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:

'Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been and shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

'To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but, in apportioning the penalty to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under

which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in the credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

'To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty and oblivion of all offence against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

'It is our royal pleasure, that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next!'

"When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

CHAPTER II

CLASH WITH EASTERN AND WESTERN NATIVE POWERS: COMPLETION OF INDO-BRITISH TERRITORIAL EXPANSION: AND GROWTH OF AN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY—(FROM 1824)

INTRODUCTORY

By 1823, British supremacy and control were established over the whole area stretching from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the Sutlej to the Upper Brahmaputra and the Karnaphuli. But still there were some powers on the North-West (the Sikhs, the Sindhis, the Pathan and Baloch tribes of the Frontier, and the Afghans), and on the North-East (the Assamese and the Burmese),—whose absorption or reduction was necessary before the British dominion in India could become a safe and sound unit.

The hopes of the early twenties that absolute peace and equilibrium would follow the epoch ending with 1823, were not, as already noted, fully realised. “The First Burmese War, the disastrous Afghan War, the short and sharp campaigns of Sindh and Gwalior, the two fierce conflicts with the Sikhs involving at least three desperate battles, the Second Burmese War,—and finally the grim struggle in which month after month the European garrisons of Hindostan supported by a few loyal native regiments fought with their backs to the wall till the longed-for succour came and the great Mutiny was crushed: these followed on each other in steady succession.”¹

The foreign policy of the period after 1823 also received a new colour. Sir Alfred Lyall has remarked: “As the

¹ A. D. Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 219.

expansion of our dominion carried us so much nearer to foreign Asiatic countries, our rapid approach to the geographical limits of India proper discovered for us fresh complications, and we were now on the brink of collision with new races."² Hitherto the ambitious projects of the French in the Near and the Middle East, and the fear of a French conquest of India had greatly engaged the attention of the British. The policy of Marquess Wellesley was considerably influenced by the French menace ; this is clear from some of his despatches. The Duke of Wellington writes in his Memorandum on Wellesley's administration : " The first intelligence which reached Marquess Wellesley, upon his arrival in India, was that the ancient native enemy of the Company (Tipu) had formed an alliance with the French at Mauritius, for the purpose of attacking the British nation in India ; and that, in consequence of this alliance, a body of Frenchmen had already been landed on the port of Mangalore on the coast of Malabar and had marched to Seringapatam. Shortly after the receipt of this intelligence, it was known in India that Bounaparte, with a large French army, had landed and taken possession of Egypt and that the avowed object of this expedition was to invade India by that route. After the treaty of Tilsit, the world seemed partitioned between France and her new ally Russia, and Lord Minto sent diplomatic missions to Persia and Afghanistan to prepare them against a possible extension of the influence of Russia over and through them in the direction of India ; but the missions met with no great success.³ The French menace to England's Eastern Empire, however, disappeared after Waterloo, and Russia then definitely took the place of France in the political horizon of British India. So its foreign policy was henceforth influenced by the Asiatic expansion of Russia and her various enterprises in the East.

² *British Dominion in India*, p. 297.

³ *Lord Minto's Letter to the Court of Directors*, 2nd February, 1808. Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, pp. 252—55.

SECTION I

RISE OF THE SIKH POWER : THE SIKH WARS AND ANNEXATION
OF THE PUNJAB

In spite of their being exhausted by struggles with the Mughals, the Sikhs did not entirely lose their military spirit after the death of Banda, but they caused frequent troubles and harassment to the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali, though they could not successfully check his advance. Some of the Sikh chiefs erected forts in convenient places, overran the plains of the Punjab, shut up the Muslim governors in their forts at Sirhind, Dinanagar, and Lahore, and they twice seized Lahore itself and retained it for some time.⁴ When the Afghan invader appeared year after year, the Sikh chiefs temporarily retreated, but soon after his departure, they came out to re-occupy their lost possessions. "The years 1761-62," remarks Sir Lepel Griffin, "were a turning point in Sikh history . . . for they contain the first stand of the Khalsa against a regular army. Its defeat, although severe, gave it so much confidence that it was able the following year to conquer the province of Sirhind, and to found on a secure basis the great chiefship of the Cis-Sutlej."⁵ During the years following Ahmad Shah's speedy retirement in 1764, the Sikhs became master of Lahore, partitioned among themselves the whole country from the Jhelum to the Sutlej, and assembling at Amritsar, they proclaimed their new sway by striking coins with a legend "to the effect that Gooroo Govind had received from Nanuk 'Deg, Tegh, and Futteh,' or grace, power and rapid victory."⁶

The Sikhs divided themselves into fraternities or associations called 'mils' (meaning 'alike' or 'equal'), usually recorded

⁴ Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, Chap. IV.

⁵ Ranjit Singh (1905), pp. 74-75.

⁶ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

as twelve in number⁷—(1) Phulkian, (2) Ahluwalia, (3) Bhangi, (4) Kanheya, (5) Ramgarhia, (6) Singhpuria, (7) Krora Singhia, (8) Nishania, (9) Sukarchakia, (10) Dublwala, (11) Nakkais, (12) Shahids. Of these Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, and 11 possessed lands north of the Sutlej and the remaining six south of that river. Each *misl* was under a *Sardar* or chief; but their "composition was always changing, and their possessions passed from one hand to another rapidly."⁸ These different confederacies very often fought with one another and could not therefore stand as nation during that period of struggle for supremacy in India. Besides these regular bands, there were the Akhalis, "a body of men who threw off all subjection to earthly governors and who peculiarly represented the religious element of Sikhism."⁹

A military adventurer with ambition and a personality can sometimes, by successfully asserting his authority over the several independent bands of soldiers in a country in anarchy, organise them into a strong military force and thereby create out of fragments, a nation able to leave a mark on the page of history. Such a turn came in the career of the Sikhs with the advent of Ranjit Singh, born in 1780. He was the son of Sardar Maha Singh,¹⁰ the enterprising leader of the Sukarchakia confederacy, who died in 1792 at Gujranwala. Ranjit got an opportunity for distinction during Zaman Shah's invasion of India. Zaman Shah, who had succeeded Timur Shah on the throne of Kabul in 1793, always cherished hopes of an Indian

⁷ "The *misls* were fraternities, increasing and diminishing according to circumstances. Indeed the number 'twelve' was more traditional than real; some gave birth to other *misls*, while others died out altogether." Wheeler, *History of India*, p. 588. For detailed accounts of the Sikh '*misls*' vide Latiff, *History of the Punjab*, 1891, pp. 296—346; Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, pp. 134—39.

⁸ Griffin, *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁹ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

¹⁰ Ranjit's mother was Raj Kour, who was the daughter of Raja Gajpat Singh of Jhind and was married to Maha Singh in 1774 A.D.

Empire. He led two or three invasions into the Punjab during 1795—98, and in the last he received valuable services from Ranjit for which the Afghan King appointed him governor of Lahore with the title of Raja when he was only nineteen. He soon established himself at Lahore by rooting out all the elements hostile to him.

The political situation of the Punjab at this time has been thus briefly described: " Kasur, a considerable town, 25 cos south-east of Lahore, peopled chiefly by Pathan emigrants, was ruled by Nizamuddin Khan, a powerful Mahomedan chief. Chak-Guru, now known as Amritsar, was in the hands of the Bhangis, under Golab Singh; Multan was governed by Muzaffar Khan, Sadlozai, son of Shuja Khan, who claimed common descent with the Abdali King, Ahmad Shah, and whose ancestors, coming from Kandahar, occupied Multan in the disturbances following the accession of Nadir Shah to the Kabul throne. Daera was occupied by Abdul Samad Khan; Mankera, Hot, Banu and the neighbouring country, by Mohammed Shah Nawaz Khan Moin-ud-dowla, the successor of Nawab Mahomad Khan, and Tank by Sarwar Khan Kalti Khel. These were all Afghan usurpers who, originally governors of the Kabul Government of the Punjab, had become independent rulers of the countries under their charge, owing to the enfeebled state of the Durrani Government. Dera Ghazi Khan including Bahawalpur, and a tract of country adjoining Multan, was ruled by the Dandpotra, Bahawal Khan; Jhang by the Sial, Ahmad Khan; Peshawar by Fattah Khan, Barakzai, the nominal vassal of Mahmud Shah and Kashmir by his brother, Azim Khan. The fort of Attock was in possession of the Wazir Khels, under Jahandad Khan, the Kangra hills were under Raja Sansar Chand; Chamba was under Raja Charat Singh, and the country from Hoshiarpur to Karpurthalla under Fateh Singh, Ahluwalia, afterwards the 'turban brother' of Ranjit Singh. The territories, Trans- and Cis-Sutlej were governed by independent Sikh Sardars, and their confederacies, called *misls*, and other independent chiefs, and so were

Wazirabad, Dhanui, Khoshab, and Pakpattan, the seat of the great shrine of Bawa Farid¹¹

In 1802 Ranjit took possession of Amritsar from the Bhangis ; he soon threw off the Afghan yoke and gradually brought under his authority all the Sikh *misl*s west of the Sutlej. When in 1805, the Holkar, being pursued by Lord Lake, solicited Sikh help, Ranjit Singh refused it : like the Rajputs, the Sikhs also had no love for the Marathas, and another chance of a combination of Hindu powers was lost. The treaty of Lahore, concluded on 1st January, 1806, excluded the Holkar from the Punjab and left Ranjit Singh free from English interference in his plans of conquest north of the Sutlej.¹²

"In truth," remarks Mr. Cunningham, "Runjeet Singh laboured, with more or less of intelligent design, to give unity and coherence to diverse atoms and scattered elements to mould the increasing Sikh nation into a well-ordered state, or commonwealth, as Govind had developed a sect into a people, and had given application and purpose to the general institutions of Nanuk."¹³ It was this desire for mastery over all the Sikhs that led Ranjit to think of extending his influence over the Sikhs lying east of the Sutlej in the tract between that river and the Jamuna, sometimes known as Sirhind. After the defeat of the Sindhia the Cis-Sutlej states had come, though without any formal arrangement, under British protection. A quarrel between the chiefs of Nabha and Patiala gave Ranjit Singh the opportunity for interfering in the affairs of the Cis-Sutlej states. On 26th July, 1806, he crossed the Sutlej, and captured Ludhiana, though he made it over to his uncle Bhag Singh of Jind.¹⁴ He crossed the Sutlej for the second time in

¹¹ Latiff, *History of the Punjab*, p. 351.

¹² About this time Ranjit Singh celebrated the Holi festival at Lahore. Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 363. Latiff wrongly gives the date of the treaty as 11th January.

¹³ *History of the Sikhs* (1903 Ed.), p. 156.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

the following year with a large army placed under Diwant Mokham Chand, "an able man, who fully justified the confidence reposed in him,"¹⁵ and arbitrated in a dispute between Raja Sahib Singh of Patiala and his queen, much to the advantage of the latter, from whom, it is said, he had accepted some presents.¹⁶ Some of the Sikh chiefs alarmed at Ranjit Singh's aggressions, and not in sympathy with his Pan-Sikhism, sent a deputation for help to Mr. Seton, the British Resident at Delhi, in the month of March, 1808.

This became a matter of serious consideration for the English. For strategic and diplomatic reasons, it was necessary for them to check the advance of Ranjit Singh to the Jamuna. But to resist the Lord of Lahore by force would have led to an open rupture with him, which the English could hardly hazard at that time in view of the possibility of a French invasion of India.¹⁷ In fact, the fear of this invasion made it imperative for the Company "to seek alliances, not only beyond the Jamuna but beyond the Indus."¹⁸ Lord Minto thought of securing two objects, that is, preventing Ranjit Singh's advance, and at the same time persuading him to form an offensive and defensive alliance with the British against the French if they should ever invade India. In order to give effect to his resolution, he sent Metcalfe on a mission to Ranjit Singh, and at the same time he assured the Sikh states of protection, for the advance of Ranjit "seemed to render the interposition of some friendly states, between his military domination and the peaceful sway of the English, a measure of prudence and foresight."¹⁹ But in return for the proposed alliance Ranjit

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 169; Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 364.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹⁷ Mr. Auber (*Rise and Progress of the British Power in India*, Vol. II, p. 461) writes about the contemporary strong belief in a triple alliance between the French, the Turkish and the Persian Emperors for invasion of India. Mr. Cunningham has also noted it, *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁸ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Singh demanded an acknowledgment of his sovereignty over all the Sikh people. He appeared for the third time south of the Sutlej and conquered some of the Sikh states ; it appeared that the negotiations would break down. "The policy of the Maharaja," remarks Griffin, "was skilful, bold and deserved that success which it would probably have achieved had the danger of a French invasion been real and not an imaginary one."²⁰ The chances of a French invasion soon disappeared with Napoleon's engagement in the Peninsular War and with the improved relations between England and Mahmud II, the new Sultan of Turkey. The British envoy now strongly pressed his points. Ranjit Singh evaded compliance with his proposals and war seemed imminent. In the month of January, 1809, Lord Minto sent a body of troops under Sir David Ochterlony "to support the British envoy in his relations with the Lahore ruler, and effectually confine Ranjit Singh to the north of that river." On the 9th February, 1809, Ochterlony issued a proclamation "declaring the Cis-Sutlej states to be under British protection, and that any aggressions of the chief of Lahore would be resisted with arms."²¹ As Cunningham suggests, this note of warning and Ranjit's apprehension that some of the jealous Punjab chiefs might tender their allegiance to the British, brought him down to accept the terms proposed by the English. He now concluded a treaty with the English at Amritsar on the following terms :

"(1) Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the state of Lahore ; the former shall be considered, with respect to the latter, to be on the footing of the most favoured powers, and the British government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the river Sutlej."

²⁰ *Ranjit Singh*, p. 177.

²¹ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

- (2) The Raja will never maintain in the territory which he occupies on the left bank of the river Sutlej more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity.
- (3) In the event of violation of any of the preceding articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship, this treaty shall be considered null and void."²²

By the treaty of Amritsar, *the British frontier was pushed from the Jamuna to the Sutlej, and British troops were posted at Ludhiana*. Two proclamations (one dated 3rd May, 1809,²³ and the other dated 22nd August, 1811),²⁴ were issued by the British Government to settle its relations with the new protected states and their mutual relations. But it was long before the settlement could be regarded as satisfactory.²⁵

The treaty of Amritsar substantially checked one of the favourite dreams of Ranjit Singh, that is, a universal supremacy over the Sikhs to the north as well as to the south of the Sutlej. But this failure did not force him into a life of idleness and inactivity; on the other hand, his activities were henceforth directed towards the north, the north-west and the west,—a more difficult region to manage, up to which not many native powers of the plains had expanded in the past. He acquired Kangra and got the better of the Gurkhas (1809—1811), inflicted a terrible defeat on the Afghans at Haidaru on 13th July, 1813, and secured Attock, the great key to the Frontier. The fugitive Afghan King, Shah Shuja, became in 1814 practically a prisoner

²² Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 144; Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix IX; Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 379.

²³ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix No. X.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Appendix No. XI.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 176—78.

in the hands of Ranjit Singh, who secured from him the famous diamond Koh-i-noor. But Shah Shuja soon effected his escape and retired to Ludhiana (within the British sphere) in 1816. After some futile attempts for several years Ranjit Singh captured Multan in 1818, and Kashmir also passed into his hands in 1819. He took Peshawar in 1823, but left it as a dependency to Yar Muhammad Khan, brother of Muhammad Azir, governor of Peshawar, after the death of Fateh Khan. Thus by the year 1824 the three Muhammadan kingdoms of Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar were added to Ranjit's dominions; and in about the same time that in the Gangetic regions the British power had become supreme, in the Indus basin the Sikhs rose to supremacy. Ranjit's power went on increasing, and with the object of creating strong buffer states in order to check Russian influence, Lord William Bentinck met Ranjit Singh at Rupar on the Sutlej in October 1831, and got the treaty of alliance with him renewed. On 6th May, 1834, the citadel of Peshawar was captured by the Sikh general Hari Singh Nawla and Peshawar, after having been for ten years a dependency, passed formally under Sikh rule. The impact of Sikh advance was also felt on Sindh, but it was checked by the English out of political and commercial motives, as we shall see later on. Nevertheless, Ranjit Singh left a mighty empire when he died on 27th June, 1839, at the age of fifty-nine.

Ranjit Singh is one of the most arresting personalities in Indian history. Cunningham writes: "Ranjit Singh found the Punjab a warring confederacy, a prey to the factions of its chiefs, pressed by the Afghans and the Marathas, and ready to submit to English supremacy. He consolidated the numerous petty states into a kingdom, he wrested from Kabul the fairest of its provinces, and he gave the potent English no cause for interference. He found the military array of his country a mass of horsemen, brave indeed, but ignorant of war as an art, and he left it mustering fifty thousand disciplined soldiers, fifty thousand well-armed yeomanry and militia, and more than three hundred pieces of cannon for the field. His rule was

founded on the feelings of a people, but it involved the joint action of the necessary principles of military order and territorial extension ; and when a limit had been set to Sikh dominion, and his own commanding genius was no more, the vital spirit of his race began to consume itself in domestic contentions."²⁶ Ranjit was short in stature ; he was devoid of any beauty of features and was deprived of the left eye by small-pox ; " yet his appearance was prepossessing, his manner and address were delightful and his features were full of animation and expression."²⁷ He himself received no education ; nevertheless he encouraged learning. He has been charged with the vices of drinking and intemperance in his private life ; but he was never unmindful of his public duties. Mr. Cunningham has noted that it " would be idle to regard Ranjit Singh as an habitual drunkard or as one greatly devoted to sensual pleasures ; "²⁸ he writes in another place that Ranjit was " assiduous in his devotions ; he honoured men of reputed sanctity, and enabled them to practise an enlarged charity ; he attributed every success to the favour of God, and he styled himself and people collectively the ' Khalsa,' or Commonwealth of Govind."²⁹ Possessed of indefatigable energy, firm determination and untiring perseverance, Ranjit was a born ruler of men. Sir Lepel Griffin has admitted it in the following sentences : " We only succeed in establishing him as a hero, as a ruler of men and as worthy of a pedestal in that innermost shrine where history honours the few human beings to whom may be indisputably assigned the palm of greatness, if we free our minds of prejudice and, discounting conventional virtue, only regard those rare qualities which raise a man supreme above his fellows. Then we shall at once allow that, although

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 271-72.

²⁷ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 495.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 208-09. Mr. Latiff holds a similar view on this point, *Op. cit.*, p. 496. For further details about Ranjit Singh's religion, vide *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926.

sharing in full measure the commonplace and coarse vices of his time and education, he yet ruled the country which his military genius had conquered with a vigour of will and an ability which placed him in the front rank of the statesmen of the century."³⁰ Victor Jacquemont, a French traveller, who visited Ranjit Singh's Court at Lahore, remarked: "Ranjit Singh is an extraordinary man—a Bonaparte in miniature."³¹ Mr. A. F. M. Abdul Ali has proved from a study of some original records that "Ranjit Singh had many similarities with Napoleon."³² Though fond of military conquests, he was not cruel or bloodthirsty but he treated the vanquished with kindness and consideration.³³ He might have used frauds and trickery in his political methods; but one can very well say that hardly has the game of politics been ever fought or won without these means. Machiavellian statecraft and Bismarckian policy of 'blood and iron' have been resorted to, more or less, in every age and clime by political rulers of men and by military despots. Ranjit was not a religious reformer like Nanak but he was a military leader and the recreator of the Sikh nation; as such, he could not be above those means. Baron Carl Von Hugel, a German traveller, who visited Ranjit Singh's Court in 1835, thus remarks: "The sole aim of Ranjit Singh is the preservation and extension of his unlimited power; and though his ambitious mind considered all means perfectly allowable to this end he has never wantonly imbued his hands in blood. *Never perhaps was so large an empire founded by one man with so little criminality.*"³⁴

³⁰ *Ranjit Singh*, p. 95.

³¹ *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 98. "The records of the Imperial Record Department," remarks Mr. A.F.M. Abdul Ali, "teem with instances of his favour and bounty, bestowed irrespective of caste, creed and religion. In some cases even the booty taken by his soldiers was ordered to be returned to the proper owners." *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926.

³⁴ Quoted in *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926

Ranjit Singh's civil administration was not oppressive though Sir Lepel Griffin has laboured to prove it so.³⁵ Cunningham is certainly a more reliable authority, and his opinion in this matter is somewhat different. He writes: "He (Ranjit) took from the land as much as it could readily yield ; and he took from the merchants as much as they could profitably give ; he put down open marauding ; the Sikh peasantry enjoyed a light assessment ; no local officer dared to oppress a member of the Khalsa ; and if elsewhere the farmers of revenue were resisted in their tyrannical proceedings, they were more likely to be charged than to be supported by battalions. . . . Ranjit Singh never arrogated to himself the title or the powers of despot or tyrant."³⁶

Ranjit's genius was, of course, better displayed in his re-organisation of the Sikh military system. "The whole wealth and the whole energies, of the people, were devoted to war, and to the preparation of military means and equipment," and Ranjit converted the Sikh army into an engine of terrible efficiency,—a strong military body "which," according to Hunter, "for steadiness and religious fervour has had no parallel since the 'Ironsides' of Oliver Cromwell,"³⁷ He rightly realised that the old cavalry force of the Sikhs and guerilla mode of warfare would not be of much value at a time when European infantry and artillery were winning brilliant victories in India, and with this idea he tactfully changed the entire organisation of the Khalsa army in order to make it as formidable as possible. "The two branches of the army, namely, the infantry and the artillery, which were despised and even ignored in the eighteenth century, now came to be regarded as the mainstay of the military strength of the state. . . . Again, the maintenance of a standing National Army, regularly paid from the treasury, rather than the feudal levies of the chiefs, became

³⁵ *Ranjit Singh*, pp. 144—52.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

³⁷ *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1926.

the recognised policy of the Sikh monarchy under Ranjit Singh. The change was indeed radical and it looks as if the whole of the old material was thrown into a melting pot and cast into a new shape."³⁸ The incentive for the army reform came from Ranjit himself, but he was much assisted in work by European military adventurers like Allard, Ventura, Count Avitabile, and a few others some of them having experience in Napoleonic wars.³⁹

The rise of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh was like the flash of a meteor destined to disappear quickly. At the time of Ranjit's death the Sikhs were at the zenith of their power, and "then it exploded," remarks General Sir J. H. Gordon, "disappearing in fierce but fading flames." As is always the case with a military despotism, which owes its growth to the abilities of a single powerful ruler but follows soon after his removal a downward course of degeneration and decay, Ranjit's death in 1839 was the signal for the appearance of disorders and confusion among the Sikhs, which discredited them in the course of a few years and made them prostrate before the British power. Anarchy and revolutions distracted their energies; the central civil government broke down; one weak ruler after another was removed by assassination in quick succession; all real powers passed into the hands of the Khalsa soldiery; and "during the prolonged anarchy and confusion which spread through the country, no revenues could be realized and the whole country was devastated."⁴⁰ Ranjit was succeeded by his almost imbecile son Kharak Singh, but the government soon fell into the hands of the latter's able and youthful son Nao Nehal Singh, who, though at heart opposed to the *wazir* Dhian

³⁸ Sita Ram Kohli, *The Army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh*, *Journal of Indian History*, 1921-22. This paper supplies us with interesting and valuable details about Ranjit's army. For further studies on this topic reference may be made to the Persian Ms. No. 622 in the Oriental Public Library at Patna.

³⁹ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-15. Griffin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 137-40.

⁴⁰ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 524.

Singh and the Jammu chiefs, temporarily allied with them against his father's favourite Chet Singh, who was murdered on 8th October, 1839. They also succeeded in effecting the removal of the British agent Lieutenant Colonel Wade, whom they did not like for several reasons and who was replaced by Mr. Clerk on 1st April, 1840. But Kharak Singh died on 5th November, 1840, and his promising son also met with a fatal accident on the same day, while returning home from the funeral rites, by the fall of the gateway in the Lahore fort. It is not certain whether the latter was the victim of a plot organised by the Jammu chiefs, as some writers say ; but this may be presumed that the Jammu Rajas had every reason to wish him death.⁴¹ After some disputes about the succession between the widow of Kharak Singh, Mai Chand Kaur, who was supported by various Sikh chiefs, notably of the Sindhianwala family, and Sher Singh (reputed to be a son of Ranjit Singh but whose legitimacy was doubtful), the latter, with the help of the Khalsa army, succeeded in proclaiming himself as the Maharaja on 18th January, 1841. Apprehending difficulties from the new ruler, the Sindhianwala chiefs retired into the British territories. Sher Singh had "induced the troops of the state to make him a king, but he was unable to command them as soldiers, or to sway them as men, and they took advantage of his incapacity and of their own strength to wreak their vengeance upon various officers who had offended them and upon various regimental accounts and muster-masters who may have defrauded them of their pay. Some houses were plundered, and several individuals were seized and slain."⁴² The murder of Mai Chand Kaur in June 1842 did not remove Sher Singh's embarrassments and he himself was assassinated by Ajit Singh, one of the Sindhianwala chiefs, on 15th September, 1843. Dalip Singh, a minor, was then raised to the throne with his mother Rani Jhinda, an able but unscrupulous woman, as

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 500.

⁴² Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

the Queen Regent. The army now became the virtual ruler of the state.⁴³ It failed to utilise its power for the good of the Sikh nation ; it had become ungovernable and was responsible for " much of the bloodshed and mischief which ravaged the country." The Lahore darbar became anxious to be free from its control but was not able to defy it openly. So the incapable members of the darbar considered that the only chance of retaining their own position and power would be by removing the army by inducing it to engage in a contest with the English in the course of which its 'superabundant energy' would be exhausted and its power would be broken making room thereby for the darbar-officers to make peace with the English. " This—the main feature of the first Sikh war," remarks Mr. Roberts, " must constantly be borne in mind. The leaders were half-hearted or even treacherous, fearing victory almost as much as defeat. We were fighting against a fine army without a general, or, at any rate, without one supreme controlling mind."⁴⁴

But this persuasion would not have by itself been sufficient to goad the army into a war with the English, if its own members had not been convinced that ' their colossal neighbour ' (the English) were meditating an invasion of their country. This conviction was not wholly unfounded or unreasonable ;⁴⁵ some acts on the part of the English certainly strengthened it. As Cunningham points out, the English advanced " bodies of troops towards the Sutlej contrary to their policy of 1809 ; "⁴⁶ during 1844 and 1845 the English were preparing boats at Bombay for making pontoon bridges across the Sutlej, and they were also equipping troops in the newly acquired territories of Sindh for a march upon Multan ; and " various garrisons of the north-west provinces were being

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 331 ; Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 520.

⁴⁴ *History of British India*, p. 334.

⁴⁵ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 335—37.

gradually reinforced, while some of them were being abundantly supplied with the munitions of war as well as with troops."⁴⁷ To the Sikh army, all these things were "held to denote a campaign, not of defence, but of aggression."⁴⁸ Thus, when the officers of the Lahore darbar incited the Sikh soldiery to prevent the prospective invasion of their country by the English, they at once responded to it and decided to take the initiative and advance against them.

The Sikh army crossed the Sutlej on 11th December, 1845, between Huriki and Kasur, and on the 14th of that month reached within a few miles of Ferozepore without any opposition from the local British commander who was rather unprepared at the moment for this sudden offensive. Cunningham has condemned⁴⁹ this unpreparedness of the British and their underestimation of the strength of the Sikhs. But as a matter of fact, the British had not neglected the frontier, but, as already noted, they were making various suitable preparations and their army had been increased to 40,000 men and 100 guns. The unopposed march of the Sikhs through the Sutlej was due to Major Broadfort's personal misconceptions and negligence. The Governor-General Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge (1844—48), who had been a member of Parliament for two decades and who had gained some experience in the Napoleonic wars, issued his declaration of war on 13th December, 1845, and also proclaimed "the possessions of Maharajah Dhulop Singh, on the left of British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories."⁵⁰ The first battle was fought at Mudki, twenty miles to the south-east of Ferozepore, on 18th December, 1845, between the united Ambala and Ludhiana divisions of British troops under the command of Sir Hugh

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* It may be noted in this connexion that the home authorities of the E. I. C. were in favour of a general policy of annexations since 1841 (long before Dalhousie).

⁴⁹ *Op. cit.*

⁵⁰ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix XVII,

Gough and the Sikh army under Lal Singh. The engagement was bloody and sharp. The British soldiers first "reeled before the Khalsa battalions ; " but Lal Singh treacherously left the field at a critical moment " leaving the Sikhs to fight as their valour might prompt."⁵¹ They were at last defeated with the loss of seventeen guns ; but for the English " the victory was dearly purchased, and by it the British learnt the true character of their foe."⁵² On their side 657 men were wounded and 215 were killed, including Major-General Sir Robert Sale, known for his gallant defence of Jalalabad and Major-General Sir John M'Caskill. Two days after the battle of Mudki, the British army marched against the Sikh entrenchments of ' Feroze Shah ' (Phirushahr or ' Phirus town ') about twelve miles from the Sutlej, and was joined by Sir John Littler's division. At the beginning of the contest on 21st December, the Sikhs fought stubbornly and with terrific force ; the " position of the English was one of real danger and great perplexity."⁵³ The Commander-in-Chief himself took that view : " During that night of horrors, we were in a critical and perilous state." The treachery of the Sikh generals ultimately helped the English cause and the Sikh entrenchments were finally captured on 22nd December. But for this failure of Sikh leadership the result of the battle might have been otherwise. Yet such hard contests could not but cause heavy losses on both sides ; on the English side 694 men were killed including 103 officers (such as Major Broadfort, Political officer, D' Arcy Todd, of Herat fame, and Brigadier Wallace) and 1,721 were wounded ; the Sikhs' casualties were estimated to come up to about 8,000 men in killed and wounded and they lost 73 fine guns. On 31st December, 1845, the Governor-General issued a proclamation wherein he called upon " all natives of Hindostan who had taken service under the Lahore Govern-

⁵¹ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 541.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Cunningham.

ment to quit their service at once, and place themselves under the orders of the Governor-General of India. They were ordered to repair to the British side of the Sutlej and to report themselves to the British authorities. If they failed to comply with this order, they were to be considered as having forfeited all claim to British protection, and to be treated as traitors to their country and enemies of the British Government."⁵⁴

The victors of 'Feroze Shah' were for some time "paralyzed after their prodigious exertions and intense excitement,"⁵⁵ and remained inactive for the time being for want of heavy guns, ammunition and stores, which they daily expected from Delhi. Before their army was properly reinforced, a strong body of the Sikhs under Ranjur Singh Majhithia again crossed the Sutlej in January and made a dash on the frontier station of Ludhiana. Sir Harry Smith (afterwards Governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to intercept the Sikh advance, suffered a defeat in a skirmish with the Sikhs at Buddewal on 21st January. But reinforced by a brigade under Wheeler and effecting a junction with the Ludhiana troops, he raised the forces under his command to 11,000 men with 32 guns, and inflicted a defeat on the Sikhs, in spite of their strong resistance, at Aliwal, on 28th January, 1846. The Sikhs fled across the Sutlej, many of them being drowned in the river. The British Commander-in-Chief exultingly remarked: "I am unwonted to praise when praise is not merited, and I here must avowedly express my firm opinion and conviction, that no troops in any battle on record ever behaved more nobly." The final battle was fought on 10th February, 1846, at Sobraon (more correctly Subrahan, named after the tribe inhabiting the village) where the Sikhs had constructed strong entrenchments. "Sobraon," remarks Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler, "proved to be the hardest fought battle in the history of British India. The Sikh soldiers, unlike their treacherous commander Tej Singh, were prepared

⁵⁴ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 544.

⁵⁵ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, p. 357.

to conquer or die for the glory of the Khalsa ; ”⁵⁶ but while the soldiers did everything, the Sikh commanders, with the honourable exception of Sham Singh Atriwala, remained inactive or proved traitors. As Cunningham has observed : “ Hearts to dare and hands to execute were numerous, but there was no mind to guide and animate the whole.”⁵⁷ Treachery and disunion always ruin a nation ; the courage and resoluteness of the Sikh soldiers were thus of no avail against the united and purposive organization of the British. Though the brethren of the Khalsa “ fought with the valour of heroes, the enthusiasm of crusaders, and the desperation of zealots sworn to conquer the enemy or die sword in hand ”⁵⁸ since the early dawn of 10th February, they at last gave way by the midday, and “ the formidable entrenchments of Subraon, which had bid defiance to the British ”⁵⁹ were stormed. “ The Sikhs lost in killed, wounded, and fled, about eight or ten thousand men ; many of their run-away soldiers were killed while crossing the Sutlej, which was crimsoned with the blood of a fugitive multitude.”⁶⁰ No mercy, no quarter was granted. The British Commander-in-Chief remarked : “ Their awful slaughter, confusion and dismay were such as would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous conquerors if the Khalsa troops had not in the early part of the action sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously mangling every wounded soldier whom in the vicissitudes of attack, the fortunes of war left at their mercy.”⁶¹ The casualties on the English side were 320 killed and 2,083 wounded.

The victory at Subraon was decisive ; it saved the British power in India from humiliation in a critical struggle with “ the

⁵⁶ *History of British India*, 597.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p. 597.

⁵⁹ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 547.

⁶⁰ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*

⁶¹ Quoted in Latiff, *Op. cit.*, pp. 547-48.

bravest and steadiest enemy ever encountered in India by a British army."⁶² The Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief received peerages and other rewards, and honours and bounties were freely distributed among all ranks. On 13th February, 1846, the whole British army crossed the Sutlej and on the 20th occupied Lahore. A treaty was concluded on 9th March, 1846, the terms of which were dictated by the English to the vanquished Sikhs in the old capital of Ranjit Singh.⁶³ By these terms the Maharaja of Lahore renounced "for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to, or connection with, the territories lying to the south of the river Sutlej" and engaged "never to have any concern with those territories, or the inhabitants thereof;" he ceded to the Company "in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories and rights in the Doab, or country, hill and plain situate between the rivers Beas and Sutlej." The Lahore darbar being unable to pay the one and a half crores of rupees, demanded as war indemnity by the English, or failing to give satisfactory security for its eventual payment, the Maharaja transferred to the Company "in perpetual sovereignty, as equivalent for one crore of rupees all his forts, territories, rights and interests, in the hill countries, which are situate between the rivers Beas and Indus, including the provinces of Cashmere (Kashmir) and Hazarah," promising to pay the remaining fifty lacs on or before the ratification of this treaty. The Maharaja agreed to "disband the mutinous troops of the Lahore army, taking from them their arms;" the regular army of the Lahore State was henceforth limited to 25 battalions of infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and 34 guns which had been captured at the battle of Sobraon were surrendered to the English. The control of the rivers Beas and Sutlej, with the continuation of the latter river, commonly called the Garrah and Panjnad, as far as the confluence of the Indus at Mithankot, and from Mithankot to the borders of

⁶² Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 695.

⁶³ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VIII; Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix XVIII.

Baluchistan was, with respect to tolls, to remain with the British Government. Free passes were to be allowed to the British troops through Lahore territories, and the Maharaja engaged "never to take or retain, in his service, any British subject, nor the subject of any European or American state without the consent of the British Government." Kashmir and the hill states from the Beas to the Indus were cut off from the Punjab proper, and by a separate treaty concluded on 16th March with Golab Singh, a sardar serving the Lahore darbar, these were transferred to him for one million sterling.⁶⁴ Referring to this arrangement with Golab Singh, Mr. Cunningham has observed that it was "a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the power of the Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness, and the objections become stronger when it is considered that Golab Singh had agreed to pay sixty-eight lacs of rupees (6,800,000) as a fine to his paramount before the war broke out, and that the custom of the East as well as of the West requires the feudatory to aid his lord in foreign war and domestic strife. Golab Singh ought thus to have paid the deficient million of money as a Lahore subject, instead of being put in possession of Lahore provinces as an independent prince."⁶⁵ A modern writer Mr. W. A. J. Archbold has also made the following observation: "What was clear was that the Lahore state must be reduced in size, that Kashmir was the easiest limb to lop off, and such being the case Gulab Singh was the only man to whom it could be well handed over."⁶⁶ The minor Dalip Singh was recognised as the Maharaja with Rani Jhindan as regent of the state and Lal Singh as the executive minister. It was stated that the Governor-General would not "exercise any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore State"; but a British force "adequate for the

⁶⁴ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix XX.

⁶⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 1380.

⁶⁶ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 552.

purpose of protecting the person " of the Maharaja was left at Lahore, which was to be withdrawn after the close of the year 1846, and Sir Henry Lawrence was placed there as the British Resident. Some events following quickly made an alteration of this arrangement necessary. The transfer of Kashmir to Golab Singh was resented by some. In the month of October Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, the Sikh Governor of Kashmir, rose in an insurrection against Golab Singh, at the instigation of Lal Singh ; it was put down by a considerable British force. Lal Singh was tried by a formal Court of Enquiry and his guilt being proved, he was dismissed from the ministership and was deported to Benares. Thinking that anarchy would revive without the presence of the British troops, the friendly sardars asked for a revision of the treaty. So a new treaty was signed on 16th December, 1846,⁶⁷ which made the British the real masters of the Punjab. Its administration was placed in the hands of a Council of Regency of eight Sikh sardars, acting under the control and guidance of the British Resident. The Lahore Government agreed to pay to the British twenty-two lacs of rupees for the maintenance of a British force. It was stated that this arrangement would last till 4th September, 1854, when the minority of Dalip Singh would terminate and the Government be handed over to him. Henry Lawrence was appointed British Resident at Lahore, and he tried with the help of a band of officers, his brothers George and John Lawrence, Abbot, Edwardes, Hodson, Nicholson, and Lumsden, to introduce various reforms in the country. Henry Lawrence sailed for England with Lord Hardinge on 18th January, 1848 ; his office was held for some time by his brother Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence and it was ultimately conferred on Sir Frederick Curie on 6th April, 1848.

Lord Hardinge shrank from annexation of the Punjab which would have required a greater force than what he had at his disposal, and the plan of ' subsidiary alliance ' did not commend

⁶⁷ Cunningham, *Op. cit.*, Appendix XXI.

itself to him as he apprehended future complications thereby. But the arrangements that he effected were "lacking in prospects of permanence." The Sikhs were far from feeling themselves subdued though their army had been defeated. They attributed their defeats and humiliation to the perfidy of their leaders who, they believed, were now reaping the consequences of their actions. The Queen-mother Rani Jhinda was accused of hostile plots against the British Resident and she was removed from Lahore. This added to the bitterness of Sikh feelings and of discontent against British ascendancy, which waited only for a suitable opportunity for a gigantic outburst. In fact, a Second Sikh War was inevitable. The Sikh nationalists, who had given proofs of their strong determination and bravery and who had a tradition of brilliant achievements behind them, were not likely to submit without another attempt. The next Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie (1848—1856), was to see the Punjab aflame with rebellion within three months of his arrival. "It needed but an event of sufficient general interest to excite a national rising, and that event was supplied by the city of Multan, long a storm centre."

Mulraj, a man of some strength and ability, who had succeeded his father Sawant Mal as Governor of Multan in 1844, was in some troubles owing to deficient revenue-collection in his district, and consequent failure in paying off the sum for which he had contracted with the Lahore darbar as the price of his governorship. In March 1848 he expressed his desire to give up his charge and the state thereupon appointed Sardar Khan Singh Man in his place, "on a fixed salary of 30,000 rupees a year in lieu of the contract system."⁶⁸ The Sardar went to Multan with 500 state troops and two British officers, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European regiment. On 19th April these two officers

⁶⁸ Lee-Warner, *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie* (1904), Vol. I, p. 154.

took formal charge of the fort of Multan, but they were soon murdered while coming out of it. Mulraj was probably implicated in this murder. Some soldiers of the escort joined Mulraj, who declared a war against the British on 20th April, 1848, summoning 'people of every creed' to join his standard.⁶⁹

This was indeed a critical moment for the British power in India; the revolt of Mulraj affected their prestige and challenged their authority in the Punjab. The British Resident, Sir Frederick Curie, wrote to Lord Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, for permission to send a body of troops to suppress the Multan revolt. But the latter decided not to send any troops and to defer the operations till the beginning of the cold weather. He wrote to the Resident on 30th April, 1848: "There can be no doubt that operations against Multan, at the present advanced period of the year, would be uncertain, if not altogether impracticable; whilst a delay in attaining the object would entail a fearful loss of life to the troops engaged, most injurious in its moral effects, and highly detrimental to those future operations which must, I apprehend, be undertaken."⁷⁰ This decision though approved by the home authorities evoked much criticism,⁷¹ but it has been rightly pointed out by certain writers that there was a good political reason behind it. They point out that "technically speaking it was the business of the Sikh authorities to suppress the rebellion," and the Commander-in-Chief wanted by this delay to sound the strength of the Punjab Government to suppress it as well as its sincerity towards the British Government. He apprehended also a general rising of the Sikhs and therefore preferred the chance of a big revolt with the certainty of throwing a powerful conquering army into the Punjab in proper season late in the year, to the hazard of at once sending a small force when failure might precipitate disaster; especially as Multan was reputed to

⁶⁹ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p. 603; Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 559.

⁷⁰ Lee-Warner, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 156.

⁷² Lee-Warner, *Op. cit.*, pp. 157—60.

be exceedingly strong, and the country was a dangerous one to Europeans for summer campaigns being intensely hot.⁷²

In spite of this decision on the part of the supreme government to delay activities, a young lieutenant named Herbert Spencer, serving under the Sikh Council of Regency, and the Resident Curie made "heroic but mistaken efforts to deal with the rising on a small scale."⁷³ Though they began in right earnest they had at last to abandon the siege of Multan and the revolt of Mulraj soon developed into a Sikh national rising. Early in August, Chatter Singh, the Sikh governor of the Hazara district, had risen in revolt and had murdered Colonel Canora, an American in the service of the Sikh government, and on 14th September, 1848, his son Sher Singh, who had been unwisely sent by the Lahore Resident to join the British besieging force at Multan, went over to the side of Mulraj with all his troops. Owing to the intrigues and activities of Rani Jhingan, the whole of the Punjab had become a "scene of covert disaffection"⁷⁴ and all the old Sikh leaders gathered round Sher Singh. They purchased the friendship and help of their old enemies the Afghans by the surrender of Peshawar.

All these strengthened Lord Dalhousie's determination for a final tussle with the Sikhs and in a letter to the Secret Committee, dated 7th October, 1848, he "spoke of a general Punjab war and the occupation of the country."⁷⁵ He declared on 10th October, 1848: "Unwarned by precedents, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war and on my word, Sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance." But it was not before the second week of November next that the English could begin offensive operations. On 16th November Lord Gough crossed the Ravi, and on 22nd November he fought an indecisive battle with Sher Singh at Ramnagar on the Chenab.

⁷² Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*.

⁷³ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 555.

⁷⁴ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 564.

⁷⁵ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 555.

The Sikhs then entrenched themselves strongly at Chilianwala, where a bloody but indecisive battle was fought on 13th January, 1849. By this battle the Sikhs lost some brave men and only twelve guns, while the losses of the English were great,—602 killed and 1,651 wounded; three regiments lost their colours and four horse-artillery guns were captured. "This was the last great attempt of the (derelict) army of Ranjit Singh to recover independence. They fought bravely and desperately and the advantage of the bloody battle that had been fought was decidedly in their favour, for they continued to occupy, for a month, strategical positions from which the British were unable to dislodge them."⁷⁶ But the English were more successful at Multan, which was stormed on 22nd January, 1849, after a gallant defence by the Sikhs. Mulraj was compelled to surrender at discretion.

The disaster and carnage at Chilianwala had roused criticism both in India and in England, and Sir Charles Napier was appointed by the Directors to supersede Lord Gough as Commander-in-Chief. But before he arrived, Lord Gough had been able to inflict a deadly blow on the Sikhs. After Chilianwala, the Sikhs had moved on towards Gujarat, a town near the Chenab, Lord Gough slowly pursuing them by way of Sadulapur. Sher Singh was now joined by his father Chatter Singh at the head of all his forces and by Akram Khan, a son of Dost Muhammad Khan, with some Afghan soldiers. "For the first time," wrote Dalhousie, "Sikhs and Afghans were banded together against the British power. It was an occasion which demanded the putting forth of all the means at our disposal, and so conspicuous a manifestation of the superiority of our armies, as should appeal each enemy and dissolve at once their compact, by fatal proof of its futility."⁷⁷ The Sikh forces, in

⁷⁶ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 570.

⁷⁷ Letter from Lord Dalhousie to the Secret Committee in the Punjab, *Blue Book*, 1847—49, quoted in Macfarlane, *History of British India* (1862), p. 630.

Lord Gough's estimate, numbered 61,500 men with 61 guns. Lord Gough commanding 250,000 men with 100 guns⁷⁸ was also joined by the Multan army under General Whish on 20th February. On 21st February the two armies met in a battle near Gujarat. "It was essentially an artillery action, and is known as the battle of the guns."⁷⁹ After three hours' sustained cannonade Lord Gough compelled the Sikhs and the Afghans to leave the positions which they had defended with resolute hardihood, and put them to flight ;—"their ranks broken, their positions carried ; their guns, ammunition, camp-equipage, and baggage captured ; their flying masses driven before the victorious pursuers from midday to dusk, receiving most severe punishment in their flight."⁸⁰ The victory at Gujarat, gained by the English at the comparatively small loss of 69 killed and 670 wounded, was decisive. The Governor-General remarked that the action at Gujarat "must ever be regarded as one of the most memorable in the annals of British warfare in India ; memorable alike from the greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter."⁸¹ On 13th March, Sher Singh, Chatter Singh and all the Sikh sardars and soldiers laid down their arms ; and the Afghans were hotly pursued by Sir Walter Gilbert, who recovered Attock and drove them towards the Khyber Pass and Kabul. Mulraj was tried by a military court and was sentenced to life-long imprisonment and banishment beyond the seas, where he died soon.

The complete defeat of the Sikhs sealed the fate of their country. Their prospects of maintaining independence disappeared, and on 29th March, 1849, Lord Dalhousie on his own

⁷⁸ Dr. V. A. Smith notes that "the British now became for the first time superior to the enemy in artillery." *Oxford History*, p. 699.

⁷⁹ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p. 604.

⁸⁰ Despatch of Lord Gough in *Punjab Blue Book*, quoted in Macfarlane, *Op. cit.*, p. 630.

⁸¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*

responsibility⁸² issued a proclamation announcing "that the Kingdom of the Punjab is at an end, and that all the territories of the Maharaja Dulip Singh are now, and henceforth, a portion of the British Empire in India." Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Lawrence were opposed to this annexation, and the Cabinet also thought in their way. The Secret Committee had written to him on 24th November, 1848, that after the complete defeat of the Sikhs it would be expedient for him "to review the important question of annexation in all its bearings, military, financial and political" and they thought that there was "no necessity for an immediate action."⁸³ But Lord Dalhousie felt that circumstances had created the "necessity for an immediate action."⁸⁴ Three other courses,—the first being the restoration of former relations with Lahore after the reduction of Multan and the punishment of Mulraj, the second, the annexation of Multan only, and the third, the retention of the nominal sovereignty of the Maharaja under a greater degree of British control—were weighed in his mind by Dalhousie. But he considered each of these to be fraught with inconvenience and anxiety, and annexation seemed to him to be the best course. He remarked: "however contrary it may be to our past views and to our present views, annexation of the Punjab is the most advantageous policy for us to pursue. I firmly believe we shall not succeed in establishing a friendly Sikh power."⁸⁵

The young Maharaja Dalip Singh was granted a pension of £50,000 a year. He was sent to England with his mother Rani Jhindan, and placed under the guardianship of the physician Sir John Logan of the Bengal Army. He subsequently embraced Christianity and lived the life of an English landlord with an estate in Norfolk. Later on he returned to the Punjab

⁸² Lee-Warner, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 232—35.

⁸³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 239.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 237.

and reembraced his old faith, but he could not regain any authority. His mother (the first Indian princess to make a prolonged stay in England) died in London in 1853. The celebrated Kohinur, taken at this time by the English, was presented to Her Majesty Queen Victoria by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company and was shown in the Exhibition of 1851.

Various opinions have been expressed about Dalhousie's annexation of the Punjab. Two points are however clear. Firstly, it is to be admitted that Dalip Singh had to suffer for the faults of others ; and, secondly, it should be noted that British interests and influence in India became safe and unquestioned. Mr. Roberts has described it as a "momentous step which finally carried the frontiers of British India to their natural limits, the base of the mountains of Afghanistan."⁸⁶ After annexation, the settlement of the province engaged the Governor-General's attention. He constituted a Board of three commissioners, consisting of Henry Lawrence as President, his brother John Lawrence and Charles Mansel. The functions of the Board were divided into Political, Revenue and Judicial, and the members had each special charge of one of those departments, "though all worked jointly when any question of more than an ordinary importance arose."⁸⁷ The old Sikh armies were disbanded, a general forces disarmament was effected ; civil and military police were organised ; and a new army, called the Punjab Frontier Force, was raised under the immediate control of the Board. Changes were introduced in the spheres of industry, commerce, agriculture and land revenue.⁸⁸ Fortified posts were established along the north-west frontier ; roads were laid out in all directions, the most important one

⁸⁶ This is, however, not quite correct ; the natural N.-W. Frontier of India is the Hindukush ; the failure to reach that has created many problems of Indian defence in modern times.

⁸⁷ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 574.

⁸⁸ Ramsay Muir, *Making of British India*, p. 350.

connecting Lahore with Peshawar ; and canal works, like those in the Bari Doab, were undertaken.⁸⁹ In 1853, Henry Lawrence went to serve in Rajputana, the board was abolished and Sir John Lawrence was appointed the first Chief Commissioner of the Punjab with a Judicial Commissioner and a Financial Commissioner under him. The name of Sir John Lawrence is associated with important reforms in different spheres.

The Punjab chiefs rendered valuable services to the British Government during the Mutiny and received rewards in return.⁹⁰ From 1st January, 1859, the Punjab and its dependencies were constituted into Lieutenant-Governorship. The first Lieutenant-Governor the same Sir John Lawrence had to retire on account of ill health towards the end of February and was succeeded by Sir Robert Montgomery, whose administration was notable for the opening of the Bari Doab canal on 11th April, 1859.⁹¹ In the Ambala darbar, held by Canning on 18th January, 1860, the chiefs of Patiala, Jhind and Nabha received some territorial concessions. Under the auspices of Sir Robert Montgomery, the first exhibition of Punjab arts and manufactures was held at Lahore in 1864 and it lasted for six months. After his arrival as Governor-General and Viceroy of India in January 1864, Sir John Lawrence visited Lahore, held there a grand darbar and formally opened the Lawrence Hall, erected by his Punjab friends to commemorate his services. Sir Robert Montgomery, in whose honour also a memorial was erected in the shape of the Montgomery Hall, resigned his office in January 1865, and was succeeded by Sir Donald McLeod. The office of Judicial Commissioner was abolished in 1865, and a chief court, consisting of two judges, was established with final appellate authority in civil and criminal cases. Sir Donald McLeod took keen interest in the introduction of

⁸⁹ Latiff, *Op. cit.*, p. 575.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 582-83.

⁹¹ The total cost for the construction of this canal amounted to Rs. 1,35,85,502.

new horticultural products, in medical training and in the working of the municipal system. Sir Donald retired from his office in January 1870, and was succeeded by Sir Henry Marion Duran, who died after seven months. The next Lieutenant-Governor was Sir Henry Davies during whose time the Punjab was honoured by the visit of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales. On 2nd April, 1877, Sir Henry Davies was succeeded by Sir Robert Eyles Egerton, who was followed by Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison on 2nd April, 1882. In November 1882, the Viceroy (Lord Ripon) opened the great Sirhind Canal. The next Lieutenant-Governor was Sir James Broadwood Lyall (2nd April, 1887).

SECTION II

ANNEXATION OF SINDH

As we have already seen, during the latter part of the eighteenth century Sindh was being governed by the Amirs or Mirs of the Talpura family with their three branches stationed at Hyderabad, Khairpur and Mirpur. They were theoretically under the supremacy of Afghanistan, though the "connection was seldom more than nominal." After the death of Fateh Ali in 1809, a treaty of friendship was concluded by the British Government with his three brothers Ghulam Ali, Khurram Ali and Murad Ali by which it was provided that the "English Government will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French" in Sindh.⁹² This treaty was renewed in 1820 with the addition of an article "binding the contracting parties to take vigorous measures to suppress the predatory hordes who were continually disturbing the peace of the frontier."⁹³ The journey of Alexander Burnes up the Indus *en route* to Lahore disclosed the importance of the control of Sindh to the British.

⁹² Colonel Keith Young, *Scinde in the Forties*, edited by Arthur F. Scott, Introduction, x.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

In 1831 Ranjit Singh suggested to Lord William Bentinck a partition of Sindh, but the latter did not support the idea, and proceeded to deal independently with the Amir of Hyderabad, who rather reluctantly agreed to a treaty concluded with the British on 20th April, 1832, on the following terms :

- (1) " That the two contracting Power bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.
- (2) That the British Government has requested a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindoostan by the rivers and roads of Sinde by which they may transport their goods and merchandise from one country to another ; and the said Government of Hyderabad hereby acquiesces in the same request on the following conditions :
 - (a) That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads. (b) That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.
- (3) That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sinde, but shall come as occasion requires and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India."

This treaty was renewed in 1834.

Till 1838 Ranjit Singh frequently expressed his ambitious desire of annexing Sindh, which was steadily opposed by the British Government, apprehensive of a further strengthening of the Sikh power, and which led it ultimately to think of a closer alliance with the Amirs of Sindh and to the extension of British influence there.⁹⁴ As a price for this protection against

⁹⁴ " You will in treating with the Amirs communicate with them, without reserve, in reference to the dangerous position in which they stand, and you will apprise them, that this Government is sensible how essential it is, not to their interests only but to their very existence,

Sikh ambition, Sindh had to come under the net of British imperialism. By a treaty concluded on 20th April, 1838, Lord Auckland extorted a consent from the Amirs of Sindh to receive at Hyderabad an accredited British Resident.⁹⁵ This was not all. "Under Auckland and his cabinet of secretaries," writes Mr. Roberts, "British policy in India had fallen to a lower level of unscrupulousness than ever before, and the plain fact is that the treatment of Sindh from this time onward, however expedient politically, was morally indefensible."⁹⁶ On the outbreak of the Afghan war, which made control of the Indus highly necessary for the English for transporting Bombay troops to Afghanistan, they felt no scruple in violating the treaty of 1832 and "acted in a very high-handed manner towards the Amirs in taking an armed force through their country."⁹⁷ It was intimated to the Amirs that "while the present exigency lasts. . . the article of the treaty prohibiting the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores must necessarily be suspended."

By the Tripartite Treaty of 26th June, 1838, between Shah Shuja, the English and Ranjit Singh, Shah Shuja agreed to "relinquish, for himself, his heirs, and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears of tribute, over the country held by the Ameers of Scinde (which will continue to belong to the Ameers and their successors in perpetuity) on condition of the payment to him by the Ameers of such a sum as may be determined under the mediation of the British Government, 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by him to Maharaja Ranjeet Singh." But as the price of this mediation, Lord Auckland exacted a large sum from the Amirs of Sindh, though

that the ties by which they are connected with the British Empire should be strengthened." Letter to Pottinger, Resident in Sindh, dated 26th September, 1836, quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 524.

⁹⁵ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 363.

⁹⁶ *British History*, p. 326.

⁹⁷ *Scinde in the Forties*, XI.

the latter produced reasonable arguments to the effect that they had ceased paying any tribute to Shah Shuja during his thirty years' exile from Kabul and that the Shah himself had exempted them from all claims in 1833. To add to the humiliation of the Sindh chiefs, they received a strong warning from the English in the following terms: "... we have the ready power to crush and annihilate them, and we will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely for either the integrity or safety of our Empire, or its frontiers."⁹⁸ Under the threat of Sir John Keane's advance on their capital, the Amirs of Sindh were compelled to accept a treaty in February 1839, the effects of which have been described by Lord Auckland in the following terms: "... the confederacy of the Amirs is virtually dissolved, each chief being placed in his own possessions, and bound to refer his differences with the other chiefs, to our arbitration; that Scinde is formally placed under British protection and brought within the circle of our Indian relations; that a British force is to be fixed in Lower Scinde, at Tatta, or such other point to the westward of the Indus as the British Government may determine; a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum, in aid of the cost of this force, being paid in equal proportions by the three Amirs, Mir Noor Mahomed Khan, Mir Musser Mahomed Khan, and Mir Mahomed Khan, and that the navigation of the Indus, from the sea to the most northern point of the Scinde territory, is rendered free of all toll. These are objects of high and undoubted value and especially so when acquired without bloodshed as the first advance towards that consolidation of our influence, and extension of the general benefits of commerce, throughout Afghanistan, which form the great end of our design."⁹⁹ There is no doubt that these arrangements were highly unjust. Lord Auckland went further; after the treaty had been very reluctantly accepted by the Amirs, he revised it to suit his own advantage and returned

⁹⁸ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 526.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 529; *Scinde in the Forties*, XII,

to the Amirs for final signature, "who objected, implored and finally gave way, by affixing their seals to the revised documents."¹⁰⁰

During the terrible crisis of the Afghan war, when the Amirs of Sindh might have caused considerable embarrassments to English, they faithfully observed all their engagements with them,¹⁰¹ and their country was used as a base of operations against the Afghans. But instead of rewards for their fidelity, the Amirs were wrongly charged with disaffection and hostility against the British Government. Major James Outram, the Resident at Hyderabad, who was conversant with the Sindh affairs, was not entrusted with the settlement of Sindh, but in the autumn of 1842, he was superseded by Sir Charles Napier, who was placed by the new Governor-General Lord Ellenborough (1842—44) in supreme control, both military and political,—“a step,” as pronounced by a writer generally favourable to Lord Ellenborough, “at such a crisis, of very questionable policy.”¹⁰² Napier, remarks Innes, “conducted his operations on the theory that the annexation of Sindh would be a very beneficent piece of rascality for which it was his business to find an excuse—a robbery to be plausibly effected.”¹⁰³ This opportunity was supplied to him by a succession dispute at Khairpur. He arbitrarily decided this question in favour of Ali Murad, brother of Mir Rustam, the old Rais of Khairpur, by neglecting the claims of the latter's son Mir Muhammad Hussain. His real object in this arrangement is set forth in the following words: “It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be urged, viz., that we should treat with one Ameer, instead of a number. This will simplify our political dealings with these princes, and gradually reduce them to the class of rich noblemen, and their chief will

¹⁰⁰ Thornton, *History of the British Empire in India*, Vol. VI, p. 411.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13; Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 248.

¹⁰² Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 415.

¹⁰³ *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

be perfectly dependent on the Government of India, living as he will do so close to this large station (Sukkur) and I have no doubt that it will be quickly a large town.”¹⁰⁴ But the chiefs of Khairpur decided that Mir Rustam Khan should abdicate in favour of his son.

Napier at once declared that the charges against the Amirs were proved, and being bent on annexing Sindh he “pursued a bullying policy, always assuming that the Government of India was at liberty to do what it pleased, without the slightest regard to treaties.”¹⁰⁵ He laboured hard to impose a fresh treaty on the Amirs, by which they were required to cede certain important territories in lieu of tribute, to provide fuel to the steamers of the English navigating the Indus, and they were to relinquish the right of coining money. The British Government were to coin for them, and the coin was to bear on one side “the effigy of the sovereign of England.” The right of coining money is one of the most important attributes of sovereignty and its assumption meant that the Amirs were going to be reduced to the position of dependents of a foreign power,—a situation highly offensive to them. But they did not resort to open hostilities without further provocations caused by Napier himself. Even before the Amirs had accepted the treaty he sequestered the territories in question, and issued such a strongly worded proclamation that it seemed as if Sindh had already passed under British control. Sindh was thus dealt with by Napier, remarks Thornton, “as though the right of the Governor-General of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure were unquestioned and unquestionable; and, moreover, as if it were desired to exercise this right in a manner as offensive as possible to those who were to suffer privation from the exercise.”¹⁰⁶ In order to excite awe in the minds of the Amirs, Napier marched upon Imamgarh (‘the Sindh

¹⁰⁴ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 533.

¹⁰⁵ V. A. Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 685.

¹⁰⁶ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 419.

Gibraltar'), a desert fortress lying half way between Khairpur and Hyderabad, when all were professedly in a state of peace, and attacked and destroyed that fortress early in January, 1843. Outram, who had been recalled to Sindh as the British Commissioner, was able, by personal influence, to persuade the Amirs (with the exception of one of the Amirs of Khairpur who said that his seal was with his brother and promised to ratify the treaty at a future date) to sign the treaties of 12th February, 1843.

But aggression seldom goes without resistance whether it becomes successful or futile, immediate or belated. Napier's high-handed acts had excited the warlike Beluchis to an intense pitch of animosity, and on 15th February they attacked the residence of Outram, who was compelled to take refuge in a steamer. Open war now became inevitable. On 17th February Napier with a force numbering about 2,800 men and 12 guns inflicted a defeat on a Beluchi army of about 22,000 men at Miani, a few miles from Hyderabad. Six of the Amirs (three of Khairpur and three of Hyderabad) at once submitted to the British and Hyderabad was immediately occupied by the latter. This did not however bring the contest to an end. Sher Muhammad, 'the Lion of Mirpur,' remained in possession of considerable forces with which he made an attempt to retain his independence. But he was completely routed, on 24th March, at Dabo, six miles from Hyderabad. Napier occupied Mirpur on 27th March, Amarkot on 4th April, announced his victory to Ellenborough in the now well-known phrase, "*peccavi*, I have Sindh." Sher Muhammad made yet another attempt, but he was finally defeated by Jacob on 14th June and was driven out of Sindh, with which the war came to an end.¹⁰⁷

British arms having thus vanquished the Beluchis, Sindh was annexed in August, 1843, the Amirs were exiled, and Sindh became henceforth a British province. Napier accepted

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 445-46.

£70,000 as his share of the prize-money, but Outram instead of pocketing his own share amounting to £3,000 distributed the sum for charitable institutions. He disagreed with his chief's policy and wrote to him: "I am sick of policy; I will not say yours is the best, but it is undoubtedly the shortest—that of the sword. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause."¹⁰⁸ Napier became the first governor of Sindh and the next four years were devoted to its reorganisation and to the consolidation of British authority there.

Lord Ellenborough's policy and Sir Charles Napier's conduct towards the Sindhis received almost universal condemnation. The Court of Directors disapproved of it though they did not care to restore Sindh to its real owners. A critical examination of the facts of this transaction establishes beyond doubt that the Amirs had given no provocations, that their conduct was not all along hostile, but they had to some extent helped the British in their Afghan wars, and that the Governor-General's policy was purely aggressive. Mr. Innes has aptly remarked: "If the Afghan episode is the most disastrous in our Indian annals, that of Sindh is morally even less excusable."¹⁰⁹ He has remarked in another place that "Sindh is the one instance in which it is difficult to believe that the case for annexation was not more or less deliberately manufactured in opposition to the declared sentiments of the most high-minded, capable, and well-informed servants of the Government."¹¹⁰ We can compare with this a similar statement of Mr. Ramsay Muir: "Sindh is the only British acquisition in India of which it may fairly be said that it was not necessitated by circumstances; and that it was therefore an act of aggression."¹¹¹ Mr. Thornton has also opined that "the modern

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Smith's *Oxford History*, p. 685.

¹⁰⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 247.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 250. As has been already noted, the Court of Directors as early as 1841 had declared in favour of an annexation policy.

¹¹¹ *The Making of British India*, p. 311.

history of India affords many instances of similar chance ; but few, if indeed any, in which the incorporation has been effected so entirely without fair pretence. The Amirs of Sind wished no alliance or connection with us ; they owed us nothing, and they had inflicted on us no injury ; but it suited our policy to reduce them to vassalage, and they were thus reduced."¹¹² Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier tried to defend this policy by various specious arguments ;¹¹³ they have also had some advocates in writers like Macfarlane¹¹⁴ and Hugh Murray.¹¹⁵ But these are hardly substantiated by facts and cannot stand the test of historical criticism.¹¹⁶ Even Dr. Smith has acknowledged that " Lord Auckland had broken treaties with the Amirs of Sindh in the most cynical fashion. Lord Ellenborough went further, and deliberately provoked a war in order that he might annex the province."¹¹⁷ Sir Charles Napier himself admitted in his Diary : " We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be."

SECTION III

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

The North-West Frontier represented by the mountainous tracts lying between Afghanistan and the Indus has ever presented " both an international and a local problem of enormous complexity and difficulty."¹¹⁸ The valleys and defiles of

¹¹² *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 412.

¹¹³ Napier's letter to Outram, January 1843, quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 538; Napier's observations on the occupation of Sindh, Ramsay Muir, *Op. cit.*, pp. 328-29; Lord Ellenborough's letter to Wellington, *Ibid.*, pp. 330-31.

¹¹⁴ *History of British India*, pp. 565-66.

¹¹⁵ *History of British India* (1857), pp. 602-14.

¹¹⁶ *Vide* Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 448-66.

¹¹⁷ *Oxford History*, p. 684.

¹¹⁸ Simon Committee Report, Vol. I, p. 316.

these intersecting rugged and barren mountain ranges have since the middle ages been inhabited by hardy and fanatical tribesmen who have often taxed the energies of successive Indian governments. Besides, for centuries invaders from outside India have pushed their way through north-western and western passes into the Indo-Gangetic plains ; and it has been the traditional policy of Imperial powers within India since the days of the Mauryas, to try to control this tract (more or less effectively) and to reach a scientific frontier towards the North-West.

The annexation of Sindh in 1843 and the conquest of the Punjab in the course of the next few years carried the British boundaries beyond the Indus and made them co-terminous with the territories of the frontier tribes, bordering on Sindh and the Punjab. Sir Charles Napier did not take measures to guard the most exposed part of the Sindh frontier extending for about 150 miles from Kashmir to the northern spurs of the Hala mountains. This left Sindh open to the terrible incursions of the Bugtis from the Kachhi hills and of the Dombkis and Jakranis from the Kachhi plain ; they could not be subdued by Napier even after a regular expedition against them in 1845. It was Major (afterwards General) Jacob who, on being appointed the sole political agent on the upper Sindh in 1848, "completely revolutionised Napier's system"¹¹⁹ and relieved Sindh from the dread of Baluch inroads.

Towards the Punjab, the frontier problem was more complex and formidable due to geographical as well as political reasons. There the frontier was too long and too rugged to be easily defended, and the British had succeeded to a "heritage of anarchy," due to the weakness of the later Sikh administrators (since 1839). During the administration of Lord Elgin I (1862-63), a band of Muhammadan fanatics known as the Wahabis, chiefly inhabiting the frontier regions but having an agency at Patna in Bihar, and with their influence spreading

¹¹⁹ *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 449.

far and wide through secret channels, created troubles in the Punjab. But they were suppressed in the month of December 1863, and their stronghold of Malka was destroyed.

From 1849 to 1901 the trans-Indus districts remained with the Punjab. In 1876 the three northern districts of Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat were formed under the commissionership of Peshawar and the three southern ones, Banu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan under that of the Derajat. In 1878 the system of political agencies was introduced; Kurram was formed into an agency in 1892, and the three other agencies of Malakand, Tochi, and Wana came into being between 1895 and 1896,—Malakand being placed under the direct control of the Government of India from the beginning.

British attention was directed more and more towards Quetta as the Afghan situation became more tense. Quetta, lying between the Bolan and the Kohjak passes, has "two great features of importance. It blocks one of the two main avenues into India, and it offers an easy advance on the flank of an attack proceeding by the Khyber, the other main gate of the frontier."¹²⁰ It was in the possession of the Khan of Khelat, who by the treaty of 1854 promised "to abstain from negotiations with any other power, without first consulting the British; to receive British troops in Kalat (Khelat) whenever such a step should be thought necessary; to protect merchants passing through his territories; and to prevent his subjects from harassing the British border. In return for this he received an annual subsidy of Rs. 50,000."¹²¹ But the Khan failed to comply with these terms, and by 1873 his territory fell into anarchy leading to raids on the British borders. This led to the mission of Major (afterwards Sir) Robert Sanderman to the Khan's territory, and he concluded the treaty of Jacobabad on 8th December, 1876, by which the long-coveted fort of Quetta came under British occupation. This was followed by the

¹²⁰ Dodwell, *A Sketch of the History of India*, 1858—1918, p. 131.

¹²¹ *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. VI, p. 454.

creation of the Beluchistan Agency, Major Sandeman being appointed (on 21st February, 1877) Agent to the Governor-General with his headquarters at Quetta. The occupation of Quetta was much opposed by the Council of India, but Lord Lytton (1876—1880), the nominee of the imperialist Prime Minister Lord Beaconsfield, justified it on the ground that "it was impossible to remain inert spectators of the anarchy in Kalat, when the connection between Kalat and Sindh was so intimate that any disturbance in the one was immediately reflected in the other."¹²² It was also meant as a counter-measure against Russian designs in the East, and Lord Salisbury regarded it as "the father of the Central Asian Mission of the future."¹²³

From 1876 the frontier policy of "masterly inactivity" of the Lawrence or "non-intervention" school was thought to be unsuitable. Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty, which was marked by attempts to further the cause of British Imperialism, saw the growth of a consciousness, among some English statesmen, of the necessity for a scientific frontier.¹²⁴ This forward policy both to the north-west and the north-east was further defined by Lord Lansdowne, a high-minded and courageous conservative, who remained as the Governor-General of India from 1888 to 1893, and Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army during that period. The former was a strong believer in the doctrine of "the sphere of influence" within which, he said, "we shall not attempt to administer the country ourselves, but within which we shall not allow any aggression from without."

The forward policy on the frontier required that the Afghan boundaries on the side of India should be definitely settled, the tribal lands should be reduced to order and strategic

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 455.

¹²³ Dodwell, *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹²⁴ In England, during this period, the mind of the Prime Minister Lord Beaconsfield was filled with grandiose schemes of imperialism.

railways should be constructed. In 1889, Lord Lansdowne, "acting on certain vague and indeterminate charges, which were never properly substantiated," displaced the Maharaja of Kashmir from his government and placed it with a council under the authority of a British Resident. But the Maharaja was restored in 1905, also for reasons not fully known. By the year 1888 British control was established over the Bori and Zhob valleys lying to the south of the Gomal Pass, and in 1899 the British Government declared the Gomal river, from Domandi to its junction with the Zhob stream to be boundary between Baluchistan and the Punjab frontier zone. This was followed by the British occupation, during 1891 and 1892, of Hunza and Nagar in the Gilgit valley, two places commanding the communications with Chitral. The Khan of Khelat was also required to abdicate in 1892.

These British activities on the frontier naturally created apprehensions in the minds of Abdurrahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, who wrote to Lord Lansdowne: "If you should cut them out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you or to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appears on the borders of India, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies . . . In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects and will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your government."¹²⁵ Under such circumstances, war between the Amir and the British Government appeared to be imminent. Lord Lansdowne himself admitted that "all the conditions were calculated to lead to misconceptions and strained relations." Conflict was, however, in the end averted by the British policy of compromise at this

¹²⁵ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 462.

time. The mission of Sir Mortimer Durand to Kabul (2nd October—16th November, 1893) resulted in an agreement by which the boundary lines were demarcated by Afghan and British commissioners. The Amir received certain districts, and agreed not to interfere with the frontier tribes like the Afridis in the Khyber, the Waziris, and the tribes in the reigns of Swat, Bajaur, Dir and Chitral. The Amir's subsidy paid by the Indian Government was raised from twelve to eighteen lakhs and he was permitted to purchase and import munitions of war. As a sort of check against Russian advance, the British Government declared in the same year a formal protectorate over Gilgit and Chitral.

The Durand Agreement, no doubt, restored cordial relations between the two governments, but it did not remove all risks of wars and frictions on the frontier, as is proved by the facts of frontier history since 1893. The Amir himself expressed the following view about the results of the mission: "Sir Mortimer Durand's mission reconciled matters by giving me some sort of compensation, and I am quite contented and satisfied that I have gained more than I have lost by British friendship. I merely mention these facts to show . . . that though England does not want any piece of Afghanistan, still she never loses a chance of getting one and this friend has taken more than Russia has."¹²⁶ Dr. Davis has remarked that "the importance of this agreement has been somewhat exaggerated . . . The new boundary line was not based upon sound topographical data, for, during the process of demarcation, it was discovered that certain places, marked on the Durand map, did not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were perpetrated, such as the handing over to the Amir of the Birmal tract of Waziristan, peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom were included within the British sphere of influence. The worst blunder of all was the arrangement by which the boundary cut the Mohmand tribal

¹²⁶ Quoted in *Roberts, Op. cit.*, p. 493.

area into two separate parts . . . In all probability the political issues at stake occasioned the sacrifice of ethnological requirements."¹²⁷

In fact, disturbances soon appeared on the north-west frontier in the time of Lord Landsdowne's successor, Lord Elgin (1894—99), the son of the second Viceroy. In 1895, the Mehtar or chief of Chitral was murdered at the instigation of Sher Afzal, an ex-Mehtar, and Umra Khan, the ruler of Jhandol, proclaimed a 'jihad' throughout Dir, Swat, Bajaur. The British Agent at Gilgit, Dr. (afterwards Sir George) Robertson, who had proceeded to Chitral, was besieged in Fort Chitral by a combined force of Chitralis and Pathans. The British Government sent Sir R. Low with a force of 15,000 men to their relief; but Chitral was ultimately relieved by Colonel Kelly with a handful of men from Gilgit. Though the retention of Chitral was urged by Lord Elgin who also proposed the construction of a road from Peshawar through Swat, the Liberal Government of Lord Rosebery thought of evacuating it. On 14th March, 1895, a proclamation was issued by the Government of India to the people of Swat and Bajaur declaring that their territory would not be occupied if they allowed British forces to pass unmolested through their territories. The Liberal opposition could not prevent the retention of Chitral, as the Unionist regime of Lord Salisbury reversed the decision of Lord Rosebery's government and authorised Lord Elgin's government to construct a military road from Chitral to the British frontier. The Chitral affair raised fierce party strifes in England; the Unionists urged its retention on grounds of strategic necessity while the Liberals advocated its evacuation and opposed the construction of a road on the argument that it would mean a violation of the proclamation of March 1895, and thus a breach of faith with the frontier people. On the Elgin Government's position and the attitude of the Unionists, Dr. Davis writes: "The Liberal contention, that the construction

¹²⁷ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI. p. 462.

of a new road was a deliberate breach of faith with the tribes and contrary to the spirit of the proclamation, was merely a party cry, for the tribes, with one exception, had paid no heed to the proclamation and had resisted the British advance."¹²⁸ The Liberal attitude was one of abstract justice, while the Unionists were guided by considerations of the strategic necessity of preventing any attack upon India by Russia from the Chitral side.¹²⁹ But it is difficult "to see how any effective movement could be made by Russia from the Chitral side, unless she were in complete military occupation of Afghanistan, or in friendly alliance with the Amir. In 1895 the danger of an attack upon India from the direction of Chitral was infinitesimal."¹³⁰

Meanwhile, the frontier tribes grew restive owing to the British advance and activities, and in 1897 the whole frontier was ablaze with violent risings. The active forward policy pursued by the British Government during the nineties was by itself sufficient to excite anti-British feelings in the minds of the fierce and freedom-loving frontier tribes; to this was added the influence of religious fanaticism fanned by the Muslim priests. The Amir Abdurrahman himself assumed the title of *Zia-ul-millat wa-ud-Din*, the "Light of the Nation and Religion" and published a book entitled *Taqwim-ud-din* (Catechism or Almanac of Religion), wherein he declared a *jihad* or holy war against all unbelievers. In other parts of the world also relations between the Christians and the followers of Islam were not at all cordial. As for example, the Arabs of the Sudan had broken the British squares; in England popular clamours against Sultan Abdul Hamid II of Turkey for his harsh treatment of the Armenians "roused to fury much latent anti-Christian feelings." But it would be a mistake to regard religious fanaticism as the real cause of the outbreak; we need

¹²⁸ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 464.

¹²⁹ Frazer, *India Under Curzon and After*, p. 49.

¹³⁰ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 464.

not "confuse fanaticism with the natural desire of the tribesmen for independence."¹³¹ The plain fact is that religious fanaticism only served to intensify the feelings of discontent and resentment which had already been awakened in the minds of the frontier people and which might, have even independently burst forth at any moment.

On 10th June, 1897, the British political agent and his escort at Maizar in the Tochi Valley were treacherously attacked. In July, the tribesmen of Swat, under Sadullah Khan, attacked the British fortified posts at Chakdarra and Malakand. In August the Mohmands, dwelling north of the Kabul river, rose under Najm-ud-din and attacked the village of Shankargarh in the Peshawar district. Lastly, the Orakzais and Afridis, being instigated by Mulla Sayyid Akbar, laid siege to the fortified posts on the Samna Ridge and captured the Khyber forts. It was after severe fighting in two regular campaigns that the situation became gradually quiet by 1898. The campaign was undertaken by the Malakand Field Force under Sir Bindon Blood against the Mohmands; and a second force was sent under Sir William Lockhart to the Tirah valley, south-west of Peshawar, against the Afridis.

Lord Curzon's viceroyalty (1899—1905) saw important changes in the North-West Frontier. Though the Tirah campaign had been concluded by the spring of 1898, yet when Lord Curzon arrived in India in January 1899, about 10,000 British troops were quartered across the British administrative border, in the Khyber, on the Samna Range, in Waziristan, and in the Malakand area. With regard to the frontier question, the new Viceroy followed a middle course between an extreme forward policy, though he retained Chitral, and a policy of definite retreat ("back to the Indus"), and thus he may be said "to have founded a new school of frontier politician."¹³² His frontier policy has been described as "one of

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 466.

¹³² Frazer, *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

withdrawal and concentration.”¹³³ This was summed up by him as consisting of the principles of “withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal forces in the defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces in British territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, and improvement of communications in the rear.” He gradually withdrew large numbers of regular British troops from the Khyber pass, the Khurram valley, Waziristan, and the tribal country generally, and filled in their places by a tribal militia trained and commanded by British officers. The Viceroy also adopted the principle of “establishing moveable columns of regular troops at convenient centres on the edge of the plains, ready always to march at a moment’s notice to the relief of the tribal forces.” A small regular garrison was, however, kept at Kila Drosh, at some distance to the south of the Mehtar’s capital in Chitral; and in 1902 regulars were stationed at Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. Forces were increased and concentrated within British lines and important strategic railways were constructed to Dargai at the base of the Malakand, Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber and to Thal at the mouth of the Khurram valley. Another aspect of Lord Curzon’s frontier policy appears in his granting allowances at regular intervals to the important frontier tribes ‘for keeping open the roads and passes, for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity and for the punishment of crime.’¹³⁴ The British Government also made attempts to regulate and limit the importation of arms to the tribesmen.

Curzon’s policy has been generally defended on the argument that for several years after the rising of 1894 it secured peace on the frontier with the exception of the outrages committed by the Mahsud Waziris in 1901, against whom “he refused to sanction an expedition but restored to the expedient of a blockade coupled with a series of swift blows at Mahsud

¹³³ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 466.

¹³⁴ Frazer, *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

villages." It has also been pointed out that his system made a great saving in expenditure ; during seven years he spent only £248,000 on military activities on the North-West Frontier as against £4,584,000 during the years 1894—98. " If anybody," declared Lord Curzon in the House of Lords in 1908, " had been disposed to doubt the success of the scheme of frontier policy which has now been in existence for ten years, his doubts must have been dispelled, and I hope that we shall now hear no more of the wild-cat schemes for advancing into tribal territories, annexing up to the border, and driving roads through the tribal country."¹³⁵ But Prof. Dodwell, while acknowledging Lord Curzon's military reforms as 'a great improvement,' remarks that " in fact it was scarcely the complete success that it was claimed to be ; and when the tribal levies failed to perform their duties, or the Khyber Rifles developed a habit of shooting their Adjutant, the outside world heard nothing of it."¹³⁶ Lord Minto wrote to the Secretary of State that " there is a great deal to be said for the system (Lord Curzon) inaugurated, which was a substitution of tribal levies for regular troops, in the hope of interesting the tribes themselves in the defence of the frontier. But neither the border police nor the levies have been capable of filling the position from which the troops were withdrawn."¹³⁷

Besides these military and police measures, another more important item of his reforms was the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901, with an area of 40,000 square miles. For about a quarter of a century proposals had been made by Viceroys and frontier officers for the creation of a new administrative unit in the North-West. For one reason or another these proposals were not carried into effect. Lord Lytton thought of creating " an enormous trans-Indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the

¹³⁵ Quoted in *Roberts*, p. 517.

¹³⁶ *A Sketch of the History of India*, p. 160.

¹³⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*

trans-Indus districts of Sind, with the exception of Karachi." But nothing definite had been done before Lord Curzon, whose plan was limited only to the northern section. According to the decision "that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the frontier should be more directly than hitherto under the control and supervision of the Government of India," this northern area was now placed under a Chief Commissioner directly responsible to the Government of India. There was to be also a revenue and a judicial commissioner. Politically the new province was formed into two parts: (1) the settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and (2) the trans-border tracts lying between the administrative and Durand boundaries. The latter comprised, besides the five political agencies of the Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana, also the tribal areas, the political control of which remained vested in the Deputy-Commissioners of the adjoining settled districts. The Punjab Government ceased to exercise any authority west of the Indus except in the settled district of Dera Ghazi Khan. In order to avoid confusion, the old "North-West Provinces" was renamed "The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh."

Lord Curzon's scheme was calculated to secure peace and administrative order in the troubled North-West Frontier. "In itself," says Prof. Dodwell, "it was an excellent measure. While the administration of the Punjab was rapidly assuming the regular, formal and report-ridden character of the older British provinces, it was but wise to exempt from these changes the exposed districts where a vigorous executive remained an essential need, and where the personality of the administration counted for much more than laws and regulations."¹³⁸ But it was not effected without opposition from the older civil servants in the Punjab, who complained against the rather harsh strictures of Lord Curzon on their administration. Lieutenant Colonel H. A. Deane (afterwards Sir Harold Deane) became the

¹³⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

first Chief Commissioner ; Mr. C. E. Bunbury was the Chief Judicial Officer with two divisional and sessions judges of Peshawar and the Derajat under him ; Mr. (afterwards Sir) Michael O'Dwyer remained in charge of revenue administration as the revenue commissioner.

Lord Curzon's plan, though commendable in many respects, did not offer the final solution of the Frontier Problem. The spirit of unrest and independence which characterised the tribes could not be thoroughly subdued, and administrative difficulties in the spheres of justice and revenue remained both in the settled districts and in the tribal areas.¹³⁹ In the year 1908 there was a rising in the Afridi and Mohmand valleys, partly due to instigation from Afghanistan and partly to resentment at the construction of the Loi-Shilman Railway. But except minor operations, no large punitive expeditions were undertaken till the Great War. But this period was "marked by the growth of the arms traffic, which entirely revolutionised the nature of border warfare ;¹⁴⁰ by the increase of raiding by well-organised gangs of outlaws from Afghanistan ; and by the development of the Mahsud problem which still awaits solution."¹⁴¹ All these factors, combined with the weakness and inefficiency of the Border Military Police or the Militia, increased the complexity of the frontier problem in spite of some efforts on the part of the Afghan as well as the British Government. After the outbreak of the Great War, the British Government tried to avert the danger of an Afridi rising by deciding, on 1st February,

¹³⁹ For details on this point, vide, *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, pp. 470—73 ; *Simon Commission Report*, Vol. I, pp. 318—23.

¹⁴⁰ It may be noted here that at the present moment, frontier warfare is again thought by experts to have undergone fresh developments in nature, owing to the up-to-date character of the arms and munitions supplies that reach the border tribesmen in various ways (e.g., range of sniping has increased, and plane bombing has become more difficult).

¹⁴¹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 473.

1915, to grant them double their allowances. The Amir Habibullah remained friendly to the British cause, but a spirit of unrest was manifest among the Mohmands and the Mahsuds, for which punitive expeditions were sent against them.

The system of Lord Curzon worked till 1914, but it collapsed amidst the general unrest created by the Great War. After the restoration of peace, the Government of India realised the necessity of settling the 'political' part of the Frontier problem permanently. The solution was found in what has been described as a "forward" policy, aiming "to destroy the frontier problem by civilising the people whose lack of civilisation has hitherto provided the hardest part of the problem."¹⁴² Grave disturbances took place on the Frontier during the summer of 1930, and their suppression necessitated some extraordinary measures on the part of the Government of India.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report made the following remarks about the North-West Frontier: "For reasons of strategy the two frontier provinces must remain in the hands of the Government of India. But inasmuch as our guiding principle, where the principle of responsibility cannot yet be applied, is that of government by consultation with the representatives of the people, we think that in some, if not all, of these areas it would be well to associate with the personal administration of the Chief Commissioner some form of advisory council, adjusted in composition and function to local conditions in each case. This question we would leave to the further consideration of the Government of India."¹⁴³ In 1922 a committee presided over by Sir Denys Bray recommended constitutional reform in

¹⁴² *India in 1925-26*, p. 203. Compare the speech of Sir Denys Bray in the Legislative Assembly in March 1923. It is instructive to note that Asoka's policy (twenty-two centuries ago) towards the tribesmen on his frontier was exactly the same, viz., destroying the problem by giving them the benefits of a higher civilization, which task was given to his 'antamahāmātras' or political agents resident in the frontier tribal states.

¹⁴³ *M. C. Report*, para 198.

the North-West Frontier Province though it emphasised the need of control of the Central Government ; but nothing was done to give effect to it. The Indian Statutory Commission considered the subject of the future constitution of the North-West Frontier Provinces and remarked that " the question of law and order, which in other parts of British India is a domestic and internal matter, in the North-West Frontier Province is closely related to the subjects of foreign and diplomatic policy and of imperial defence. Marauders to whom fighting is second nature, and who possess and freely use arms of precision, are always liable to be swept into frontier raids of a more general character, and the influence which the Mullahs can exert over these fanatical and ignorant tribesmen, combined with the risk of threatening movements on a larger scale in Central Asia, makes the administration of law and order in the North-West Frontier Province partake of the nature of an All-India problem."¹⁴⁴ The Commission did not therefore suggest any change in the existing arrangements by which the Chief Commissioner combined in his person the dual responsibility of administering the five districts and acting as Agent for the Governor-General in dealing with the tribal area," nor did it consider that " his relation to the army authorities need be affected." It, however, made certain recommendations, which have been summarised thus : " For the first time the North-West Frontier Province will have its own legislature, containing elected representatives, with powers both of taxation and of voting expenditure ; the opportunity of putting questions to the provincial administration, and of moving, discussing and carrying resolutions on public matters affecting the province, will give the North-West Frontier Province Legislative Council the means of exerting a very important influence on policy as well as an opportunity of working representative institutions, of which the area has as yet no experience. Moreover, the province will now, for the first time, be guaranteed full

¹⁴⁴ *Report*, Vol. I, p. 323.

representation in the Central Legislature, and will have voice in determining to what extent duties shall be imposed to feed the Provincial Fund, in which the North-West Frontier Province no less than the Governor's province will share."¹⁴⁵

The Sub-Committee No. V of the Indian Round Table Conference, which held its meetings on the 18th and 30th December, 1930, and on the 1st January, 1931, was "unanimous in attaching urgent importance to the need for reform in the North-West Frontier Province." It recommended "that the five administered districts should cease to be a centrally administered territory under the direct control of the Government of India, and that they should be given the status of a Governor's Province, subject to such adjustment of detail as local circumstances shall require, and the extent of the All-India interests in the Province necessitates." It recommends that as in other Governor's Provinces, "there should be a classification of provincial subjects entrusted to the charge of the provincial government" and that the "Executive should consist of the Governor assisted by two ministers, of whom one should be an official." In January 1932, it was announced that the province would be constituted as a Governor's Province, and the provisions of the Government of India Act, with certain exceptions, should be applied there. His Excellency the Governor and Agent to the Governor-General Sir Ralph Griffith, assumed charge of the province on 18th April, 1932.

SECTION IV

RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN

The importance of Afghans and Afghanistan in Indian history, during the two and a half centuries closing with the collapse of the decaying Mughal Empire, has already been shown. Here we have to survey the relations of the successors

¹⁴⁵ Vol. II, p. 106.

of Ahmad Shah Abdali with the new rulers of India. Ahmad Shah left behind him eight sons, but his second son Timur Mirza, named by his father as his successor, seized the throne and transferred his capital from Kandahar to Kabul.¹⁴⁶ He placed Kandahar under his son Mahmud Mirza and "on ascending the throne he augmented the pay of the Afghan chiefs, and gave the tribes a great extension of territory ; several of the sirdars received appointments of great trust and high command and titles much esteemed at the court of an Asiatic sovereign."¹⁴⁷ Payendah Khan, who after his father Jamal Khan, became the chief of the Barakzai tribe, was deeply attached to him and enjoyed his confidence so much that he never did anything without consulting him. He also put much trust in his Kazilbash horsemen.

In 1779 Timur proceeded to Sindh (theoretically a dependency of Afghanistan) in response to an appeal for help made by the head of the Kalora ruling family against Mir Fath Ali Khan, chief of the rival Talpura dynasty. He seized Bahawalpur where he got immense riches and restored the Kalora Amir ; but no sooner had he returned to Kabul than the Talpuras rose again, and, with the help of the Khan of Khelat, defied his generals.¹⁴⁸ Timur's authority over Balkh and Akhshah was but nominal, and he experienced much difficulty in suppressing a rebellion in Khorasan. While once at Peshawar, his ruin was planned by several conspirators, who were, however, cruelly suppressed by the Shah ; in vengeance he put one-third of the inhabitants of Peshawar to the sword. From this time Timur became "suspicious, morose, and restless, and his clemency, which had till then rendered his reign remarkable, entirely ceased, and it terminated in an act of unparalleled cruelty," when he died in 1793.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ *History of the Afghans*, by J. P. Ferrier (London, 1858), p. 96.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴⁸ For further details about Sindh, *vide* the Section on 'Annexation of Sindh.'

¹⁴⁹ Ferrier, *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

At his death the kingdom of Afghanistan comprehended Kashmir, Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul, Balkh, Kulu, Kandahar, Multan and Herat. Khelat, Baluchistan as well as Persian Khorasan acknowledged its suzerainty, and Sindh was theoretically a dependency. Timur left thirty-six children behind him of whom twenty-three were sons ; the majority of them at the time of their father's death were governors of various provinces : the eldest Humayun Mirza was at Kandahar ; Mahmud Mirza, the second son who supported his elder brother, was at Herat ; Abbas Mirza, the fourth, was at Peshawar ; Zaman Mirza, the fifth was at Kabul ; Shuja-ul-mulk was at Ghazni and Kohan Dil was in Kashmir.¹⁵⁰ The princes were preparing for a war of succession when Zaman Shah was able to capture the throne with the help of Payendah Khan, who by a stratagem eliminated the other sons.¹⁵¹ Payendah Khan also succeeded in attaching to Zaman Shah's cause the most influential sections of the Afghan nobility and the mercenary Qizilbash of Kabul. Zaman Shah encountered many difficulties in the Punjab, east of the Indus, and so he placed Lahore formally under Ranjit Singh as a subordinate chief in 1799 ; whenever Zaman Shah came down towards Peshawar to settle his affairs, his brothers dispersed over the different districts behind him, and fomented plots and insurrections against him. He put his eldest brother, who had proclaimed himself Shah at Kandahar, into prison depriving him of his eyesight ; and satisfied another brother, Mahmud Mirza, by appointing him to the Governorship of Herat.

From 1798 Zaman Shah was at the height of his power and, while at Lahore, he meditated an invasion of interior Hindustan like his predecessors Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah. Though it may now appear to us that an invasion by Zaman Shah had not much chance of success at the close of the 18th or beginning of the 19th century owing to altered

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁵¹ For details, vide *Ibid.*, p. 110.

conditions of the country, yet at that time the prospect of it "kept the British Indian Empire in a chronic state of unrest"¹⁵² especially in the days of Sir John Shore and Lord Wellesley. It is said that all the disaffected elements in India sought his invasion, and "from northern Oude and from southern Mysore had gone forth invitations to the Afghan monarch."¹⁵³ Some writers say that Lord Wellesley received a letter from the Afghan prince "giving notice of his proposed expedition into India, and requesting that the English army should cooperate in driving back the Marathas from the north into the Deccan."¹⁵⁴ Dundas, who was confirmed in the "belief of his (Zaman Shah's) hostile designs," wrote to Lord Wellesley that they "ought to keep a very watchful eye upon the motions of that Prince, whose talents, military force, and pecuniary resources, afford to him the means of being a formidable opponent."¹⁵⁵ Lord Wellesley assembled "a large British army in Oude, under the command of Sir J. Craig, for the protection of the Nabob's territories against this expected invasion."¹⁵⁶ He also instructed Mehdi Ali Khan, a naturalised Persian, who was acting as the Company's Resident at Bushire, "to take measures for inducing the Court of Persia to keep Shah Zaman in perpetual check, but without any decided act of hostility."¹⁵⁷ The relations between Afghanistan and Persia, where two of Zaman Shah's brothers, Mahmud and Firuz, had taken refuge, were strained at that time, and the Shah of Persia ordered and also personally conducted military operations against Zaman Shah. "The actual result of the Persian military operations was slight, but the consequent

¹⁵² Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 2.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵⁴ Sykes, *History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 298; Wheeler, *British India*, p. 546.

¹⁵⁵ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, p. 638.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. lxxxiii.

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in Sykes, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 299.

retirement of Zaman Shah from Lahore to Peshawar, in order that he might be ready to fight if necessary, relieved the Afghan pressure on India."¹⁵⁸ Wellesley wrote exultingly to the Secret Committee in London on 28th September, 1801 :—" The active measures adopted by the Court of Persia against Zemaun Shah, which were instigated in the first instance by Mehdi Ali Khan, and subsequently encouraged by Captain Malcolm,¹⁵⁹ produced the salutary effect of diverting the attention of Zemaun Shah from his long-projected invasion of Hindostan during three successive seasons. The hostility of Baba Khan unquestionably proved the ruin of Zemaun Shah's power. The assistance afforded by Mehdi Ali Khan under my orders, to the Prince Mahomed Shah, originally enabled that Prince to excite those commotions, which have recently terminated in the defeat of Zemaun Shah, in his deposition from the throne and in the entire extinction of his power ; to the consolidated and active government of Zemaun Shah has succeeded a state of confusion in the country of the Afghans highly favourable to our security in that quarter."¹⁶⁰

Zaman on his return journey from Lahore to Kabul passed with his army through great disasters ; " in fact, it was the debris of an army of attenuated men, harassed by a thousand miseries and privations, that Zaman succeeded in bringing into Peshawar."¹⁶¹ After appointing his brother Shuja-ul-mulk governor of Peshawar, he proceeded to Kabul, where however he could make but a short stay because he had to go to Kandahar for suppressing revolts in that city. These revolts were mostly due to the indiscreet and intriguing policy of Zaman's minister Wafadar Khan, who was the moving spirit in the state, and these led to that " great strife between the royal princes (Sadozais) and the Douranee sirdars " (principally

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ For Malcolm's Mission, *vide* the Section on ' Foreign Policy.'

¹⁶⁰ Owen, *Op. cit.*, p. 610.

¹⁶¹ Ferrier, *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

the Barakzais), which lasted for the next half century.¹⁶² Zaman Shah suppressed the revolts with terrible cruelties; Payendah Khan and many other chiefs, who took part in the conspiracy in favour of Zaman's brother Shuja-ul-mulk, were executed in 1799. Zaman Shah thus established his authority at Kandahar and then returned to Kabul. But all this could not make Zaman Shah's position safe; indeed his end was nearing. The sons of Payendah Khan, led by the eldest Fateh Khan went to Khorasan, where they joined Prince Mahmud Mirza to organise an open revolt. Zaman Shah, who was at that time also troubled with revolts in Peshawar, the Punjab and Kashmir, was overthrown, captured and blinded. His minister Wafadar Khan was publicly executed at Kabul. Thus Mahmud became the Shah of Afghanistan, whilst Zaman Shah fled to Bokhara, to Herat and finally to India. Here at Ludhiana, the once "dreaded Afghan monarch whose threatened invasion of Hindostan had for many years been a ghastly phantom haunting the Council-Chamber of the British Indian Government," survived his blindness for half a century as a pensioner of that Government, and as a witness of the greatness of his former vassal Ranjit Singh and his successors' vicissitudes.

Mahmud (1800—1803) was however a Shah only in name and remained a puppet in the hands of Fateh Khan, who had succeeded his father as chief of the Barakzais. In 1801—1802, there were risings of the Ghilzais, a turbulent tribe, which were suppressed by Fateh Khan with great slaughter. Soon the city of Kabul became the scene of sanguinary disorders originating in a quarrel between the Afghans who were Sunnis and those who were Shias. The King and the Qizilbashs identified themselves with the latter and order was restored by the Barakzai Wazir. But the Sunnis sought revenge on Mahmud, and in July 1803, with their help Shah Shuja was able to enter Kabul in triumph. He seized Mahmud and confined him in a

¹⁶² Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 19.

dungeon at Bala Hissar. "To him, who in the hour of victory had shown no mercy, mercy was shown in the hour of defeat. It is to the honour of Shah Soojah that he forebore to secure the future tranquility of his empire, by committing the act of cruelty which had disgraced the accession of the now prostrate Mahmoud."¹⁶³ Fateh Khan was pardoned and returned to Kabul as minister to the new king.

Though begun with clemency, Shah Shuja's reign was not destined to be peaceful, and his end was tragic. "His resources were limited, and his qualities were of too negative a character to render him equal to the demands of such stirring times. He wanted vigour; he wanted activity; he wanted judgment; and above all, he wanted money."¹⁶⁴ As with every Afghan king, it was absolutely necessary for him to bring the powerful chiefs under control. But he made a great mistake in alienating Fateh Khan and other sardars, who stirred to revolt Prince Kaysar, son of Zaman Shah, who had been made governor of Kandahar by Shah Shuja. The revolt was suppressed with great difficulty; Prince Kaysar was pardoned and restored to the government of Kandahar, and Fateh Khan fled to Herat to offer his services to Kamran Mirza, son of his old master Mahmud.

Shah Shuja next reduced Sindh to obedience in 1805, sums to the value of £320,000 being exacted from the Amirs. He then proceeded to Peshwar to receive the British Ambassador Mr. Elphinstone, who concluded a treaty with the Shah on 17th June, 1809.¹⁶⁵ But meanwhile Fateh Khan leagued himself with the Qizilbashs, released his old master Mahmud Shah from prison, and occupied Kandahar. Shah Shuja was defeated at Nimula near Gandamak, and after his Wazir, Akram Khan, was killed, he fled into the mountains of the Khyber "abandoning on the field of battle all his baggage and the royal treasure which

¹⁶³ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 28.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 336.

independent of a sum of £2,000,000 contained precious stones of immense value.”¹⁶⁶ Mahmud Shah secured an enormous booty and seized the throne of Kabul. Shah Shuja then took to a life of wandering intrigue making “new efforts to splinter up his broken fortune.”¹⁶⁷ In 1812 he was a prisoner at Kashmir, where he remained for about a year, and after his release went to Lahore. Ranjit Singh took from him the famous Koh-i-nur and did not fulfil his promises of help. “Powerless rather than discouraged,” Shah Shuja retired to Ludhiana, where he became a pensioner of the Company like his brother Zaman Shah.¹⁶⁸

Mahmud Shah, thus restored (1809—16) on the throne of Afghanistan, was a man of feeble and effeminate character. He “wished for power with reference only to the sweets of life and the pleasures which it procured, leaving to others the cares of government,” and he thus became a tool in the hands of his Barakzai minister Fateh Khan, who appointed his brothers in succession as governors of the provinces except Herat which remained in the hands of Mahmud’s brother Firuz-ud-din, who ruled it as an independent sovereign without sending any tribute. Fateh Khan did not, however, abuse his power, but restored prosperity in Afghanistan. His step-brother Dost Muhammad (born of a Qizilbash mother), was now his great helper. He reduced the Amirs of Sindh and Baluchistan to obedience, reconquered, in alliance with Ranjit Singh, Kashmir, which had revolted under Atta Mahammad Khan, a son of the late wazir Akram Khan (killed at the battle of Nimula), and placed his own brother Muhammad Azim as governor there. But on his refusal to make good his promises to Ranjit Singh, the latter seized Attock and defeated a force under Dost Muhammad.

¹⁶⁶ Ferrier, *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹⁶⁷ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 27.

¹⁶⁸ For this period of Shah Shuja’s life, *vide* Burne’s *Sketches* quoted in Ferrier, *Op. cit.*, pp. 143—45; Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 97—103.

With a view to stem the tide of Persian encroachments upon the limits of the Durrani kingdom, Fateh Khan decided to lead an expedition to Khorasan ; he also wanted to utilize this expedition for taking possession of Herat. He reached Herat towards the close of 1816, declared Firuz-ud-din to be a rebel, took him prisoner and sent him to Kabul. Dost Muhammad killed some guards of the city "spoiled the treasury and violated the harem ;" in an inglorious scuffle he tore off the jewelled sash supporting the trousers of one of the royal princesses.¹⁶⁹ Such excesses naturally highly enraged the feelings of members of the royal family ; Kamran Mirza, son of Mahmud Shah, secured his father's consent for punishing Fateh Khan, who was arrested, blinded and literally hacked to pieces in the presence of both of them (1818). But the ignoble death of this once wise and brave Barakzai minister was a great mishap for the ruling family of Afghanistan. "The murder of Poyandah Khan," remarks Kaye, "shook the Suddozye dynasty to its base. The assassination of Futteh Khan soon made it a heap of ruins."¹⁷⁰ This atrocious deed excited Dost Muhammad, who had fled to Kashmir. With a fixed determination to avenge the blood of his kindred, Dost Muhammad raised an army in Kashmir with the help of his brother Muhammad Azim Khan, and marched against Kabul, which was then nominally ruled by Kamran, the actual control of affairs remaining in the hands of Atta Muhammad. Mahmud Shah having fled to Ghazni, Dost Muhammad secured possession of Kabul through the treachery of Atta Muhammad Khan, who nevertheless received a cruel punishment at the hands of the new lord for his past instigation of Kamran to the cruel murder of Fateh Khan. His life was spared but he was sent "blind and helpless into the world, with the mark of Barukzye vengeance upon him."¹⁷¹ The whole country was soon in

¹⁶⁹ There are various accounts about the identity of this lady.

¹⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 111.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

Barakzai hands except Herat, where Shah Mahmud and Prince Kamran found refuge and commended themselves to the overlordship of Persia. Mahmud died in 1829 and was succeeded by Kamran at Herat.

For a few years (1818—1826) Afghanistan remained without a strong ruler, as the Barakzai brothers were divided among themselves, each of them trying to set up one or other Durrani puppet on the throne. At length in 1826 Dost Muhammad Khan made himself master of Kabul. He was subsequently formally elected King by an assembly of the chiefs and was proclaimed Amir by the chief Mulla with all the necessary ceremonies. A man of better character than his contemporaries, Dost Muhammad was endowed with courage, enterprise and activity, and he ruled for twelve years with vigour and ability.¹⁷² He foiled an attempt of Shah Shuja in 1834 to recover his throne but owing to the treachery of his brother Sultan Muhammad Khan Peshawar was lost to the Afghans for ever in the same year and it could not be retaken in spite of their successful expedition of 1837 and the victory of Dost Muhammad's son at the battle of Jamrud on 1st May in that year.¹⁷³ Thus Dost Muhammad remained surrounded by dangers on all sides. "On the north there were revolts in Balkh; on the south one of his brothers was holding out against him at Kandahar; on the east he was harassed by Ranjit Singh at Peshawar with Shah Shuja and the British Government in the background; on the west there was Mahmud Shah and Kamran at Herat, with Persia plotting behind and Russia looking in the distance."¹⁷⁴ In these circumstances he naturally sought to conclude an alliance with the English, provided the latter did not help Shah Shuja in plots to regain the

¹⁷² For an estimate of Dost Muhammad, *vide* Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 108-09, 121—24 and Burnes' opinion about him quoted in Ferrier, *Op. cit.*, pp. 196—98.

¹⁷³ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 133—38.

¹⁷⁴ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p. 551.

throne of Afghanistan, and provided they helped him to recover Peshawar from Ranjit Singh.

Just at this time the course of European politics exercised a decided influence in reshuffling the political relations among the powers in Asia. The central facts which determined these relations were the Eastern ambitions of Russia and her designs in Asia especially since the treaty of Gulistan, concluded between Russia and Persia in 1813, and the anti-Russian policy of the British ministry, chiefly of Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs in England, a striking example of which is supplied by the treaty of Teheran signed on 25th November, 1814, between England and Persia, by which "all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void, and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain." Thus, as Mr. Ramsay Muir has remarked "the last stage of British advance in India was influenced by European politics; just as Wellesley's conquest had been the outcome of Napoleon's ambitions, and as the first British success in the Carnatic and Bengal had followed upon the world-wide rivalry of French and English in the middle of the eighteenth century." After the death of Abbas Mirza in the autumn of 1833 and of Fateh Ali Shah in the autumn of 1834, Muhammad Mirza, son of the former, became the Shah of Persia. He was a close friend of Russia and the Muscovite influence now became paramount at the Persian court. Russia was now "making a cat's paw of Persia and urging the Shah to seize Herat,"¹⁷⁵ which was then ruled nominally by Kamran but the real powers were in the hands of his wazir Yar Muhammad Khan. The ambitions of Russia caused great anxiety to British statesmen. At Russian instigation, the Shah of Persia actually laid siege to Herat (November 1837 to September 1838) which was, however, relieved due to the brave defence of the Afghans and the heroic exertions of a young British lieutenant, Eldred

¹⁷⁵ Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, p. 551.

Pottinger, who was then travelling in Afghanistan. But British suspicions had now been deepened into alarm.

In 1836, Lord Auckland, the nominee of the Government of Melbourne in England, came out as the Governor-General of India. In May 1836, Dost Muhammad sent a congratulatory letter to Lord Auckland on his arrival and solicited his help against the Sikhs;¹⁷⁶ the Governor-General pleaded that it was "not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent states." Dost Muhammad thereupon, made overtures to Persia and Russia, "not because he wanted a Russian alliance, but to facilitate diplomatic pressure on the British." But the Governor-General, whose mind, in common with those of the other Whigs in England, was deeply perturbed by the prevalent 'Russophobia,' could not allow things to take their own way. Lord Palmerston, who saw in Russian designs "imminent peril to the security and internal tranquility" of the Indian Empire, urged on the Government of India to take necessary steps for counteracting the ambitions of Russia. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors through its letter dated 25th June, 1836, instructed the Governor-General to "judge as to what steps it may be proper and desirable for you to take to watch more closely, than has hitherto been attempted, the progress of events in Afghanistan, and to counteract the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquility of our own territory. The mode of dealing with this very important question, whether by despatching a confidential agent to Dost Muhammad of Kabul merely to watch the progress of events, or to enter

¹⁷⁶ He wrote: "The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may suggest itself to your wisdom for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance." Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 170.

into relations with this chief, either of a political or merely, in the first instance, of a commercial character, we confide to your discretion, as well as the adoption of any other measures that may appear to you desirable in order to counteract Russian advances in that quarter, should you be satisfied from the information received from your agents on the frontier, or hereafter from Mr. McNeill, on his arrival in Persia, that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan. Such an interference would doubtless be requisite, either to prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that quarter, or to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence."¹⁷⁷

Alexander Burnes was sent by Lord Auckland to the Amir ostensibly on a commercial mission¹⁷⁸ but in reality to judge political matters.¹⁷⁹ Dost Muhammad, who preferred an alliance with the English to one with the Russians,¹⁸⁰ agreed to accept the overtures of the British Government if the latter helped him in the matter of reoccupying Peshawar from Ranjit Singh. Burnes also recommended an alliance with him and "if the forward policy preached at this time from London and Teheran was the only way to counteract Russian intrigues, Lord Auckland's Government ought to have smiled upon their agent's mode of strengthening the Amir's hands against Persia at no great cost to the Indian Treasury. A strong government beyond the Khaibar would have formed an efficient

¹⁷⁷ Sir Auckland Colvin, *John Russel Colvin*, p. 87.

¹⁷⁸ "This project of a commercial mission" to Afghanistan, writes Kaye (*Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 171) "was no new conception of which Lord Auckland was the parent. It has at least been thought of by Lord William Bentinck—and, certainly with no ulterior designs. It was suggested, I believe, to Lord William Bentinck by Sir John Malcolm."

¹⁷⁹ Burnes himself wrote to a private friend that he had come to Kabul "not only to look after commerce" but "to see into affairs and judge of what was to be done hereafter." Hunter, *Lord Auckland*, p. 44. Compare a similar note of Burnes quoted from his private correspondence by Kaye in *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 188, footnote.

¹⁸⁰ Burnes' letter in Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 195—98.

barrier against Russian diplomacy and Persian arms. A little more of the pressure which had just been applied to the "old man of Lahore" would have induced him to yield up his costly and troublesome conquest of Peshawar, if not to the Amir of Kabul, at any rate to the Amir's brother, Sultan Muhammad. Lord Auckland would have thus secured by peaceful methods all those ends for which, a year later, he rushed into a costly, fruitless and unrighteous war."¹⁸¹ Lord Auckland and his advisers, like his two secretaries, William Macnaghten and John Colvin, who were possessed with an entire distrust of Dost Muhammad, refused to put any pressure on Ranjit Singh and to accept Burnes' suggestions. The Amir, therefore, naturally drifted into a Russian alliance, and Viktevitich, the Russian agent, who had already arrived at his court, but had been before received "in a scurvy and discouraging manner,"¹⁸² was now received with more favour when his last efforts for securing the friendship of the British Government failed. Thus after a fruitless mission Burnes left Kabul on 26th April, 1838.

Lord Auckland failing, through his own fault, to utilise Afghan friendship for checking Russian designs now resorted to an unfortunate step leading to ruinous consequences. He had pleaded the doctrine of non-interference in the private affairs of neighbouring states; but now he formed a resolution that the *de facto* government of Afghanistan should be upset and the exiled Shah Shuja should be restored to the throne of Kabul with the help of the Sikhs. Macnaghten, secretary to the government, was sent to Lahore and a tripartite treaty was accordingly arranged between Shah Shuja, Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the British Government on 26th June, 1838. Lord Auckland did not at first intend to send British troops beyond the Indus. His idea was to make a demonstration of force at Shikarpur, while Shah Shuja would regain the throne with

¹⁸¹ Trotter's *Auckland*, pp. 45-46.

¹⁸² Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 204.

his own followers and the help of his Sikh allies. But he was soon convinced that this would not be possible without more effective military actions. On 1st October, 1838, he issued a manifesto from Simla, which contained an official justification of the proposed Afghan War and in which, in the words of Sir Herbert Edwardes, "the views and conduct of Dost Muhammad were misrepresented with a hardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied."¹⁸³ "The welfare of our possessions in the East," remarked the Governor-General in that manifesto, "requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquility, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandisement." He further noted that "a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, whose popularity throughout afghanisthan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities."¹⁸⁴ After the withdrawal of the Persians from the siege of Herat (9th September, 1838), the news of which reached Lord Auckland sometime in October, the danger of Russo-Persian aggression was removed for the time being, and "the legitimate object of the expedition across the Indus was gone. All that remained was usurpation and aggression."¹⁸⁵ But the Governor-General announced to the world by the General Order of 8th November that the intended expedition should still be carried on "with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier."¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Quoted in Trotter's *Auckland*, p. 68.

¹⁸⁴ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 369—74.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 383-84.

Lord Auckland's Simla Manifesto, his plan to dethrone Dost Muhammad and his policy of war against Afghanistan have been justly censured from different points of view. In the Simla Manifesto "lies were heaped upon lies." Lord Auckland's note about Dost Muhammad's "unprovoked attack upon our ancient ally" has been compared by Trotter "for truthfulness with the wolf's complaint in the fable against the lamb." It was issued by the Governor-General without the concurrence of the Supreme Council of India, against the advice of his Commander-in-Chief and in opposition to the wishes of the Court of Directors. The Court of Directors wrote to the Governor-General in their letter to him, dated 20th September, 1837, that the proper course "with respect to the states west of the Indus" was "to have no political connection with any state or party in those regions, to take no part in their quarrels, but to maintain so far as possible a friendly connection with all of them." He had the support only of the Cabinet at Westminster guided by Sir John Hobhouse. In spite of Thornton's attempt to justify the plan of reinstating Shah Shuja by deposing Dost Muhammad,¹⁸⁷ all impartial writers have held that it was morally indefensible. As an independent sovereign of Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad had every right to form an alliance with Russia or Persia however opposed it might be to the interests of the British.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, it is also to be noted that he drifted into an alliance with Russia and Persia after he had been refused British help, which he so earnestly desired, by Lord Auckland and his advisers. Kaye has well remarked: "we had ourselves alienated the friendship of the Barakzye Sirdars. They had thrown themselves into the arms of the Persian King, only because we had thrust them off. We had forced them into an attitude of hostility which they were unwilling to assume; and had ourselves aggravated the dangers which we were now about to face on the western frontier of

¹⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 142—49.

¹⁸⁸ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 316.

Afghanistan.”¹⁸⁹ This step was also politically inexpedient. Dost Muhammad was a capable ruler and he had been able to secure obedience of the Afghan tribesmen. Shah Shuja, though possessed of some capacity, had been an unlucky victim of failures. His cause was not supported in Afghanistan and he had no chance of becoming popular there by being reinstated with the help of an alien Christian power and a Hindu (Sikh) power that had grown at the expense of several Muslim states. He was a monarch, says Kaye, “whom the people of Afghanistan had repeatedly, in emphatic, scriptural language, spued out for these Barukzye chiefs, who, whatever may have been the defects of their government, had contrived to maintain themselves in security, and their country in peace, with a vigour and a constancy unknown to the luckless Suddozye Princes.”¹⁹⁰ Thus the expedition was commenced, continues the same writer, “in defiance of every consideration of political and military expediency; and there were those who, arguing the matter on higher grounds than those of mere expediency, pronounced the certainty of its failure, because there was a canker of injustice at the core. It was, indeed, an experiment on the forbearance alike of God and of man; and, therefore, though it might dawn in success it was sure to set in failure and disgrace.” Among those who disapproved of it and predicted its failure were the Duke of Wellington, Lord Wellesley, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr. Edmonstone, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Sir Henry Willcock and Mr. Tucker. The Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Tucker that “the consequence of crossing the Indus, once to settle a government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial march into that country.” Lastly, as already noted elsewhere, the poor excuse of the Russian menace which the Auckland government pleaded disappeared before the operations actually commenced, and it would have been a wise

¹⁸⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 376.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

piece of statesmanship to retire at that time from 'an untenable position.' Under pressure from London, the Russian Government recalled its agents; the Shah of Persia withdrew from the siege of Herat (9th September, 1838); and this "cut from under the feet of Lord Auckland all ground of justification, and rendered the expedition across the Indus at once a folly and a crime."¹⁹¹ But no consideration could prevent Lord Auckland and his advisers from launching into a war, which has been pronounced by Innes, as probably "the most unqualified blunder committed in the whole history of the British in India."¹⁹²

The 'Army of the Indus,' intended for the occupation of Afghanistan, assembled at Ferozepur, towards the close of November, 1838, under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Fane. But he had to resign his command owing to ill-health before the Army of the Indus began its march, his place being taken by Sir John Keane from Bombay. On account of Ranjit Singh's objection to the passage of British troops through his dominions, it was arranged that Shah Shuja, with the main army under Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton should march on Kandahar by way of Bahawalpur, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the Bolan and Khojak Passes (*i.e.*, via Quetta to Kandahar), thus traversing a distance of a thousand miles between Ferozepur and Kabul, while the Sikh expedition, accompanied by colonel Wade and Shah Shuja's son Timur, should invade Afghanistan by way of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. "The plan," remarks Dr. Smith, "violated all the conditions of sound strategy, and was that of a lunatic rather than of a sane statesman."¹⁹³ Sir W. Macnaghten, envoy and adviser

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

¹⁹² *A Short History of the British India*, p. 237.

¹⁹³ *Oxford History*, p. 678. But cf. Macdonald's letter from Attock, dated 27th November, 1839 (the day of crossing the Indus): "With the extraordinary natural difficulties which the whole line between Peshawar and Kabul presents, and with an enemy so enterprising and determined as Dost Muhammad to dispute the ground with us, I think it next to an

at Shah Shuja's court, proceeded with the expedition in charge of its political implications, Sir Alexander Burnes acting as his chief lieutenant. The march through Sindh involved a flagrant violation of the treaty of 1832 with the Amirs of Sindh, whose consent was extorted by the Governor-General through intimidation.¹⁹⁴ Both the Bengal and the Bombay forces were very much thinned in numbers before they reached Kandahar after undergoing great sufferings for lack of water supply and provisions.¹⁹⁵ The military letters and public parliamentary utterances of this time show that the British Government was emulating the feats of Alexander the Great and congratulating themselves on their success.

On 25th April, 1839, Shah Shuja re-entered Kandahar amidst temporary excitement and curiosity of the people.¹⁹⁶ But the "restoration of the legitimate monarch presented itself to the Afghans merely in the light of a successful foreign invasion"¹⁹⁷ and on his public entry, therefore, "there was no popular enthusiasm. The whole affair was a painful failure."¹⁹⁸ After the first outburst of curiosity had subsided, he was greeted with feelings of "sullen indifference than of active devotion."¹⁹⁹ However, success at first attended the British arms. Kandahar

impossibility that our troops could have made their way to Kabul." So it would seem that apart from Ranjit's objection there were well-considered military reasons also for choosing the roundabout route. *Vide* Journal of Indian History, August 1933.

¹⁹⁴ *Vide* the section on "Annexation of Sindh." Macdonald, however, in his letter of 3rd October, 1838, alleges that the Amirs while pretending to be friends of the British entered into secret alliance with Afghanistan, Persia and Russia, and so the British were going to fight them for a passage through Sindh, or if necessary to occupy Sindh and make the Indus the British boundary forthwith (*vide* Journal of Indian History, August 1933).

¹⁹⁵ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 420—36.

¹⁹⁶ Macnaghten's letter to Lord Auckland, dated 25th April, 1839.

¹⁹⁷ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 238; Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 444.

¹⁹⁸ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 440.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

was occupied in April, and Ghazni was stormed in July,^{199a} Dost Muhammad evacuated Kabul on 3rd August, 1839; and on the 7th Shah Shuja entered there triumphantly without any popular welcome or even a 'common salaam.' "It was," says Kaye, "more like a funeral procession than the entry of a king into the capital of his restored dominions."²⁰⁰ The British civil and military officers received honours, Lord Auckland being made an earl, Sir John Keane a baron, and Macnaghten a baronet. The Russian expedition to Khiva in the month of November failed. On 2nd November, Dost Muhammad surrendered himself to Macnaghten; he was sent down as a prisoner to Calcutta where he was well treated. For a little while it appeared that the British arms had received a fresh lustre. But, as we shall see, by the end of 1841, "that lustre, such as it was, had been lamentably besmirched."

Lord Auckland decided to keep in Afghanistan 10,000 Bengal troops under General Cotton, and General Nott was summoned from Quetta to command at Kandahar. The rest of the troops were sent back to the interior India. The Governor-General committed two fatal mistakes at this time. Firstly, he appointed General Elphinstone, an old and incompetent officer in bad health, to the command of the army in Kabul, against the advice of his Commander-in-Chief, who

^{199a} For a first-hand account of the fall of Ghazni, cf. Lt.-Col. R. Macdonald's letter dated Ghazni, 23rd July, 1839 (the day of the fall) to Col. Egerton (Journal of Indian History, August 1933). In that letter Macdonald notes that the fall of Ghazni "will be most acceptable news throughout all India, that is to all those well disposed to the British Rule; it will have a great effect on Burmah and Nepaul, and I may add Persia, both showing the strongest symptoms of a desire to break with us;" also (in his letter dated Kabul, 14th October, 1839) "the moral effect of what we have done in Afghanistan is not confined to that country, but extends to the many discontented spirits in India and to the neighbouring states, who were eagerly looking forward to our arms meeting with disaster in this country, which would have been the signal for them to have raised their rebellious forces and to have struck a blow at our power."

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

preferred General Nott. Secondly, by an extraordinary folly, which prepared the way for the ultimate disaster, the citadel of Kabul, known as the Bala Hissar, was in defence to Shah Shuja's request made over to him for housing his seraglio, and the troops were cantoned in indefensible plains exposed to attacks on every side while the commissariat stores were placed in a separate quarter.

The difficulties of the Afghan position were increased by the death of Ranjit Singh (27th June, 1839) and the confusion at Lahore, which followed it.^{200a} In Afghanistan itself the situation was full of dangers and difficulties, and these now quickly appeared. Shah Shuja could never secure a national support; he could be maintained only with British arms and Sikh backing, which latter had now failed. "The palace of his fathers had received him again; but it was necessary still to hedge in the throne with a quickset of British bayonets."²⁰¹ The Governor-General now saw that it was not advisable to withdraw the British army of occupation if Shah Shuja was to remain as the ruler of Afghanistan; the feeling against him was so strong among the people there that an evacuation of the country was thought impossible even when the surrender of Dost Muhammad "seemed to offer a legitimate opportunity" for it. But the cost of maintaining the English army of occupation was heavy (a million and a quarter a year at the lowest estimate) and this meant a heavy drain upon the resources of

200a Another letter of Macdonald (No. 5) dwells on the moral effect produced by the British successes in Afghanistan on the Sikh power, who thereupon, even after Ranjit's death, were anxious to keep on good terms with the British whose interest it was also to keep on good terms with the Sikhs, their army trained by French officers of Napoleon's school remaining as efficient as ever.

201 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 3. Cf. Macdonald's letter from Kabul, of 14th October, 1839 (*vide* Journal of Indian History, August 1933): "Our friend Shah Shooja is not popular, and to maintain him on the throne it was absolutely necessary to have left some of our troops in support of him. He will be to the Indian Government a very expensive bird to keep on his perch."

India, for which she could expect nothing in return; the presence of the English in Afghanistan also increased the prices of all the necessities of life, which affected the chiefs as well as the poor.²⁰² The political system established by the English in Afghanistan contained elements of decay. The Shah remained a puppet in the hands of the British officers, who for various reasons became unpopular. "The double government," says Kaye, "which had been established was becoming a curse to the whole nation."²⁰³

In these circumstances, the course of safety probably lay in the British withdrawing with Shah Shuja, when his position seemed to be untenable in Afghanistan. The Court of Directors wrote to Lord Auckland towards the close of 1840:—" . . . we again desire you seriously to consider which of the two alternatives (a speedy retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable increase of the military force in that country) you may feel it your duty to adopt. We are convinced that you have no middle course to pursue with safety and with honour." For their part they preferred "the entire abandonment of the country, and a frank confession of complete failure, to any such policy." But Macnaghten, who saw that "everything was quiet from Dan to Beersheba," that their prospects were "brightening in every direction," that everything was *couleur de rose*," scouted the very idea of withdrawal as "an unparalleled political atrocity. The consequences would be frightful. The act would not only involve a positive breach of treaty, but it would be cheat of the first magnitude."²⁰⁴ Lord Auckland thought that this sort of withdrawal would mean a confession of the failure of his policy, and he did not want to "purchase the advantages of their withdrawal at the price of the failure of the Afghan expedition."²⁰⁵ He tried to solve

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

the dilemma, in the midst of which the British found themselves by following an unfortunate half-way course. He decided to retain the English army of occupation and to follow a policy of economy by withdrawing from the tribal chiefs the subsidies for which alone they had so far adhered to the British. "This misplaced economy produced its natural results"²⁰⁶ in the shape of outbreaks in different parts by the autumn of 1841.

In Kabul the danger was "aggravated by the habitual and flagrant misconduct of some of the English there."²⁰⁷ On 2nd November, violence and alarm reigned in the city; a mob attacked the house of Alexander Burnes, and murdered him, his brother Charles and also Lieutenant William Broadfoot. The insurgents also sacked the house of Captain Johnson, the Shah's Paymaster. The mob did not at the beginning exceed 100 men; but all this took place when 5000 troops remained idle within easy reach of the insurgent city. A timely relief would have saved the life of three English officers, and "stampeded out the little fire which grew by sufferance into a wide conflagration."²⁰⁸ The English officers betrayed on this occasion a sad want of promptness, energy and ability. Their indecision, inactivity and differences of opinion with one another were responsible for these disastrous results.²⁰⁹ "Burnes did not believe the outbreak to be a formidable one; Macnaghten did not believe it to be a formidable one; and Elphinstone was entirely swayed by the opinion of his political associates."

²⁰⁶ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 506.

²⁰⁷ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 240.

²⁰⁸ Trotter, *Op. cit.*, p. 137. "Not only I, but several other officers," says Captain Johnson, "have spoken to Afghans on the subject; there has never been one dissenting voice, that had a small party gone into the town prior to the plunder of my treasury and the murder of Burnes, the insurrection would have been instantly quashed"—Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 178. "... there appears to have been," remarks Mr. Thornton, "an almost unanimous determination to shut the ears against all intimations of danger, and indulge in a luxurious dream of safety equal to that within the Maratha ditch." *Op. cit.*, p. 352.

²⁰⁹ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 280—85.

Requests were made to General Nott at Kandahar and to General Sale at Gandamak; the latter not in a position, for want of transport, to answer the call, and decided to fall back on Jalalabad for keeping a control over the Peshawar Road, while the former declared that the advance to Kabul through the snows was then impracticable. On the other side, Muhammad Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad, a young man of daring and energy, appeared in Kabul as the leader of the Afghans. On 23rd November, the Afghans won a victory, which, in the opinion of Eyre, was decisive,²¹⁰ over an English force in the Bamaru hills, and the English troops began to lose heart. In reply to certain overtures from Kabul, Macnaghten opened negotiations, but nothing came out of it as the Afghans demanded unconditional surrender.

The news of these disastrous events, which began to reach Lord Auckland from 25th November, 1841, disconcerted him. On 4th December, he wrote to Macnaghten:—"... the maintenance of the position which we attempted to establish in Afghanistan is no longer to be looked to, and that after our experience of the last few weeks it must appear to be, if not vain, yet upon very consideration of prudence, far too hazardous and too costly in money and in life for us to continue to wrestle against the universal opinion, national and religious, which has been so suddenly and so strongly brought in array against us. And it will be for you and for this government to consider in what manner all that belongs to India may be most immediately and most honourably withdrawn from the country."²¹¹ The situation became, day by day, more critical for the English; and Macnaghten, apprehending starvation, concluded a humiliating treaty on 11th December, by which it was provided that the British forces should evacuate the

²¹⁰ Eyre, *Kabul Insurrection*, p. 163. "No less than six great errors," says Eyre, "must present themselves even to the most unpractised military eye, each of which contributed in no slight degree to the defeat of our troops, opposed as they were by overwhelming numbers."

²¹¹ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 508.

country as soon as possible (within three days), that Dost Muhammad and all other Afghans detained in India should return to Kabul, and that Shuja should either remain on a pension in Afghanistan or should go to India with the British troops.²¹² But there was mutual distrust between the contracting parties ; Macnaghten added irresolution to weakness by entering into negotiations with the Ghilzai and the Kafilbashi chiefs. " His mind," remarks Kaye, " was by this time unhinged ; his intellect was clouded ; his moral perceptions were dead."²¹³ This attempt to divide the enemy was a suicidal step on his part. He was soon betrayed by them, was drawn into a conference with Akbar Khan on 23rd December and was murdered there with one of his companions Mr. Trevor ; Lawrence and Mackenzie escaped with their lives through great perils.

Thus the British envoy was murdered and his companions were seized within a few hundred yards of an entrenchment occupied by 4500 troops. But " not a hand was raised to rescue the supposed captives or to avenge their fate."²¹⁴ Major Eldred Pottinger, who received the office held before him by Macnaghten, wanted to reject all terms with the Afghans, and to occupy Bala Hissar to the last or to cut their way to Jalalabad. But he was overruled by Elphinstone and other military officers, to whom adversity had offered no lesson and who remained quite apathetic towards the vindication of national honour and thus stood for evacuation. The treaty was ratified on 1st January, 1842,²¹⁵ the guns, muskets and ordnance stores having been previously surrendered. On 6th January the retreat from Kabul began, the sick and the wounded being lodged in the Bala Hissar ; the British troops, " a crouching, drooping, dispirited army," and camp-followers, 16,000 men in

²¹² Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 278—80.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

²¹⁴ Trotter, *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

²¹⁵ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix IV.

all, proceeded through storm and snow and a heavy shower of bullets from the Afghans, Akbar and his fellow chiefs having lost all control over them. In the course of two or three days several women and children, and many officers, including Pottinger, George Lawrence and Elphinstone himself were handed over to Akbar Khan as hostages. Many lives were sacrificed ; " the retreat became a rout, the rout a massacre." ²¹⁶ The last desperate attempt was made by the English, on 11th January, at the Jagdalak Pass, when twelve officers lost their lives. Of the 16,000 men that had started from Kabul, all perished with the exception of 120, who remained as prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan, and one Dr. Brydon, " sorely wounded, and barely able from exhaustion to sit upon the emaciated beast that bore him," reached Jalalabad on 13th January, to relate the story of this terrible catastrophe. ^{216a} There was, however, one relief for British honour amidst these ignoble reverses ; Nott and Rawlinson gallantly defended Kandahar, and Sale and Broadfoot held Jalalabad against the attacks of the Afghan tribesmen.

When the news of these cumulating disasters reached Lord Auckland, he became despondent and unnerved. ²¹⁷ But he tried to cover his folly by issuing on 31st January, a General Order, in which he described the great disaster as " a partial reverse " and " a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British-Indian army." He and his colleagues tried to take measures " for the maintenance of the honour and interests of the British Government." The first relieving force

²¹⁶ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 321.

^{216a} Macdonald, however, in his letter of 17th June, 1842, refers to " the Journal of the Serjeant Major of the 37th Native Infantry, containing his account, as an eye-witness, of the occurrences from the date of General Elphinstone's force quitting Kabul, until its final destruction, and his (the Narrator's) making his escape to Jellalabad. It is a far better account than Dr. Brydon's, who seems scarcely yet to have recovered his reason, which in his fright he certainly lost for the time."

²¹⁷ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 1—14.

under Brigadier Wild passed through the Khyber and captured the fort of Ali Masjid, but was compelled to fall back. Colonel George Pollock, an able officer of the Bengal artillery proceeded to Peshawar, but before he could start for relieving Jallalabad, Lord Auckland had to leave his office.

Mr. Kaye throws the responsibility for the failure and disasters of the Afghan expedition on the military commander Mr. Elphinstone, though there were also other causes. "Whatever more remote causes of this lamentable failure may be found elsewhere. it is impossible," he says, "to conceal or to disguise the one galling fact, that the British army at Kabul was disastrously beaten because it was commanded by an incapable chief."²¹⁸ He believes justly that England's policy in Afghanistan was unrighteous, and remarks "that the wisdom of our statesmen is but foolishness, and the might of our armies is but weakness, when the curse of God is sitting heavily upon an unholy cause."²¹⁹ Captain Trotter gives a critical explanation for this "tremendous Nemesis." "The utter collapse of that (Lord Auckland's) policy, rafeul, lawless, and blundering as it was, sprang mainly from the choice of agents ill-fitted for their work. Macnaghten's cheery trustfulness, Elphinstone's bodily and mental decay, Shelton's stupid wilfulness, chronic dissensions between the civil and military powers, Sale's withholding of timely succour, all conspired, with Lord Auckland's half-measures and ill-timed economies, to work out the dramatic Nemesis of an enterprise begun in folly and wrong-doing. A Nott or even a Keane, would have turned to worthier account the zeal of his officers and the disciplined courage of his troops. A better managed retreat would have saved our honour and many thousand lives. Viewed however in connexion with the events of the past three years, the annihilation of Elphinstone's force looked like our just reward for the wanton invasion of Afghanistan. It

²¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 330.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

seemed as though a curse had brooded over our Afghan policy from the day when British troops escorted Shah Shuja towards his former capital, a curse which blinded Macnaghten's eyes to the plainest facts, which led Burnes and Cotton to choose the worst possible site for cantonments ; which placed a gentlemanly invalid in the chief command, and stultified the efforts of our ablest and smartest officers to atone for the shortcomings of their imbecile chiefs."²²⁰

Lord Ellenborough reached Calcutta and took the oaths of office on 28th February, 1842. He stated his policy with regard to Afghanistan in a letter, written on 15th March, to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir J. Nicolls. He declared that the British Government would no longer "peril its armies and with its armies the Indian Empire" for supporting the Tripartite Treaty. Therefore, he said, "whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon military considerations, and hence, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jalalabad, at Ghuznee, at Khelat-i Ghilzye ; and Candahar ; to the security of our troops, now in the field, from all unnecessary risk ; and finally to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which may make it appear to them, and to our own subjects and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Afghanisthan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed."²²¹ But the news of the defeat of General England at Hikalzai on 28th February, and Palmer's surrender of Ghazni led him to alter his resolution, and he issued orders for the evacuation of Kabul and Kandahar without any thought

²²⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 164-65.

²²¹ Quoted in Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 192.

of reprisals or for the rescue of the prisoners, about a hundred and twenty of them being still in the hands of the Afghans. Neither Pollock nor Nott however moved immediately, but pleaded want of carriage and the dangers of a hasty retreat as reasons for their standing fast. The situation in Afghanistan had in fact greatly improved in the meantime ; on 5th April Pollock had passed through the Khyber by a masterly manoeuvring and had joined hands, ten days later, with Sale at Jalalabad, where the garrison had raised the siege by defeating the besieging army in a pitched battle ; and at Kandahar, Nott had held his own position by defeating the insurgents. Shah Shuja, the nominal king shut up within the Bala Hissar, was murdered by the son of the Barakzai Nawab, Zaman Kan. The cause of the murder is not definitely known ; but " it was doubtless the inevitable outcome of Barakzai feeling whatever the immediate occasion."²²² Lord Ellenborough's orders for immediate evacuation raised an explosion of indignation among the military officers ; but just in time, he " discovered a way to maintain a particularly empty show of consistency, and at the same time to satisfy the universal demand for the decisive re-conquest of Kabul and recovery of the prisoners as a preliminary to withdrawal."²²³ On 4th July he wrote letters to Nott and Pollock repeating the orders for withdrawal, but suggesting to the former that he might, if he did not think it to be too risky, retire from Jalalabad *via* Ghazni and Kabul and also permitting the latter to cooperate with Nott should that officer " decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghazni and Kabul."

By the middle of August, Pollock knew of Nott's intention to " retire to India *via* Kabul and Jalalabad," and on 20th August he marched out of Jalalabad with 8000 of his best troops. On 23rd he reached Gandamak and drove a body of the Afghans from the neighbouring fort and village of Mamu.

²²² *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 515.

²²³ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

Khel. Having heard that Nott had started, he left the place on 7th September, defeated the Ghilzais at Jagdallak on the 8th, and on the 13th won a decisive victory over Akbar Khan at Tezin near the pass of Khurd Kabul; on 15th September he was in Kabul and hoisted the British flag once again at Bala Hissar on the next day. On the 17th he was joined by Nott. Nott had marched out of Kandahar on 7th August at the head of 8,000 choice troops, "confident alike in their leader and in themselves." He occupied Ghazni on 6th September, destroyed the fortifications and carried away the gates of the tomb of the Ghazi, which Mahmud Ghaznavi had, it was believed, carried away eight centuries ago from the Hindu temple of Somnath in Gujrat. The English prisoners, who had been during these months shifted from place to place, were rescued. But Colonel Stoddard and Captain Conolly who had been sent to form friendly relations with the Amir of Bokhara were beheaded there publicly in a market-place. "The glory of the avenging army at Kabul was marred by acts of barbarity" when the great bazar at Kabul, which Pollock himself called "the grand emporium of trade in this part of Central Asia" was blown up by gunpowder and many unoffending men had to suffer before the city was evacuated on 12th October.

Lord Ellenborough in a proclamation from Simla, which was issued on 10th October but was dated 1st October, demonstrated the utter failure of Lord Auckland's Afghan policy and declared: "The Governor-General will leave it to the Afghans themselves to create a government amidst the anarchy which is the consequence of their crimes.

"To force a sovereign upon a reluctant people, would be as inconsistent with the policy as it is with the principles of the British Government, tending to place the arms and resources of that people at the disposal of the first invader, and to impose the burden of supporting a sovereign, without the prospect of benefit from his alliance.

"The Governor-General will willingly recognise any government approved by the Afghans themselves, which shall

appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states.

"Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its empire the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace, to the protection of the sovereigns and chiefs, its allies, and to the prosperity and happiness of its own faithful subjects."²⁴⁴

In another bombastic proclamation addressed to "All the princes and chiefs, and people of India," he announced: "Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghuznee. The insult of eight-hundred years is at last avenged." He wanted to commit this "glorious trophy of successful war," as he called it, to the princes and chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwara, of Malwa and of Gujrat, who were to "transmit the gates of sandalwood through your respective territories to the restored temple of Somnath." This proclamation was at once farcical and full of mischief. "The folly of the thing," remarks Kaye, "was past all denial. It was a folly, too, of the most senseless kind, for it was calculated to please none and to offend many."²²⁵ It offended the feelings of the Muslims, the Hindus did not care about it, while it was pointed out by antiquarians that the gates were made much later than the eleventh century, 'of no wood more precious than deal or deodar.' It simply subjected the Governor-General to ridicule and censure; the rest of the world remained completely unaffected by it. Lord Ellenborough met the returning troops in a grand review at Ferozepur amidst a great display of pomp. Dost Muhammad was released and returned to Kabul, where he regained his power and ruled till his death in 1863; his subsequent career, especially his successful opposition to Persia in 1856 showed

²²⁴ Quoted in Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 376-77.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

"how entirely superfluous the whole disastrous episode had been."

Commenting in conclusion on the policy of the Afghan war, Mr. Kaye²²⁶ has remarked that "no failure so total and so overwhelming as this is recorded in the pages of history. No lesson so grand and impressive is to be found in all the annals of the world It is upon record, that this calamitous war cost the natives of India, whose stewards we are, some fifteen millions of money. All this enormous burden fell upon the revenues of India, and the country for long years afterwards groaned under the weight." The gains were nothing but the losses were many. The main object of the expedition was to erect a friendly power in Afghanistan as a barrier against encroachment from the West. But "after an enormous waste of blood and treasure" the British only left "every town and village of Afghanistan bristling" with enemies of the English, while the British disasters in that country "encouraged anew the aggressions of the Persian and the intrigues of his Muscovite ally."

For ten years after the restoration of Dost Muhammad as the Amir of Afghanistan, British relations with Afghanistan were "undefined but sullen. They were modified under the pressure of Persian eagerness to expand eastwards and reconquer Herat and Kandahar."²²⁷ When the Persians attacked Herat in 1855, a treaty was concluded between the British Government and Dost Muhammad, by which the former agreed not to interfere with the Amir's territories and the latter promised in return to be "the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company."²²⁸ They fought together against the Persians when they seized Herat in 1856.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 398—402; *vide* also Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 391—94.

²²⁷ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 404.

²²⁸ Aitchison, Vol. XI, p. 340.

Sir John Lawrence, who succeeded Lord Elgin as Viceroy in 1864, advocated a policy of "friendship towards the actual rulers combined with rigid abstention from interference in domestic feuds." He did not interfere in the fierce civil war that broke out in Afghanistan after the death of Dost Muhammad in 1863 and allowed the members of his family (chiefly (1) Sher Ali, his third son and the heir-designate, (2) his two elder half-brothers, Afzal, governor of the northern province of Turkestan and Azim, governor of Kurram in the east, (3) his younger uterine brother Azam, governor of Kandahar, and (4) Abd-ur-Rahman, son of Afzal) to wage wars for the throne. Afzal Khan and Azim Khan rebelled against Sher Ali in 1864; Azim Khan and his nephew Abd-ur-Rahman continued the rising in 1865; in 1866 Sher Ali was expelled from Kabul and in 1867 from Kandahar; by the end of 1868 however Sher Ali succeeded in defeating or slaying his rivals and established himself as Amir of all Afghanistan. Azim fled for refuge to Persia, where he soon after died; Abd-ur-Rahman who "had never seen the benefit of English friendship,"²²⁹ took shelter in Bokhara as a Russian pensioner, destined to emerge ten years later as the Amir of Afghanistan. During this period, Lawrence, in pursuance of his policy of "assenting peaceably to the visible facts resultant from a neighbour's settlement of his own affairs after his own fashion,"²³⁰ recognised each combatant in turn (Sher Ali in 1864; Afzal in 1866 and 1867; then Azim, and then Sher Ali once more) as he succeeded in asserting his authority. When Sher Ali made himself the undisputed ruler of Afghanistan, Sir John Lawrence sent him a present of £60,000 and 3,500 stands of arms. He said: "While strictly refusing to enter into anything like an offensive and defensive alliance with the Amir of Kabul, I think it should be carefully explained

²²⁹ Abd-ur-Rahman, *Autobiography*, Vol. I, p. 111.

²³⁰ *Essays on the External Policy of India*, by J. W. S. Wyllie, edited by Sir W. W. Hunter (1875), p. 119.

to him that we are interested in the security of his dominions from foreign invasion, and that provided he remains strictly faithful to his engagements we are prepared to support his independence ; but that the manner of doing so must rest with ourselves."

This policy of Lawrence, which an imprudent adviser described as the "Policy of Masterly Inactivity," has been bitterly attacked by some as well as strongly defended by others. The grounds of defence are that British interference was forbidden by the clauses of the existing treaties,²³¹ that every reasonable advantage was secured by remaining passive,²³² and that interference would have thrown the Afghans into the arms of Persia or Russia.²³³ The critics of the policy have pointed out that non-interference was impracticable. When in 1867 the chief rivals sought Russian or Persian help, Lawrence declared that if there were any chance of the Persian occupation of Herat then the British Government should "openly assist the party at Kabul, if at the time being that party should appear to be in a condition likely, with such assistance, to hold its position." He did not strictly conform to it when he sent material aid to Sher Ali in 1868. Moreover, the real object of establishing a strong and friendly power in Afghanistan was not secured ; on the other hand, the policy "seemed to the Afghan chiefs rather cold-blooded and selfish, and made it difficult to establish really friendly relations between the Governor-General and the Amir."²³⁴ Sher Ali himself said that the "English look to nothing but their own interests and bide their time."²³⁵ "Critics of the policy of *laissez faire*," remarks Mr. Roberts, "could say with some truth that such action was a direct encouragement to successful rebellion, that British approval of an Afghan chieftain's claims swung automatically

²³¹ Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, pp. 190-91.

²³² *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

²³³ Dodwell, *A Sketch of the History of India*, p. 114.

²³⁴ Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 740.

²³⁵ Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 303.

with the gale of superior force like the vane of a weather-cock, and that no ruler of Afghanistan could set much store by a recognition which was transferred so lightly from one rival to another.”²³⁶ Lawrence has also been charged with lack of insight into and want of information about the facts of Central Asian and Frontier History. This is however true that his policy was ‘cheap and cautious.’ Mr. Wyllie has remarked that he “lulled the wakeful Anglophobia of Russian generals and disarmed their inconvenient propensity to meet supposed plots of ours in Afghanistan by counter-plots of their own in the same country.”²³⁷ Even Lord Auckland supported this non-interference: “Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without or, what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence from entanglements at either Kabul, Kandahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a compact, highly equipped and disciplined army, stationed within our own territories or on our own border; in the contentment if not in the attachment of the masses; in the sense of security of title and possession with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the principal chiefs and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within British India which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and military strength; in husbanding our finance and consolidating and multiplying our resources; in quiet preparation for all contingencies which no Indian statesmen should disregard; and in a trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.”²³⁸

²³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 409.

²³⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

²³⁸ Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, p. 194.

Russia, thwarted in her push towards the Straits after the Crimean War, had been meanwhile advancing steadily through Central Asia towards the northern Afghan frontier. In 1864 the Russians touched the borders of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva, the three great Muslim Khanates, which had then lost their old greatness and whose absorption, therefore, by the Russian Empire "was as nearly a natural process as anything political can be."²³⁹ In 1865 the Russians annexed Taskhend; in 1867 the new province of Russian Turkestan was constituted with General Kaufmann as its first Governor-General; in 1868 Bokhara fell after sending a desperate appeal to Lawrence.²⁴⁰ One principal motive for this Russian advance towards Afghanistan was the strengthening of the Muscovite political influence in Europe. "Great historical lessons," noted the new Russian ambassador Baron de Staal, appointed to London in 1864, "have taught us that we cannot count on the friendship of England, and that she can strike at us by means of continental alliances while we cannot reach her anywhere. No great nation can accept such a position. In order to escape from it the Emperor Alexander II, of everlasting memory, ordered our expansion in Central Asia, leading us to occupy today in Turkestan and the Turkestan steppes a military position strong enough to keep England in check by the threat of intervention in India."²⁴¹ Thus the expansion of Russia was bound to be a menace to British interests in India and to influence the policy of the British Government. Lord Curzon rightly remarked that 'Russia would be able to keep England quiet in Europe by finding occupation for her in Asia.'

Lawrence was not entirely blind to the Russian question. He tried to solve it by pressing the Home Government for coming to some definite agreement with Russia in Europe instead of occupying some advanced positions in Asia. If that

²³⁹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 407.

²⁴⁰ Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, p. 185.

²⁴¹ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 408.

were done, England, according to him, could have no legitimate objection to Russian advance but could rather welcome it as a means of a European power civilising the Central Asian people so as to lessen the chances of repetition of medieval barbarian invasions. He was supported in this view by Sir Herbert Edwardes, an important frontier official, who wrote: "Can any one say that to substitute Russian rule for the anarchy of Khiva, the dark tyranny of Bokhara and the nomad barbarism of Khokand would be anything but a gain to mankind?" This view, though enunciating a grand Utopian principle, was rather unpolitical; Russian advance in Central Asia could hardly be compatible with the position of the British in the East. Lawrence thus "seems wholly to have ignored," remarks Prof. Dodwell, "the point that unless England could entrench herself so strongly in Central Asia as to convince Russia of the futility of movements in that direction, an agreement in Europe could only be reached by subordinating English to Russian interests on the continent."²⁴²

Lawrence was succeeded by Lord Mayo, a member of the Conservative party in England, who was selected by the British Premier Disraeli. With regard to Afghanistan his "policy was no reversal, but a continuation and development" of that followed by his predecessor. He himself wrote in a letter to Lord Lawrence: "I believe that when you sent Sher Ali the money and arms last December, you laid the foundation of a policy which will be of the greatest use to us hereafter. I wish to continue it." In pursuance of this policy, the Viceroy gave to Sher Ali the second amount of £60,000 which Lord Lawrence had promised and met him in a conference at Ambala in March 1869.²⁴³ The Amir came with five distinct objects in view;—he hoped for a definite treaty, a fixed annual subsidy,

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ The Russian newspapers of the time said that at the Ambala Conference 'the first stone of the wall laid which the Anglo-Indian Government is hastening to build across the path of the Russians in Central Asia.'

assistance in arms or in men to be given 'when he might think it needful to solicit it,' for a clear engagement "laying the British Government under an obligation to support the Afghan Government in any emergency ; and not only that Government generally but that Government as vested in himself and direct descendants, and in no others," and lastly for a recognition by the British Government of his younger son Abdulla Jan as his heir to the exclusion of the elder son Yakub Khan, who had helped him much in securing the throne but had since incurred his displeasure.²⁴⁴ But the British Government was not prepared to agree to those terms. The Viceroy succeeded in defeating the Amir's objects by his diplomacy and was able by his personal charm and winning manners to impress him. "We have distinctly intimated to the Amir," wrote Lord Mayo, "that under no circumstances shall a British soldier cross his frontier to assist him in coercing his rebellious subjects. That no fixed subsidy or money allowance will be given for any named period. That no promise of assistance in other way will be made. That no treaty will be entered into, obliging us under every circumstance to recognise him and his descendants as rulers of Afghanistan. Yet that, by the most open and absolute present recognition of respect for his character and interest in his fortunes, we are prepared to give him all the moral support in our power, and that in addition, we are willing to assist him with money, arms, ammunition, native artificers and in other ways, whenever we deem it desirable to do." The Amir was further informed by Lord Mayo that the Government of India would "view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position." Some English writers have tried to represent the Ambala Conference as a grand success ; but it is doubtful if the non-committal policy of the British Government was very much pleasing to the Amir and "it is possible that he was less pleased than he was

²⁴⁴ Hunter, *The Earl of Mayo*, p. 125.

believed to be." Alarmed by Russian advance the Amir had no help but to be satisfied with these hollow promises of the British Government, and on his return to his capital he tried to carry out some reforms according to the suggestions of Lord Mayo.

The settlement of the Russian question had been left as a legacy by Lord Auckland, and under Mayo it led to diplomatic discussions directed towards the creation of a neutral zone between the two governments. Negotiations were opened between the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, and Prince Gortschakoff in Europe, and Sir Douglas (then Mr.) Forsyth, a distinguished Bengal civilian going on leave, reached St. Petersburg in October 1869 for expressing before the Russian Government the views of the Government of India. The English urged the neutralisation of the portion lying on either side of the Oxus between Bokhara and Afghanistan, while the Russians preferred to regard Afghanistan itself as a suitable neutral zone. This opened fresh discussions, and though in 1871 the Russians objected to Badakshan being included within the Afghan boundaries, yet after friendly negotiations they accepted in 1873 the suggestions of England. But the ambitions of Russia were not definitely checked. "All that was really obtained was an admission that Russia regarded Afghanistan as beyond her sphere of interest."²⁴⁵

The absorption of the Khanates on the Oxus by Russia and her steady advance towards the northern frontier of Afghanistan rekindled the Amir's anxiety and alarm. So, though his belief in the support of the British Government had been gradually waxing, in July 1873 he sent an envoy to meet the Viceroy in a conference at Simla for securing 'an unequivocal guarantee against Russian attack.' Lord Northbrook (1872—1876) "proposed assuring him that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms and troops, if necessary to

²⁴⁵ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 409.

expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity." But his proposal was not supported by the Duke of Argyll, the Secretary of State for India in the first Gladstone Ministry. The Cabinet, influenced by the ideas of Lawrence, thought that there was no necessity for any such formal guarantee, and asked Northbrook to limit his assurances to a simple declaration that "we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan." "This decision," remarks Prof. Dodwell, 'was well-meant. But its authors lacked imagination to perceive that it could not appear reassuring to Sher Ali. To him it could mean nothing but a continuation of the Lawrence policy of helping those who no longer needed assistance.'²⁴⁶ Being thus disappointed in his hope of an alliance with the British Government, the Amir now turned towards Russia for support. It would be wrong to accuse the Amir of insincerity towards England. Placed between two forces, one of Russian expansion and the other of British advance towards his kingdom, the Amir realised that it would be eventually necessary for him to form an alliance with the one or the other. We have seen that for long he preferred Great Britain to Russia ; but the former's cold and unsympathetic attitude led him to seek the latter's help. The British Government might very well have effected a slow and tactful modification of Lawrence's policy to suit the changed circumstances of the case.

British indifference thus eventually evoked Afghan hostility ; two other circumstances widened the breach. The Government of India was at this time ill-advised enough to arbitrate on the boundary claims of the Persians and Afghans in Seistan. Instead of bringing about peace between the two neighbouring powers, the British decision simply irritated the Amir, who regarded it "as a substantial measure of injustice." Another cause of offence was that when Sher Ali declared his son Abdullah Jan as heir-apparent, the Viceroy did not express his willingness to recognise him as such. His answer to the

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 411.

Amir was "designedly couched, as nearly as circumstances admit, in the same language as that in which in 1858 the Punjab Government were instructed to reply to the letter from Dost Mahomed Khan intimating the selection of Sher Ali as heir-apparent." This meant that Abdullah Jan could not expect any better help from the English in the matter of his succession to the throne than Sher Ali himself had received. This measure might have been precautionary and based on the best of motives ; but caution is not always equivalent to statesmanship and "good intentions are no satisfactory substitute for intelligence." The Amir was coming more and more under Russian influence. The exchange of letters between Afghanistan and Russia, which had been begun in 1870 by General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, became more frequent from 1875, and the Russian agents also began to appear in Kabul. The Russian excuse for this correspondence was that "the letters were not letters of business, but merely letters of compliment." "But it was disquieting to watch the coming and going of the bearers without any real knowledge of what was passing behind the scenes."²⁴⁷

All attempts made in Europe to bring about an understanding failed ; and the Russian conduct had been for some years very ambiguous. In 1873, Count Schuvaloff, visiting England on a special mission, assured the British Cabinet that the Russian Emperor had passed orders against the occupation of Khiva ; but within a year it became a Russian province 'under a most thinly disguised protectorate.' In March 1874 the Emperor issued a declaration that all expeditions against the Tekke Turkomans had been forbidden, but on 10th May General Lomakin was appointed military governor of a newly-constituted trans-Caspian province. Before his departure for India to take up office as Viceroy, Lytton had a conversation with the Russian ambassador who suggested that England and Russia should unite to crush the Muslim states of Central Asia.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

But events were gradually drifting towards a crisis. The Amir ceased to consult the British Government about replies to Kaufmann's letters and was suspected of holding secret conferences with the Russian agents. Lord Salisbury asked for absolute discontinuance of correspondence between Russia and Afghanistan but the Russian Government refused to comply with this. The position was thus summed up by the Government of India: "The messages from General Kaufmann have not yet been despatched. . . . only once or twice a year. During the past year they have been incessant. The bearers of them are regarded and treated by the Amir as agents of the Russian Government, and on one pretext or another some person recognised by the Afghan Government as a Russian agent is now almost constantly at Kabul. We desire to submit to your Lordship's consideration whether our own conduct would be viewed with indifference by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg were the Government of India to open similarly friendly relations with the Khans of Khiva and Bokhara.

From 1874 the Government in England had been watching these events with more jealousy and attention than before. In the month of March, Disraeli succeeded Gladstone as the Premier of England with Lord Salisbury as the Secretary of State for India. The advent of these men marked "a sharp swing of foreign policy both in Europe and in Asia." Disraeli, an imperialist to the very finger-tips, naturally looked with distrust upon the Russian policy in Asia and became anxious to counteract her motives. So the old policy of the Lawrence school, which had been one of "general inaction, of subsidies, smooth words, and an amiable acceptance of Russian assurances,"²⁴⁸ had to give way before the spirited foreign policy of the Disraeli Cabinet, which aimed at expanding the limits and enhancing the prestige of the British Empire throughout the world. With regard to Afghanistan, its views were the same as those of Lord Dufferin expressed a few years later in

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 414.

the following terms:—"It would be manifestly futile to base the safety of the North-Western Frontier of India upon any understanding, stipulation, convention or treaty with the imperial government."²⁴⁹ The British Cabinet became convinced that the designs of the Russians in Asia must be checked by constant watchfulness, prompt action and tactful diplomacy.

At this time the Government of India had only a Muhammadan agent at Kabul, who wrote, as Salisbury thought, "exactly what the Amir tells him," and whose information did not tally with reports received from other sources. The British Government was thus at a disadvantage about getting exact and timely accounts of Afghan affairs. Lord Salisbury wrote to Northbrook on 19th February, 1875: "It has the effect of placing upon our frontier a thick covert, behind which any amount of hostile intrigue and conspiracy may be masked. I agree with you in thinking that a Russian advance upon India is a chimera. But I am by no means sure that an attempt to throw off the Afghans upon us is improbable."²⁵⁰ He, therefore, suggested that the Amir should be asked to give his consent to the establishment of a British agent at Herat. This was opposed by Northbrook and his Council. The Viceroy wrote to Lord Salisbury: "I cannot agree with your suspicions about the Amir, they are not confirmed by anyone of authority here." Lord Salisbury replied that the British Government could by no means be indifferent to the extension of Russian influence "upon the uncertain character of an Oriental chief whose ill-defined dominions are thus brought within a steadily narrowing circle between the conflicting pressure of two great military empires, one of which expostulates and remains passive whilst the other apologises and continues to move forward." "It was," as Lytton truly said, "not a question of letting alone, but of letting lead alone." Lord Salisbury also urged the absolute necessity of getting accurate

²⁴⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Lord Salisbury*, Vol. II, p. 71.

and early information about Afghan affairs. "The case is quite conceivable in which Her Majesty's Government may be able by early diplomatic action to arrest proceedings which a few weeks or even days later will have passed beyond the power of even the Government of St. Petersburg to control." When he insisted on his orders being carried into effect, Northbrook again raised a protest and resigned soon afterwards. Even if, as was said, the resignation was due to private reasons or differences on other matters of policy, it is clear that the Viceroy could not have worked with Lord Salisbury any longer. He had already disagreed with the latter on the tariff question, and he was strongly opposed to his Afghan policy which, in his opinion, was "a reversal of that advocated by Lord Canning. . . . renewed by Lord Lawrence. . . . ratified by Lord Mayo." "All the spirited foreign policy notions," he mentioned in a private letter, "come from Frere and Co, at home. Here we are very quiet and steady people."²⁵¹ There was a fundamental difference between the two in temperament. Mr. Mallet has remarked that "Lord Salisbury's brilliant and subtle intellect, his contempt for precedent, and a certain proneness to impulsive decisions presented a striking contrast to Lord Northbrook's caution and common sense, his reliance upon ascertained fact and experience, his power of steady and effective action."²⁵²

Lord Lytton was now sent out as the Viceroy of India to carry out the vigorous policy of the Disraeli Cabinet. He came, in his own words, with instructions for "a more definite, equilateral and practical alliance" with the Afghan Amir and to obtain his consent for the establishment of a permanent mission. To the Amir might be conceded all the terms that he had asked for in 1873, that is his subsidy was to be increased. Abdullah Jan was to be recognised as heir to the throne of Afghanistan, and he was to be given a definite promise 'by

²⁵¹ Mallet's *Northbrook*, p. 99.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

treaty or otherwise ' of British help against foreign attack. But Sher Ali refused to receive the English envoy by pointing out that the British Government was already bound to protect him against Russia and that if he permitted the establishment of a British Resident within his territory, he could not deny the same thing to the Russians. Lord Lytton held that the Amir's reply contained terms of " contemptuous disregard " of British interests and gave him a warning that he " was isolating Afghanistan from the alliance and support of the British Government." Three members of the Viceroy's Council, Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman, and Sir Arthur Hobhouse disagreed with the Viceroy. A conference between one of the ministers of the Amir, Sayyid Nur Muhammad, and the British Commissioner at Peshawar, Sir Lewis Pelly, was arranged and the negotiations lasted from October 1876 to March 1877, but these produced no satisfactory results. The blame for this has been laid upon Lord Salisbury, and there is no doubt that his policy was bound to fail. But " unless it is argued that British influence in Afghanistan was worthless, greater blame attached to Argyll for throwing away the golden opportunity of 1873 than to Salisbury for seeking to retrieve his predecessor's error. European affairs were moving to a crisis. A continuation of the policy of quiescence would permit Russia to strengthen her growing influence over the Amir and thereby greatly increase her power of hampering British foreign policy. European conditions required that Sher Ali should make an open choice between British and Russian friendship, for if he was not a friend to Great Britain, he was a dangerous potential enemy."²⁵³ " A tool in the hands of Russia," said Lytton, " I will never allow him to become. Such a tool it would be my duty to break before it could be used."²⁵⁴ Thus, the Secretary of State for India thought British interests, which had every chance of being jeopardised by unsatisfactory relations with Afghanis-

²⁵³ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 416.

²⁵⁴ Quoted in *Ibid*.

tan and by the machinations and advance of the Russians, could be safeguarded. But there was something to be said for the Amir as well. As an independent ruler of Afghanistan, it was perfectly within his rights to refuse to accept a British Resident or to enter into relations with Russia, however sharply these might have collided with British interests. The British Government had no moral justification for preventing him from following these courses. "The old Lawrence policy," remarks Mr. Roberts, "was in truth based upon a generous recognition of the rights of small and weak states; the school of Lytton and his followers relied upon a cynical doctrine of political expediency."²⁵⁵ The view that Britain had every right to treat Afghanistan as a dependency, being in a much weaker and inferior position, does not carry much weight nowadays, for the so-called right and privilege of a 'powerful and highly civilised' nation to extend its influence over a country which is 'comparatively weak and barbarous,' against the latter's wishes, honour and sentiments, is only a convenient pretext for the working of subtle diplomacy or aggressive imperialism.²⁵⁶

Besides trying to place a British Resident within the Amir's territory, Salisbury and Lytton were anxious to obtain a position of advantage on the Afghan frontier, for political and military convenience; they accordingly secured the occupation of Quetta, a place of great strategic importance, by virtue of a treaty concluded with the Khan of Khelat towards the close of 1876. Lord Salisbury regarded the Khelat mission as "the father of the Central Asian Mission of the future. The agent would reside... chiefly at Quetta... He would have leisure for collecting information from Candahar—Herat—Kabul—and Balkh... English rupees would try conclusions with Russian roubles in the *zenana* and the *divan*." He also indulged in plans for the extension of British outposts nearer to

²⁵⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 436.

²⁵⁶ Students of International Law and Politics will find instances of this in 'Protectorates,' 'Colonial Protectorates,' 'Spheres of Influence,' etc.

Afghanistan through the territory of the frontier tribes. His daughter writes that this was opposed by the old frontier officials "who looked with suspicion upon any system of diplomacy which required secrecy and dexterity." But on the other hand the Viceroy was now, as he himself admitted, bent upon effecting the "gradual disintegration and weakening of the Afghan power."

The destiny of an Eastern potentate was however in these days linked up with the forces of world history, as Asiatic politics had long ago come largely under the influence of the European powers. So Lytton's plans had no chance of success unless the designs of the Russians, who had been as keenly interested in Afghan affairs as England, could be effectively combated. In Europe events tending to intensify Anglo-Russian antagonism were developing quickly. In 1875 Bosnia and Herzegovina rebelled against Turkey, and this led in May 1877 to the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. Any storm in the Near East was bound to move the cabinets of Europe. It was rightly held that England's interests were sure to be hampered by the establishment of Russian influence over Constantinople, which would give her the supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean and thus the control over the shortest sea route to India, Australia and the Far East. Bismarck truly said that "the Suez Canal was the neck of the British Empire;" and it had been the policy of British statesmen like Canning and Palmerston to prevent Russia from fishing in the troubled waters of the Black Sea. Disraeli (now Earl of Beaconsfield) took a similar view of the affairs in the East, and after obtaining from Parliament a grant of £6,000,000 for naval and military purposes, he despatched a fleet to Constantinople, and Indian troops were sent overseas to Malta. In March, 1878, Russia concluded with the Sultan the treaty of San Stefano, "well-calculated to offend Europe." But its terms "could not be accepted either by Great Britain, who saw all her worst nightmares of Russians in India realized, or by Austria, who saw her cherished dream of a port on the Aegean for ever falsified." The Beaconsfield

Cabinet denounced it, prepared for war, secured the Sultan's permission for the occupation of Cyprus and sent reinforcements to Mediterranean squadron. War between England and Russia seemed inevitable ; but it was averted by the mediation of Bismarck. The question was referred to a Congress of the European powers, which sat in Berlin from 13th June to 13th July and offered only a temporary solution of the problem. The decisions of the Berlin Congress being rather unfavourable to Russia influenced in a way the course of Asiatic politics. Russia's designs in the Near East being foiled by the action of Great Britain, she sought recompense in Asia by opposing there the match of British imperialism.

As a sort of counterpoise to the concentration of English fleets and Indian troops in the Mediterranean, the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan "sought a specific alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan and initiated a military movement" in the direction of Afghanistan and India.²⁵⁷ From Tashkhend a body of 20,000 men marched towards the Afghan border, and another body towards the Pamirs and Kashmir. On 13th June, the opening day of the Berlin Congress, Colonel Stolietoff proceeded from Tashkhend to Kabul carrying a letter from Kaufmann to the Amir. "Be it known to you," wrote Kaufmann to Sher Ali, "that in these days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion verbally to you, I have deputed my agent, Major-General Stolietoff . . . He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope you will . . . believe him as you would myself."²⁵⁸ Mr. Roberts writes that the Amir made "desperate attempts" to oppose the envoy's advance ; but Prof. Dodwell has remarked that "instead of meeting with any firm refusal, the mission found at the frontier half-hearted,

²⁵⁷ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 416.

²⁵⁸ Quoted in Dodwell's *Sketch*, etc., p. 134.

probably mere ostensible orders not to enter the country.”²⁵⁹ The envoy ignored them and reached Kabul on 22nd July, and negotiated a treaty, which has been referred to by the Amir in his letter to Kaufmann, dated 23rd August :—“ He (Stolietoff) has reduced to writing the verbal representations the object of which was to strengthen the friendly relations between the illustrious Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, and made it over to me.” The Amir probably received a guarantee against external attack ; but after the Berlin settlement, Kaufmann had sent orders to Stolietoff not to make any definite promises to the Amir and had recalled the forward march of the two columns. However, even on the strength of the very moderate promises of the Russians, Sher Ali now defied the overtures of the Government of India. “ So a prince,” remarks Prof. Dodwell, “ who had been alienated from the English by their own errors was at a moment when help was impossible, brought into conflict with them by the errors of the Russians.”²⁶⁰

Lytton, with the approval of the Home Government, now insisted that Sher Ali should receive a British envoy in his letter which reached Kabul on 17th August, the day on which the Amir’s favourite son, Abdullah Jan, died. This was used as a convenient pretext for delaying the answer to Lytton’s letter. The Amir consulted the Russian envoy, who was still at Kabul and who asked the Amir to postpone the reply as long as possible while he himself went to Tashkhend to seek the official help of the Russian Cabinet for the Amir. This encouraged the Amir to turn a deaf ear to English negotiations. Mr. Roberts remarks that the whole procedure of the Viceroy was “ a calamitous mistake. It was plain that Russia and no Afghanistan was responsible for the entry of the mission into Kabul, and it was she, if anyone, as Lord Lawrence urged,

²⁵⁹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 417.

²⁶⁰ *Sketch, etc.*, p. 135.

who ought to have been called to account.”²⁶¹ He also suggests that the British Government ought to have tried to win over the Amir after the departure of Stolietoff. But it is very doubtful if, as the matters then stood, these courses could lead to any satisfactory result. Frere truly remarked: “It may be very convenient to say we will be guided by circumstances; but that is not the sort of policy which wins friends and deters enemies.”²⁶²

Lord Lytton thought that the treaty of Berlin had “freed our hands and destroyed, at the same time, all hopes on his (Sher Ali’s) part of complications to us or active assistance to himself, from Russia.” He sent Sir Neville Chamberlin, with a small escort, on a mission to Peshawar but the latter was prevented from passing beyond Ali Masjid, a post at the entrance of the Khyber Pass. The British Government regarded this as a direct affront on itself. “The Amir’s policy,” wrote Lytton, “was to make fools of us in the sight of all Central Asia and all India without affording us any pretext for active resentment. My policy was naturally to force the Amir to change his policy or to reveal it in such a manner as must make the public a partner with the government in the duty of counteracting it.”²⁶³

Lord Lytton showed an overhastiness in trying to force a mission on the Amir of Kabul, before the Russian forces had been withdrawn from the Turkish territory and the treaty of Berlin had been properly executed. Both Beaconsfield and Salisbury, who “would have preferred to see the Afghan trouble smoothed over or at all events put off for a twelve-month,” complained against “the inopportune haste of the Indian Government” and it raised stormy debates in the Cabinet on 25th and 30th October, 1878. At last Lytton’s views, supported by Lord Cranbrook, the new Secretary of State for India, prevailed. The Cabinet instead of sanctioning an imme-

²⁶¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 439.

²⁶² Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 418.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

diate war sent on 2nd November an ultimatum, which was to expire on the 20th, to the Amir demanding from him a "full and suitable apology" and his consent to the acceptance of the proposed mission. But no reply came from Sher Ali before 30th November, and British troops had already begun to move on the day after the ultimatum expired. All this while the Amir solicited help from the Russians but the latter found themselves unable to afford it and Kaufmann asked him to make peace with the English if he could get an opportunity. Thus was Sher Ali duped at a moment when he required Russian help most for meeting a situation which had arisen by his acceptance of the Russian mission. "Lytton and Cranbrook were right," remarks Prof. Dodwell, "in seizing this precise moment to reestablish British ascendancy at Kabul, when Sher Ali's hostility was manifest, when Russian intervention would have involved tearing up the agreement reached so lately at Berlin, and when Russian resources, financial and military, were depleted by the recent war."²⁶⁴

War being declared on 21st November, the British armies advanced by the three great passes of Afghanistan,—one under Sir Samuel Browne through the Khyber, another under Major-General Roberts through the Kurram valley and a third under General Stewart marched from Quetta through the Bolan Pass. Kandahar was occupied almost without any opposition; Sher Ali fled into Russian Turkestan and died on 21st February, 1879, at Masar-i-Sharif. His son Yakub Khan opened negotiations and concluded the treaty of Gandamak on 26th May, 1879. By this agreement the foreign affairs of Afghanistan passed under British control; the Amir handed over to the English the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi and agreed to receive a permanent British Resident at Kabul with agents at Herat and other places on the frontier; he was promised an annual subsidy of six lacs and was assured of

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

help in men, money and arms against foreign attack at the discretion of the English.

The treaty of Gandamak "marked the apogee of Lord Lytton's Afghan policy." It seemed to have secured for the English all that they had desired; Lord Beaconsfield said that the English had obtained 'a scientific and adequate frontier' for their Indian Empire. But their hopes were belied before long. The very fact that Yakub Khan was now supported and guaranteed by a foreign power wounded the feelings of the Afghans; the selection of Kabul as the residence of the British agent was 'dubious and ill-omened;' and lastly neither the new Amir nor the British agent, Major Cavagnari, was fitted by his character and abilities to ensure the success of the settlement. The former was, in the opinion of those who met him, 'shifty, unstable, lacking in character,' while the latter though 'resolute and forceful,' was not "suited for a position of delicacy." Major Cavagnari was at first well received when he reached Kabul on 24th July, 1879, but he was murdered on 3rd September with the whole of escort by a body of mutinous Afghan troops, Yakub Khan making no effort to save him. "The degree of Yakub's complicity was never ascertained; the Amir can neither be acquitted of complicity nor convicted of design; but if it was not he who brought about the murder in quick disgust at the situation in which he found himself, it was instigated by dynastic enemies eager to see him hopelessly embroiled with his English protectors."²⁶⁵ This disaster sounded the death-knell of the Gandamak settlement. "The web of diplomacy," wrote the Viceroy, "so carefully and patiently woven, has been rudely shattered... All that I was most anxious to avoid in the conduct of the late war and negotiations has now been brought about by the hand of fate."²⁶⁶ Measures of retribution were promptly adopted. Sir Donald Stewart immediately reoccupied

²⁶⁵ Dodwell, *Sketch, etc.*, p. 141.

²⁶⁶ Quoted in Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 444.

Kandahar ; Yakub Khan appeared in the British camp on 27th September and threw himself upon British protection, and General Roberts marched through the Khyber to Kabul which he entered on 12th October after inflicting a defeat on the rebels at Charasiab and punishing those who had taken part in the murder of the British agent. Yakub Khan was deported to India as a state prisoner, and he lived at Dehra Dun till his death in 1923. Lytton and the Government in England thought of disintegrating Afghanistan by placing a chief at Kandahar, a region in which the English were most interested and by establishing a cantonment at Pishin. But the affairs suddenly took an unexpected turn by the appearance of Abdurrahman, son of Afzal Khan, the eldest son of Dost Muhammad, as a claimant for the throne of Afghanistan. Abdurrahman had been living as a pensioner in Russian territory since 1870 ; in 1878 Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General, had thought of installing him as Amir in place of Sher Ali if the latter proved intractable ; now in 1880 he took leave of the Russian Governor-General to start for Afghanistan to try his luck. He was an able man and had " inherited his grandfather Dost Muhammad's vigour, judgment and ferocity." Soon after his arrival, Lord Lytton decided to recognise him as Amir, but his plan could not be carried out immediately because of the change in the ministry in England and in the office of the Governor-Generalship of India.

The foreign and Indian policy of the Beaconsfield Government had excited strong criticism and bitter condemnation among the Liberals in England. Lord Hartington described Lytton as " the incarnation and embodiment of an Indian policy which is everything an Indian policy should not be." The Beaconsfield Government was defeated in the election of 28th April, 1880 ; Gladstone became Prime Minister of England for the second time and Cranbrook and Lytton were replaced respectively by Hartington as Secretary of State and Ripon as Viceroy. The Liberal Government's policy was set forth in Lord Hartington's despatches

of May and November 1880 ; " it appears that as the result of the two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditure of large sums of money all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the state which it was desired to see strong, friendly and independent, the assumption of fresh and unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country."²⁶⁷ Therefore, " sharing the opinions of some of the most eminent Indian statesmen of past and present times, and, up to a very recent date, of every minister of the Crown responsible for Indian policy," the new government thought that the results of the recent interference in Afghanistan " have been precisely those which have been foreseen and apprehended by the opponents " of Lytton's policy. " If the Afghans," remarked Lord Hartington, " have ever been disposed to look with more friendship on either their Russian or Persian than their British neighbour, it is not an unnatural result of the fear for the loss of their freedom which our past policy has been calculated to inspire." But on reaching India, Ripon took over " the negotiations with Abdurrahman at the point where Lytton had laid them down and conducted them to the conclusion at which Lytton had already aimed."²⁶⁸ He recognised Abdurrahman as Amir on the conditions that he was to " have no political relations with any foreign power except the English, and that the districts of Pishin and Sibi were to be retained by them." The Amir was promised an annual subsidy ; by obtaining a control of the foreign relations of Afghanistan, the Viceroy now dispensed with the demand for the maintenance of a British Resident in Afghanistan. A rival to the new Amir soon appeared in the person of Ayub Khan, a son of Sher Ali, who then held Herat under his control. On 27th July, 1880, he defeated a British force under General Barrows at Maiwand

²⁶⁷ Quoted in Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 448.

²⁶⁸ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 421.

between Kandahar and the Helmand river, and compelled the rest of the vanquished to take shelter within the walls of Kandahar. But they were soon relieved by Sir Frederick (afterwards Lord) Roberts (destined to be one of the greatest British military leaders during the next 35 years), who effected a brilliant march from Kabul to Kandahar, covering about 213 miles of mountainous country in twenty days with 2,800 European and 7,000 Indian soldiers and 8,000 camp-followers, and routed the army of Ayub Khan at the battle of Kandahar. Ayub Khan was finally overpowered in the month of September by Abdurrahman who now established his undisputed authority over Afghanistan. Lytton's plan of partitioning the kingdom of Afghanistan was abandoned, and Ripon withdrew all British troops from that country.

Opinions are divided about the desirability and usefulness of the Second Afghan War. It has been "condemned as a war of aggression and as a war that failed of its object." It is indeed true that imperialistic expansion necessitates a resort to questionable aggression, and there is no doubt that Afghanistan had become subject to it. But in this case, the British aggression on Afghanistan was chiefly meant to check Russian designs in Central Asia about which there could be no doubt, as the events of 1878 clearly showed. Thus it cannot be said that the Second Afghan War was wholly unnecessary in the interests of the British Empire in India. Neither was it altogether fruitless, though it cost so much in men and money. "The Russianised Amir was expelled" and one friendly to the English took his place; the designs of Russia received a check. The Khan of Khelat passed under British control, the province of British Baluchistan was formed with the addition of two new and important districts of Sibi and Pishin, and Quetta was definitely occupied by the British, who also secured the uninterrupted use of the Bolan Pass.

Russian ambitions, which received a temporary setback, sought outlets for expansion as soon as opportunities appeared due to the external difficulties of the Gladstone ministry.

“Fortified by a secret treaty with Germany,” the Russians tried to encroach on what was in those days regarded as Afghan territory, though they occasionally proclaimed that their intentions were protection and peaceful development of trade. This is well illustrated by their manner of occupying Merv, an oasis lying 150 miles south-west of the Oxus and of equal distance from the Zulfiqar Pass on the way to Herat. The strategic importance of this place had been greatly exaggerated by politicians seized with what the Duke of Argyll called “nervousness,” and the British Foreign Office often sought assurances about its safety. In 1882 the British ambassador received assurances from De Giers that Russia had no intention of taking possession of new regions but that her influence “was entirely devoted to the establishment of a firm and permanent peace in that region.” But early in 1884 Russia brought the Merv chiefs under her control by force. As Curzon said, “the flame of diplomatic protest blazed fiercely forth in England; but after a momentary combustion was as usual extinguished by a flood of excuses from the inexhaustible reservoirs of the Neva.”²⁶⁹

This event gave birth to much popular excitement in England and made some action on the part of the Liberal Government absolutely necessary. Lord Ripon's Government had agreed to a Russian proposal for a joint commission with the object of delimiting the Russo-Afghan boundary lines in dispute lying between the rivers Hari Rud and Oxus. A British Indian official, Sir Peter Lumsden, and General Zelenoi were appointed as heads respectively of the English and Russian commissions; they met for the first time after much delay caused by Russia, on 1st October, 1884, a month before Lord Dufferin arrived as the Viceroy of India (1884—1888). But a peaceful settlement was delayed by Russo-Afghan disputes about their respective territorial rights and by April 1885 discussions

²⁶⁹ Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. I, p. 423 from Lord Curzon's *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 111.

reached a deadlock. While Lumsden had been waiting in North-Western Afghanistan, the Russians occupied the Zulfikar Pass and came into collision with the Afghan troops at Panjdeh, situated a hundred miles due south of Merv, on 30th March. They drove a body of Afghan troops out of Panjdeh and interrupted the telegraph line from Meshed to Teheran.

These events nearly precipitated a war. Public opinion in England was deeply incensed against Russia and the Conservatives clamoured for strong action ; in Russia also the war party had influenced over the Emperor. Gladstone's position thus became critical. But a risky and calamitous war was prevented by the tact of Lord Dufferin, the diplomacy of the home government and the good sense of the Amir. The Amir, who had already arrived at Rawalpindi for an interview with the Viceroy, did not lose himself in the excitement but considered the whole thing in a calm way. "I was not a man to get excited," the Amir later remarked, "and therefore took the matter calmly as a lesson for the future." He rightly realised that Afghanistan would not gain in the least by an unnecessary war waged in her territory between England and Russia ; and he became, therefore, determined to avoid it at all costs. "Afghanisthan," he remarked, "was between two millstones and it had been already ground to powder." "My country," he noted later on in his Autobiography, "is like a poor goat on whom the lion and the bear have both fixed their eyes and without the protection and help of the Almighty Deliverer the vi tim cannot escape very long." The Viceroy, who was wise enough to refrain from wounding the national sentiments of the Amir and his people, acceded to his suggestions and he returned home with satisfaction. Meanwhile, Gladstone, who, in the first flush of resentment, had characterised the Russian attack on Panjdeh as "an unprovoked aggression," sought to satisfy the clamours of the British war-party by calling up the reserves and asking for a vote of eleven million pounds for extra military preparations. The Russian government was placated by Gladstone's consent

to refer the question to the arbitration of the King of Denmark and the Russians "agreed to retire from the Zulfiqar Pass where they had no business on condition of retaining Panjdeh to which they had no right." But Gladstone's dexterity could not lead to any successful issue and the proposed arbitration did not turn up. His ministry fell in June and his successor, Lord Salisbury, took over the negotiations. The Boundary Commission resumed its work, Sir West Ridgway continuing the work of Sir Peter Lumsden, who had been recalled. It agreed upon a 'frontier line from the Hari Rud over the spurs of the Paropanisus range to the low ground of the Oxus valley' but it could not come to any satisfactory decision as to where the boundary line should touch the Oxus. After a good deal of negotiations between Kabul, Simla, London and St. Petersburg, the line of demarcation was finally settled by a protocol signed at St. Petersburg in July 1887.²⁷⁰ The Amir remarked ironically: "The knots that were tied with regard to the Afghan frontier were united with the tips of the fingers of excellent measures."²⁷¹ It is important to note that 'by the new boundary line the Amir did not lose a penny of revenue, a single subject or an acre of land,'²⁷² and Russian advance towards Herat received a definite check. Six years of comparative quiet followed but the feelings of mutual distrust were not completely extinguished. Disputes were revived by the Russian advance towards the Pamirs and no settlement was reached till by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1895 Afghanistan surrendered the territory north of the Panjdeh while the Russian protectorate of Bokhara gave up that portion of Darwar lying south of Oxus. The southern boundary of the Russian Empire was fixed at the Oxus. "The boundary lines," remarks Sir Alfred Lyall, "now set up by British and Russian officers on the Hindukush and by the Oxus record the

²⁷⁰ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 475.

²⁷¹ Quoted in Dodwell, *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

²⁷² Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 476.

first deliberate and practical attempts made by the two European powers to stave off the contact of their incessantly expanding Asiatic empires," and Anglo-Russian tension in Asia began to relax gradually. "But the representatives of both nations in Central Asia long continued to believe the worst of the other's designs and vehemently strove to counteract them."²⁷³

The period after 1884-85 saw a great expansion of Russian railway policy, uniting finally the Trans-Caspian and the Orenburg-Tashkend lines at Kush on the Afghan frontier. In 1900 the Russians sought to place the Governor-General of Turkestan in direct communication with the Kabul government, and they repeated this demand in 1903 in terms which the British Government "deeply resented." On 21st March, 1905, a treaty was concluded between the Government of India and Amir Habibullah, who had succeeded his father Abdurrahman in 1901, whereby the engagements between the former and the latter's father were renewed. But both in the time of Curzon and Minto, he was suspected of leanings towards Russia. All these made an understanding between England and Russia necessary but it was prevented firstly by the influence of German diplomacy and secondly by the strong differences of opinions between the Viceroy, Lord Minto II (1905—1910) and the Secretary of State, Sir John Morley, who was a man of strong personality, anxious to take a more active and direct part in the administration of India than the former Secretaries had done. In 1906, when the negotiations for a settlement had been formally opened, Lord Minto pointed out that it would not be proper to enter into any definite agreement with Russia without a previous discussion in this matter with the Amir Habibullah. "To me," he remarked, "it seems infinitely more important to keep on friendly and controlling terms with him than to enter into any bargain with Russia which might lessen our influence with him or alienate him from us." But this view was wholly rejected by Morley.

²⁷³ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 426.

who insisted that "the terms should only be communicated to the Amir as a settled thing." The India Office further proposed to allow direct communication between Russia and Afghanistan. The Viceroy was strongly opposed to this concession. "We are," he wrote, "to open a very dangerous door to intrigue and to sacrifice the power which the Amir has agreed with us to exercise to check such intrigue"²⁷⁴; so the proposal was abandoned after long discussions. There was another proposal of the Secretary of State to the effect that England and Russia should suspend the construction of strategic railways for a period of ten years. This also was justly opposed by the Viceroy, who pointed out that England would be loser by it because while the "Russian scheme was practically complete, the English one was not," and this proposal also was therefore dropped.

An understanding was at first reached by the Anglo-Russian Convention signed on 31st August, 1907. So far as Afghanistan was concerned, the Convention left her political status unchanged; Russia definitely acknowledged that this country lay outside her sphere of influence and she also agreed to conduct her relations with the Amir through the British Government, and equal commercial privileges were provided for English and Russian traders. It was stipulated that these clauses were to take effect after the Amir had formally signified his assent. But this formal assent was refused by the Amir, who "regarded this union of the two great neighbours with a natural suspicion."

In fact, Minto had no faith in the policy behind Convention. "I do not believe," he wrote, "that she (Russia) is capable of controlling the movements of her frontier officers in those regions . . . and whatever bargain she may enter into with us, I have no doubt that her officers will continue to perfect their various forms of advance on the frontiers of India." He further remarked: "I wouldn't bargain with

²⁷⁴ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 429.

Russia in Central Asia on any account—she has too many opportunities of getting the best of us, and the risks of a mistake are too great.” Morley replied that “this country cannot have two foreign policies.” Lord Minto was being guided by considerations of safeguarding British interests in Asia, while Morley’s ideas were based on European and not Asiatic conditions. We have to remember that “even the most skilful foreign policy is more usually a choice of evils than the selection of advantages. In the present case, the prospective need of a European coalition involved Indian policy in new difficulties.” The Pan-Islamic forces received an additional stimulus for uniting against the combination of the European powers. The orthodox sections in the Muslim countries did not like very much the attempts of the European powers towards westernisation of Islamic peoples, and they now tried to utilise religion as a bond of union among themselves. Russia and Turkey were at loggerheads with each other ; German agents at Kabul were engaged in exciting Afghan hostility against England ; and the differences between the old allies, England and Turkey, went on increasing. Pan-Islamism could not work ahead so long as Russia and England remained allied. But matters took a serious turn after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the consequent disappearance of the recently formed Anglo-Russian alliance, when the aggressive Islamic parties got a favourable opportunity.

The ill-advised attempts of the Amir Habib-ul-lah to introduce Western manners and customs into his country, even to the extent of changing the dress of the ladies of his zenana, made him unpopular with the orthodox and anti-British party, and he was assassinated on 20th February, 1910. His son, Aman-ul-lah, the new ruler of Afghanistan, discarded the policy of his father and grandfather, and manifested designs of hostility against the English. This led to the third Afghan War, one of the many episodes in the Epic of the Great War. Aman-ul-lah crossed the frontier and commenced ravaging British territories. After meeting with some reverses, the

British-Indian Army succeeded in finally repulsing the Afghan attacks. The war came to an end by the treaty of Rawalpindi signed on 8th August, 1919,²⁷⁵ which was confirmed by another treaty concluded on 22nd November, 1921. By these treaties, Afghanistan secured her freedom from British control in external affairs. The British subsidies to the Afghan Government were confiscated ; but the British Government agreed to sanction the residence of an Afghan minister at London and the Afghans got the privilege of importing goods into Afghanistan through Indian ports duty free. This Afghan War had two important effects :—“ In the first place, allegations of incompetency in medical and transport arrangements were brought against the Government of India at a time when that Government was passing through a period of great difficulty and acrid criticism ; and in the second place, it left as its heritage a disturbed border . . . ”²⁷⁶ However, the close of the year 1921 saw friendly relations established between the British Government and Amir Aman-ul-lah, whose accession had been marked with open hostility. In 1922 an Afghan minister was appointed at the Court of St. James and a British minister at the Court of Kabul. In June 1923, an Anglo-Afghan Trade Convention “ put into formal shape the obligations accepted by the British Government under the Treaty of 1921 in respect of goods in transit, through India to Afghanistan.” Afghanistan had also recently concluded a treaty of alliance with the National Government of Angora. Thus “ buttressed in her foreign relations with her neighbours, ” she “ embarked upon a new era of internal development ” in administration, education and commerce. Certain incidents almost caused another Anglo-Afghan friction during the year 1923-24, but the danger was averted by British representations and friendly action on the part of the Afghan Government.

²⁷⁵ *India in 1919*, p. 13.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

The far-reaching and rather hasty internal reforms of the Amir Aman-ul-lah (who refused to take a lesson from his father's life) were not liked by the conservative sections of his people, and soon produced a civil war, which was watched by the Government of India with grave anxiety. Aman-ul-lah had ultimately to abdicate the throne, which was usurped by Bachai-i-saqao, a remarkable adventurer, and the country remained in a state of strife and confusion during 1929. During this civil war, the Government of India withdrew its representative from Kabul and maintained neutrality. Order was, however, restored during the subsequent year by an officer of the late Amir, Muhammad Nadir Shah, who became the next King by general choice, and Indo-Afghan relations were again satisfactorily re-established. Nadir Shah was slowly working out almost all the modernising schemes of Aman-ul-lah, but with great caution and tact, and the foreign relations of Afghanistan were also developing rapidly, both in the diplomatic and the commercial spheres,—but he was soon assassinated by a partisan of the pro-Amanullah faction. The succession of Nadir's son Zahir is so far unchallenged, and all is quiet in Afghan land; but the striking personality of the ex-King and Queen are still a force in their country.

SECTION V

BRITISH INDIAN RELATIONS WITH PERSIA, TIBET, AND BHUTAN

A. PERSIA

During the closing years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, the British dominion in India was threatened by perils from beyond the Indus. At the same time Lord Wellesley was effecting a marvellous transformation of the Company's position in India, he also paid due attention towards safeguarding it against external dangers. In 1799 he sent Mehdi Ali Khan, a naturalised Persian who had been acting as the Company's Resident at Bushire, on a mission

to the Shah of Persia, with the object of putting pressure on Zaman Shah of Kabul, who aspired to play the aggressive rôle of his predecessor Ahmad Shah Abdali.²⁷⁷

But more dangerous than the designs of Zaman Shah would have been the success of the intrigues of the French in interior Asia or the materialization of plans of advance of Russia through it.²⁷⁸ "An offensive alliance," remarks Mr. Kaye, "between France, Persia and Caubul, might have rendered the dangers, which once only seemed to threaten us from the north-west, at once real and imminent."²⁷⁹ The British Government, therefore, sought to secure the friendship of Persia, and despatched in 1799 Captain John Malcolm on a mission to the Court of the Persian Shah with instructions "to induce the Shah of Persia to bring pressure on Zaman Shah, to counteract any possible designs of the French, and to restore the prosperity of British and British-Indian Trade" (with Persia). It was partly a commercial and partly a political mission. The mission, says Captain Malcolm, was "completely successful." Wellesley also asserted it strongly when he wrote to the Secret Committee that "Captain Malcolm returned from his embassy in the month of May, after having completely succeeded in accomplishing every object of his mission and in establishing a connection with the government of the Persian Empire, which promises to the interests of the British nation in India political and commercial advantages of the most important description."²⁸⁰ Making allowance for some exaggeration in these statements, we can say with Sykes that "Malcolm's first mission ended in complete success."²⁸¹ Owen has remarked that Lord Wellesley "dissipated the storm which was gathering on the Afghan mountains by a diplomatic discharge, through the medium of Mehdi Ali Khan, and

²⁷⁷ Sykes, *History of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 298—300.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 4.

²⁸⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 301.

following this up by Malcolm's Persian mission, he both secured India from a repetition of the Abdali inroads, and obviated the more distant contingencies of invasion from Central Asia, Russia or France."²⁸² Malcolm had negotiated a commercial and a political treaty with a Haji Ibrahim, the Shah's Wazir, and these were formally signed on 28th January, 1801.²⁸³ By the commercial treaty it was provided that English and Indian merchants should be permitted to settle free of taxes at the ports, and that English broadcloth, iron, steel and lead should be admitted free of duty. The political treaty was meant to put pressure on the Afghans and to check the extension of French influence in Persia. The terms providing against the French were marked with extreme bitterness, which has been adversely criticised.

For six or seven years after the treaties had been signed, "profound indifference concerning Persia prevailed in Calcutta,"²⁸⁴ and in the meanwhile chances of Russian advance and of growth of French influence re-appeared. In 1801 Russia annexed Georgia and planned further advances. The Persians suffered heavily in Armenia in 1804, and disgusted with the procrastination of England, who was then in temporary alliance with Russia, the Shah of Persia sought French help. This led to the growth of French influence in Teheran, but nothing positive took shape as the convention of Tilsit (1807), by bringing France and Russia into alliance, changed the whole situation.

The British Governments in London and Calcutta now awoke to the need of "doing something" to counteract the designs of Napoleon in the East. In 1808 Minto sent Captain Malcolm on his second mission to the court of Persia, whilst a similar mission under Sir Harford Jones (afterwards Jones-Bridges) had at the same time been despatched thither by the

²⁸² Wellesley's *Despatches*, p. xxxi.

²⁸³ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. XII, p. 38.

²⁸⁴ Sykes, *Op. cit.*, p. 302.

British Cabinet. Malcolm reached the Persian Gulf first, in May 1808, when French influence was dominant at Teheran ; he met with an uncourteous reception and returned completely unsuccessful to Calcutta, where he urged that an expedition should be sent to take possession of Karrak, an island in the Persian Gulf.²⁸⁵ Sir Harford Jones appeared in the scene after Malcolm's departure, when a reaction against the French influence had set in at Teheran, and he met with better luck. He entered into negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of a preliminary treaty, dated 12th March, 1809,²⁸⁶ by which the Shah of Persia, declaring all other engagements void, promised " not to permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India, or towards the ports of that country." He also undertook, in case of the British dominions being attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other power, " to afford a force for the protection of the said dominions." In the event of Persia being invaded by any European force, the British Government agreed to afford to the Shah a military force, or in lieu thereof, " a subsidy with warlike ammunitions such as guns, muskets, etc., and officers to the amount of that may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force invading." The projected invasion to Karrak was disowned. The proceedings of Sir Harford caused a good deal of friction with the Government of India, but Lord Minto soon accepted the arrangements he had made by insisting that

285 " A little too impetuous, perhaps—a little too dictatorial, that energetic military diplomatist (Malcolm) commenced at the wrong end of his work. He erred in dictating to the Persian Court the dismissal of the French embassy as a preliminary to further negotiations when in reality it was the end and object of his negotiations. He erred in blustering out all his designs in unfolding the scheme of policy he intended to adopt, and so committing himself to a line of conduct which after-events might have rendered it expedient to modify or reject. He erred in using the language of intimidation at a time when he should have sought to inspire confidence and diffuse good-will among the officers of the Persian Court." Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 57.

286 Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. XII, p. 46.

"the execution of the treaty should be entrusted to an officer nominated by himself." Accordingly Malcolm was sent on a third mission to Persia. "It was indeed a mere pageant, and a very costly, but not wholly a profitless one."²⁸⁷ It yielded excellent literary fruits in the shape of Malcolm's valuable *History of Persia*, Pottinger's *Travels in Beluchistan*, and Kinner's *Geographical Memoir*. Henceforth the control of diplomatic relations with Persia remained in the hands of the British Cabinet, though from 1826—35 the nomination of the Persian envoy was entrusted to the Government of India. A definitive treaty, based on Sir Harford Jone's preliminary agreement, was signed on 24th November, 1814.²⁸⁸ By the terms of this treaty "which was specially declared to be defensive, all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void, and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain . . . As regards Afghanistan the British Government was not to interfere in case of war breaking out between Persia and the Amir, whereas Persia, on her part, agreed to attack Afghanistan if it went to war with Great Britain."

From the treaty of Gulistan (1813-14) up to the year 1826 "there was at least an outward observance of peace" between Russia and Persia. But hostilities broke out again in the latter year. On the strength of the Treaty of Teheran by which England had promised to help Persia against any European invader if she herself was not the aggressor, the Shah of Persia appealed to his ally for help; but the British excused themselves from affording it on the plea that Persia was the aggressor, though "it is certain that the real provocation came not from the Mahomedan but from the Christian state."²⁸⁹ Persia

²⁸⁷ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 72, footnote.

²⁸⁸ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 336; Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 103—107; Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I.

²⁸⁹ Kaye, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 152.

was defeated and had to conclude the humiliating treaty of Turkomanchi in February 1828. "The backwardness of England at such a time," writes Mr. Kaye, "was of dubious honesty, as it doubtless was of dubious expediency. A more forward policy might have been more successful."²⁹⁰ After the defeat of Persia, the British Government tried to 'salve their political conscience' by taking advantage of the embarrassments of Persia to cancel that article of the definitive treaty by which they were bound to afford her military or pecuniary aid and by paying a large indemnity to their stricken ally. But English influence henceforward naturally steadily declined at the Persian Court, while that of Russia became predominant.

During the period 1832—57, Persia, a 'facile tool' in the hands of Russia, was goaded by her to make "persistent though unsuccessful efforts . . . to recover provinces on the eastern confines of the Empire in order to balance heavy losses on the west."²⁹¹ Besides expeditions to Khiva and Khorasan, the main Persian objective was Herat, which was besieged several times and was once (1856) actually occupied for a short period; Persia also intended to advance further into Afghanistan, which would threaten the British Indian Empire and thus serve Russian interests. The "Game of quiet intimidation" which Russia was now trying against the British Empire in India through the agency of Persia caused apprehensions in the minds of the British statesmen. McNeill, British Minister to Persia in 1836, noted that a Russian regiment "at her farthest frontier post, on the western shore of the Caspian, has as great a distance to march back to Moscow as onward to Attock on the Indus, and is actually farther from St. Petersburg than from Lahore, the capital of the Sikhs." The Government of India, therefore, made "strenuous efforts to keep Afghanistan outside the spheres of influence of both Russia and Persia, not

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ Sykes, *Op. cit.*, p. 322.

shrinking from an Afghan campaign, from costly missions, or even from war with her old ally Persia (1856)."²⁹² Peace was concluded with Persia in 1857, after which relations with Persia improved from the British point of view.

British policy towards Russia was intimately connected with England's position in the Persian Gulf. Her interests in the Gulf were vital and it was necessary on her part, for commercial as well as political reasons, to maintain a general control over all the coastline eastwards from Aden to Baluchistan. For her, as she thought, it was highly important to keep open and safe the trade route to India over the sea washing Arabia and Persia and to prevent other powers from creating a fortified base or making territorial acquisition on either seaboard of the Persian Gulf. In short, for her eastern supremacy, her control of the Gulf was to remain inviolate.²⁹³ But this attitude of England provoked the resentment of the Continental powers, France, Russia, Germany and also. Turkey, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and led them to challenge British paramount influence in the Gulf. In 1892 a French statesman declared in the Chamber of Deputies that Great Britain exercised her claim in the Gulf and arbitrated in the disputes between Arabian, Persian and Turkish chiefs "in a form European diplomacy had never recognised."²⁹⁴ France was busy intriguing at Muscat, and in 1898 she was about to secure from the Sultan of Oman a coaling-station at Bunder Jissah, five miles south-east of Muscat, in violation of the Sultan's agreement of 1891 with the British Government by which he had promised 'never to alienate or to permit a foreign power to occupy any part of the state of Oman'; but her attempt was frustrated by Lord Curzon, who in the following year, sent a small naval squadron to the Gulf from Calcutta to make a demonstration. A similar attempt on the part of Russia

²⁹² Sykes, *Op. cit.*, p. 323.

²⁹³ Lovat Frazer, *India Under Curzon and After*, pp. 112—15.

²⁹⁴ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 522.

in 1900 to obtain a coaling-station on the northern shore of the entrance to the Gulf was also defeated. England supported Shaikh Mubarak of Koweit, a town having a fine harbour at the head of the Gulf, against the attempt of Turkey to undermine his independence, and in 1899 the former entered into an agreement with the British Government that he should grant no concessions to any other foreign power. Thus when early in 1900 a German mission under Herr Stemrich arrived at Koweit to obtain a site for the terminus of the Berlin to Baghdad Railway at the Koweit harbour, Shaikh Mubarak refused to grant the request. These attempts of the European powers to sap the supremacy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf led England to formulate her claims openly. Lord Lansdowne, then Foreign Secretary, made the following declaration in the House of Lords on May 5, 1903:—"I say it without hesitation, that we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all the means at our disposal."²⁹⁵ Britain thus asserted her "Monroe Doctrine in the Middle East" and has tried to maintain it ever since.

Such a strong policy on the part of England was also meant to safeguard her interests in Persian waters against the growth of Russian influence in Northern Persia and her attempts to spread it southwards. Lord Curzon, long before he became Viceroy, urged the extension of British influence by excluding that of the other Powers. He wrote: "I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any Power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and as an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British Minister, who was guilty of acquiescing in such a surrender, as a traitor to his country."²⁹⁶ As Viceroy he visited the Gulf in 1903 and en-

²⁹⁵ Quoted in Lovat Frazer, *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

forced his policy by several other measures, such as the Sistan Mission of 1903—05 under Sir Henry McMahon, the establishment of consulates in the ports and the internal trading centres, the projection of a railway from Quetta westwards to Nushki, a distance of 93 miles, the construction of a road from Nushki to the frontier post at Robat Kila, a distance of 327 miles, and opening of a postal service along the route with frequent telegraph offices and stores and reorganisation of the Indo-Persian customs and tariff. Thus Lord Curzon was markedly successful in his Persian policy.

From 1905—10 Persia passed through internal disorders and troubles, and attempts to establish democratic institutions in that stronghold of despotism produced disastrous consequences. The Shah Musaffar-ed-din indeed yielded to the popular demands for representative institutions and convoked a National Council or *Mejlis* in 1906. But the constitution failed under his immediate successors and Persia's disintegration followed apace. Russia and England, however, tried to settle the nature of their respective interests in Persia by peaceful negotiations, and this resulted in the Anglo-Russian convention, signed on 31st August, 1907. Under it the contracting parties bound themselves to respect the integrity and political independence of Persia, and Persia was divided into three spheres of influence. "Great Britain obtained the south-east corner, including all the territory within a line drawn from the Afghan frontier through Gazik, Birjand, and Kermend to the sea at Bunder Abbas. Russia secured the whole of Northern Persia. Her sphere extended through all the territory north of a line drawn from Kasr-i-shirin on the Turkish frontier, through Isfahan, Tezd, and Kakhk to the point where Russian and Afghan frontiers intersect . . . The intervening regions, including the greater part of Southern Persia and the whole of the Gulf coast on the Persian side, constitute the third or neutral sphere." Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, declared that the Persian Gulf was not included within the scope of the convention but that Russia had expressed

during the negotiations that she would not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Gulf. Each country declared that she would not "seek for herself or her own subjects or those of any other country any political or commercial concessions such as railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport or insurance" within the other's sphere or should not prevent the other party from obtaining those concessions there.

The Convention, of course, averted Anglo-Russian conflict in Persia between the years 1907—10. "The arrangement has tended," remarks Lovat Fraser, "even more than the war in Manchuria, to remove the fear of a Russian advance which so long oppressed those charged with the defence of India. During the prolonged troubles in Persia it has been the surest guarantee of undiminished mutual confidence between Russia and ourselves."²⁹⁷ But it has evoked criticism for certain features. It gave "grave offence to the Persians" as Persia was not consulted about the new arrangement.²⁹⁸ It is true that "there is something amazingly cynical in the spirit in which Western powers dispose of the heritage of other races."²⁹⁹ Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords' debate on 6th February, 1908: "I am almost astounded at the coolness, I might even say the effrontery with which the British Government is in the habit of parcelling out the territory of Powers whose independence and integrity it assures them, at the same time it has no other intention than to preserve, and only informs the Power concerned of the arrangement that has been made after the agreement has been concluded."³⁰⁰ It has been characterised as an "imperfect instrument," and many politicians held that the British gains were meagre as compared with those of Russia, as the Russian sphere of influence included half the country while that of England was too small.³⁰¹ But

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

²⁹⁸ Sykes, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 414.

²⁹⁹ Lovat Fraser, *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

³⁰⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 130—34; Sykes, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 412—15.

one should remember in this connection that Russian influence had already extended very much over Northern Persia, and, therefore, in this respect Great Britain, in the words of Sir J. D. Rees "had not so much given away advantages as accepted a position that had grown up."³⁰²

Persia continued in a miserable plight before the Great War and during it. At the outbreak of the war, being "helpless with practically no force that could be trusted, no money and worse than all, no fighting spirit," she declared strict neutrality. But the Central European powers tried to "embarrass Great Britain and Russia by creating disturbances in Persia, in Afghanistan and on the frontiers of India, and to force Persia into the world war on their side."³⁰³ After the fall, in June 1917, of the Vusugh-u-Dola Ministry, which had followed the policy of 'benevolent neutrality' towards Great Britain, the new ministry under Ala-u-saltana proved as a whole hostile to her. Russian influence also began to diminish from 1917 (owing to the break-up of the Czarist Russia by the Revolution). The collapse of Russian influence, which had so long proved a barrier against other European intrigues in Central Asia, now appeared as a serious menace to the British Indian Empire by exposing its frontiers to the European enemies of England.³⁰⁴ In March 1918, the British Government sent a note to Tehran asking for "friendly action and the guarding of the frontiers of Persia against the return of enemy agents." The Persian Government replied in April that the "despatch of British troops to Persia made attempts to preserve Persian neutrality utterly impossible . . . and, in conclusion expressed the hope that the British Government would leave Persia alone and permit her to commence reforms." This encouraged the enemies of Great Britain to greater exertions. But her position became better by 1919, and by the Anglo-Persian Agreement of

³⁰² Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 566.

³⁰³ Sykes, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 442.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 487.

August, 1919, she reiterated her old promise to "respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia," and further agreed to help her in the preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers, in the improvement of her communications and in a fair revision of the customs tariff.³⁰⁵ This agreement was, however, annulled by the Persian Government in February 1921.³⁰⁶ There was rapidly developing in these years a national renaissance in the three Islamic states of Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia, who tried together to 'westernise their subjects.'

B. TIBET

While the British Government had been trying to secure the North-West Frontier, attention was also drawn further to the North-East where the territory of Tibet touched the Indian borders in the mountains. Being nominally subject to China, Tibet was in reality an independent theocracy, the chief authority in the state being vested in the Dalai Lama of Lhasa but for many years no Dalai Lama had grown up to maturity, each in turn expiring at such an age as left powers with Councils of Regency.

The East India Company's relations with Tibet, which had begun in a friendly manner in the time of Warren Hastings,³⁰⁷ turned, however, to be gradually unsatisfactory. In 1887 the Tibetans made an 'inexplicable invasion' into the little protected state of Sikkim but they were expelled with losses by General Graham in the next year. This was followed by British negotiations with China, and in 1890 a Convention was concluded between Great Britain and China, which settled the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet and provided for the

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 520—22.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 548.

³⁰⁷ Bogle's Embassy to Tibet, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, June, 1933. The commercial, cultural and political relations of India proper with Tibet are not of course so recent, but there is a whole ancient and medieval history of these important relations.

appointment of joint commissioners for considering "the questions of facilities for trade, pasturage for Tibetan cattle in Sikkim, and mutual methods of communication."³⁰⁸ In 1893 the joint commissioners entered into a further agreement and a trade mart was established at Yatung just over the Tibet-Sikkim frontier. But being determined to keep their country free from the influence of the British Indian Government, the Tibetans paid no heed to those conventions.

Thus, Lord Curzon, on coming to India, 'found relations with Tibet at an absolute deadlock.' Two new factors had just then appeared in the political situation of Tibet; in the first place, the Chinese showed a strong desire to throw off Turkish (Manchu) imperial domination, and secondly, after many decades, a Dalai Lama had grown to manhood, and had succeeded in overthrowing the Regency Government by a *coup d'état*. This was due to the influence of Dorjief, his tutor during his minority and a Russian Buddhist³⁰⁹ who had acquired great influence by his residence in Lhasa for twenty years.

Dorjief conducted several religious missions to Russia, (which had many Buddhist subjects) in 1898, 1900 and 1901. The Russian Foreign Minister assured the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that the object of these missions was religious. But rumours rapidly spread that Russia had entered into a secret treaty with China, by which the latter ceded at least some of her rights in Tibet to the former. The British Government, which had no means of testing the validity of these stories, believed that the missions sought to serve political purposes under a religious garb, and naturally suspected the Grand Lama of leanings towards Russia. Lord Curzon thought of meeting the situation by sending a mission, and in November, 1903, he persuaded the Home Government, which was not at first in favour of any advance into Tibet, to sanction his

³⁰⁸ Lovat Fraser, *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

³⁰⁹ Followers of Islam, Buddhism and Brahmanism have by no means been rare within Russian dominions.

proposal after a good deal of argumentation. The mission started in 1904 under Colonel Younghusband, and after baffling the attempts of the Tibetans to check its advance, reached Lhasa on 3rd August. Finally, a treaty was concluded by which "markets for the exchange of goods were to be opened, an indemnity (greatly reduced by the Home Government) to be paid, and the Chumbi Valley occupied for three years as a temporary pledge." China's suzerainty over Tibet was confirmed by the action of the British Foreign office in taking her into confidence.

According to one school of writers, Lord Curzon "by his policy of persistence crushed a cleverly-veiled design" hostile to the imperial interests of England, while in the opinion of another school he "seemed to have embarked upon a course of unwarranted and disastrous interference with a weak and independent state."³¹⁰ This much is certain that politically the mission had very little or no importance, though it might have a grand spectacular effect in 'unveiling Lhasa.' It should be noted in this connection that a great Bengali explorer Rai Bahadur Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., having no dread of the unknown, had entered the forbidden country of the Dalai Lama long before Colonel Francis Younghusband led the expedition across the Himalayas, and therein he was following the ancient and medieval tradition of Bengal missionaries who found wide scope for their civilizing activities in the Trans-Himalayas. In the opinion of Dr. Smith "the expedition of Younghusband was unnecessary and all but fruitless."³¹¹ The Secretary of State, Mr. St. John Brodrick, declared, that "the course of affairs on the Indian frontiers cannot be decided without reference to imperial exigencies elsewhere." The Home Government did not like to offend Russia by the establishment of British supremacy at Lhasa at a time when the two powers were disposed to settle their differences in Central Asia, and

³¹⁰ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 538.

³¹¹ *Oxford History*, p. 771.

preferred, therefore, a conciliatory policy. On 2nd June, 1904, Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, assured the Russian ambassador that "so long as no other power intervened, Great Britain would neither annex Tibet, nor establish a protectorate over it, nor attempt to control its internal affairs." By the Anglo-Russian convention of August, 1907, both Russia and England agreed to carry on their political relations with Tibet through China, not to send direct emissaries to Lhasa and to interfere in its internal administration and not to acquire any part of Tibetan territory. During the next quarter century, however, trade relations between British India and Tibet have increased, and communications and mutual knowledge have considerably improved, so that indirectly British Indian influence in Tibet has become a tangible force.

C. BHUTAN

British relations with the Bhutanese, a large group of hill tribes in the Eastern Himalayas, began since 1772 when in helping the local chief of Cooch-Bihar, they expelled them from that principality. Bhutan (Bhota-sthana) was a dependency of Tibet, and after the conclusion of a treaty of peace with the Teshu Lama in 1774, Warren Hastings sent George Bogle to Lhasa for trying to open up commercial relations. But this led to no result owing to the untimely death of the Teshu Lama. A commercial mission under Turner followed in 1783 but it proved a failure. The British acquisition of Assam in 1826 brought them into closer contact with the Bhutanese, who carried on depredations into the Duars (=doors) or passes leading into Assam. Several unsuccessful negotiations, e.g., Pemberton's mission in 1838, followed; and the affairs on this frontier remained unsatisfactory, while Bhutan itself was frequently in the throes of revolutions. A mission was sent by Lord Elgin under Hon. Ashley Eden (4th December, 1863—12th April, 1864). But the envoy was insulted by the Bhutanese who compelled him to sign a humiliating treaty surrendering to

them the Duars leading into Assam. This treaty was repudiated by the Government of India, and war followed. At first the British frontier officials conducted the war inefficiently and in January 1865 the Bhutanese drove out a British garrison at Dewangiri with the loss of two guns. Peace was, however, concluded in the month of November. The Bhutanese ceded the eighteen Duars in return for an annual subsidy of £5,000. A strip of territory, about 180 miles long and from twenty to thirty miles broad, was added to British dominions.³¹² Lord Lawrence acted wisely in not further prosecuting the war, and British relations with Bhutan have since been cordial.

SECTION VI

THE EASTERN FRONTIER : CONQUEST OF BURMA AND ASSAM

A government of India has to take into account the political importance of the North-Eastern frontier as well. Mughal imperialism, especially in the time of Aurangzeb, tried to push its limits towards this eastern frontier ; and the British Empire in India was, in course of its territorial expansion, also drawn towards it. The English had commercial relations with Burma since 1587.³¹³ The eastern boundary of Bengal, in which was included the district of Chittagong, for long remained 'very ill-defined, and variable.' Immediately south of Chittagong lay the Kingdom of Arakan, south of that Pegu, and south of that again the coastland of Tenasserim. In the latter half of the eighteenth century while in the north of India a kindred people, the Gurkhas, were conquering Nepal, a Tibeto-Chinese race rapidly brought Arakan, Pegu, Tenasserim and the whole basin of the Irrawaddy under the sway of a new kingdom of Burma with its capital at Ava.

The region of Pegu was conquered by a Burman chief named Alampora from the Talaings in the delta of the Irra-

³¹² Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, pp. 131-32.

³¹³ D. G. E. Hall, *Early English Intercourse With Burma*, Introduction.

waddy (Trikalingas, old colonists from the three Kalingas or East coast of India), and thus was established a strong expansive monarchy in Further India about 1750 A.D. Under his successors, chiefly under his third son Bodoaphra who as the sixth sovereign of the dynasty reigned from 1779—1819, the Burmese kept on expanding in all directions. Bodoaphra was succeeded by his grandson Hpagyidoda, who was greatly responsible for the Burmese war of 1824. The Burmese conquered Arakan in 1784, established their control equally over Upper and Lower Burma by 1793, and next pushed on close to Chittagong, and they occupied Manipur close to Surma Valley in 1813. These Burmese conquests made it necessary for the English to open political intercourse with the Burmese; and their Government in Calcutta accordingly sent envoys to Burma,—Captain Symes in 1795 and 1802;³¹⁴ Captain Cox, 1797; Captain Canning, 1803, 1809, 1811. But the envoys were not favourably treated and the missions proved unsuccessful,³¹⁵—while the contemporary political missions to the North-Western Asiatic States produced better results.

The advance of the Burmese on the Chittagong frontier made an ultimate collision with the British inevitable. Fugitives flying from the territories conquered by the Burmese took shelter over the British border and used their new quarters as a base of inroads into the conquered provinces. The British Government steadily declined to surrender them to the Burmese in spite of repeated demands to this effect on the part of the latter. So, when the British were engaged in the large-scale campaign against the Pindaris, the King of Ava in 1818 sent a letter to Lord Hastings demanding the surrender of Chittagong, Dacca, Murshidabad and Kassimbazar on the ground of their

³¹⁴ Lt.-Col. Michael Symes, *Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava, published in 1800, and reprinted in Constable's Miscellany, Edinburgh, 1831*; 'The East India Company's Missions: Commercial Envoys through the Wilds of Burma in the early part of the nineteenth century' in *Proceedings I. H. R. C.*, 1927.

³¹⁵ Wheeler, *British India*, p. 516; *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 559.

being ancient dependencies of Aracan, part of the Burmese dominions (possibly referring to the Magor—Arakanese piratical domination of the riparian tracts of E. & S. Bengal in 17th and 18th centuries). But before the letter reached Calcutta, the British had been relieved of pressures from other quarters, and the Governor-General returned the communication to the King of Burma with the remark that it was perhaps a forgery. After a temporary respite, the Burmese resumed their rôle of conquest and annexed the Hinduised Ahom Kingdom of Assam in 1821-22, which brought them into contact with the whole north-eastern frontier of British India. They were now prepared to invade British territories; in September 1823 they occupied Shahpuri island, near Chittagong, and soon the British outposts from that island to Dudpatti were driven in by Burmese commanders who also threatened an invasion of interior Bengal.

The Burmese Government paid no heed to the British demands for satisfaction, and war could no longer be averted. It was declared by Lord Amherst on 24th February, 1824. Soon afterwards he received a communication from the Burmese Governor of Pegu re-asserting the claim formerly made by the King of Ava to large portions of British territories, repeating the alleged grievances of the Burmese sovereign, and expressing the wish of "the fortunate King of the white elephants, lord of the Seas and earth," that as the officers on the Burmese frontier had full powers to act, he would receive no more communications till everything should be 'settled.'³¹⁶ The physical features of Burma, "which was one vast expanse of forest and morass, laced longitudinally by mountain ranges and the valleys of the Irrawaddy, Sittang, and Salween," afforded the best defence to the Burmese. As a military force in open fighting the Burmese could not be certainly compared with the British troops of that time, but the former possessed consider-

³¹⁶ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 17. For further details, vide '*Papers Relating to the First Burmese War*' in *Calcutta Review*, 1852, pp. 187-232, and '*The First Burmese War and the Madras Army*' in *Proceedings I. H. R. C.*, 1927

able skill in building stockades of timber with great rapidity, or in throwing up earthworks and sinking rifle-pits.

In considering the plan of operations against the Burmese, the British Government decided that on the frontier, "operations should be in a great measure defensive ; but not so exclusively as to preclude the expulsion of the Burmese from territories in which they had recently established themselves by usurpation."³¹⁷ The main blow was to be struck through an expedition by sea to Rangoon with the idea that it could then proceed up the Irrawaddy. Bengal Presidency supplied a part of the force required for the expedition ; the remainder, forming by far the larger portion, was recruited chiefly from Madras (the people of that region being better acquainted with the Burmese). The British armada under the chief command of Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell occupied Rangoon on 11th May, 1824. But the entire population had disappeared into the jungles of Pegu leaving Rangoon denuded of every kind of supplies. The expedition had been undertaken in a wrong season and without any satisfactory arrangement for securing supplies. Soon after the occupation of Rangoon by the British, the rains set in, and with them fever and dysentery ; while their troops had to depend on the provisions supplied irregularly by the Calcutta contractors. The efforts of Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, gave some relief, but till the end of the rains the English had to remain almost inactive.

Bandula, the ablest of the Burmese generals, had proceeded north to invade Bengal in the same month of May and had repelled a British detachment at Ramu on the Chittagong frontier ; but now he was recalled for meeting the counter-invasion in Pegu. On 1st December, the Burmese army, 60,000 in numbers, appeared in front of the British position at

³¹⁷ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 18. Thornton's chief authorities are certain official documents, a *Narrative of Major Snodgrass, the Memoirs of Lt. Maw, and the Account of General Morrison*, all three being concerned with the Burmese War, and also the *Narrative of H. H. Wilson*.

Rangoon and threw up entrenchments with great rapidity. After several skirmishes, the Burmese were signally defeated on 15th December, and fell back upon Donabew, forty miles up the river.

Sir Archibald Campbell then decided to advance upon Prome, the second city of the Burmese Empire, and after whiling away some time in dilatory preparations, he commenced his march on 13th February, 1825. But Bandula held out bravely for a month before the column sent against him, and the general advance was delayed till 1st April, when Bandula was killed by a rocket and his troops beat a hasty retreat during the night, abandoning everything, including a store of grain. Three weeks later Campbell occupied Prome on 25th April without any resistance, but the rains having set in further offensive operations were again stopped.

The Burmese Government again collected a large army. Immediate hostilities were, however, averted owing to the opening of negotiations in the month of August. In September, an armistice was agreed upon till 18th October, soon extended at the request of the Burmese to 2nd November, and a conference was arranged at Ngyaungbengzaik, twenty miles above Prome, between the British Commander and the Minister of the King of Ava.³¹⁸ The British Commander demanded that "the Court of Ava should abstain from interference with Cachar, Manipur, and Assam; should cede Assam to the British Government and pay two crores of rupees as an indemnity for the expenses of the war; one immediately and the other at a future period, the Tenasserim provinces being retained till its liquidation." These were not accepted by the Burmese, and hostilities were resumed at the expiration of the armistice. But all the attempts of the Burmese proved unsuccessful against the British troops, and towards the end of December, they opened negotiations for peace, which were

³¹⁸ Sir Arthur, P. Phayre, *History of Burma* (1883), p. 253; Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 66-67.

entertained by the English, though their army continued its march. A treaty was at last agreed to "upon the terms formerly proposed by the British authorities, excepting that the provinces of Ye, Tavai, and Megui were added to the territorial cessions, and the pecuniary payment reduced from two crores to one." But the treaty was not ratified by the appointed time, and hostilities recommenced whereupon on 19th January, 1826, the British attacked and defeated the Burmese and marched towards their capital. The last desperate attempt of the Burmese Government, with an army of 10,000 men, was frustrated by the British forces, who inflicted a defeat on it at Pagan and advanced to Yandaboo within sixty miles of their capital. There, on 24th February, 1826, peace was concluded. The King of Ava had to accept British terms by agreeing to surrender absolutely the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim, to interfere in no way in Assam, Cachar and Jaintia, and to recognise Manipur as an independent state, and to pay a heavy war indemnity amounting to a million sterling; provision was made for the residence of an accredited minister from each state at the court of the other and for the conclusion of a commercial treaty 'upon principles of reciprocal advantage.'³¹⁹ A commercial treaty, "not of nature calculated to place the trade between the two countries on a satisfactory footing,"³²⁰ was concluded on 23rd November; but a British Resident was not admitted before 1830 A.D. From that date Colonel Burney held that office for seven years and discharged his duties successfully. King Hpagyidoo fell a victim to fits of melancholy and had to be kept in strict seclusion. He was deposed by his brother Tharrawaddy in May 1837 and "lived as a prisoner but well-treated, for several years."

The First Burmese War has received much censure for the manner in which it was conducted. "The war had been,"

³¹⁹ Thornton, *Op. cit.*, pp. 82—84.

³²⁰ Phayre, *Op. cit.*, p. 259; Wheeler, *British India*, p. 519.

remarks Mr. Innes, "in many respects a disastrous one."³²¹ The expedition had been dispatched "in almost entire ignorance of the circumstances of the country to which it was to proceed, and without any adequate preparation for securing supplies ;"³²² it had been a grossly needless waste of life and wealth. Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, observed in April 1826 : "There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy ; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated and its success rendered more certain."³²³ But for the help that he sent in the shape of reinforcements and supplies, the British troops in Burma would have experienced greater troubles.

Justice should be done to the Burmese soldier who, says Phayre, "fought under conditions which rendered victory for him impossible."³²⁴ The soldiers were recruited from amongst the untrained peasants fighting with crude instruments. But they were experts in the construction of stockades and fought bravely to the best of their ability. It has been observed that "the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer."³²⁵

The treaty of 1826 did not, however, close the story of Anglo-Burmese hostilities. The monarch of Burma had no disposition to observe its spirit. The British Residents sent to the Court of Ava were not courteously treated. King Tharra-waddy (1837—45) said : "The English beat my brother, not me. The treaty of Yandaboo is not binding on me, for I did not make it. I will meet the Resident as a private individual, but as Resident, never. When will they understand that I can

³²¹ *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 182.

³²² Thornton, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 91.

³²³ Gleig, *Life of Munro*, Vol. II, p. 279.

³²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

³²⁵ Quoted in Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 653.

receive only a royal ambassador from England? ”³²⁶ Now this was nothing but a repudiation of the treaty of Yandaboo by the King of Burma, who was, in this matter, “ within the Burmese constitution, whereby all existing rights lapsed at a new King’s accession until he chose to confirm them.” British Residents were now finally withdrawn from Burma. Soon after Tharrawaddy, like his predecessor, was seized with insanity, and was placed under restraint by his son King Pagan (1845—52). The merchants, settled at the coast, complained of ill usage and harassments at the hands of the Governor of Rangoon. By the summer of 1852, this matter became so serious that in the month of September the European merchants at Rangoon sent a memorial to the British Government in Calcutta requesting it to intervene in the matter, and declaring that otherwise they would be compelled to abandon their property and leave Burmese territory.

In response to this appeal Lord Dalhousie sent, two months later, Commodore Lambert to Rangoon in Her Majesty’s frigate the *Fox* to investigate into the complaints of the merchants and to demand compensation from the King of Burma, along with the removal of the Governor of Rangoon. Many have considered this action as being unnecessarily provocative ; even John Lawrence, who wished to help and not merely to criticise, wrote, “ Why did you send a Commodore to Burma if you wanted peace? ” Dalhousie himself later on admitted, “ these commodores are too combustible for negotiations.”³²⁷ But it should be remembered that some action on the part of the British Government to remedy the grievances of their merchants had become necessary, and as the British Resident at the Court of Ava had been already withdrawn, “ there was ” as Mr. Roberts says “ perhaps no other means of showing the Burmese authorities that the matter was one of urgency.”³²⁸

³²⁶ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 560. For details about the internal history of Burma from 1826—51, vide Wheeler, *Op. cit.*, pp. 572—74.

³²⁷ Lee-Warner, *Dalhousie*, Vol. I, pp. 417-18.

³²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 347.

The British Commodore received a courteous reply from the King of Burma, who sent a new governor to settle the matters ; the old governor was recalled but with every mark of honour and in triumph. Lambert sent to the new governor a deputation of senior naval officers, but when the officers reached the palace at the appointed hour they were refused audience and were informed by the servants of the governor that he was asleep. The officers in great indignation returned to the frigate. At this insult, the Commodore demanded the immediate payment of the compensation to the amount of £1,000 sterling and an apology from the governor. As a security for these, he declared a blockade and seized a royal ship. The Burmese Governor replied that the naval officers who had been turned away were drunken ; the Burmese batteries opened fire on the *Fox* and the British Commodore also returned it.

Lord Dalhousie accepted responsibility for Lambert's action and sent an ultimatum to the Burmese Government making a demand for compensation and an indemnity of £100,000 to be paid by 1st April, 1852. But in the meanwhile he set himself to make immediate preparations for war, as his plan was to begin the operations before the heavy Burma rains set in. The commissariat, the transport and the medical arrangements were this time well organised, and under the Governor-General's personal superintendence, precautions were taken to avoid the errors of the First Burmese War. The annexation of the Punjab had placed at his disposal the Sikh soldiers, who could be persuaded to take service across the sea without any prejudice to their caste rules. Lord Dalhousie's ultimatum remained unresponded, and on the day it expired (1st April, 1852) a land force of 5,800 men under the Commander-in-Chief, General Godwin, a veteran of the First Burmese War, together with 19 sailors and marines, reached Rangoon. Martaban fell quickly before the British soldiers, and the Great Pagoda of Rangoon was stormed on 14th April, the British flag being hoisted on its golden dome. This was followed by the capture of Bassein, situated on the north-west corner of the delta of

the Irrawaddy. Lord Dalhousie himself appeared on the scene in September ; Prome was captured in October and Pegu was finally secured in November. Thus the main military operations came to an end. Dalhousie wanted to stop now, by annexing the occupied portion of Burma ; the Court of Directors supported him, but suggested that either Pegu should be voluntarily ceded by a formal treaty or else the British should advance upon Ava to compel that cession. An advance on Ava would have, however, eventually led to the annexation of all Burma, which Dalhousie wanted at that time to avoid, and the Burmese sovereign also did not come down from Ava to conclude a treaty. Pegu or Lower Burma was, therefore, annexed by a Proclamation on 20th December, 1852. Lord Dalhousie wrote to the King of Burma that if he again began hostilities " they will end in the entire subjection of the Burmese power, and in the ruin and exile of yourself and your race."³²⁹

By the annexation of Lower Burma, the eastern limits of the British Indian Empire were carried up to the river Salween, and the eastern frontier of India was protected against incursions from outside. The entire coast of the Bay of Bengal from Chittagong to Singapore passed under British control, and the independent kingdom of Upper Burma was shut off from access to the sea except through British territory. Major (afterwards Sir) Arthur Phayre was appointed Commissioner of Pegu ; with the help of Captain (afterwards General) Fytche he introduced various administrative changes for the establishment of law and order within the new province extending as far north as Myede, fifty miles beyond Prome.

Meanwhile a change occurred in the internal history of Burma ; Mindon (1853—78), brother of King Pagan, deposed the latter and kept him in imprisonment for the rest of his life. In many respects Mindon was a better man than his four predecessors.³³⁰ He tried, through various friendly means, to get

³²⁹ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 562.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

back Pegu from the British, but his efforts ended in smoke. In 1854 he sent envoys asking Lord Dalhousie to restore it; but the latter said to Phayre, "Tell the envoys that so long as the sun shines, which they see, these territories will never be restored . . . We did not go to war with the King but with the nation."³³¹ In 1857 he changed the capital by leaving Ava-Amarapura and building a new city Mandalay near by, but he deviated from old custom in not burying human victims at the foundations of the city. To his subjects his most glorious achievement was the summoning of the Fifth Buddhist Council and the presentation, by way of its memorial, of a new spire to the Shwe Dagon pagoda in Rangoon. He gave up the seclusion of his predecessors, employed Europeans, treated the British officers courteously, and sent envoys to Europe.³³² Upper Burma was opened to trade by treaties concluded in 1862 and 1867 between the Governments of India and Burma. "Mindon did everything possible to foster trade with Yunnan, even removing a governor of Bhamo for obstructing English officers . . ."³³³ But "trade in Burma itself was hampered by Mindon, who not only enforced the usual royal monopolies but was also the largest dealer in all kinds of produce in his dominions. Even so, at the end of his reign whereas the annual value of English trade across land frontiers in India was £5,145000, with Upper Burma and Yunnan it was £3,225000."³³⁴ The English Resident at Mandalay had always to remove his shoes and to take his seat before the King, with his feet behind him. In 1876 the Viceroy tried to stop this inconvenient practice, with the result that thereafter no Resident was allowed into the Palace, and all British Indian business had to be transacted through the Ministers outside.

Mindon's death became the signal for disorder in the Burmese Kingdom as he left behind him fifty-three wives, forty-

³³¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*

³³² *Ibid.*, p. 433.

³³³ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

eight sons, sixty-two daughters. At last one of his sons Thibaw, a young man of cruel disposition and addicted to gin, ascended the throne, and tried to secure his position by the "Massacre of his kinsmen" and rivals culminating in the "Jail-Massacre" of September 1884. The Government of India withdrew its residency in October, 1879, "only because reports that Thibaw contemplated exterminating it coincided with the outcry at Cavnari's murder in Kabul."³³⁵ Thibaw's rule did not prove to be vigorous, but it fell into confusion. Negotiations for some sort of settlement failed, and the non-officials in British Burma, even Dr. Marks, an Anglican missionary running a mission school at Mandalay, urged the annexation of Thibaw's dominions. But the chief commissioner, Mr. Bernard, opposed these proposals, and the Government of India, "saying that internal misgovernment did not justify intervention, and that statistics did not support the contention that Thibaw's misrule diminished trade, would neither act nor even protest against the later massacres."³³⁶

But, for other reasons, the British Government was soon involved in action against (Upper) Burma. King Thibaw's policy in negotiating commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and especially with France was regarded by the English as opposed to their interests. The relations between England and France were at this time embittered over colonial disputes in northern, north-western and central Africa.³³⁷ France, having gained an empire in Indo-China, was trying to establish her influence in Upper Burma. Burmese missions visited that country in 1878 and 1883, and when in January 1885, Ferry,

³³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

³³⁷ Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, Vol. II, pp. 623-24; Ramsay Muir, *A Short History of the British Commonwealth*, Vol. II, pp. 627-28; 'Diplomatic Relations of France with Burma' in Proceedings I. H. R. C., 1927; 'Anglo-French Rivalry in S.-E. Asia' in *Modern Review*, 1925.

the French foreign minister, concluded a public treaty for trade, "he gave the Burmese envoys at Paris a secret letter promising to permit the import of arms through Tonkin when order was restored."³³⁸ A French Consul, Haas, proceeded to Mandalay; and through him and a Burmese envoy in Paris, negotiations were carried on for the "establishment of a bank at Mandalay, construction of a railway from Mandalay to the new rail head in British Burma, and the management of the royal monopolies, capital and interest to be secured on the revenues of the Kingdom." On the protest of the British Cabinet, the French Government disclaimed all knowledge of the proceedings of their envoy and recalled him. But this could not remove the suspicions of the British Government; its standpoint was that "the establishment by France of a dominant and exclusive influence in Upper Burma would involve such serious consequences to our own Burmese possessions and to India, that it should be prevented even at the risk of hostilities with Mandalay."³³⁹ Frenchmen had helped in training up Maratha armies right up to the early part of the nineteenth century, and they had their share in forging the Sikh engine of war but 40 years ago; French influence might again raise another formidable foe in Burma, and that might even be part and parcel of a revived Anglo-French struggle in India. The immediate occasion for the outbreak of war was supplied by Thibaw's behaviour towards an English firm, the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation. He imposed a fine of ten lacs on the said Corporation on hearing that a French syndicate was ready to take over the Corporation lease of the teak forests. Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy, demanded an enquiry into the case, but Thibaw refused to comply with it. The Viceroy then, with the permission of the Government in England, dispatched to him an ultimatum demanding the admission of a British envoy at Mandalay, suspension of all actions against the

³³⁸ *Cambridge History*, VI, p. 437.

³³⁹ Quoted in Dodwell, *Sketch of the History of India*, p. 157.

Company till the envoy's arrival, subordination of Burma's foreign policy to the advice of the British Government, and acknowledgment of the right of the British to trade with the Chinese through Thibaw's dominions. The King of Burma refused to accept these terms, whereupon the British troops already collected at Rangoon were ordered to advance. General Pendergast moved up the Irrawaddy and took Mandalay without any strong resistance. On 28th November, 1885, Thibaw surrendered himself to the British troops, and he was deported with his family to Ratnagiri in the Bombay Presidency. Upper Burma was annexed to the British Empire by a formal proclamation issued on 1st January, 1886. But operations had to be continued for several years against irregular armed bands before order could be completely restored in Burma. In the meanwhile the process of settlement was carried on. The conquest of Burma brought about some change in the Government of India's diplomatic relations with the Chinese Empire (now its next neighbour) which still maintained a vague and formal claim of suzerainty over Burma and Tibet. China's consent to the British annexation of Burma had to be purchased at the cost of abandoning a projected British commercial mission to Lhasa. During the year 1923-24 the peace of the frontier of Burma marching for some thousand miles with that of China "was threatened by nothing worse than occasional rumours of impending incursions from the borders of Mongmao and Chefang."³⁴⁰ A Burma Frontier Service was accordingly created for the protection of the tracts adjoining China.

The conquest of Upper Burma is an instance of 'high-handed and rather relentless'³⁴¹ procedure for the sake of imperial interests. Lord Dufferin was, from the very beginning, determined on conquering it for protecting the eastern frontier of the Indian Empire against external aggressions, and for checking the growth of French influence in that quarter.

³⁴⁰ *India in 1923-24*, p. 21.

³⁴¹ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 480.

He had written before the war began: "If, however, the French proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt to forestall us in Upper Burmah, I should not hesitate to annex the country; and as at present advised, I think that this mode of procedure would be preferable to setting up a doubtful prince."³⁴² Thibaw might have been a cruel and uncompromising king and he might have inflicted some sufferings on the British merchants, "but it would be hypocrisy," says Mr. Roberts, "to maintain that the tyranny of the king or even the impediments he put in the way of British commerce would by themselves have brought his downfall."³⁴³ Then, as an independent sovereign of Upper Burma, which formed no part of the British Empire, Thibaw had every right to negotiate treaties with any power, and it is also to be admitted that the French from Indo-China, having entered into Upper Burma at the request of its independent sovereign, 'had at least as much right as the British from (Lower) Burma to extend their influence over (Upper) Burma, or even more.' But the history of imperialism, in different parts of the world, shows that all such considerations are swept away before its march, and the conquest of Burma formed no exception to this.

The new British administrators of the whole land of Burma proceeded to effect changes in it with certain preconceptions in their minds. They "came to regard the Burmese as one dead level of peasants, without caste distinctions or hereditary institutions, their government as an unsystematised despotism and Upper Burma as a *tabula rasa* whereon to erect an administration of the approved Anglo-Indian type."³⁴⁴ Modern researches have since invalidated these preconceptions, and have shown that "there was in Upper Burma a complete social, religious and political system of appreciable vitality."³⁴⁵ However, the

³⁴² *Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, by Sir Alfred Lyall, p. 398.

³⁴³ *Op. cit.*, p. 481.

³⁴⁴ *Cambridge History*, VI, p. 440.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

country has improved much under British administration. In 1862, Lower Burma, consisting of the three commissionerships of Pegu, Tenasserim and Arakan, was constituted into a single province of British Burma with headquarters at Rangoon. In 1885, the province of Burma was formed with the combination of Upper and Lower Burma, with headquarters at Rangoon. It was governed by a chief commissioner up to 1897 when it was placed under a Lieutenant-Governor. Legislative power was in the hands of the Government of India until 1897, when the Burma Legislative Council, a small body with limited powers and an official majority, was formed.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report assumed that Burma must remain "part of the Indian polity" for military reasons. The Joint Select Committee, however, spoke against the conclusion of Burma as a Governor's province within the Government of India Bill. Its members stated in the Report:—"They do not doubt but that all Burmese have deserved and should receive a constitution analogous to that provided in this Bill for their Indian Fellow-subjects. But Burma is only by accident part of the responsibility of the Governor-General of India. The Burmese are as distinct from the Indians in race and language as they are from the British." But great dissatisfaction was expressed in Burma for the delay in introducing some measure of advance as had been already granted to the other provinces of India in the shape of the dyarchy. A special committee, with Sir Frederick Whyte as its President, visited Burma in 1921; its recommendations were in the main approved, and Burma was constituted as a Governor's province at the beginning of 1923. The Indian Statutory Commission also visited the country and took evidence there; and it drew attention to the essential differences,—geographical, religious, linguistic, and social, between India and Burma,³⁴⁶ and pointed out the homogeneity of the latter as a unit by itself.³⁴⁷ The

³⁴⁶ Report, Vol. I, pp. 77-78.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

said Commission believed "in the necessity of Burma's separation from India" on two main grounds:—"one is the strength which Burman sentiment in its favour has now attained to the overshadowing of every other Burman demand—and the other is the constitutional difficulty of giving to Burma a satisfactory place in any centralised system designed to advance the realisation of responsible government in British India."³⁴⁸ The Commission considered the military, financial and economic consequences of the separation³⁴⁹ and thought that "the announcement should be promptly and publicly made that the separation of Burma from British India has been decided upon, and that consideration will at once be given to the question of the new constitution of Burma, and to the adjustment of the many complicated and important matters which must arise during the period of transition."³⁵⁰ Under the Act of 1935 Burma has been separated from India with a distinctive constitution.

The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth saw the decay and fall of the Ahom Kingdom of Assam, and it was conquered by the Burmese in 1821-22. But it soon fell under British control after the treaty of Yandaboo in 1826. The Rajas of Manipur, Cachar and Jaintia were restored to their respective possessions, but the Brahmaputra Valley with the exception of two tracts in Upper Burma, *viz.*, Sadiya and Matak, was placed in November, 1828, under direct British administration, and David Scott was appointed Agent to the Governor-General for the whole eastern frontier from Cachar and Sylhet in the south to the Sikkim country in the north.³⁵¹ David Scott was succeeded by Mr. J. C. Robertson, and early in 1833, Purandar Singh was formally made Raja of Upper Assam, except Sadiya and Matak, under British protec-

³⁴⁸ Report, Vol. II, p. 181.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 185—88.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

³⁵¹ Gait, *History of Assam*, pp. 284—86.

tion on condition of his paying an annual tribute of half a lac of rupees. The other part of the country was retained by the Company and in 1834, when Mr. Robertson had been succeeded by Captain (afterwards General) Jenkins, the British portion was divided into four districts, *viz.*, Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang, and Nowgong.³⁵² The territories left under native rulers were, in course of time, annexed by the British, and the hill tribes were also subdued, e.g., Cachar in August 1832, Jaintia in March 1835, Purandar Singh's dominions in October 1838, Matak and Sadiya in 1842.

In 1874 Assam was placed under a separate Chief Commissioner, Lt.-Col. R. H. Keating, V.C., C.S.I., being the first incumbent of this office.³⁵³ In 1890, an attempt to remove the Senapati or Commander-in-Chief of the Manipur state on the south-eastern border of Assam created some troubles. Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, was sent to settle the affairs, but he was murdered. Manipur was thereupon occupied by the British troops and it was placed under the control of a British Political Agent, acting on behalf of a minor Raja.³⁵⁴ On the partition of Bengal in 1905 Assam and Surma Valley were amalgamated with fifteen districts of old Bengal to form a new province, Eastern Bengal and Assam. But when this arrangement was changed in 1912, Assam again became a separate unit. At present it has no University and High or Chief Court of its own, and in Justice and Education the Bengal institutions have still jurisdiction over it.³⁵⁵

SECTION VII

GROWTH OF AN INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

We may now briefly review the main outlines of Indian foreign policy, the details about which have already been noted

³⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 292-93.

³⁵³ For a list of the succeeding chief commissioners, vide *Ibid.*, p. 333.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 343-44.

³⁵⁵ Compare Orissa and Sindh.

in the course of our narrative. During the last decade of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, the English dominions were exposed to the invasions by land and by sea, of the French, then engaged in a deadly conflict with England in Europe and elsewhere,—and to those of the Afghans (and, it was believed, of other adjacent powers) from the North-West.³⁵⁶ The foreign policy of the Company during this period was, therefore, concerned with defeating the designs of those powers. Lord Wellesley was fully alive to the danger of a French invasion of India ; he wrote to Castlereagh on 25th July, 1803 :—" The degree of danger to be apprehended from France in India during the existence of war is in my opinion inconsiderable in the present state of our power in India, provided that power be duly exerted in maintaining a commanding superiority in these seas, and in preserving our European and native land forces in a state of complete efficiency and strength. It is also essential to the security of these dominions to cultivate the military energy of the Government, and to animate its vigilance and zeal, together with the spirit of the army, by encouraging the free and unrestrained course of our exertions against the enemy in India."³⁵⁷ We have already noticed³⁵⁸ how Wellesley secured the friendship of Persia by the first mission of Malcolm to the court of Teheran leading to the Anglo-Persian commercial and political treaty of 1800,³⁵⁹ how his expedition to the Red Sea together with the downfall of Napoleon destroyed the hopes of the French for a dominion or sphere of influence in the Near and Middle East, and how his Oudh policy contributed to the security of the North-West Frontier of the Gangetic possessions of the Company. The defeat and death of Tipu followed by the annexation of the Carnatic Payen Ghat, together with the fall

³⁵⁶ Owen, *Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 568—70; 578-79.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

³⁵⁸ Vol. I, Part II, p. 97; Vol. II, Chap. I.

³⁵⁹ Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 3—10.

of Tanjore, gave the Company "the full command of the Coromandel seaboard, and so diminished the danger of a hostile landing on that coast ;"³⁶⁰ while the destruction of the military power of the Northern Maratha states and the alliance of the English with the Peshwa enabled them to acquire the control over the Western seaboard from Goa to the Narmada, to strengthen their position in Gujrat, and to occupy Bundelkhand ; the First Maratha War also gave them Cuttack, so that the Bengal and Madras seaboard were linked.

Students of Indian History should note that European wars have influenced the course of Indian politics noticeably since the middle of the eighteenth century. This influence became more marked during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The battle of Waterloo dug the grave of Napoleon's ambitions and relieved the East like the West from the spreading pressure of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. But this did not eliminate the influence of European affairs upon Eastern politics. The place of France was now taken by Russia, which was "in many ways well formed for Asiatic conquest, alike in manners, organisation, ideas and policy."³⁶¹

Lord Minto took precautionary measures against Russian designs in the East by embassies to the Persians, the Afghans and the Sikhs ; a generation later apprehensions of Russian advance led to the First Afghan War. For some time after this the Government of India was free from these anxieties because of the visit of Tsar Nicholas to Queen Victoria in 1844 and the formation of an Anglo-Russian *entente* by which the powers agreed to leave the Khanates of Central Asia as a zone of neutrality between the two empires. But the events leading to the Crimean War in 1854 and its results reawakened Anglo-Russian jealousy. Being baffled in the direction of Constantinople, Russia sought to make amends by an advance through

³⁶⁰ Owen, *Op. cit.*, p. xxi.

³⁶¹ Dodwell, *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

Central Asia, which she steadily carried on, approaching gradually the Northern Afghan frontier.

This Russian advance appeared as a serious menace to the safety of the British Empire in India while Sir John Lawrence had been following his policy of "masterly inactivity" with regard to the North-West. All attempts, made about 1870 to create a neutral zone in Asia, failed. As Prof. Dodwell has remarked, "the settlement of the Anglo-Russian relations in Asia depended on the settlement of Anglo-Russian differences in Europe, a fact which Lawrence overlooked in demanding that the Central Asian question should be settled in Europe, and which the Home Government overlooked in expecting its problems to be solved for it in India."³⁶²

Meanwhile Russian influence went on expanding in Central Asia, and Sher Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, being dissatisfied with the cold behaviour of Lord Northbrook and British arbitration between Afghanistan and Persia in the matter of their boundaries in Siestan, was gradually drifting towards an alliance with Russia. The Balkan Wars, 1876—78 complicated the situation, and the decision of the Berlin Congress, by dissatisfying Russia, added to the intensity of Anglo-Russian hostility. Lord Lytton was specially selected as the Viceroy of India for counteracting the Russian danger. He occupied Quetta in 1878, but Sher Ali now welcomed a Russian envoy, refused admittance to an English one and rejected British overtures. Lytton declared war against the Amir and victory remained with the British. But a change of ministry in England resulting in the formation of the Gladstone administration, which was against the Conservative imperialistic policy towards Afghanistan, compelled Lytton to resign his post. His successor Lord Ripon ended the Afghan War but took measures to check Russian designs in Afghanistan.

From 1880 the foreign policy of the Government of India received a new orientation. Besides Russia, "in the eighties,

France, under the restless guidance of Jules Ferry, resumed for a while her ancient rôle of a rival in the colonial world, while German ambitions too, made themselves felt, though, so far as India was concerned, rather through their influence on Russian and French and Turkish policy than as a direct force."³⁶³ The Government of India had thus to be careful to guard not only the north-west frontier towards Afghanistan but also that of the south-east towards Burma and Indo-China, and that of the north towards Tibet. It was not till in the early years of the 20th century that England, France and Russia agreed to sink their disputes in distant lands in view of the stupendous growth of German militarism, against which they subsequently combined in 1914. But the outbreak of the World War brought into being a more complicated foreign situation for the Government of India. Many German agents tried to provoke the Afghan Amir against the Government of India; the Russian Revolution of 1917 deprived England of Russia's alliance; and the open war with Turkey embittered Muslim feelings against the British Empire, and these were accentuated by the rise of a new Pan-Islamic fervour. The termination of the World War did not bring complete safety to the North-West Frontier of India. "To the menace of German arms there succeeded the more formidable menace of Bolshevik ideas."³⁶⁴ During 1920 Bolshevik influence increased in Central Asia and was an established fact by the middle of 1920. The forces of Bolshevism now tried to enter India by gaining footholds in Persia and Afghanistan. Towards the end of that year the Soviet Government in Central Asia underwent some reverses, when the Amir of Afghanistan "invited a British delegation to Kabul, for the purpose of exploring the possibilities of an Anglo-Afghan treaty." But the Soviet agents did not stop their attempts to penetrate India. In the summer of 1921 a Russo-Afghan treaty was ratified, which permitted the establishment

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

³⁶⁴ *India in 1919*, p. 6.

of Russian consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni. From the Indian standpoint this was menacing. But the Amir of Afghanistan refused to grant "free transit through his country to the Bolshevik agents; and Russian intrigue was powerless to prevent the conclusion of a treaty between Afghanistan and Great Britain, which implied, if not close friendship, at any rate neighbourly relations."³⁶⁵ The Amir also gave a written assurance that "Russian consulates should be excluded from the neighbourhood of Indo-Afghan frontier."³⁶⁶ The resumption of Anglo-Russian relations within the last few years "has brought about some relaxation of the tension which had previously existed."³⁶⁷

³⁶⁵ *India in 1922-23*, p. 29.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁷ *India in 1930-31*, p. 10.

CHAPTER III

THE INDIAN STATES

The past history of the Indian States, the policy of the British Government towards them, their present status, rights, duties and obligations are, for various reasons, topics of immense interest and importance to a student of Modern Indian History. Many of those states rose into independence and prominence during the decadence of Mughal imperialism ; but even as independent units owing only a nominal allegiance to the Mughal Emperor they came into contact with a new foreign power, the English, who proceeded to fill in the vacuum created by the subsidence of the former.

Two important points should be remembered at the very outset. Firstly, all the Indian states cannot be placed under one category. Mr. Pannikar thinks that they fall into three distinct classes : “ (a) those whose treaties entitle them to full and absolute sovereignty within the state, (b) those who, though treaty states, enjoy criminal and civil jurisdiction ad legislative powers only under supervision, and (c) those whose rights are based on grants and *sanads*.”¹ Secondly, “ the transformation of Indian States was partly by force of circumstances and partly by the pressure of irresistible currents of history ; and the policy towards them was evolved partly by the official character of the East India Company, partly by the views and ambitions of Governors-General, but mainly by the conviction which developed with Wellesley and continued up to our own time, that the Government of the whole of India directly or indirectly by the British is part of a preordained system.”²

¹ *Relations of Indian States with the Government of India*, Introduction,

xx.

² Pannikar, *The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States*, 1774—1858. (*The Calcutta University Readership Lectures*, 1929), Introduction, xi.

Mr. Lee-Warner, in his well-known work, *The Native States of India*, has noticed three epochs in British relations with the Indian States; the first, that of the 'Policy of the Ring-Fence'; the second, that of 'Subordinate Isolation' from 1813 to 1857; and the third, that of 'Subordinate Union' from 1857 (to the Great War and the Reforms); we might add a fourth, that of Equal Federation, now in the process of evolution for about two decades. According to Lee-Warner, the Company during the first period treated the Indian princes as independent rulers and did not interfere in their affairs. But certain events of history, such as the Oudh affairs during the times of Warren Hastings and Lord Wellesley, the treaty of Benares of 5th July, 1775, the Rohilla War, Lord Wellesley's policy towards Mysore, and the treaty of the English with Ranjit Singh in 1809,—show that there were a number of important exceptions to this postulated principle, and that the Company intervened in the affairs of some states when it became necessary for self-defence or strengthening of position. The fundamental idea of the Company's system in the time of Warren Hastings was the defence of their neighbours' frontiers for safeguarding their own territories³ against the advance and attacks of the Marathas, the Afghans and the militant Muslim usurpers of Mysore. Lord Wellesley effected a transformation in the position of the Company and left it as almost the predominant power in India. Two points should be, however, carefully noted in the relations of the Company with the Indian powers at that time:—(1) "All the treaties except that with Mysore are negotiated on a basis of equality. The Company did not claim any paramountcy or imperial authority, and the treaties themselves clearly show that at least in the case of those States which were not conquered there was a spirit of reciprocity." (2) "Each of these treaties guarantees in a most absolute manner the absolute authority of the Ruler over his subjects and most unequivocally repudiate any claim to intervene in the

³ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

affairs of the state.”⁴ Wellesley did not like these features and tried to omit them when possible. He wrote to the Court of Directors on 3rd August, 1799, regarding the treaty with Mysore:—“ Recollecting the inconvenience and embarrassments which have arisen to the parties concerned under the double governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oudh, Carnatic and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve for the Company the most extensive and indisputable rights of inter-position in the internal affairs of Mysore.” Indeed from one point of view, the native states of the earlier half of the nineteenth century afforded examples of the same transitional type of ‘ double government ’ which was initiated in Bengal in the middle of the eighteenth century, and gradually spread to Oudh, and South India, and then to the rest of India,—the earlier (and a few later) double governments developing into full British administrative units,—the other double governments getting stereotyped into “ Native States,” where the evils of double government have been minimised partly by the efficiency and policy of the steadily strengthening Central Government, and partly by the growing influence of British India over ‘ Native ’ India in many ways.

With the establishment of the Company as a paramount power after 1818 the treaties of reciprocity and mutual amity gave place to those of ‘ subordinate co-operation.’ In the new treaties concluded by Lord Hastings, the Indian states surrendered all forms of external sovereignty, as they could not “ make war or peace, nor could they negotiate agreements with other Princes.” As regards internal sovereignty, the States retained it in full “ so far as the terms of the treaties, and the declared policy of the British Government go.”⁵ But in actual practice, as is natural in a connection between unequal powers, there was

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁵ Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States*, p. 288. Cf. *Hastings' letter to Metcalfe, Resident at Hyderabad, and his note in his private journal, dated 6th February, 1816; both quoted in Pannikar, Policy Towards States, etc., pp. 52—57.*

a great deal of interference by the Company in the internal affairs of the Indian states (in Oudh, Mysore, Nagpur, Udaipur, Jaipur, etc.). The nature and degree of interference varied in different states according to the 'personality and temperament' of the agent.⁶ About Lord Hastings' relations with the Indian States it should be noted that, though an 'aggressive champion' of British paramountcy, he was "not an annexationist."⁷ Lord Amherst (1823—28), who was mostly occupied by the war with Burma, had no time to initiate a new policy. But the initial reverses of English arms in Burma led some of the States to think of a speedy downfall of the Company's power, and so some disturbances took place in Alwar, in the Sondh-wada tract of Central India, and at Bharatpur.⁸ In 1823, David Ochterlony sought to place on the throne of Bharatpur its rightful heir Raja Baldeo Singh, a minor. But this was opposed by his cousin Durjan Sal, whereupon Ochterlony ordered troops to march from Delhi in support of his nominee. But his orders were countermanded; he was promptly recalled by the Governor-General, and he died soon afterwards. His successor Sir Charles Metcalfe soon complained that Durjan Sal was fomenting plots against the English amongst the neighbouring Rajput and Maratha States, and declared that British influence was "too pervading to admit of neutrality." Accordingly, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Combermere, marched up with his troops and captured the famous Bharatpur fort on 18th January, 1826. Durjan Sal was deported and British prestige was vindicated.

In the period from Lord Hastings' retirement to the Mutiny, the relations between the British Government and the Indian States were marked by two features:—(1) the power of the Company's Residents in the internal administration of the States gradually increased; and (2) the Governors-General of this gen-

⁶ Mehta, *Op. cit.*, pp. 238—49.

⁷ Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, etc., p. 51.

⁸ *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 577.

eration were "frankly annexationists in their policy."⁹ The Residents were "transformed from diplomatic agents representing a foreign power into executive and controlling officers of a superior government."¹⁰ The Residents' power grew so much that Col. Macaulay wrote to the Raja of Cochin: "The Resident will be glad to learn that on his arrival near Cochin the Raja will find it convenient to wait upon him."¹¹

The Government of India's policy of annexation with regard to the states had political as well as economic backgrounds.¹² The former consisted in the Governor-General's desire of bringing territories directly under British rule whenever opportunities appeared and of gradually ignoring the titular Mughal Emperor. The economic background lay in the Company's necessity to secure more revenues and greater commercial facilities through uninterrupted cross-country communications and abolition of economic barriers. Lord Dalhousie wrote in his *Despatch*, dated 28th February, 1856: "In the possession of Berar and the neighbouring districts the British Government, it deserves to be remembered, has secured the finest cotton tracts which are known to exist in all the continent of India and thus has opened up a great additional channel of supply through which to make good a felt deficiency in the staple of one great branch of its manufacturing industry." The misgovernment in the native states and the desire to extend the blessings of British rule in them were put forward as two main grounds for annexation. Mr. Lee-Warner has remarked: "Lord Dalhousie, or with greater justice the Court of Directors, may be reasonably blamed for not correcting the principle of non-interference; but it is unreasonable to condemn annexation, which was the logical and inevitable outcome of that narrow principle, without reference to the policy of which it was, under the circumstances, the only safety-valve or correc-

⁹ Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, p. 57.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹² *Ibid.*

tive."¹³ But it should not be forgotten that the policy of subsidiary alliance, by guaranteeing the rulers in their possessions against rebellion, revolution or deposition, or even opposition of subjects, and thus removing all incentive for good government, was greatly responsible for the maladministration of the states.¹⁴ Cornwallis wrote to Lord Lake: 'From the reports I have received from Residents, I am sorry to find that the States who are intimately connected with us are reduced to the most forlorn condition; that these powers possess no funds or troops on which they can depend, that anarchy and disaffection prevail universally throughout their dominions.' "Wherever the subsidiary system is introduced," wrote Sir Thomas Munro, "the country will soon bear the marks of it, in decaying villages and decreasing population." Sir Henry Lawrence remarked in 1848: "If ever there was a device for insuring mal-government, it is that of a Native Ruler and Minister both relying on foreign bayonnettes and directed by a British Resident. Even when all three are able, virtuous and considerate, still the wheels of government could hardly move smoothly. Each of the three may work incalculable mischief, but no one of them can do good if thwarted by others."¹⁵

The policy of annexation, being applied since the time of Bentinck, was more definitely emphasised during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Auckland. The Court of Directors formally enunciated in 1841 the policy "of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue."¹⁶ This policy reached its culmination under Lord Dalhousie, who in pursuance of what is known as the 'doctrine of lapse' brought the British dominion in India on the verge of a catastrophe. This doctrine meant that, on the failure of natural heirs, the

¹³ *The Native States of India*, p. 153.

¹⁴ Pannikar, *Relations of Indian States*, pp. 28—32.

¹⁵ *Calcutta Review*, 1848. Such views were evidently one of the main bases of the annexation policy in the Punjab (1849).

¹⁶ Quoted in Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, p. 64.

sovereignty of dependent states, or of states created by the British power, lapsed to the paramount power ; it did not also recognise the right of the ruling families of those states to adopt heirs. Lord Dalhousie declared that the British Government " in the exercise of a wise and sound policy is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindu Law. The government is bound, in duty as well as in policy, to act on every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance of good faith."¹⁷ Besides conquest and lapse Dalhousie sometimes applied the maxim of " the good of the governed " for acquiring territories. It is of course true that Dalhousie did not invent the policy of annexation ; the principle had been asserted as early as 1834, being laid down in the instructions of that year of the Court of Directors (whose clearer formulation of it in 1841 has already been noted). But there was certainly a more vigorous application of the principle in the hands of Dalhousie. " There was," writes Mr. Innes, " fully adequate precedent for every one of his annexations. But his predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided ; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of annexing if he could do so legitimately."¹⁸ It has been held that the British Government as the successor of the Mughal Empire in the position of the Paramount Power in India was " entitled to refuse their sanction to an adoption " and to absorb territories. But justified or not, the actual result of the annexations of Dalhousie was that they created a suspicion in the minds of the Indian rulers that their states were in

¹⁷ Lee-Warner, *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*, Vol. II, p. 116.

¹⁸ *A Short History of the British in India*, p. 279.

danger of complete absorption by British Imperialism, and this feeling had its outburst in the Mutiny of 1857—59. An impartial student of history “will not deny that there was abundant reason for uneasiness in the minds of native rulers, and there is much evidence to show that such uneasiness did, as a matter of fact, exist.”¹⁹ Every case of Dalhousie’s annexation with the exception of Karauli in Rajputana received the approval of the Government in England. The reason given for that exception was that Karauli was “a protected ally,” and not a “dependent” state, and the Governor-General declared himself to be “very well content” with this decision.²⁰

We have already described the annexation of the states of Sindh, the Punjab and Burma (with Assam); a brief review of the fate of other important States may now be attempted. Owing to the misgovernment of Raja Krishna Udaiyar and the consequent disorders in Mysore, Bentinck in 1831 pensioned off the Raja and took over its administration, which remained in the hands of the British till 1881. For the same reason was annexed the principality of Cachar on the borders of Assam, and so was Manipur in 1832 at its own request after the death of its ruler without an heir; and the territories of the *raja* of Jaintia to the north-east of Sylhet, who had sacrificed three British Indian subjects to the goddess Kali, were absorbed in 1835 within the British Empire. Virarajendra Wodiar, *raja* of Coorg, was guilty of extravagance and excessive tyranny; he also displayed hostility towards the English and formed a plot to seize the station of Bangalore. The British Government declared war on the *raja* on 15th March, 1834, and the latter eventually surrendered. His country was annexed to the British Empire by a formal proclamation, dated 7th May, 1834, which after reciting “the unanimous wish of the inhabitants of Coorg to be taken under British protection,” assured them “that they shall not again be subjected to Native rule.” The

¹⁹ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

²⁰ Lee-Warner, *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 173.

raja was deported first to Vellore, and then to Benares ; in 1852 Lord Dalhousie permitted him to visit England with his ten-year old daughter, and he died in London about 1863.²¹ In 1842 Lord Auckland annexed the territory of the Nawab of Karnul on suspicion of his disaffection towards the British Government. In 1843 there were troubles in the Maratha state of Gwalior. After the Maratha wars of 1818 Gwalior had been left under Daulat Rao Sindhia as the most powerful military state on the left of the Sutlej. Daulat Rao died in 1827, when his ambitious queen Maharani Baiza Bai had to adopt his kinsman Jankoji, though she herself controlled the government for about six years. The dowager-queen's regency became intolerable to the young Raja, who drove her out from his dominions in 1833. These incidents naturally gave birth to various intrigues and counter-intrigues within the kingdom, which continued for several years and became more intense after Jankoji's death in February 1843. He left behind him a girl-widow of thirteen years named Tara Bai, who, with the concurrence of supporting chiefs and of Lord Ellenborough, adopted Jayaji Rao a boy of eight. But intrigues quickly multiplied, and a dispute arose between two rival parties over the selection of a regent for the boy *raja*. The Gwalior *darbar* was for carrying on the administration as before by a council of ministers ; but Lord Ellenborough insisted on the appointment of one individual as regent. The Rani's choice for the post fell upon Dada Khasgi-wala, while Lord Ellenborough was in favour of Krishna Rao Kadam, the Mama Sahib or the maternal-uncle of the late ruler. Mama Sahib was duly appointed regent of Gwalior much against the expectations of the queen and her advisers, who contrived to bring about his downfall in favour of Dada. Lord Ellenborough broke off diplomatic relations by withdrawing the British Resident from Gwalior. But there was another factor in the situation, which caused British anxiety and led to their armed intervention. It is generally found that

²¹ Smith, *Oxford History*, p. 660. Another and a more famous Indian princess, Rani Jhinde, was already in England at this time.

during civil strifes in a kingdom which has a strong army, the control of affairs soon passes into its hands enabling it to dictate terms to the rival factions.²² The Gwalior army, 40,000 strong, possessed of 200 guns, became the leading factor in the situation. The Governor-General calculated that a combination between the Gwalior troops and the Sikh army, which after the assassination of Sher Singh had assumed a threatening attitude, would prove to be a serious danger for the British Empire in India. He, therefore, made up his mind to avert the crisis by armed intervention in time. He came to Agra on 11th December, 1843, and a British force under the command of Sir Hugh Gough advanced to Gwalior. This was regarded by the Gwalior troops as tantamount to a declaration of war and they became determined to fight the interveners. But they were defeated in two engagements, viz., at Maharajpur by a contingent under Sir Hugh Gough and at Panniar by a corps under General Grey. A new arrangement was now made with the Gwalior State. It was not of course annexed, but its independence practically disappeared, and it became definitely a protected state. A council of regency was appointed to govern the kingdom during the *maharaja's* minority, and it had to act according to the advice of the British Resident. The army was reduced from 40,000 to 9,000 men, and a British contingent of 10,000 was subsidized. It should be noted that during the days of the Mutiny, the Sindhia and the native army under his able minister Dinkar Rao remained loyal to the British cause, while the British Indian contingent joined the revolt and murdered its English officers.

So early as 1834 the Court of Directors had remarked about certain princely adoptions: "Wherever it is optional with you to give or to withhold your consent to adoptions, the indulgence should be the exception and not the rule, and should never be granted but as a special mark of approbation." The doctrine of lapse had been applied to certain states before

²² Compare England during the Civil War and the rise of Cromwell, and the Punjab of the Ranjit in the same time.

Dalhousie, e.g., to Mandavi in 1839, to Kolaba and Jalaun in 1840, and to Surat in 1842. The states that passed under British sway in Dalhousie's time by this doctrine were,—Satara in 1848, Jaitpur and Sambalpur in 1850, Baghat in 1850, Udaipur in 1852, Jhansi in 1853 and Nagpur in 1854. Dalhousie stated his position thus: "In states owing their origin to our grant or gift, if heirs fail, according to the terms of our grant we annex." So far as the state of Satara was concerned, it had been bestowed by Lord Hastings on a representative of the House of Shivaji after the fall of the Peshwa in 1819. The kingdom of Satara was in this sense created by the British Government. In 1839 the Raja was deposed on a charge of misgovernment and was replaced by his brother. The latter had no son and just before his death in 1848 he adopted a son without the knowledge of the Governor-General or the British Resident. Lord Dalhousie and almost all the leading British officials in India held that the adoption by the late *raja* of Satara, in the absence of any sanction of the British Government, could not be held to be valid, and that the state therefore lapsed to the sovereign power. The Court of Directors also supported his action by saying: "We are fully satisfied that by the general law and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Satara, cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the Paramount Power; that we are under no pledge, direct or constructive, to give such consent; and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it." Like Satara, Nagpur had fallen into the hands of the British in 1818. But Lord Hastings reinstated a member of the royal house as Raja over a shorn principality. The Raja died in 1853; no lineal descendant in the male line survived, nor had he adopted any heir. It was therefore annexed, though many of Dalhousie's advisers, especially Colonel Lowe, were against him. In a long Minute, dated 28th January, 1854, Dalhousie justified the annexation of Nagpur state as being of British creation. But even Lee-Warner, an avowed apologist of Dalhousie, has expressed the opinion

that in the case of Satara and Nagpur, "imperial considerations weighed with him. . . they were placed right across the main lines of communication between Bombay and Madras, and Bombay and Calcutta. Consolidation was therefore to be secured by their annexation."²³ There is no doubt that the annexation of Nagpur gave solid political and economic advantages to the British power. A tableland, 80,000 square miles in area with a population of 4,000,000, gave the English, along with other obvious resources, some of the finest cotton lands and the control of the land route from Calcutta to Bombay. Different opinions have been expressed about Dalhousie's disposal of the Nagpur state funds and treasures. Kaye, in his *Sepoy War*, speaks of the "spoilation of the palace" and remarks that the "gain of money is not worth the loss of character." This at least is true that it "was a tactless blunder and that might well have been avoided."²⁴

Jhansi was a district of Bundelkhand ceded to the English by the Peshwa in 1817, when Lord Hastings placed Rao Ramchand as hereditary ruler of the state on terms of "subordinate cooperation." He died childless in 1835, when a son adopted by him on death-bed without sanction of the British Government was set aside, and his uncle Raghunath Rao was given the succession. The new *raja* died in 1838, when the British placed his brother Gangadhar Rao on the throne. The last king died in November 1853 leaving no issue but an unrecognised adopted son. This gave Lord Dalhousie the opportunity to annex it. "The dependent nature of Jhansi," he declared "does not admit of dispute." Dalhousie's similar action with regard to Baghat and Udaipur was reversed by Lord Canning. Sambalpur (in Orissa), the suzerainty over which passed from the Bhonsles to the British between 1818—26, was annexed to the British dominions in 1850²⁵ on the death of its ruler Narayan

²³ *The Native States of India*, p. 152.

²⁴ Roberts, *Op. cit.*, p. 353.

²⁵ *Vide* R. D. Banerjee, *History of Orissa*, pp. 289, 306.

Singh without any heir, since the state was created or restored by the British. A part of Sikkim, about 1676 square miles (forming the Darjeeling District), was taken over in 1850 as a penalty for its raja's seizing the representative of the British Government and ill-treating two British subjects. The Nizam of Hyderabad stood heavily indebted to the Company for his failure to pay regularly the stipulated sum for the maintenance of a British contingent in his state. An agreement was concluded with him in May 1853, by which the British Government obtained the cotton-growing province of Berar in lieu of the subsidy.²⁶

As a corollary to this principle of lapse to the paramount power, Dalhousie swept away the titles and pensions of some of the native rulers on the ground that "appearances without the reality of authority were sure to shake Native confidence in our good faith."²⁷ On the death of the Nawab of Carnatic in 1853, Lord Dalhousie agreed with Lord Harris, Governor of Madras from 1854—59, not to recognise any successor to the Carnatic Nawab. However, in 1867 a pension and the title of Prince of Arcot was granted to Azam Jah, the claimant to the Nawabship. Shivaji, the raja of Tanjore, died in October 1855, leaving behind him only two daughters and sixteen widows but no son or collateral male heir. On this Dalhousie decided that the rajaship in Tanjore had "come to a natural end" and abolished it. His proposal to abolish the title of the Mughal Emperor at Delhi was thwarted by the Court of Directors, and so the shadow lingered for a little while more. On the death of Baji Rao II, the ex-Peshwa, Dalhousie refused to continue the pension of eight hundred thousand rupees (which Sir John Malcolm had granted) to his adopted son Dundu Pant, better known as Nana Saheb. Kaye has regarded this action as "harsh," and Arnold has described it as "grasping."

²⁶ Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 93. The economic significance of this step has already been noted.

²⁷ Lee-Warner, *Lord Dalhousie*, Vol. II, p. 134.

Dalhousie's argument was that the pension granted to Baji Rao II was a personal one and could not pass on to his successor.

Oudh was annexed not on the ground of lapse or escheat but misgovernment. Since the treaty of 1801 the administration of the country had gone from bad to worse to the great suffering of the people. Several Governors-General had warned the rulers of Oudh but did not try to remove the fundamental defect in the administration created by the subsidiary system under which the King could do anything and everything under the guarantee of British protection. Lord William Bentinck wrote to the King of Oudh in April 1831, that if there was no improvement he would be "transmuted into a pensioner of state." In 1837 Lord Auckland concluded a treaty with the ruler of Oudh, by which, among other terms, it was provided that he must introduce reforms in the administration or hand it over to the British officers while nominally retaining the sovereignty. The Court of Directors abrogated this treaty, but Lord Auckland informed the King of Oudh of the disallowance of one clause only and not of the other provisions of the treaty, and somehow or other "the treaty was actually included in a subsequent government publication and was referred to as still in force by succeeding Governors-General." In 1847 Lord Hardinge warned him that if he delayed in introducing reforms then he would "incur the risk of forcing the British to assume the government of Oudh."²⁸ Colonel Sleeman, Resident in Oudh from 1848—54, and his successor Colonel Outram, both of whom were opposed to unnecessary interference with Indian rulers, reported about the deplorable condition of Oudh. Some solution had, of course, become necessary. Lord Dalhousie wanted to take over the administration of the country by allowing the king to retain a nominal sovereignty, and he was not personally in favour of complete annexation. In his Minute, dated 18th June, 1855, he wrote: "The reform of the adminis-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 312.

tration of the province may be brought, and the prosperity of the people may be secured, without resorting to so extreme a measure as the annexation of the territory, and the abolition of the throne. I, for my part, therefore, do not advise that the province of Oudh should be declared to be British territory."²⁹ But he was overruled by the Court of Directors, who decided on annexation. Outram tried to induce the King of Oudh to abdicate ; but the King, with tears in his eyes,³⁰ refused, on 7th February, 1856, to sign the treaty of abdication. At this Outram published the proclamation of annexation on 13th February, 1856. Wagid Ali Shah, the last Nawab of Oudh, was then deported to Calcutta and was allowed a pension of twelve lacs a year.

The annexation of Oudh was certainly an unpleasant episode, and it was " frankly a question of territorial aggrandisement."³¹ Lord Dalhousie himself wrote to Sir George Couper on 15th December, 1855 : " The course proposed by the Court (of Directors) is not warranted by international law. It would be either conquest or usurpation of the power of government by force of arms."³² There was of course misgovernment in Oudh, but the Company itself was greatly responsible for this.³³ Sir Henry Lawrence remarked : " The facts furnished by every writer on Oudh affairs, all testify to the same point, that British interference with that province has been as prejudicial to its court and people as it has been disgraceful to British name." To quote the words of Col. Sutherland, an able and temperate writer, " there is no state in India with whose government we (the East India Company) have interfered so systematically and so uselessly as with that of

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 322.

³⁰ It is however difficult to sympathise with the tears of most of the Indian rulers of the transition period.

³¹ Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, p. 66.

³² Quoted in *Cambridge History*, Vol. V, p. 585.

³³ Innes, *Op. cit.*, p. 284.

Oude.”³⁴ The Court of Directors ought to have considered that the ruling family of Oudh with all its vices had remained loyal to the British Government and had “always done their best to help in the hour of need.” Moreover, the Nawab of Oudh could very well say that the annexation was a violation of an old treaty, because he had never been informed that the Court of Directors had disallowed Auckland’s treaty of 1837. There is no wonder, therefore, that the annexation of Oudh was regarded as a “gross breach of national faith.” Sleeman who thought it to be a political blunder, said that it would “cause our good name to suffer,” and that “good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes.”

On the other hand, some states like Khairpur in 1832, Bahawalpur in 1833, Kashmir in 1846, and Jind just before Dalhousie’s appointment, received assurances that the internal administration of their countries should be left to their rulers. It is to be noted in this connection that the policy of the Company towards the Indian states from the time of Lord Hastings till the arrival of Canning was “chaotic, indefinite and contradictory.”³⁵ “The authorities of the Company were wavering with every passing fancy as to whether the rulers were *zamindars*, feudatories, tributaries or independent sovereigns; and each Governor-General and each Resident held and enforced his own views.”³⁶ At one time they interfered in minute affairs of administration and at another allowed the ruler to act as he liked. “The position in 1858,” remarks Prof. Dodwell, “was therefore exceedingly indefinite. Beside the rights vested by treaty in the Company, there had arisen, under no sanction but that of superior power on the one side and reluctant acquiescence on the other, a body of precedents relating to successions and to interference in the internal administration of the states. Together these constituted the Company’s paramountcy,—un-

³⁴ Quoted in Pannikar, *Policy Towards States*, pp. 66-67.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

defined, undefinable, but always tending to expand under the strong pressure of political circumstances. . . . The princes who in the eighteenth century had been *de facto* sovereigns but *de jure* dependents, had become *de facto* dependents, though possessing treaties many of which recognised them as *de jure* sovereigns.”³⁷

Many of the Indian states, as we have already noted, rendered valuable services to the Company during the Mutiny, for which they were rewarded with honorary titles and pecuniary or territorial concessions. But even after the change of government in 1858 the old treaties “ were confirmed *en bloc* ;” and so the ambiguities in the position of these states were not removed. Nevertheless the direct assumption of sovereignty by the Crown ushered in a new policy of the Government of India towards the Indian States. The Company’s policy of annexation was reversed. “ We desire,” said the Queen’s proclamation of 1858, “ no extension of our present territorial possessions, and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others.” Lord Canning issued a number of *sanads*, commonly known as “ adoption *sanads*,” about 140 in all, in two forms, one for the Hindu and the other for the Muhammadan states. The first recognised the right of the Hindu chiefs to adoption on failure of natural heirs, and the second recognised any succession that may be “ legitimate according to Muhammadan law.” But this did not mean that the States became entirely free in the matter of succession ; every succession still required the consent of the Government of India. “ The succession to a Native State,” it noted in 1884, “ is invalid until it receives in some form the sanction of the British authorities.” Again in 1891, the Secretary of State wrote : “ Every succession must be recognised by the British Government, and no succession is valid until recognition has been given.”

³⁷ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 492.

From foreign and independent units of undefined status the States became transformed after 1858 into protected feudatories of the Crown of England, and they were to be regarded henceforth as parts of a *single charge*, "as partners with the Government of India, not only in the defence of the Empire and in the output of its foreign treaties and its international activity, but also in the material and moral progress of the united country."³⁸ The freedom from annexation was not purchased without a price; it was followed by 'ever-growing closeness of control' (from Canning to Curzon) of the Government of India as the paramount power. If the new policy, writes Mr. Pannikar, "definitely put a stop to annexations, it introduced in its stead rule by loaned officers, by nominated *dewans*, and strict control through the Residents. The attempt was to aggrandise not the *territories* but the *power* of the Central Government, and to make the Indian States integral portions of the Indian policy."³⁹ Certain obligations have devolved on the States through the exercise of the Crown's prerogatives in the matter settling precedence and granting honours, in recognising successions, assuming the guardianship of minor princes, in sanctioning the acceptance of foreign orders, and in granting passports and recognising or appointing consular officers.⁴⁰

The paramourcy of the Crown over the Indian States began to be asserted in clear terms soon after the Mutiny. "There is a reality," wrote Canning in his *Despatch*, dated 30th April, 1860, "in the suzerainty of the sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt but is eagerly acknowledged by the chiefs."⁴¹ This dependent character of

³⁸ Lee-Warner, *Native States of India*, p. 160.

³⁹ Relations of Indian States with the Government of India, p. 37.

⁴⁰ Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India*, Chap. XI.

⁴¹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 317. It should be noted here that after the disappearance of the last Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah II the claims of the *Mughals* did not come down to the Crown of England. By the Act of 1858 the Crown got *only* those rights which the Company had possessed, and it was specially laid down that "all treaties made by the Company shall be

the States was emphasised by different viceroys. The visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (afterwards King Edward VII) to India in 1875, which was welcomed with eager demonstrations by the States, was followed by the great Delhi Durbar arranged by Lytton in 1876, when Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India. Students of history will note that this was the age of Disraelian imperialism ; and the two events noted above marked the extension of its spirit over India. Later on Lords Curzon and Hardinge (II) continued this, policy of strengthening the Imperial idea by holding magnificent Durbars.

In some cases, the Paramount Power has had " to make decisions and exercise the functions of paramountcy beyond the terms of the treaties in accordance with changing political, social and economic conditions."⁴² Its interference in the internal affairs of the States has also increased through various new developments, such as the construction of railways and telegraph lines (and latterly telephone, radio and aerial services), and growth of the public press, extension of free trade, etc. Lord Chelmsford declared in his speech to the Princes' Conference : " There is no doubt that, with the growth of new conditions and the unification of India under the British Power, political doctrines have constantly developed. In the case of extra-territorial jurisdiction, railway and telegraph construction, limitation of armaments, coinage, currency, and opium policy and the administration of cantonments,—to give some of the more salient instances,—the relations between the States and Imperial Government have been changed. The change, however, has come about in the interests of India as a whole. . . . We cannot deny, however, that the treaty position has been affected, and that a body of usages, in some cases arbitrary

binding on Her Majesty. " The claim of inheritance of Mughal authority," writes Mr. Pannikar, " is a phantasmagoric fancy of imaginative officers, and it has nothing to support it in law or history."

⁴² *Buller Committee's Report*, p. 14.

but always benevolent, has come into being."⁴³ The necessity of ensuring good government to the people has also served as a ground for interference. This is well illustrated by Lord Ripon's 'Instrument of Transfer,'—a document of considerable importance in the history of the States, in which Ripon laid down the conditions under which he restored Mysore to its Maharaja in 1881.⁴⁴ It provided that no succession shall be valid until it has been recognised by the Governor-General-in-Council, "that the Maharaja shall at all times remain faithful in allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty"; that the Maharaja "shall not, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council, build any new fortresses or strongholds, or repair the defences of any existing fortresses or strongholds in the said territories"; that he "shall not without the permission of the Governor-General-in-Council, import or permit to be imported into the said territories arms, ammunition or military stores, and shall prohibit the manufacture of arms, ammunition, and military stores throughout the said territories, or at any specified place therein, whenever required by the Governor-General to do so"; that "the military force employed in the Mysore state. . . shall not exceed the strength which the Governor-General-in-Council may from time to time fix"; that "the coins of the Government of India shall be legal tender in the said territories. . . The separate coinage of the Mysore state, which has long been discontinued, shall not be revived." Articles 14 and 15 provided for the free grant of all lands required by the Government of India for the construction of railway and telegraph lines, and article 18 laid down that the Maharaja of Mysore shall comply with the wishes of the Governor-General-in-Council "in the matter of prohibiting or limiting the manufacture of salt and opium, and the cultivation of

⁴³ Lord Chelmsford's *Speeches*, Vol. II, p. 278.

⁴⁴ The document may be consulted in Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India*, pp. 174—79; Mukherjee, *Indian Constitutional Documents*, Vol. I, pp. 575—80; Aitchison, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 231.

poppy, in Mysore ; also in the matter of giving effect to all such regulations as may be considered proper in respect to the export and import of salt, opium, and poppy-heads."

Among several cases, three may be noted here as examples of the Paramount Power's right to intervene ; the Baroda case (1873—75), the Manipur case (1891-92) and the Hyderabad case (1926). In 1873, Malhar Rao, the Gaekwar of Baroda was charged with misgovernment of his kingdom, and a commission of enquiry was appointed by the Government of India to enquire into the facts. He was required to improve the state of his administration. In the following year he was charged with an attempt to poison the British Resident at Baroda, who was himself "a man wanting in acuteness and in tact, who certainly made matters much more difficult for the Gaekwar than he need have done."⁴⁵ The Gaekwar was arrested on 13th January, 1875, and was placed for trial before a new commission consisting of the Chief Justice of Bengal, another judge, one high political officer, two ruling princes,—Sindhia and Jaipur,—and Sir Dinkar Rao. The Indian Section of the Commission found the Gaekwar 'not guilty.' But the Government of India deposed him on the charge of misgovernment, and declared his heirs precluded from succession. A child member of the family named Sayaji Rao was installed in his place, and the administration of the state was placed under a council of regency with Sir T. Madhava Rao at its head. The arrest and trial of an Indian Prince was certainly an unprecedented procedure, and the question as to how far such interference was justified by treaties has been very much disputed. "What is notable here as elsewhere," remarks Prof. Dodwell, "is a deplorable laxity in regard to treaties. Sometimes they were to be enforced up to the very limit of constructive interpretation ; sometimes (though rarely) government chose not to exercise its full rights and allowed its agents to use language quite at variance with the fundamental facts, thus greatly, need-

⁴⁵ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 499.

lessly, unwisely, increasing the ambiguous position of the princes and multiplying the occasions of misunderstanding."

The Manipur rebellion of 1891 drew the intervention of the Government of India. The State was not annexed. The old ruler Sur Chandra Singh was deposed as unfit to rule; the Senapati, the younger brother of the king, was hanged for murdering the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and the state was given to a boy Raja, who was placed under a British Political Agent. The Manipur case led to the enunciation of certain important principles, such as (1) "the assertion of the Government of India's right to settle successions, and to intervene in case of rebellion against a chief"; (2) "the doctrine that resistance (in a native state) to Imperial orders constitutes rebellion"; (3) "the right of the Paramount Power to inflict capital punishment on those who had put to death its agents while discharging the lawful duty imposed upon them," (4) "the repudiation by the Government of India of the application of International Law to the protected States" (*India Gazette*, 21st August, 1891). In fact, the States have no real international status. Prof. Westlake points out that "their position has been imperceptibly shifted from an International to an Imperial basis."

The Hyderabad case (1926) also led to an authoritative pronouncement by the Government of India about its right to intervene in the internal affairs of the States. His Excellency Lord Reading pointed out to His Exalted Highness the Nizam that "the right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown. The British Government have indeed shown again and again that they have no desire to exercise this right without grave reason. But the internal, no less than the external, security which the Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the protecting power of the British Government, and where Imperial interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the people of a State is seriously and grievously affected by the

action of its government, it is with the Paramount Power that the ultimate responsibility of taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy are all subject to the due exercise by the Paramount Power of this responsibility."⁴⁶

During Lord Curzon's viceroyalty we find a great insistence by the Foreign Department of the Government of India on the maintenance of administrative efficiency in the States. "The Native Chief," said Lord Curzon in his Gwalior speech in 1899, "has become by our policy an integral factor in the imperial organisation of India. He is concerned not less than the viceroy or the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the country. I claim him as my colleague and partner. He cannot remain vis-à-vis of the empire a loyal subject of her Majesty the Queen Empress, and vis-à-vis of his own people a frivolous or irresponsible despot. He must justify and not abuse the authority committed to him; he must be the servant as well as the master of his people." There was also a marked desire to tighten Imperial control, and to "ignore treaty stipulations where important considerations were deemed to be at stake." Curzon pronounced in his Bahawalpur speech in 1903 that the ties between the Indian Princes and the British Crown "have no parallel in any other country of the world. The political system of India is neither feudalism nor federation;⁴⁷ it is embodied in no constitution; it does not always rest upon a treaty; it bears no resemblance to a league. It represents a series of relationships that have grown up between the Crown and the Indian princes under widely differing historical conditions, but which in process of time have gradually conformed to a single type." He established the Imperial Cadet Corps for giving military training to the sons of the Indian Princes. In 1902 he obtained from the Nizam a lease of the Assigned Districts of Berar *in perpetuity* at an annual rent of £168,000.

⁴⁶ Quoted *in extenso* in *Butler Committee's Report*, Appendix II.

⁴⁷ Thirty years later, the Indian political system is, however, drifting towards a federation ideal.

Towards the end of Lord Curzon's administration, his somewhat "exacting demands" and his regulations restricting the Princes' visit to Europe began to be opposed by them. But this was also a time when the Viceroy's plan of partitioning Bengal had created political unrest in India, for combating which the Government of India "looked round naturally for allies and helpers."⁴⁸ The Indian Princes had actively helped them in suppressing the Mutiny of 1857, and it was now thought that "they were therefore to be cultivated rather than coerced."⁴⁸ This consideration brought a change in the policy and attitude of the Government of India towards the Indian States. Lord Minto declared in his Udaipur speech on 3rd November, 1909: "I have . . . made it a rule to avoid as far as possible the issue of general instructions, and have endeavoured to deal with questions as they arose from reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, local conditions, antecedent circumstances and the particular stage of development, feudal and constitutional, of individual principalities." But he did not forget to emphasise the paramountcy of the Crown, as he also said that the "imperial government has assumed a certain degree of responsibility for the general soundness of (the princes') administration and would not consent to incur the reproach of being an indirect instrument of misrule." On the occasion of investing the Maharaja of Jodhpur with ruling powers, on 26th February, 1916, Lord Hardinge described the Indian Princes as "helpers and colleagues in the great task of Imperial rule."⁴⁹

This new policy was manifested in two measures, which had, however, their beginnings in the pre-Curzon era. One was the further development of the Imperial service troops, the formation of which dates from the administration of Lord Dufferin (1884—88). These troops, maintained and controlled by the Indian States, were trained by British officials lent for

⁴⁸ *Cambridge History*, Vol. VI, p. 506.

⁴⁹ Mukherjee, *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 592.

the purpose, and they were not under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief except when on active service. These troops have rendered valuable services for Imperial defence especially during the World War;⁵⁰ they were first employed in the Hunza campaign of 1893, and Lord Curzon was the first to utilise them for service outside India.

The other measure meant the "abandonment of the century-old policy of the isolation of individual states." It was Lord Lytton who first thought of constituting an Indian Privy Council comprising some of the great Princes of India, who were to consult with the Governor-General on questions of common interest. But the proposal bore no fruit owing to the opposition of the authorities in England, and only some of the leading Princes received the empty title, 'Councillors of the Empress.'⁵¹ Lord Curzon's plan for a Council of Ruling Princes and Lord Minto's schemes first for an Imperial Advisory Council and then for an Imperial Council of Ruling Princes also led to no tangible results. But the utility of this policy was generally realised during and after the Great War, and Lord Hardinge "initiated conferences with the Ruling Princes on matters of imperial interest and on matters affecting the states as a whole."⁵² Lord Chelmsford "carried the system of conferences further by utilising them for the purpose of discussing general questions affecting the states as a whole."⁵³ The Montagu-Chelmsford Report made a definite recommendation in this matter: "We wish to call into existence a permanent consultative body. There are questions which affect the states generally and other questions which are of concern either to the Empire as a whole or to British India and the States in common, upon which we conceive the opinion of such a body

⁵⁰ *Montagu-Chelmsford Report*, para 298.

⁵¹ Lady Betty Balfour, *Lytton's Indian Administration*, p. 111; *M. C. Report*, para 301.

⁵² *Butler Committee's Report*, p. 20.

⁵³ *M. C. Report*, para 301.

would be of the utmost value . . . Any member of the Council or the Council as a whole might request the Viceroy to include in its agenda any subject on which discussion is desired . . . The direct transaction of business between the Government and any State would of course not be affected by the institution of the council."⁵⁴ The Report also recommended that "political practice should be codified and standardised ; that Commission of Enquiry and Courts of Arbitration should be instituted ; that a line of demarcation should be drawn between rulers enjoying full powers and those who do not ; that all important states should be placed in direct political relations with the Government of India ; and that machinery should be set up for joint deliberation on matters of common interest to British India and the Indian States." The Chamber of Princes was accordingly set up by the Crown by Royal Proclamation on 8th February, 1921, which runs as follow : " My Viceroy will take its counsel freely in matters relating to the territories of Indian states generally and in matters that affect these territories jointly with British India or with the rest of my Empire. It will have no concern with the internal affairs of individual states or their rulers or with the relations of individual states with my Government while the existing rights of these states and their freedom of action will in no way be prejudiced or impaired." The Chamber of Princes contains, in the first place, 108 Rulers of States ' who are members in their own right,' and, in the second place, of twelve additional members elected by the rulers of 127 other states not included in the above group. The Viceroy is the President of the Chamber and annually a Chancellor and a Pro-Chancellor are elected from among the members. Its Standing Committee advises the Viceroy on matters referred to the Committee by him, and " proposes for his consideration other questions affecting Indian States generally or which are of concern either to the States as a whole or to British India and the States in common." The Chamber of

⁵⁴ Para 306.

Princes "is a deliberative, consultative and advisory body, but not an executive body."⁵⁵ Two important provisions in its composition should be carefully noted: (1) "Treaties and internal affairs of individual states, rights and interests, dignities and powers, privileges and prerogatives of individual Princes and Chiefs, their estates and the members of their families and the actions of individual Rulers shall not be discussed in the Chamber"; (2) "The institution of the Chamber shall not prejudice in any way the engagements or the relations of any State with the Viceroy or Governor-General (including the right of direct correspondence), nor shall any recommendation of the Chamber in any way prejudice the rights or restrict the freedom of action of any state." The constitution of the Chamber is an event of great significance, in the sense that it has marked a departure from the old policy of isolation, and "the princes have gained a new position as Indian and imperial personalities who have collectively a right to be consulted on matters affecting policy and whose voice naturally carries great weight. They have been, in fact, collectively recognised as an independent constituent of the Empire."⁵⁶

The proposals for the future constitutional reforms in India have led the Crown, the States and the people of British India to study the position and rights of the Indian States with a view to fit them suitably in the new form of government. The Indian States Committee, usually known as the Butler Committee from the name of its Chairman Sir Harcourt Butler, was appointed in December 1927, to enquire into the relationship between the Government of India and the Indian States, "to enquire into the financial and economic relations between British India and the States, and to make any recommendations that the Committee may consider desirable or necessary for their most satisfactory adjustment."⁵⁷ Of about 600 States the Committee visited only 15, took evidence from 48 witnesses and received

⁵⁵ *Simon Commission's Report*, Vol. I, p. 90.

⁵⁶ Pannikar, *Relations of Indian States*, p. 148.

⁵⁷ *Butler Committee's Report*, p. 5.

70 answers from different States to their questionnaire. The Committee classified the Indian States in the following table :—

Class of States, Estate, etc.	Number.	Area in square miles.	Population.	Revenue in crores of rupees.
I. States the rulers of which are members of their Chamber of Princes in their own right.	108	514,886	59,847,186	42·16
II. States the rulers of which are represented in the Chamber of Princes by twelve members of their own elected by themselves.	127	76,846	8,004,114	2·89
III. Estates, Jagirs and others.	327	6,406	801,674	·74

The main recommendations of the Report are that (1) the Viceroy, and not the Governor-General-in-Council as at present, is to be the Crown's agent in dealing with the States, (2) the relationship between the Crown and the Princes is not to be transferred, without the agreement of the Princes, to a new Government in British India responsible to a Legislature, (3) the scheme for the constitution of a States Council of six including three Princes is to be rejected, (4) intervention in the administration of a state is to be left to the Viceroy's decision, (5) special committees are to be appointed to enquire into disputes that may arise between States and British India, (6) a committee is to be appointed to enquire into the financial relations between British India and the States, (7) there should be separate recruitment and training of political officers, forming a special service of their own, drawn from the universities in England.

The Committee's recommendations have been criticised in various ways. It has been pointed out that the direct-relation theory is historically unsound, as the relations of the States were first established with the East India Company, its Governor-General, its Governor-General-in-Council, and even with its military or political officers, and not with the sovereign of England; later on the Crown roundly assumed the sovereignty of British India from the Company and also the widely differing relations and obligations of the Company with the several States; there were no fresh defining treaties entered into by the Crown with them; only their non-absorption and *status quo ante* was guaranteed for the time being. It has been further pointed out that this theory is a positive permanent barrier to the possible union of the Indian States and British India. Sir M. Visvesvaraya, a former Dewan of Mysore and a strong believer in a federal constitution evolved through a coalition of Indian States with British India, has remarked that in the Butler Committee's Report "here is no hint of a future for the Indian States' people. Their proposals are unsympathetic, unhistorical, hardly constitutional or legal There is no modern conception in their outlook, certainly nothing to inspire trust or hope." In presiding over the Indian States Subjects' Conference held at Bombay in May 1929, Mr. C. Y. Chintamani said that "the Butler Committee was bad in origin, bad in the time chosen for its appointment, bad in its terms of reference, bad in its personnel and bad in its line of enquiry while its report is bad in its reasoning and bad in its conclusions." In a letter addressed to the *Manchester Guardian*, Mr. P. L. Chudgar, a member of the Indian States People's Delegation, wrote: "The Butler Committee's Report virtually leaves the position the same as before. While clearing up much misunderstanding it furnished a basis for further enquiry, *inter alia* into the following questions: (1) the position of the States of classes one and two in the future constitution of India, (2) the future of the position of the States of class three, (3) the desirability of defining precisely the circumstances under which the

powers of intervention mentioned in paragraphs 40 and 50 of the report can effectively be invoked, and the provision of a proper procedure thereof."

The Indian Statutory Commission rightly held that the proposed federal constitution of India cannot be evolved by ignoring the Indian States, who would be also influenced by the new constitution. His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner in his statement made after reading the Viceroy's announcement of October 31, 1929, said that the Princes "have openly given expression to the belief that the ultimate solution of the Indian problem and the ultimate goal—whenever circumstances are favourable and the time is ripe for it—is Federation, which word has no terrors for the Princes and Governments of the States." The Statutory Commission made three concrete proposals: (1) drawing up of a list of 'matters of common interest,' (2) inclusion, in the Preamble to any new Government of India Act, of a "recital which would put on record the desire to develop that closer association between the Indian States and British India which is the motive force behind all discussions of an eventual Federal Union," (3) the "creation and setting up of a standing consultative body containing representatives both from British India and the Indian States with powers of discussion and of reaching and recording deliberative results on topics falling within the list of matters of common concern." The Princes and the representatives of the Indian States of course attended the Round Table Conferences and made speeches sympathetic to the idea of a Federation for all India, but it is also clear from their deliberations that the problem of creating a Federal Constitution comprising British India and the Indian States is a very intricate one. The Government of India Act, 1935 provides that the accession of the States to the proposed federation for India is voluntary. This accession will be effected by the King's acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by the ruler personally whereby he for himself, his heirs and successors, declares that he accedes to the federation with the intent that the King,

the Governor-General, the federal legislature, the federal court, and any other federal authority shall, by virtue of his instrument of accession, but subject always to the terms thereof and for the purposes of the federation, exercise in relation to his state such functions as may be rested in them by or under the Act, and assumes the obligation that due effect is given within his state to the provisions of the Act, so far as applicable under the instrument."

DYNASTIC LISTS

TABLE 1

THE HOLKAR FAMILY




TABLE 2

THE SINDHIA FAMILY




TABLE 3

RANJIT'S FAMILY

BUDH SINGH

(founder of the Sukarchakia confederacy)
[d. 1718]




TABLE 4

DURRANI SHAHS

AHMAD SHAH, DURRANI (1747—73)

Timur Shah (1773—93)

Zaman Shah (1793—1800)

Mahmud Shah (1800—1803)

Shah Shuja (1803—1809)

Mahmud Shah (restored 1809)

TABLE 5

BARAKZAI WAZIRS

JAMAL KHAN, BARAKZAI (1747—73)

Payenda Khan (1773—1800)

Fateh Khan (1800—1803)

Dost Muhammad Khan (Amir of Kabul, 1826)

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